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Abstract
The research problem addressed in this dissertation is to develop a theory of collective communication.
Collective communication is defined as social interaction mediated through messages whose production
involves a collectivity. The focus of analysis is on social choice messages, messages that prescribe or
proscribe the behavior of members of that collectivity. The theory developed here is used to describe the
social choice messages necessary to realize common interests in specific economic environments and
the collective communication systems necessary to communicate those messages in those
environments.
The theory of collective communication is developed in four steps. First, a mathematical theory of
collective communication is derived from the unification of game theory and information theory. Building
upon the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Shannon, Ashby and Conant, philosophical foundations
are established and nineteen theorems are derived to predict the transmission of information in a basic
game and in a metagame whose outcomes describe constraints to be imposed upon strategic behavior in
the basic game.
Second, this mathematical theory is formally interpreted as a social theory of collective communication.
Third, these theorems are applied to a variety of political and social problems, including those of common
property resource management, market failure, the provision of public goods, collective action and
coordinated action.
Finally, the empirical validity of this theory is tested against research on the development of property
rights. The set of regulations and statutes governing mining activity in Nevada between 1858 and 1895 is
studied using the techniques of content analysis and multiple linear regression analysis. The predicted
relationship between the precision of mining law and the value of mine output is found to be strong, with
R squares as high as 0.82347. The research instrument is determined to be reliable and the findings to be
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The evidence presented here is limited but sufficient to motivate the continued development of a unified
theory of information and games and the use of mathematical modeling to study salient social problems
in the collective communication of social choice messages.
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ABSTRACT

THE COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE MESSAGES
THOMAS WICKENDEN
KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF

The research problem addressed in this dissertation is
to develop a theory of collective communication.

Collective

communication is defined as social interaction mediated
through messages whose production involves a collectivity.
The focus of analysis is on social choice messages, messages
that prescribe or proscribe the behavior of members of that
collectivity.

The theory developed here is used to describe

the social choice messages necessary to realize common
interests in specific economic environments and the
collective communication systems necessary to communicate
those messages in those environments.

The theory of collective communication is developed in
four steps.

First, a mathematical theory of collective

communication is derived from the unification of game theory
and information theory.

Building upon the work of von

Neumann and Morgenstern, Shannon, Ashby and Conant,
philosophical foundations are established and nineteen
theorems are derived to predict the transmission of
information in a basic game and in a metagame whose outcomes
-iv-

describe constraints to be imposed upon strategic behavior
in the basic game.

Second, this mathematical theory is formally
interpreted as a social theory of collective communication.
Third, these theorems are applied to a variety of political
and social problems, including those of common property
resource management, market failure, the provision of public
goods, collective action and coordinated action.

Finally, the empirical validity of this theory is
tested against research on the development of property
rights.

The set of regulations and statutes governing

mining activity in Nevada between 1858 and 1895 is studied
using the techniques of content analysis and multiple linear
regression analysis.

The predicted relationship between the

precision of mining law and the value of mine output is
found to be strong, withR squares as high as 0.82347.

The

research instrument is determined to be reliable and the
findings to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

The evidence presented here is limited but sufficient
to motivate the continued development of a unified theory of
information and games and the use of mathematical modeling
to study salient social problems in the collective
communication of social choice messages.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation describes the building and testing
of a theory concerning the collective communication of
social choice messages.

The theory is constructed by means

of mathematical modeling, and its validity is tested by
means of empirical research.

In this introduction

collective communication will be defined, and the
relationship between collective communication and social
choice will be described.

At the same time the significance

of the topic will be suggested, and the legitimacy of this
dissertation as an example of communications research will
be argued.

The research problem addressed in this

dissertation will then be specified, the appropriateness of
mathematical modeling as a method of theory-building in this
area will be demonstrated, and the steps to be taken in the
research process will be outlined along with the structure
of the dissertation itself.
Collective Communication
To define the term "collective communication" is problematic because there is no commonly accepted definition of
-1-

-2-

the term "communication."

Definitions of the latter range

from a general consideration of relations which transverse
all conceivable media to a specific concern with symbolic
messages through which only a particular subset of relations
is mediated.

Although the mathematical theory upon which

this dissertation is based is open to interpretations which
encompass the entire range of definitions, the approach
taken here will be to interpret this mathematical theory in
terms of a definition which restricts the meaning of
"communication" and, hence, of "collective communication" to
a relatively narrow set of phenomena.

The resulting

analysis should, thus, be commensurate with the most limited
approach to communications and, at the same time, subsumable
within any of the more general conceptualizations of the
field.
"Communication" will be defined here as "social interaction through messages. ,,1

"Interaction" is taken to mean

coordination, cooperation, covariation, correlation or any
other type of association or relation existing between the
actions of two or more individuals.

The adjective "social"

restricts the term "communication" to those interactions
which are characteristic of (or take place within the context of) society.

Finally, the phrase "through messages"

further restricts this term to only those social interactions that are mediated by "formally coded, symbolic or
representational events of some shared significance in a
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culture, produced for the purpose of evoking significance.,,2

The approach taken here to theory development

makes the nature and role of messages its central organizing
concern, and thus can be distinguished from other approaches
to the study of behavior and culture as a "communications
approach" .
The term "collective communication" will be used to
refer to social interaction mediated through certain kinds
of messages, namely, messages whose production involves a
collectivity.

The rationale behind introducing this new

term is to take the analysis of messages and systems of
messages a step beyond those models of the communication
process in which messages emanate from a singular, unified
or monolythic source.

The intention is simply to recognize

some of the complexity inherent in the production of many
different types of messages and to subject that complexity
to analysis.
Insofar as the collective production of a message
involves different types and amounts of input from different
members of a collectivity, the transformation of their
inputs into the message as it is finally received will be
described here as a collective communication "process".

The

technological or institutional means by which this
transformation is effected will be described as a collective
communication "mechanism"; and if, as is often the case, the
receiver or receivers of such a message have direct access
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to this mechanism, it will be denoted as a collective
communication "channel" or "link".

Finally, a

representation of the members of a collectivity who produce
a message, of the receiver or receivers of that message and
of the process, mechanism or channel through which they
communicate will be described as a collective communication
"system".

The rationale for introducing the term "collective
communication" is that it defines a type of communication
behavior that exists on all levels of social interaction and
yet that is so complex in structure and unique in function
as to defy conventional methods of analysis.

Moreover, the

content of collectively communicated messages is as
important for society as the form of collective
communication mechanisms is problematic for science.

By

reviewing briefly examples of collective communication on
the level of the mass media, the organization, the small
group and the dyad, the ubiquity of collective communciation
behavior can be demonstrated while, at the same time, the
multiplicity of collective communication channels as well as
their polymorphous and circular configuration can be
illustrated.
Although the adjective "collective" identifies a
subset of communications that has not been defined before in
quite this way, collective communication is a very common
phenomenon and occurs on all levels of social interaction.
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perhaps the most obvious example is that of the mass media.
The production of a film, a television or radio broadcast, a
newspaper, magazine or even a book typically involves a
collectivity of individuals in a nontrivial way.

If

television programming, for example, were conceived,
written, financed, produced, directed, acted, taped, edited,
distributed and broadcast all by one individual or group of
individuals, no one would think to ask questions such as how
much anyone individual or group contributed to the final
message,

whether each of these activities are separate and

distinct or whether they interact in some way to effect the
content of the programming.

Questions like these do arise,

however, as soon as the collective nature of the production
process is recognized.

Moreover, this type of question is

not entirely academic, as evidenced by the issue of violence
on television and the effort of the Senate Subcommittee on
Communications in the late 1970's to determine just how much
of the responsibility for that violence should be borne-individually or in various combinations--by the production
community, the networks, the stations, the audience and the
advertisers.

Lacking a well-developed theory of collective

communication, that committee was not able to arrive at any
precise determination.
Another level of social interaction on which collective communication occurs is that of the organization.
Reports, memoranda, minutes, resolutions, agendas, plans,
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budgets, schedules and other communications which circulate
within an organization are not all produced by individuals
acting independently of one another.

Rather, it is often in

terms of the various formal and informal relationships
between individuals who belong to the organization that
these messages can best be understood.

If only the dyadic

relationships within an organization are considered, the
maximum number of different, symmetrical (i.e. bidirectional) communication channels in that organization is an
arithmetic function of the number of people in that
organization.

However, if

all

the interpersonal relation-

ships between individuals in divisions, departments, offices
and work groups, on committees, boards, councils and task
forces are taken into account, the total number of different
symmetrical collective communication channels is an
exponential function of the number of people in that
organization.
To see what a difference this makes in terms of
describing the full range of communication within an organization, consider a small organization consisting of only
five people.

In such a group there are ten different binary

communication channels (channels linking two people), and it
is upon these channels that a typical analysis of organizational communication would focus.

However, there are also

ten tertiary channels (channels linking three people), five
quaternary channels (channels linking four people), and one
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channel linking all five people.

When these sixteen differ-

ent collective channels of communication are also taken into
account, the total number of possible channels by which a
message could flow within this small organization is twentysix.

With ten people in the organization, there are over a

thousand channels, only forty-five of which are binary.

And

when the number of people reaches twenty, there are more
than a million channels, less than two hundred of which are
binary.
It should also be noted that these collective communication channels are polymorphous.

That is to say, a

collective channel can accommodate a flow of messages from
any combination of senders to any combination of receivers.
If all the various combinations and permutations of senders
and receivers were also calculated, these differences
between the number of binary communication channels and the
total number of communication channels would be even more
enormous.

Thus besides illustrating the applicability of

collective communication to organizational analysis, these
examples demonstrate that serious consideration of collective communication entails a level of complexity and
requires a degree of precision exceeding that of the classic
verbal or diagrammatic models of communication.
While collective communication is an appropriate
concept for studying mass and organizational communication,
due to its capacity for representing the full complexity and
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rich variety of communication on these social levels, it
should be clear from this last example that application is
also possible on the level of small groups.

What may not be

yet apparent, however, is that even interpersonal
communication between two individuals may involve the
collective production of a message.
A contract drawn up and signed by two parties is a
good illustration of a collectively produced message that
involves only a dyad--a buyer and a seller, a husband and
wife, etc.

It also illustrates the fact that the parties

who collectively produce a message may also be the primary,
if not the sole, consumers of that message.

This is also

true of many organizational, political and economic messages
such as the minutes of a meeting or the bills passed into
law by representatives of an electorate or the prices quoted
in a stock market.

It is apparent from these examples that

in addition to being polymorphous, a collective
communication channel can accommodate a circular flow of
messages from all the members of a collectivity to themselves.

Thus while the individual producer of a message is

rarely the direct consumer of that same message, an analysis
of collective communication reveals the uniquely circular
character of many message flows.
Clearly, the ubiquity, complexity and uniqueness of
collective communication make it a subject worthy of study.
However, as it now stands, the subject is too broad.

In

-9-

order to narrow the topic, attention will be focused here
upon those situations in which collective communication
becomes problematic.

This occurs whenever the interests of

members in a collectivity differ with regard to the nature
of the message to be communicated.

As long as all interest-

ed parties agree, they can be regarded by an observer as a
single entity.

Since, in such a case, any process of

collective communication would achieve the same result, the
inherent complexity of that process can be ignored.
However, as soon as the members of the collectivity develop
conflicting as well as common interests with regard to the
message to be communicated, the type of collective
communication mechanism that is used has significant
consequences.
The investigation of collective communication in this
dissertation depends crucially, therefore, upon a precise
conceptualization of the structure of interests or incentives, of the economic environment or motivational context
within which collective communication takes place.

More-

over, the attempt made here to explain collective communication behavior will focus upon an examination of the
relationship between this structure, context or environment
and the structure of the collective communication system.

Social Choice
While many areas of social inquiry necessarily touch
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upon the relationship between collective communication
mechanisms and complex interest structures, the field of
social choice is unique in focusing attention directly upon
this topic.

Therefore, the study of collective communica-

tion here will be narrowed to an examination of the collective communication of social choice messages.
Literature in the field of social choice encompasses a
variety of social behavior most of which, however, falls
within the set of phenomena defined above as collective
communication.

Social choice theory deals with messages

such as constitutions, charters, laws, policies, and
contracts--messages which prescribe or proscribe the
behavior of the members of a social group.

Although there

can be no doubt that these phenomena are messages in the
strict sense described above, the mechanisms by which these
messages are produced have rarely been examined, as such, in
the communications literature.

The variety of these mecha-

nisms is astonishing, as demonstrated in this description
offered by March:
By a mechanism for social choice, I mean nothing
more mysterious than a committee, jury,
legislature, commission, bureaucracy, court,
market, firm, family, gang, mob, and various
combinations of these into economic, political
and social systems. Despite their great variety,
each of these institutions can be interpreted as
a mechanism for amalgamating the behavior
(preferences, actions, decisions) of subunits
into the behavior of the larger institution§ thus
each acts as a mechanism for social choice.
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Given the wide range of social institutions which can
exhibit choice behavior, it is not surprising to find that
basic theories of social choice have been developed in a
number of disciplines such as economics, political science,
mathematics and sociology.

Social choice has also been

analysed from a variety of approaches including both logical
and empirical.

In addition, the problem of social choice is

clearly related to the research undertaken in a number of
applied fields, such as conflict resolution, participatory
planning, collective bargaining, governmental decentralization, futures forecasting and direct democracy.

The

majority of the work in social choice, however, has been
done in the "strict theory of politics" and the "new welfare
economics", and it is primarily in terms of this work that
the theory of collective communication will be articulated.
The analysis of social choice messages is undertaken
here not just for convenience.

It is made compelling by the

fact that many of the most crucial interactions in our
society are mediated through messages such as these.

Except

for those situations in which a collectivity is completely
dominated by one individual or group, is in complete accord
with regard to its actions, or is completely unaware of or
unconcerned with the collective effects of individual
actions, social behavior is motivated, organized, guided and
transformed through the collective communication of social
choice messages.

This would include economic behaviors such
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as production, exchange and consumption and political
behaviors such as protection of the social order and provision for the social welfare.

A theoretical explanation of

the collective communication of social choice messages would
be useful to the extent to which it could throw light upon
salient problems in these areas.

Application of this theory

to empirical problems such as these will have to follow the
research and development described here, but there are
certain prescriptive and descriptive limitations in social
choice theory which fall within the scope of this dissertation.

Briefly, these include a theoretical controversy over

the very possibility of an acceptable collective communication mechanism and various methodological difficulties both
in representing the behavior of a collective communication
mechanism and in explaining the development of a collective
communication system.

The Research Problem
Motivated by the ubiquity, complexity and uniqueness
of cOllective communication phenomena and by the
convenience, significance and limitations of social choice
theory, the research problem addressed by this dissertation
is to develop a theory of collective communication adequate
to provide some answers to several basic questions:
1.

what types of social choice messages should be
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communicated in order to realize common interests
in different economic environments?
2.

what types of collective communication mechanisms
should be developed in order to communicate these
messages in these environments?

3.

what types of collective communication mechanisms
will be developed in different economic
environments?

4.

What types of social choice messages will be communicated through these mechanisms in these
environments?

The first two questions call for the classification of
collectively communicated messages, collective communication
systems and economic environments and for the derivation of
logical relationships between them.

While these questions

have obvious prescriptive and normative implications, the
third and fourth questions are intended to draw out the
descriptive and predictive dimension of

thi~

theory.

They

call for the empirical validation of relationships between
collectively communicated messages, collective communication
systems and economic environments expressed as hypotheses
concerning the behavior of a specific collectivity or group
of collectivities.
Inasmuch as it will be necessary here to focus attention upon the most central theoretical concepts and rela-
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tions, avoiding by means of simplifying assumptions many of
the complexities and limitations characteristic of realworld situations, the immediate results will be more
generally interpretable as normative rather than empirical
statements.

Nevertheless, the possibility of giving these

results a descriptive and predictive interpretation must not
be ignored.

statements derived through a logical process

can, after all, serve as an empirical theory predicting the
behavior of people making decisions in situations where they
have the resources and motivation to act logically.

As

Savage has put it, "logic can be interpreted as a crude but
sometimes handy empirical psychological theory. ,,4

More-

over, the refinements necessary to make these results more
generally applicable as an empirical predictions may, in
most cases, be viewed as extensions of the concepts already
introduced, e.g., as specifications of limitations in the
resources available for retrieving, processing, and
transmitting information.

Therefore, the limitations of the

theory of collective communication as a body of descriptive
and predictive statements are not inherent in this theory
but are, rather, an inescapable feature of this first stage
in theory development.

Mathematical Modeling
There are, of course, various approaches to the process of theory building.

One of these is through the use of

-15-

mathematical models.

Mathematical modeling has several

advantages over other approaches, advantages that appear to
be particularly relevant to the problem of building a theory
of collective communication.

In the first place, mathemat-

ical modeling necessitates precision in the definition of
concepts and in the specification of assumptions about how
these concepts are related.

Specifically, this means that

all concepts must be well-defined or unambiguous and that
relations must be formally represented.

That is to say, a

relation between concepts cannot be described solely in
terms of its existence and direction; the form of the
relation must also be explicitly defined.

Since collective

communication is a new and relatively difficult concept, it
would seem wise to ensure that it is well-defined and
explicitly formulated.
In addition to ensuring precision, mathematical
symbols can often express a complex theoretical relationship
more succinctly and render it more tractable to manipulation
than words can.

Since collective communication appears to

deal with phenomena that are quite complex, mathematical
representation would seem to be advantageous.

Another

feature of mathematics is the ability to proceed deductively
from axioms to theorems and thereby to detect any
unnecessary redundancy or unrecognized inconsistencies in
the assumptions which make up a theory.

Obviously such a
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capability would be useful in editing, so to speak, the
initial draft of a new theory.
Finally, mathematical models can be used to derive new
and potentially counter-intuitive hypotheses from the
assumptions of a theory.

In the exploration of a new

theoretical area, any source of new insights is surely to be
valued.

Therefore, the approach taken in this dissertation

to building a theory of collective communication will be to
develop a mathematical theory of this phenomenon, to
transform that theory through interpretation into a
mathematical model and then to subject several hypotheses
derived from that model to empirical test.

The Research Process
Although the subject of collective communication is a
new one, there are several mathematical theories which
together form the basis for a rigorous social theory
capable of answering the questions listed above.

Game

theory was invented specifically to model social situations
of complex and interrelated interests.

However, it does not

directly incorporate any general representation of
communication, of social interaction achieved through
messages rather than through the constraints imposed by the
economic environment.

Information theory, on the other

hand, was invented to model communication; but it lacks a
representation of interests, an evaluative, motivational or

-17-

economic component.

These two mathematical theories, both

based upon probability theory, complement each other and
together provide a basis for analysing the relationship
between complex interest structures and collective
communication systems.

The first step in the process of

developing a theory of collective communication, therefore,
will be

to derive from game theory and information theory a

mathematical theory of collective communication.
It was clearly the intention of those who developed
the mathematical theories of games and of information that
these theories be applicable to social (and, indeed, to
human) behavior.
Morgenstern,

The classic work of von Neuman and

The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, and

Shannon's seminal text,

The Mathematical Theory of
Communication, indicate as much by their titles. S It is
apparent, however, that these authors are using the word
"theory" to mean different things.

The first title suggests

that the theory of games is a self-contained system of
mathematical elements and relations which can be used to
model, and thus to shed light upon, economic behavior.

The

second title suggests that the relationship between the
mathematical system now generally known as information
theory and the terms that are commonly used to describe
human communication is so well established that the former
can in fact be viewed as a theory of communication behavior.
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In this dissertation a distinction will be made,
similar to that implied in the first title, between (1) the
mathematical theory, i.e., the set of propositions about
mathematical entities, (2) the mathematical model, i.e., the
mathematical theory together with a social interpretation of
each of the relevant mathematical entities to which it
refers and (3) the social theory, i.e., the set of
propositions about social entities describing the
implications of the mathematical model.

Accordingly, the

second step in the process of developing a theory of
collective communication will be

to interpret the

mathematical theory and to derive from the resulting
mathematical model a social theory of collective
communication .
This social theory of collective communication will be
extremely general.

In order to analyse the collective

communication of specific types of social choice messages,
it is necessary to give this theory a rather extensive
interpretation in terms of the language and literature of
social choice.

Only after the correspondence between the

concepts and propositions of the general theory and the
variables and relations used to describe specific social
choice problems has been established can the empirical
validity of that theory be tested.
Literature in this field is generally concerned with
problems of two kinds.

The first kind includes problems in
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evaluating the development or design of collective
communication systems, problems often designated as
normative or prescriptive.

The second kind covers problems

in explaining the development or design of collective
communication systems, problems often described as
descriptive or predictive.

It would seem desirable in the

development of a social theory to demonstrate its
applicability to problems of both kinds.

Therefore, the

third step in the process of developing a theory of
collective communication adequate to provide answers to the
basic questions described above will be

to apply the social

theory of collective communication to some of the specific
prescriptive and predictive problems in the literature on
social choice.
Although the validity of the normative or prescriptive
propositions derived from the theory of collective
communication will rest solely upon whether the assumptions
embedded in that theory are acceptable and whether the logic
with which these propositions are derived is consistent, the
validity of the descriptive or predictive proposition derived from the theory must be tested empirically.

Because

collective communication is a new theoretical area, it would
seem appropriate first to review as much of the relevant
empirical research as possible to determine the extent to
which this research supports the theory in general.

It is

not likely, however, that the specific propositions derived
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from the theory will be directly supported or refuted by
this research.

To remedy this situation, a test will be

made of some of these specific propositions by replicating
and extending research on this subject.

Therefore, the

fourth step in the process of developing a theory of
collective communication will be

to subject the specific

implications of the social theory of collectivecommunication to appropriate empirical tests.

An Outline of the Dissertation
The derivation of a mathematical model of collective
communication is accomplished here in three steps.

First,

the foundation of the model in the theories of information
and games is established.

Second, a basic theory of

information transmission within games of strategy is
constructed upon that foundation.

Third, metagames are

described and used to represent collective communication
systems.

Play of these metagames is then interpreted as the

collective communication of social choice messages.
Because the derivation of this mathematical model and,
subsequently, of the social theory of collective
communication is for the most part highly technical, the
formal unification and interpretation of game theory and
information theory is described in a series of appendices.
The dissertation proper will begin with a nontechnical
explanation of the mathematical model and a basic exposition
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of the social theory of collective communication in Chapter
One.
The next two chapters demonstrate the applicability of
this theory to more specific forms of collective
communication and the usefulness of this theory in
addressing salient methodological and theoretical issues.
Problems found in the literature on social choice are first
described and represented as game-like environments.
General propositions described in Chapter One are then
specified as hypothetical solutions to these problems.
Chapter Two treats problems solved through political forms
of collective communication and the implications of these
solutions for various methodological issues, while Chapter
Three deals with problems solved through social forms of
collective communication and the implications of these
solutions for various theoretical issues.
The last three chapters constitute an empirical test
of the validity of several general propositions and specific
hypotheses derived from the social theory of collective
communication.

Literature on the development of property

rights is reviewed in Chapter Four to establish qualitative
support for the theory in general.

Data from a particularly

relevant case study are then reanalyzed in Chapter Five and
replicated using context analysis in Chapter Six to provide
more quantitative support for some of the specific hypotheses derived from the social theory of collective
communication.

Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of
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this evidence as well as the limitations inherent in this
initial attempt at theory development are discussed in a
conclusion.
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CHAPTER I
A SOCIAL THEORY OF COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a verbal,
nontechnical explanation of the mathematical model developed
in the appendices and a general, systematic exposition of
the particular theory which results from interpretation of
this model, a theory described here as the Social Theory of
Collective Communication.

Specific mathematical terms from

this model such as "players," "strategies" and "metastrategies" will be interpreted here in terms of general
nontechnical concepts such as people, actions and messages;
and the mathematical theorems derived as formula in the
appendices will be interpreted and summarized here as verbal
theorems consisting of statements about these concepts and
their interrelationships.
While each of these verbal theorems and its
constituent terms will be interpreted and illustrated here
in some detail, a great deal of material presented in the
appendices will be omitted.

This includes discussion of the

relevant literature on information theory and game theory;
-24-
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the historical background and logical motivation for
developing a unified theory of information and games; the
foundation of this theory in the concept of the observer;
and the mathematical derivation, proof, and illustration of
each theorem.

This chapter will thus serve both as a verbal

introduction for the reader interested in and familiar
enough with the mathematical theories of information and
games to follow the developments described in the appendices
and as a nontechnical summary for those who are not
conversant with or interested in these areas and who wish to
read the body of the dissertation without reference to the
appendices.
The Social Theory of Collective Communication will be
presented in six sections, covering in logical order the
most salient implications of the mathematical model.

The

topics to be discussed are regulation, control, rational
behavior, collective communication, metacommunication, and
communication costs.

Within each section the relevant terms

and theorems will be interpreted and illustrated.

In a

conclusion the social theory of collective communication
will be discussed in terms of the answers it provides to
each of the basic questions underlying this research:
1.

what types of social choice messages should be
communicated to realize common interests in
different economic environments?

-26-

2.

What type of collective communication mechanisms
should be developed to communicate these messages
in these environments?

3.

What types of collective communication mechanisms
will be developed in different economic
environments?

4.

What types of social choice messages will be
communicated through these mechanisms in these
environments?

Regulation
In this section concepts will be introduced which are
necessary to understand the first proposition of the Social
Theory of Collective Communication.

In order to establish

the foundations of this theory in a logical manner, this
proposition is given three different interpretations, the
second and third of which follow from and build upon the
first.

A second proposition is then introduced in a manner

which demonstrates its close relation to each of the three
interpretations of the first.

These two propositions,

especially as interpreted in terms of situations involving
two or more people, lay a foundation for the rest of the
social theory.

Upon this foundation the concepts of control

and rational behavior will be used to erect a theoretical
structure within which collective communication and
metacommunication behavior can be predicted or prescribed.
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The Social Theory of Collective Communication
described here rests upon the fundamental assumptions that
people are affected by what goes on around them, that they
notice and evaluate these effects and, therefore, that they
have an interest in the events that effect them.

Collective

communication becomes important in organizations such as
labor unions, where the individuals in a collectivity have
interests in common or in situations such as contract
negotiations, where groups of individuals have interests
both in common and in conflict.

The structure of interests

in these environments can be loosely compared to the
structure of interest in games of strategy such as, say,
bridge, where team members have interests in common and
opponents have interests in conflict.
environments

These

game-like

form the context in which collective

communication behavior will be analysed.
people in a game-like environment will be described
here in terms of their

actions, and it will be assumed

that they are motivated to act by a thorough consideration
of the consequences or

results

of their actions.

Since it

may be the case that more than one possible action is available to a person in a game-like environment, it is useful to
know the

variety

of actions (the number of distinct

actions) available to a player and also the variety of
results that might obtain from the combined actions of all
people in that game-like environment.
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The first proposition in the Social Theory of
collective Communication is called the Law of Requisite
variety.

It applies to any game-like environment in which a

person would like to reduce the variety of results that
occur over a period of time (or that might occur at anyone
time), perhaps in order to achieve a certain preferred
result with more consistency or certainty.

The process by

which (or extent to which) that variety is reduced will be
designated here as

regulation.

The result of action in a

game-like environment will be described as having been
regulated to the extent that it is rendered more constant or
certain, and the person who acts so as to achieve such
regulation will be referred to as a

regulator.

One interpretation of the Law of Requisite variety is
as follows:

if a person is acting alone as a regulator in a

game-like environment, the desired result can be achieved
through consistent selection by that regulator of one
particular action.

A classic example of regulation, from

the point of view of an electrical engineer, is the action
of a thermostat as it controls the temperature in a house.
As a biologist, H. Ross Ashby illustrated regulation by the
example of a cat sleeping next to the fire, who moves closer
to the fire as it grows dimmer.

For a similar example, but

one more appropriate to the point of view of social
scientist, consider a man living in a house located in a
region such as New England where winters are cold.

The
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house is heated by a wood stove, and the man can effect the
temperature inside that house through a variety of actions
such as building a fire in the stove or not building a fire
in the stove.

In order to keep the house warm throughout

the winter, he must consistently choose one of these
actions, namely to build a fire in the stove every morning.
If he chooses not to build a fire, the house will be cold.
It is apparent from this example that

in a situation where

a regulator acts alone, variety in the results will be as
great as variety in the actions of a regulator

This is

the most basic interpretation of the Law of Requisite
Variety-- only variety can create variety .
If, despite the consistent selection of one action by
the regulator, the result varies, then some force in
addition to the regulator must be acting in that
environment.

From the perspective of the regulator, that

force may be called a

disturbance, since its actions

introduce variety into (and thereby disturb) the results.
In the case of the man living in New England, the weather in
that part of the country could be viewed as a disturbance to
the temperature inside his house.

If that man. built the

same size fire in his wood stove every morning throughout the
year, the average daily temperature inside the house would
vary quite a bit across the seasons of the year.

Thus

another interpretation of the Law of Requisite Variety,
closely related to the first, is that

in a situation where
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a regulator's action does not change, variety in the results
will be as large as variety in the actions of a disturbance.
Once again it seems that only variety can create variety.
Significantly, the regulator may attempt to reduce
variety in the results by selecting actions that together
with the actions taken by a disturbance will ensure a
consistent or certain result.

This would be the case if, in

the previous example, the man built a large fire in his
woodstove each morning during the winter, a small fire in
the spring and fall, and no fire at all in the summer.
Moreover, to come even closer to achieving a constant
temperature inside the house, he would have to make finer
adjustments in the amount of heat given off by his woodstove
(through such actions as choosing each day one or another
different kind of wood and adjusting the draft on the woodstove throughout the day).

It is apparent from this example

that regulation will be successful to the extent that the
variety of actions available to a regulator is commensurate
with the variety of actions available to a disturbance.

In

this adversarial type of situation, a result very different
from the first two emerges:

only variety can destroy

variety.
When the results of one person's actions are disturbed
by the actions of another person, and visa versa, the situation viewed from the point of view of either of these
people is identical to that just described.

However, from
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the point of view of both people taken together, i.e., if
both these people are viewed as regulators, the situation is
similar to that involving a single, undisturbed regulator
except that the focus of analysis is now upon the variety of
joint actions available to a compound, undisturbed regulator.

In the example of the man with the woodstove, if it

happens that the man is married and he restricts his actions
to loading wood into the stove while his wife opens or shuts
the draft, the man (or his wife) might keep the temperature
constant on any day if he added wood each time she closed
down the draft (or visa versa).

Acting together, however,

they could regulate the temperature inside the house simply
by coordinating their behavior to create whatever amount of
heat was needed, from a very small fire due to a stove that
was nearly empty and a draft that was nearly closed to a
roaring blaze caused by a large amount of wood and a wideopen draft.
If there is both a compound regulator and a disturbance, the situation is similar to that involving a single
regulator and a disturbance, except that, once again, analysis is focused upon joint actions rather than the actions of
a single person.

This can be illustrated by the example of

a man and his wife who coordinate their fire-building
activity both with each other and with the weather conditions.
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Because these observations are all closely related,
they will be taken together here to constitute the first
proposition in the social theory of collective
communication.

Some of these statements were articulated

earlier by Ashbyl as the Law of Requisite Variety, so they
are given the same title here.

They are formally stated and

proven as theorems 1 through 5 in Appendix B, where the
exact relation between this research and the work of Ashby
is also described.
The observations concerning variety described above
constitute necessary but not sufficient conditions for
successful regulation.

The additional conditions which,

together with those already enumerated, are both necessary
and sufficient for successful regulation constitute interpretations of the second proposition.

They are, in each

case, closely related to the interpretations given above for
the Law of Requisite Variety, except that they focus upon
the need for info·rmation rather than variety.

For this

reason the second proposition in the Social Theory of
Collective Communication is designated the Law of Requisite
Information:

For regulation to be successful, it must be

possible for the regulator to affect the results through the
choice of an action.

In the example discussed above, it

must be possible for the man to raise or lower the
temperature inside his house by means of the kind of fire he
builds in his wood stove.

Moreover,

if there is a
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disturbance in the environment, the regulator must discover
what action has been (or will be) taken by the disturbance
in order to make an appropriate selection from the set of
available actions, e.g., the man in the example above must
check the temperature inside the house before deciding how
large a fire to build.

Finally,

if the regulator is

composed of two or more people, these people must be able to
coordinate their actions, whether or not there is a
disturbance, in order to reduce variety in the results,
e.g., the husband and wife in the house described above must
decide to achieve a certain temperature by adjusting the
amount of wood burned in the stove, by adjusting the draft
on the stove, or by adjusting both in a particular way.
Each of the behaviors that are the subject of these
conditions--affecting, discovering and coordinating--can be
described as a type of information transmission, where the
word information is used in the technical sense defined in
Appendix A.

However, some understanding of the relevance of

this description and, thus, of the name of this proposition
can be gotten by considering the information that is
communicated to a person who observes some of what goes on
in this game-like environment.

For regulation to be

successful, someone who observes the result of a regulator's
behavior in a game-like environment must receive, through
knowledge of that result, information concerning the action
taken by that person.

That is to say, the uncertainty of an
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observer concerning the action that was taken by a regulator
must be lowered or reduced by knowledge of the result of
that behavior, if regulation is at all successful.
Similarly, the uncertainty of an observer concerning
the action taken by a regulator must be reduced by knowledge
of the action taken by a disturbance for the regulator to
counteract that disturbance and, thus, to succeed at
regulation.

Finally, the uncertainty of an observer

concerning the behavior of one person who is acting together
with another as a compound regulator must be reduced by
knowledge of the action taken by the other person, if they
are able to coordinate their behavior and, thus, succeed at
regulation.
In a situation such as this, where the uncertainty of
an observer concerns a selection to be made and where the
observer's uncertainty regarding this selection is reduced
by knowledge of something, it can be said, more or less
figuratively, that the selection appears to an observer as
if it has been informed by this same knowledge or, simply,
that the selection has been informed by this same knowledge.
The people who act as regulators in the example described
above are, of course, observers of the game-like
environment.

If the observer who describes the game is the

same observer who acts as a regulator, then this statement
is true in a very literal sense.

If the observers are not

one and the same, however, then the statement is more
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hypothetical or figurative.

Therefore, the three versions

of the Law of Requisite Information given above may be
stated more succinctly (if less precisely) as follows:
successful regulation requires that the selection of actions
by a regulator be informed by a knowledge of the results of
those actions, knowledge of any disturbance and knowledge of
the action or actions selected by any other regulators.
In the example referred to above, regulation is only
possible if uncertainty concerning the size of the fire to
be built by the husband is reduced by knowledge of the
temperature inside the house that would result from a fire
of a particular size, by knowledge of the weather
conditions, and by knowledge of the action taken by the wife
with regard to opening or closing the draft.
The term "information" is interpreted here to mean a
reduction in the uncertainty of an observer.

The concept of

uncertainty, however, is very closely related to the concept of variety.

Uncertainty concerning the actions or the

result of the action taken by a player or constituting a
disturbance is directly related to, and thus functions as a
measure of, variety in that action or result; for the larger
the number of possible actions or results, the more
uncertain an observer will be concerning the actual action
that is selected or result that obtains.
This relationship can be demonstrated by comparing a
situation in which a person can take only one action to a
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situation in which that person can choose between two or
more actions.

In the first situation, an observer would be

absolutely certain of the action to be taken -- the
probability of making a correct prediction would be equal to
one.

However, in the situation where a person has two

possible alternatives to choose from, an observer would not
be so certain.

Assuming that actions are chosen in a

completely random fashion by means of some procedure such as
flipping an unbiased coin, an observer would only have a
probability of 0.5 of making a correct prediction.
Moreover, as the number of alternative actions increases,
the observer's chances of correctly guessing the action to
be taken would decrease.
Assuming the observer is aware of this fact, an
increase in variety would be accompanied by an increase in
the uncertainty of the observer.

Hence the Law of Requisite

Information is closely related to the Law of Requisite
Variety.

With information understood as a reduction in

uncertainty and with uncertainty understood as a measure of
variety, the Law of Requisite Information is equivalent to a
law of "requisite reduction in variety."

The Law of

Reguisite Information is formally stated and proven as
theorems 6 through 10 in Appendix B, where the precise
nature of the relation between these first two laws and the
connection between the Law of Requisite Information and the
work of conant 2 are also described.
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Control
The first two propositions in the Social Theory of
collective Communication describe conditions on action taken
in a game-like environment requisite for regulating the
variety of possible outcomes resulting from that action.
The Law of Requisite Variety describes the variety of
actions that are necessary to achieve regulation while the
Law of Requisite Information describes certain kinds of
information concerning these actions that must be
transmitted to an observer in order for regulation to be
successful.

Together they are sufficient to prescribe the

requirements for an effective system of regulation.
However, regulation only ensures that the result of behavior
in a game-like environment can be made more certain or
constant.

It in no way guarantees that that result is in

any way good or desirable.

In this section the Law of

Requisite Information will be extended to describe the kind
of information that must be transmitted to an observer in
order for the result of behavior in a game-like environment
to be controlled.

Attention is then focused upon the

informational conditions necessary for self-control, for
only through this type of control can a person or group
achieve the best possible result.

In the next section,

self-control will be viewed as the object of rational
behavior and, in the section after that, self-control will
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be seen as the motivation for collective communication in
certain game-like environments.
It will be assumed here that people in a game-like
environment have preferences as to which of the various
possible results of behavior in that environment obtains.
In order to describe the process of evaluation or the
phenomenon of motivation, it is necessary to analyse the
different relationships that can be established between
preferences and the results of actions in a game-like
environment.

The process by which (or extent to which) such

a relation is established will be designated here as
control.
The third proposition of the Social Theory of
Collective Communication is also one articulated earlier by
Ashby3

It is based upon Theorem 12 in Appendix B and is

designated The Law of Requisite Regulation:
lation makes possible complete control.

perfect regu-

If the man heating

his horne in New England with a woodstove were not able to
maintain that horne at a certain or constant temperature, he
certainly would not be able to maintain that horne at the
temperature he most prefers.

Thus it is apparent that regu-

lation is a necessary condition for control.

However, it is

not a sufficient condition for control, for in addition to
the variety and information needed for regulation,
Successful control requires that the uncertainty of an
observer concerning the selection of an action in a game-
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like environment be reduced by knowledge of the preferences
of a person or group.
This proposition can also be stated in a more succinct
manner as follows:

successful control requires that the

selection of a result in a game-like environment appear to
an observer as if it were informed by knowledge of the
preferences of a person or group.
simplified further to read:

This statement has been

successful control requires

that the result of behavior in a game-like environment be
informed by the preferences of a person or group.
For example, in the case of the couple with the woodstove, the husband might use that stove to regulate the
temperature of their home at seventy degrees fahrenheit.
However, knowing that the husband would prefer a temperature
of sixty-five degrees fahrenheit makes it clear to an
observer that the selection of that temperature was not
fully informed by knowledge of the preferences of the
husband.

This could have been because the husband did not

know his own mind, or that he knew his own preferences but
ignored them, or that he was unaware of the size of the fire
required to achieve that result, or that the actions of his
wife or the weather made it impossible for him to exert
complete control over the temperature, or some combination
of these factors.

It is apparent from this example that the

phrase "be informed by" in this interpretation is being used
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to describe a great number of different processes, and its
meaning in some cases may be entirely figurative.
This fourth proposition in the Social Theory of
Collective Communication is derived from theorems 11 and 13
in Appendix B and is called The Extended Law of Reguisite
Information.

It can be used to specify the type of

information that is required for a person or group to
control the results of action in a wide variety of game-like
environments, and thus it subsumes the Law of Requisite
Information.
One of the most important variables that can be used
to differentiate between various game-like environments is
the extent to which a person (or group) in a game-like
environment controls the results of action in that
environment.

To the extent that a person or group does

exercise control, that person or group will be said to
exercise self-control.

To the extent that a person or group

does not exercise control, that person or group will be
described as subject to other-control.

A second crucial

distinction is whether the preferences of one person or the
preferences of more than one person are involved in the
selection of a particular result.

The former is designated

here as individual control and the latter as collective
control.
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Suppose the husband in the example described above
exerts sOle control over the temperature in the house.

This

would be described as individual self-control for the
husband and as individual other-control for the wife.

On

the other hand, if the husband and wife make a joint
decision every day as to what the temperature of the house
should be, control of the temperature would be described as
collective self-control for the group consisting of husband
and wife.

Finally, if the husband and wife agree to take

responsibility for the wood stove on alternate days, control
over the temperature in the house would appear to be a
mixture of individual self-control and individual othercontrol.
The information required to achieve these different
types of control can be described by using the Extended Law
of Requisite Information in a deductive manner.

Conversely,

this law can be used in an inductive manner to describe the
type of control that characterizes a game-like environment,
based upon an analysis of the information transmitted within
that environment.

However, until some grounds are

established for evaluating these various types of control,
they cannot be used either in prescribing or in predicting
changes in control; and it is in order to effect such
changes that collective communication occurs.
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what is needed at this pOint is to determine which
results are the best, for whom they are best, what is meant
by "best", and through what kind of control these best
results can be achieved.

From the point of view of any

particular person in a game-like environment, it seems
logical to define the

best

results as those over which no

other possible result is preferred by that person.

There

are many game-like environments, however, in which not all
people can achieve such results simultaniously.

It is

necessary, therefore, to consider those results over which
no other result is preferred by at least one person while
all the people in that environment who do not prefer those
results are indifferent as between them and any other.
These next best results are designated here as

collectively

optimal , since they are optimal from the point of view of
all the people in a game-like environment collectively but
may not be optimal from the point of view of those same
people individually.
In the example where the husband and wife heat their
home with a woodstove, consider the situation where the
husband prefers a temperature of anywhere between sixty and
sixty-five while the wife prefers a temperature anywhere
between sixty-five and seventy.

Only a temperature of

sixty-five is collectively optimal.

It can be seen from

this example that where it is possible for all people in a
game-like environment to realize a result that would be best
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for them individually, such a result is also collectively
optimal.

However, consider the situation where the husband

most prefers any temperature between sixty and sixty-five
while his wife most prefers a temperature between seventy
and seventy-five.

Assuming that both husband and wife would

prefer a temperature close to their most preferred range
over a temperature not so close, the wife would prefer a
temperature of sixty-five over any other in the range from
sixty to sixty-five.

Similarly, the husband would prefer a

temperature of seventy over any other in the range from
seventy to seventy-five.

Therefore, although it is not

possible in this situation for both husband and wife to
select a temperature that is best for both of them individually, they can select a next best or collectively optimal
temperature of either sixty-five or seventy degrees.
Finally, if both husband and wife prefer to compromise
rather than to fight over the temperature, they might agree
to select both strategies with equal probabilities and to
implement this choice by a means such as flipping a coin
each day, alternating

the temperature each day or setting

the temperature at 67.5 0

,

the expected value of this

probabilistic mixture.
To obtain collectively optimal results, it is
necessary to establish a particular relation between the
preferences of people in a game-like environment and the
results of their actions.

Therefore, it requires a
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particular kind of control, for control was defined above as
the process by which (or extent to which) a relation is
established between preferences and the results of action in
a game-like environment.

The condition particular to the

attainment of collectively optimal results, a state
designated here as collective optimality, is that all the
people in a game-like environment participate in the process
of control.

The Extended Law of Requisite Information,

which was used to describe the information required for
successful control, can now be reformulated to describe the
information required for successful control by all the
people in a game-like environment:

successful control by

people in a game-like environment requires that the result
of actions taken in that environment be informed by the
preferences of all those people.
For example, consider the case where the husband and
wife in the example above stop by to visit his in-laws, who
have set the temperature inside their house at eighty
degrees.

It may be that these in-laws are indifferent as

between the temperatures from seventy-five to eighty, but
since they neglected to ask and therefore do not know that
their daughter and son-in-law prefer a lower temperature, it
is impossible for them, even though they demonstrate
successful control over the stove, to intentionally select
a collectively optimal temperature of, say,
degrees.

seventy-five
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defined as self-control by that group and since the results
of successful control by all people in a game-like environment was defined as collective optimality, this proposition
can be stated more succinctly:
requires self-control.

collective optimality

This proposition, the fifth in the

Social Theory of Collective Communication, is based upon
theorems 14 and 15 in Appendix C and it is designated The
Law of Requisite Control.

Rational Behavior
Collective optimality is the focal point of analysis
in this dissertation,

for it includes the situation where

all people can achieve individually most preferred results
as a special case.

Moreover, it looks beyond this situation

to those which are at the heart of many social problems,
social choice processes and social phenomena generally-those situations where people must cooperate or compromise
or in some fashion coordinate their behavior in order to
realize interests held in common.

Finally, the concept of

collective optimality is seen here as a goal that motivates
collective communication behavior.

It is this relationship

between optimality and behavior that will now be described.
In a game-like environment with a form of control that
is less than what would be collectively optimal for the
people involved, efforts are often made to change to another
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form of control.

A revolution by peasants attempting to

seize control from landowners would be a clear example of
action taken to substitute one form of control for another.
Since a situation such as a revolution is one in which
people have interests both in common and in conflict, it too
can be described as a game-like environment.

However, since

actions taken in this kind of environment are aimed at
achieving a new form of control which is itself part of the
game-like environment in which other activities such as
farming have been taking place, it is related in a hierarchical fashion to that other game-like environment.

This

hierarchical relationship between game-like environments
will be indicated by designating this new environment a
metagame-like environment.

It is, thus, an environment that

can be likened to a new type of game, a metagame, which is
related to the first or basic game in such a way that the
actions taken in the metagame result in one or another type
of control in the basic game.
The behavior of a person in a game-like environment or
a metagame-like environment is said to be rational if it is
aimed at achieving at least as good a result as it is
possible for that particular person to achieve unilaterally.
If a collectively optimal result is as good a result as is
possible in a particular game-like environment, it would
appear logical for rational individuals in a metagame-like
environment to act so as to establish self-control in the
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game-like environment.

However, without knowing more about

the game-like environment it is impossible to say whether or
not self-control can be achieved individually or
collectively.

Moreover, without knowing more about the

metagame-like environment, it is impossible to say whether
or not rational individuals will be able to select either
form of self-control.
There are some game-like environments in which people
acting rationally obtain a result that is not collectively
optimal.

Such an environment will be designated here as

collectively suboptimal.

The classic example of a collec-

tively suboptimal environment is one that is used to illustrate the game of Prisoner's Dilemma.

Two prisoners,

charged with the same crime, are held incommunicado.
can be convicted only if they confess to the crime.

They
In

order to encourage them to confess, the District Attourney
promises that if one of the prisoners turns state's evidence
by confessing while the other holds out, that first prisoner
will be set free and given a reward.

The D.A. will then

seek a more severe sentence for the prisoner who holds out
and is convicted on the strength of the other's testimony.
The dilemma lies in the fact that it is rational for each
prisoner to confess, for if the other does not confess, then
the one who does gets set free with a reward, while if the
other confesses and the first does not, he gets convicted
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with a severe sentence.

However, if both prisoners act

rationally and confess, they both get convicted, whereas if
both prisoners act irrationally and hold out, they both get
set free, clearly a result preferred over the first by both
prisoners.
It is apparent from this example that in a collectively suboptimal game-like environment complete individual
self-control is not possible, for each person determines
only his own behavior while the result for one person
depends to some extent upon the behavior of another person.
Therefore if an appropriate metagame-like environment
exists, it is rational for each person to act in such a way
as to impose collective self-control upon the game-like
environment.

One way this can be done is to make the

collective behavior necessary for collectively optimal
results appear rational by associating a negative sanction
of some kind with the actions that originally appeared
rational (or by associating a positive sanction of some kind
with those actions which constitute the appropriate
collective behavior).

When rational behavior under this new

regime of sanctions is viewed in terms of the relation
between preferences and the results of that behavior, it
will appear as if a collective form of self-control has been
established.
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For example, a person who has put his house up for
sale might meet with a person interested in buying it, and
they might agree to certain terms of sale.

However, it is

in the interest of each person to violate that agreement
while the other fulfills his end of the bargain.

For the

seller this means receiving money for the house while
keeping possession of the title.

For the buyer it means

obtaining possession of the house without paying the sum
agreed upon.

Unless compliance with the agreement could be

rewarded or failure to comply could be punished, the agreement may be useless.

However, in the United states a

purchase agreement describing the sale of a house is turned
over to a third party, a bank, with instructions to insure
that neither person breaks the terms of the agreement
unilaterally.

Through the metagame-like environment offered

by this arrangement, called "escrow", buyers and sellers of
real estate are able to exercise self-control, not individually but collectively.
The imposition of collective self-control in this
manner would be rational only if the metagame-like environment were characterized by self-control itself, or otherwise
it might be possible for some person or subgroup to impose
sanctions leading to other-control for one or more people in
the game-like environment.

In the sale of a house described

above, it would not be rational, for instance, for the buyer
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to comply with the terms of sale by handing over his money
to the real estate broker, for the broker works for the
seller and would have no motivation to hold the seller
accountable if he accepted the money but refused to transfer
the title to the house.
A metagame-like environment characterized by selfcontrol will be designated here a collectively optimal
metagame-like environment, since only through action in such
an environment can collective optimality in the game-like
environment be assured.

It is now possible to state a sixth

proposition in the Social Theory of Collective Communication:

it is rational for people in a collectively

suboptimal game-like environment with access to a
collectively optimal metagame-like environment to act so as
to impose upon the game-like environment a collective form
of self-control.

Because rational behavior in a metagame

can be called metarational, this proposition is designated
the Metarationality Theorem.

It is formally derived in

Appendix C as Corollary A of Theorem 17.

Collective Communication
The Metarationality Theorem as stated above is
extremely general.

Moreover, the implications of that

theorem with regard to collective communication have not
been made explicit.

This theorem has a more concrete
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corollary, however, that draws out its predictive
implications with regard to collective communication.
As defined above, control establishes a relationship
between preferences and results obtained through the
selection of appropriate actions.

A set of actions, to be

described here as a pattern of behavior, when those actions
have been consciously and intentionally selected, will be
designated here as a collective, public or social choice.
The process through which such a pattern of behavior is
selected will be represented here in terms of the production, distribution and enforcement of a message describing
with a certain degree of specificity the prescribed (or proscribed) behavior.

Such a message will be called a social

choice message, and the process by which such a message is
produced and distributed will be regarded as a process of
communication.

According to these definitions, the result

of action in a metagame-like environment can be represented
as the communication and enforcement of a social choice
message.
This interpretation might, for the sake of illustration, be applied to the sale of a house as described
above.

The agreement on the part of a seller and a buyer to

exchange a house on certain terms could be considered a
social choice, for the agreement constitutes a choice of
certain actions on the part of both parties.

This agreement
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usually takes the form of a written purchase agreement
describing the social choice.

This purchase agreement could

be considered a social choice message.

The process of

inspecting the house, obtaining further information from the
real estate broker, drawing up and tendering a purchase
offer through the broker, negotiating the terms of sale as
described in that offer and, finally, signing the purchase
agreement in the presence of witnesses can be considered a
process through which a social choice message is produced.
Distribution of that message takes place when signed copies
of the final purchase agreement are distributed to all concerned parties, and the enforcement of that message is then
carried out by the bank which holds the instrument in escrow
and, ultimately, by the legal system and law enforcement
agencies.
The existence of a metagame-like environment will be
taken here to imply the availability of collective communication and enforcement mechanisms such as represented in
this example by the legal institutions of real estate
brokerage and escrow.

Communication and enforcement can be

carried out by mechanisms that are physically distinct, as
in this example, or by mechanisms that are physically indistinguishable.

Nevertheless, they will be considered here to

be theoretically separate.

If the metagame-like environment

represented by these mechanisms is collectively optimal, the
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communication and enforcement mechanisms will be described
here as effective, since they can be used to effect the
desired changes in control.
In order to make the implications of the Metarationality Theorem more predictive, rationality will be interpreted
as a descriptive characteristic of certain people in certain
environment at certain times.

Finally, in order to make the

implications of this theorem more precise, the Law of
Requisite control will be used to interpret the imposition
upon the game-like environment of a collective form of selfcontrol as a transformation of that game-like environment
through the collective communication and enforcement of a
social choice message into one that is collectively optimal.
The Metarationality Theorem can now be reinterpreted
as a Collective Communication Corollary:

rational people in

a collectively suboptimal game-like environment with access
to effective collective communication and enforcement
mechanisms will produce, distribute and enforce social
choice messages which specify a pattern of behavior sufficient to transform that environment into one that is collectively optimal.

This proposition, the seventh in the Social

Theory of Collective Communication and the first proposition
in that theory to move beyond description into the realm of
prediction, is a corollary of the Metarationality Theorem.
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A new concept has been introduced in this proposition
which, although its use is straightforward, may raise questions about the role of communication in the process of
social choice.

If social choice is dependent at least in

part upon the enforcement of social choice messages, then
how important, it might be asked, is communication; what is
the relation between communication and enforcement; and what
exactly is the meaning of the term "enforcement"?
Enforcement of a social choice message will be taken
here to mean action taken to ensure that the behavior of
people within a particular game-like environment resembles
as closely as possible the behavior prescribed by that
social choice message.

It will be demonstrated that not all

social choice messages need to be enforced; that among those
that do need to be enforced, the relation between communication and enforcement can be more or less close; and that
even when it is entirely separate from communication,
enforcement may depend upon and be represented as the
collective communication of a social choice message.

In

addition, while the focus in this dissertation is upon
collective communication rather than enforcement, it can be
argued that analysis of the enforcement of messages in
general and of social choice messages in particular is a
part of pragmatics, that branch of communication research
which, according to Morris,4 is devoted to the study of
signs in relation to their interpreters.
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Social choice messages do not always need to be
enforced by action taken separate from the communication of
those messages.

Members of an association, for example, may

want to know what time and place have been chosen for the
next conference to be held by that association.

Assuming

that some members plan to attend that conference, those
members would have no motivation to show up in some city or
on some date other than that decided upon and announced.

In

this type of game-like environment, the absence of
communication would be collectively suboptimal.

people

share an interest in reaching an agreement, and the content
of that agreement is important primarily insofar as it is
communicated to everyone in that environment.

Social

choice messages communicated in such an environment might be
described as self-enforcing.
The situation described as the prisoner's dilemma is
substantially different, however, and deserves close
examination.

In the first place, it is assumed that the

prisoners in this situation are held incommunicado.

If they

are never allowed to communicate with anyone but the D.A.,
any discussion of collective communication or social choice
messages is irrelevant.

The dilemma cannot be solved.

However in the United States, except under extreme
circumstances, this dilemma may be avoided, for by law
anyone who is arrested for a crime must be informed of and
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granted certain civil liberties, among which is the right to
call a lawyer.

If a lawyer for one prisoner is able to

speak with both his client and with the lawyer for the other
prisoner and if that second lawyer has, in turn, spoken with
his client, the stipulation that the two prisoners not be
allowed to communicate would be indirectly circumvented.
If the conditions of the game are altered to allow for
communication, several possi.bilites emerge.

For purposes of

exposition, it will be convenient here to regard the actions
open to each prisoner as the pleas that each may enter, a
plea of guilty or a plea of not guilty--it being understood
that a plea of guilty is accompanied by a confession in
which the other prisoner is implicated, that if one prisoner
pleads guilty and the other does not, the first will be used
as state's evidence against the second, and that if both
prisoners plead guilty, neither will be used as state's
evidence.
Consider now the case where the same lawyer represents
both prisoners.

Each prisoner would be motivated to in-

struct that lawyer to enter a plea of not guilty unless the
other prisoner instructs the lawyer to enter a plea of
guilty in the case where the first wants to plead not guilty.
That is, each prisoner would want the lawyer to enter a plea
of not guilty, conditional upon the other prisoner
instructing the lawyer to enter a plea of not guilty, where
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the latter plea is either unconditional or conditional upon
the former.

If, taking into account both their interests,

the lawyer enters a plea of not guilty on behalf of each of
his clients, this case would never come to trial, since the
D.A. apparently has too little evidence for a conviction

without at least one confession.

This example suggests that

when a social choice message produced and distributed by a
communication mechanism constitutes, in and of itself, an
action leading to certain results, enforcement of this
message is simply a part of the communication process.
On the other hand, it might be argued that in this
example it is the decision on the part of the lawyer and his
clients to enter pleas of not guilty that constitutes the
social choice "message" and that the entering of these pleas
by the lawyer represents an action whose relation to the
decision is enforced by the professionalism of the lawyer or
by the possibility of appeal through the legal system.

In

this scenario communication and enforcement are either so
closely related as to be physically indistinguishable, with
enforcement seen as a part of the communication process, or
they are separate processes, with enforcement already given
as part of the game-like environment.

In either case, this

would be another example of a self-enforcing social choice
message.
Another variation on the scenario would be generated
by assuming that each prisoner must enter his own plea in

-58-

court.

In this case regardless of any prior agreement or

social choice, each prisoner is free to plea guilty or not
guilty, and the dilemma reappears.

It is instructive, how-

ever, to consider the extent to which the pleas of guilty
and not guilty differ with respect to their finality,
especially when it is assumed that a guilty plea is
accompanied by a confession.

Having entered a plea of not

guilty, it would be possible for a prisoner to change his
plea to guilty and confess any time up to the point when
argument in the trial is officially closed.

However, while

a prisoner might also change a plea of guilty to one of not
guilty, his confession would probably make such a change of
plea ineffective, even if the other prisoner never
confessed.

Therefore, in practical terms a plea of guilty

(accompanied by a confession) is irreversable.
This difference between pleas is significant in the
situation designated as prisoner's dilemma, for the prisoner
who enters his plea first can plead innocent and use the
possibility of changing his plea later to guilty as a threat
to keep the other prisoner from entering a plea of guilty.
The same is true even if each prisoner is tried separately,
or if the prisoner who turns state's evidence is never
prosecuted, for as soon as one prisoner is brought in to
testify for the state against the other, the second prisoner
can change his plea to guilty, which would be rational if it
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would serve to lighten his own sentence.

This example sug-

gests that in a prisoner's dilemma-like situation, a difference between the finality of an action that would be
rational but would very possibly make for a collectively
suboptimal result and an action that would be irrational but
would guarantee a collectively optimal result (where the
former is irreversible but the latter is not) makes it
possible for each person in that environment to "enforce" a
social choice message simply by threatening to violate the
content of that message if anyone else does.
Once again enforcement could be viewed as an implicit
part of the social choice process, inherent in either the
communication mechanism or the game-like environment.

How-

ever, it seems logical to view enforcement in this case as
having been achieved explicitly through a separate process
which makes it possible for each prisoner to monitor the
behavior of the other for violations of the social choice
and to "enforce" the content of that choice through the
threat of bilateral violation.

The distinguishing feature

of this type of enforcement is that it is achieved without
the use of separate sanctions.
A third alternative scenario can be generated by
dropping the assumption that a plea of not guilty is
revers able while a guilty plea is not and by adding the
assumption that the two prisoners have actually committed a
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series of crimes.

In this situation one prisoner can

enforce an agreement or choice to plead not guilty to the
first crime by threatening to confess to and implicate his
partner in the others.

This example suggests that in

prisoner's dilemma-like situations which occur repeatedly, a
social choice message prescribing behavior at one point in
time can be enforced by the threat of violating such a
prescription in the future.

Since a reoccurrence of such a

situation is, in effect, distinct from its first occurrence,
even though they are exactly comparable in all other
respects, it will be represented here as an enforcement
mechanism with separate sanctions.
In the case where the crimes committed by one prisoner
are relatively unimportant compared to the crimes perpetrated by the other, law enforcement officials go to great
lengths to get the first prisoner to turn state's evidence
against the second.

In such a case, the second prisoner has

more to lose by pleading guilty than he has to gain.

How-

ever, it is not uncommon for such an "important" criminal to
bring other pressures to bear upon the one who has turned
state's evidence by threatening his life or family.

This

suggests that a social choice message may be enforced by the
administration of sanctions that are totally distinct from
the game-like environment to which that message refers.

For

such sanctions to be effective, however, it would be necessary for the "important" prisoner to send a message to
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remind the other of the possibility of such external sanctions.

Moreover, if none of the previous scenarios are

possible and two or more people in a prisoner's dilemma-like
environment decide to make use of sanctions such as these to
enforce a social choice message, the sanctions themselves
must be announced through the production and distribution of
a social choice message.
The relationship between communication of a social
choice message and behavior in a game-like environment is,
thus, both varied and complex.

It does not always involve

separate enforcement of the message.

When social choice

messages are not self-enforcing and a process of enforcement
separate from the process of communication is necessary, it
may depend for sanctions upon action in a series of similar
environments or in an environment that is totally distinct
from the first.

Even when enforcement is necessary and

depends upon sanctions in similar or different environments,
i.e., upon separate sanctions, the process by which a message is enforced always involves the communication of
information and only occasionally the administration of
sanctions.

Thus, the central feature of a social choice

process is the production and distribution of messages, not
the administration of sanctions.
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Metacommunication
The Metarationality Theorem rests upon the assumption
that the metagame-like environment is collectively optimal.
This is a restrictive assumption, however, for it may well
be that the metagame-like environment is characterized by a
form of control that leads rational people to behave in such
a way that they impose a type of control upon the basic
game-like environment that leads, in turn, to a collectively
suboptimal result.

On the American frontier, for example,

when laws governing the definition and exchange of property
rights were nonexistant or so vague as to make such rights
extremely insecure, investment in the development of
resources was typically below the level that would have been
collectively optimal.

However, as soon as the return from

such investments appeared substantial, efforts were undertaken to make use of territorial or state legislatures to
render these rights more secure by passing legislation
specifying in greater detail the process by which property
rights could be defined, protected and, exchanged.

This

example suggests that if, in the case of a suboptimal
metagame-like environment, there exists another game-like
environment that stands in the same hierarchical relation to
the metagame-like environment as the relation in which that
metagame-like environment stands to the basic game-like
environment and if that other game-like environment (to be
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designated here a double metagame-like environment) is
characterized by self-control, it is possible for people in
this environment to impose a type of control on the
metagame-like environment such that that environment would
no longer be collectively suboptimal.
This hierarchy of game-like environments could be
extended further, perhaps indefinitely.

The theory of col-

lective communication can be given some closure, however, by
regarding any sequence of two or more single metagame-like
environments related to one another in a hierarchical
fashion as constituting a compound metagame-like
environment.

Any compound metagame-like environment in

which the environment farthest away in the hierarchy from
the basic game-like environment is characterized by
collective self-control will be designated here as
collectively optimal, for working "downward" from that
metagame-like environment each succeeding environment can be
transformed until the metagame-like environment immediately
"above" the basic game-like environment in the hierarchy
becomes collectively optimal.
In the example given above concerning the development
of property rights on the American frontier, consider the
situation prior to the establishment of a territorial
government.

The development of resources was hampered by

the lack of legislation governing the definition and
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exchange of property rights over these resources.

This

legal void could not be filled however, for there was no
formal government at the appropriate level.

It was

possible, however, for the Federal Government to set up a
territorial government and for that territorial government
then to pass and enforce laws in the context of which
property rights could be well defined, carefully protected
and easily exchanged.

Of course prior to the existence of

the federal government, a constitutional convention took
place and a constitution was written which established that
level of government.

The constitutional convention and

federal government might be described together as a compound
double metaenvironment; and, insofar as these institutions
were democratic and representative of the people on the
frontier, that environment would be characterized by a
degree of self-control.
The Metarationality Theorem can now be transformed
into a Double Metarationality Theorem as follows:

it is

rational for people in a collectively suboptimal game-like
environment with access to a collectively suboptimal
metagame-like environment and a single or compound collectively optimal double metagame-like environment to act so as
to impose upon the metagame-like environment a collective
form of self-control.
As with the Metarationality Theorem, this new proposition can be given a more concrete, predictive interpretation
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in terms of collective communication.

However, since this

new proposition describes the imposition of control upon a
metagame-like environment, it must be interpreted in terms
of the production, distribution and enforcement of social
choice messages whose content prescribes a mechanism for the
collective communication and enforcement of social choice
messages.
In the example just cited, the law passed by the
federal legislature establishing a territorial government
can be interpreted as just such a message.

The communi-

cation process involved here, whether represented as a
single or compound metagame-like environment will be
designated as metacommunication, because it consists of the
communication of messages about the communication of messages.

Thus a double metagame-like environment, whether

single or compound, will be taken to imply the availability
of metacommunication and enforcement mechanisms.

The ninth

proposition in the Social Theory of Collective
Communication, designated the Collective Metacommunication
Corollary, reads as follows:

rational people in a

collectively suboptimal game-like environment with access to
ineffective collective communication and enforcement
mechanisms and to effective metacommunication and
enforcement mechanisms will produce, distribute and enforce
social choice messages which specify a pattern of behavior
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sufficient to transform those ineffective mechanisms into
ones that are effective.

As before, communication and

enforcement mechanisms will be defined as effective if they
can be represented together as a collectively optimal
metagame-like environment.

The Double Metarationality

Theorem and the Collective Metacommunication Corollary are
both based upon Collary B of Theroem 7 in Appendix C.

Communication Costs
Each of the propositions described in the preceding
section appears to be based upon the implicit assumption
that the imposition or alteration of control, and thus the
collective communication of social choice messages in a
game-like environment, is costless.

This may be true in

some cases when the collective communication mechanism is
already in place and easy to use, when failure on the part
of any person to abide by a social choice communicated
through the mechanism is immediately and abundantly obvious
to all concerned, and where such proscribed behavior results
in the loss of any possibility for arriving at an outcome
equal to or more preferred than the result of rational
behavior in the absence of a social choice.

However, in

general, where the operation of a collective communication
mechanism is not free or easy, where detection may not be
automatic and/or where some individual or group may want to
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proceed with a cooperative effort regardless of the behavior
of one or two others, this assumption is unrealistic.

In

the example discussed above, the constitutional convention
and the federal government are obviously not costless
operations.
There are at least three separate costs which must be
included in any consideraton of the efficiency of collective
communication.

Firstly, there are the transaction and bar-

gaining costs incurred in collectively producing and
distributing a message concerning the social choice.

These

include the costs of generating alternative social choices,
retrieving and transmitting information about the
preferences of people for these alternatives, producing a
message describing the collectively optimal alternatives,
and distributing this message to all concerned parties.
They will be designated communciation costs or
metacommunication costs, depending upon the level at which
they are incurred.

Secondly, there are costs due directly

to any separate system of sanctions that is employed apart
from the choice of one or another action already specified
as part of the game-like environment.

These would include

the value of any rewards and the costs of any punishments to
the people administering them.

Thirdly, there are the costs

of administering the enforcement mechanism, whether or not
it involves separate sanctions.

These include the

-68-

informational and decision-making costs necessary for
detection of violations and application of sanctions.

The

second and third set of costs will be designated enforcement
costs.
To incorporate the concept of costs into the theory of
collective communication, it is necessary to distinguish
between the gross results of action in a game-like
environment, i.e. results exclusive of any and all costs,
and the net results of that action, i.e., results which
include all the costs involved in taking action in metagamelike and double metagame-like environments.

It is clear now

that the concept of collective optimality as used in the
propositions described above must refer to net results and
not to gross results.

The cost of taking a particular

action is, of course, one of the results of taking that
action, and therefore the action taken in a metagame-like
environment to impose control upon a basic game-like
environment, would also impose the costs of taking that
action upon the basic game-like environment.
If people in a game-like environment behave in such a
way as to obtain a collectively optimal result, where
collective optimality is defined in terms which take
communication and enforcement costs into account, that
behavior will be described here as efficient.

The

communication corollaries can thus be interpreted as
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predicting that rational people will behave efficiently when
access to certain kinds of metagame-like environments is
assumed.

Whether or not particular people are rational in a

particular situation is, of course, an empirical question.
To draw out the prescriptive dimension of the Social Theory
of Collective Communication, it is useful to derive
efficiency corollaries that can be viewed as prescribing
that in order to act rationally, people with access to
certain kinds of metagame-like environments should act
efficiently.

Two propositions can be stated here as

corollaries of the rationality theorems, collolaries which
interpret rationality as a desirable characteristic of
behavior in game-like environments and which now explicitly
incorporate the concept of collective communication and
enforcement costs.
The Metarationality Theorem can be interpreted as
follows:

to act rationally, people in a collectively sub-

optimal game-like environment with access to effective
collective communication and enforcement mechanisms should
produce, distribute and enforce social choice messages which
specify a pattern of behavior sufficient to transform this
environment into one in which the results of rational
behavior, taking into account communication and enforcement
costs, are collectively optimal.

The proposition will be
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designated the Efficiency Corollary of Collective Communication.
Another proposition, resulting from a similar interpretation of the Double Metarationality Theorem reads as
follows:

to act rationally, people in a collectively sub-

optimal game-like

enviro~ment

with access to ineffective

collective communication and enforcement mechanisms and to
effective collective metacommunication and enforcement
mechanisms should produce, distribute and enforce social
choice messages which specify a pattern of behavior sufficient to transform the collective communication and enforcement mechanisms into ones through which that game-like
environment can be transformed into one in which the results
of rational behavior, taking into account communication,
metacommunication and enforcement costs, are collectively
optimal.

This proposition is designated the Efficiency

Corollary of Collective Metacommunication.

Together with

the other corollary, it is based upon Corollaries A and B of
Theorem 17 derived in Appendix C.

Conclusion
This concludes the initial exposition of the Social
Theory of Collective Communication.

The eleven propositions

described above along with their associated assumptions,
definitions and illustrations are sufficient to answer the
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four research questions with which this dissertation began.
They can serve either as a verbal introduction to the
mathematical model developed in Appendices A, B, and C, from
which they derive logical validity, or as a general summary
of the social theory whose applicability and empirical
validity are explored in the next five chapters.
This dissertation began with the problem of developing
a theory of collective communication sufficient to answer
four questions.

The first two questions were prescriptive

in nature and have been addressed primarily by the efficiency corollaries, while the last two were predictive in
nature and have been addressed primarily by the communication corollaries.

A juxtaposition of each question and

the answer provided to it by the Social Theory of Collective
Communication will provide some insight into the adequacy of
this theory as presently constituted.
The first question to be addressed was "what types of
social choice messages should be communicated to realize
common interests in different economic environments?"

This

question is addressed by the efficiency corollaries which
suggest that the best social choice messages are those which
specify a pattern of behavior sufficient to transform a collectively suboptimal game-like environment into one in which
the results of rational behavior, taking into account communication and enforcement costs, are collectively optimal
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and those which specify a pattern of behavior sufficient to
transform an ineffective collective communication and
enforcement mechanism into one through which messages such
as those described above can be produced, distributed and
enforced.

It is also apparent from these corollaries that

if the game-like environment is collectively suboptimal but
the collective communication and enforcement mechanisms are
effective, then it would be best to communicate only the
first type of message, while if the game-like environment
were collectively optimal, then it would be best not to
communicate either type of social choice message.
The efficiency corollaries thus provide precise
answers to the first research question.

They describe the

types of social choice messages that are required for
collectively optimal results in different economic (or gamelike) environments.

If collective optimality is an

acceptable norm, this answer is clearly sufficient.
It may be however that collective optimality is not
considered acceptable as a norm.

Certainly additional

norms, such as those with distributional implications, may
be applied in making a social choice when more than one
collectively optimal result is possible.

Moreover, as Sen 5

has suggested, collective optimality may be considered
acceptable only when based upon certain kinds of
preferences, e.g. preferences that are not motivated by
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hatred, jealousy, competition or ideas about what is good
for others, and only when based upon preferences defined
over certain kinds of actions, e.g., actions that have no
effect on the results of other actions taken in a game-like
environment.

Nevertheless, as an extension of individual

optimality, collective optimality is a practical criterion
to implement, it is characteristic of many real-world
collective communication and enforcement mechanisms, and it
is widely accepted in the literature on social welfare.
Thus, to the extent that the general terms of the Social
Theory of Collective Communication can be extended to
represent specific problems in a meaningful way, this theory
appears to provide useful answers to problems in message
design.
The second research question was stated as follows:
"what type of collective communication mechanisms should be
developed to communicate these messages in these environments?"

The efficiency corollaries point out that effective

communication and metacommunication mechanisms are required
for efficient behavior, but it is necessary to consider the
definition of an effective mechanism in order to obtain a
less obvious answer.

Effective mechanisms have been defined

as those that represent collectively optimal metagame-like
environments.

Since the Law of Requisite Control states

that collective optimality requires self-control,
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collectively optimal metagame-like environments can be
interpreted as collective communication and enforcement
mechanisms characterized by self-control, i.e. where the
selection of social choice messages to be produced,
distributed and enforced is informed by the preferences of
all the people affected by those messages.
Since a double metagame-like environment is also a
metagame-like environment, the same holds true for metacommunication and enforcement mechanisms.

Thus the efficiency

corollaries together with the Law of Requisite Control and
definitions of effective collective communication and
enforcement mechanisms provides a precise answer to the
second research question.

They describe the most efficient

and effective type of collective communication mechanisms
for communicating social choice messages.

Once again, if

collective optimality is an acceptable norm and if the
general terms of the Social Theory of Collective
Communication can be extended to represent specific problems
in communication system design in a meaningful way, this
theory can provide useful answers.
The third and fourth research questions are merely
predictive versions, in reverse order, of the first two:
"what types of collective communication mechanisms will be
developed in different economic environments," and "what
type of social choice messages will be communicated through
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these mechanisms in these environments?"

The third question

is answered by the communication corollaries together with
the Law of Requisite control and the definition of an
effective collective communication and enforcement
mechanism, while the fourth question is answered by the
communication corollaries alone.

The communication

corollaries suggest that rational people in a collectively
suboptimal game-like environment with access to effective
collective communication, metacommunication and enforcement
mechanisms will communicate social choice messages which
specify a pattern of behavior sufficient to transform that
environment into one in which the result of rational
behavior, taking into account communication and enforcement
costs, is collectively optimal.

Together with the Law of

Requisite Control and the definition of effective collective
communication, metacommunication and enforcement mechanisms,
the communication corollaries suggest that rational people
in a collectively suboptimal game-like environment will
develop collective communication and enforcement mechanisms
in which the selection of social choice messages to be
produced, distributed and enforced is informed by the
preferences of all the people affected by these messages.
The adequacy of the communication corollaries as
answers to these questions depends not only upon the
acceptability of collective optimality as a norm to be used

-76-

in guiding rational behavior but also upon the acceptability
of rationality as an empirical description of the behavior
of which the people under consideration are capable.
To determine the applicability of the Social Theory of
Collective Communication on a more specific level, the
extent to which the general prepositions of this theory can
be given specific meaningful interpretations and the
effectiveness with which the abstract concepts described in
these prepositions can be given concrete, operational
definitions, the communication and efficiency corollaries
will be examined in the next two chapters for solutions to
certain salient problems in the areas of political and
social communication.

These solutions will be articulated

as theorems whose implications regarding related
methodological and theoretical issues will then be drawn
out.

The empirical validity of this theory of collective

communication will be demonstrated to the extent that the
implications of these theorems correspond to the empirically
validated results of other current theories, while the
usefulness of the Social Theory of Collective Communication
will be demonstrated to the extent that it suggests answers
to questions that currently elude other theories.
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CHAPTER II
POLITICAL FORMS OF COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATION

In the first chapter of this dissertation, the
mathematical model of collective communication developed in
Appendices A, B, and C, was verbally interpreted as a theory
of collective communication.

This social theory was

described through the articulation of eleven logically
interrelated propositions which were shown to provide
answers to the four research questions with which this
dissertation began.

However, while the logical validity of

these propositions has been demonstrated, their empirical
validity is still an open question.

Moreover, the

applicability of these propositions to specific problems,
the verifiability of the answers they provide in terms of
concrete data and, indeed, the usefulness of the theory of
collective communication in supplementing current social
theory are matters still to be explored.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the applicability of the Social Theory of Collective Communication to
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theoretical problems and methodological issues in the area
of political communications.

It should be noted'that

political communication as analyzed here is quite different
from political communication as generally conceived.

These

problems and issues do not concern interpersonal, public or
mass communications about the political process, such as
political advertising or journalistic coverage of political
campaigns.

Rather, the focus of this chapter is the collec-

tive communication mechanisms which are the very essence of
a political system, such as political elections or
legislative procedures.

Political Problems and Solutions
This exploration will begin by describing three
related social situations which have proven to be
problematic:

common property resource management, market

failure, and the provision of public goods

Research

demonstrating that these situations can be described as
game-like environments will then be cited.

Propositions

described in Chapter I concerning such game-like
environments will be transformed into theorems concerning
the use of three political forms of collective communication
as a possible solution to these problems:

private property

rights messages, public property rights messages and public
goods messages.

Finally, the implications of the Social

Theory of Collective Communication will be drawn out
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regarding two methodological issues raised by these
theorems:

the measurement of precision and theCmeasurement

of power.

These implications will be compared to the

solutions offered by current work in the economics of law
and in positive political theory.

Common property Resource Management
The regulation of social interaction is both an
ancient concern and a problem of increasing salience in
modern society.

One of the most well-known and frequently

quoted explanations of the need for regulating social
interaction is Garrett Hardin's classic essay on lithe
tragedy of the commons.

III

This essay sets forth a scenario,

first sketched in 1833 by William F. Lloyd, who was inspired
in turn by the writings of Malthus, which outlines the
remorseless logic by which herdsmen who raise cattle on a
commons are compelled by their own self-interest to increase
the size of their herds until the carrying capacity of the
land is exceeded and all are ruined.

Each herdsman keeps

the proceeds from the sale of each animal he adds to his
herd while, on the other hand, he shares with the other
herdsmen the costs associated with the overgrazing caused by
this same animal.

Assuming that each herdsman's proceeds

exceed his share of the costs but that the total costs
exceed these individual proceeds, the result is as Hardin
describes:

-81-

Each man is locked into a system that compels
him to increase his herd without limit--in a
world that is limited. Ruin is the disaster
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society that believes in
the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a
commons brings ruin to all. 2
The "tragedy of the commons" is offered by Hardin both
as a specific case in point and as a general metaphor to
describe the varied problems of common property resource
management, and he pOints to many modern examples of this
"tragedy," including the arms race, the population explosion, environmental pollution, the energy shortage, species
extinction, and the global scarcity of food and raw materials.

Underlying all crises of this sort is a fundamental

problem:

HOW is it possible for self-interested individuals

to regulate social interaction so as to realize their common
interests and, in the long run, to ensure their common
survival?
When human societies are faced with problems of this
kind, their response is often to regulate interaction
through social choice messages communicated through a
political mechanism.

To the extent that this mechanism is

democratic, such regulation is achieved through the
collective communication of social choice messages.

There

are two fundamental approaches to the problem of regulating
social interaction on a commons.

Both of them are based

upon the assumption that a collective channel of political
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communication is readily available, that is, they assume the
existence of a constitution which defines voting rights,
decision-making rules and responsibilities and a criminal
justice system through which these decisions are enforced.
In addition, both approaches assume that the scope of this
political system is commensurate with the scope of "the
commons".

In other words, they assume that all those who

participate in the collective production of a social choice
message through this political channel have an interest in
the regulation of social interaction on "the commons" and
that all those who have such an interest are participants in
that communication process.

Moreover, both of these

approaches mayor may not achieve a solution to the problem through an allocation of resources that is more efficient
than that which results from unregulated interaction-interaction resulting from the structure of self-interest
and the nature of the common environment.

They differ,

however, in that the first approach requires the collective
definition and communication of a system of private property
rights while the second is based upon a definition of the
commons as public property.

The first approach thus allows

for the allocation of resources indirectly through the
market system, while the second approach requires that
resources be allocated directly through the political
system.

The advantage of one approach over the other

depends, on the one hand, upon the ease with which the goods
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(or bads) and services (or disservices) in which those on
the commons have an interest can be transformed into private
property or, in other words, upon the cost involved in
defining and enforcing private property rights over these
goods and services, and, on the other hand, upon the ease
with which these goods and/or services can be publicly
allocated, that is, upon the cost involved in negotiating
and enacting collective agreements as to the provision of
resources for producing these goods (or services).

Private property Rights Messages
Property rights are commonly thought of in terms of
ownership.

However, the ownership relation existing between

a person and a resource is both varied and complex.

To

begin with, as Alchian and Demsetz point out, "it is not the
resource itself that is owned; it is a bundle, or a portion,
of rights to use a resource that is owned."

In other words,

"what are owned are socially recognized rights of action.,,3
According to FUrubotn and pejovich, the right of
ownership consists, by general agreement, of three elements
"(a) the right to use the asset

(USUS),

appropriate return from the asset

(USUS

(b) the right to
fructus), and

(C)

the right to change the asset's form and/or substance
(abusus).,,4

Although property rights are assigned to

individuals or groups of individuals, they are, as Demsetz
has noted, "an instrument of society and derive their

-84-

significance from the fact that they help a man form those
expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings
with others.

These expectations find expression in the

laws, customs, and mores of a society."S

The significance

of property rights thus lies in their effect upon social
interaction, a point which is not lost on FUrubotn and
Pejovich, who go so far as to state that "property rights do
not refer to relations between men and things but, rather,
to the sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise
from the existence of things and pertain to their use"
(emphasis in original).6
Even more important for this dissertation is the fact
that property rights are, in fact, defined by means of messages such as laws.

Behavioral relations are the referents

of these messages; and to the extent that the specification
of individual property rights reduces uncertainty with regard to the outcome of social interaction, these messages
will effect the expectations of those who receive them and
are involved in such interactions.
messages will effect their behavior.

Hence property rights
For a message to be

informative of something more than just the wording of that
message, the receiver must have some reason to expect that
the prescriptions or proscriptions explicitly or implicitly
contained in a definition of property rights will beenforced.

Thus the information transmitted by a message conveying

property rights depends both upon the wording of that
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message and the p,obability with which that content will be
enforced, as perceived by the receiver of that message.
The perceived probability with which property rights
will be enforced depends, in turn, upon social choice messages establishing specific institutions and procedures to
ensure enforcement and social choice messages allocating
sufficient funds for such activity.

These messages must

also be perceived as being enforced, which perception
depends, in turn, upon more general messages and ultimately
upon a constitution of some sort which must contain
instructions for its own enforcement.
Because the subject is somewhat complex and because it
is not directly relevant to the specific problem addressed
in this dissertation, it will simply be assumed here that
uncertainty regarding the enforcement of property rights has
been removed to the point where it is rational to obey any
property rights messages collectively communicated in the
form of a law.

However, lest the objection be raised that

social behavior is controlled throught the enforcement of
social choices and that enforcement rather than communication is the crucial problem to be investigated, it should
be reiterated that enforcement through separate sanctions,
as was demonstrated in Chapter I, is not necessary as long
as the recognition of property rights by anyone person is
contingent upon the recognition of those rights by every
other person.

In real world situations where it may be more
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convenient to rely upon enforcement through separate negative sanctions, enforcement itself is crucially dependent
upon the collective communication of social choice messages.
Moreover, enforcement is merely one aspect of pragmatics,
that area of communications research concerned with the
relation between communication and other forms of behavior.
To see how collectively produced property rights
messages might have an impact upon social interaction,
consider once again Garrett Hardin's commons.

The commons

illustrates a situation in which all men have what Alchian
and Demsetz have called communal rights, "a bundle of rights
which includes the right to use a scarce resource but fails
to include the right of an 'absentee owner' to exclude
others from using the resource.,,7

This situation occurs

both in cases where a resource such as the air or the sea is
not owned by anyone and in cases where the resource is technically owned by the state but when that state does not
exercise its right of exclusion, such as in public parks and
thoroughfares.

As in the case of the commons, the difficul-

ty with a communal right is that, as Alchian and Demsetz
point out, "it is not conducive to the accurate measurement
of the cost that will be associated with any person's use of
the resource. ,,8
One approach to the problem posed by a system of
communal property rights is to exchange that system for one
of private property rights.

If a commons, for example, is
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enclosed so that each herdsman who now owns a portion of it
can exclude other herdsmen from using his portion, then each
herdsman no longer has an incentive to increase his herd
beyond the carrying capacity of his range, for he will be
the one to suffer the loss while, on the other hand, no one
else but he will gain from proper resource management on his
part.

It is clear that, as FUrubotn and Pejovich point out,

"to exclude some people from free access to a good means to
specify property rights in that good.,,9

Moreover, assuming

that the costs of defining and enforcing property rights to
a commons does not exceed the benefit to be gained from
doing so, a more complete and definite specification of
individual property rights decreases uncertainty and tends
to promote efficient allocation and use of that resource.
Many different kinds of mathematical models have been
developed to analyse the problems of common property resource management.

Some of these have been game-theoretical

models.

Several authors, including Hardin, Taylor,
Buchanan, and Muhsam10 have made use of the game called
prisoner's dilemma to model this general problem.

Of these,

Muhsam's version is the most useful, because it is directly
related to Hardin's conceptualization and because it makes
quite clear all the assumptions upon which the model rests.
These authors, and Muhsam in particular, demonstrate that
the problem of common property resource management can be
represented as a collectively suboptimal game-like
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environment.

Thus the collective Communication Corollary

can be interpreted in such a way as to apply directly to
this particular problem.
This particularization is made possible by interpreting the corollary specifically in terms of property rights
messages.

People with collective rights to a scarce

resource will be viewed as acting within a collectively
suboptimal game-like environment.

Collective communication

and enforcement mechanisms will be particularized as
collective political communication and enforcement
mechanisms and social choice messages will be restricted to
private property rights messages.

The sufficiency of these

messages will be further articulated in terms of both the
pattern of behavior that is specified in these messages and
in terms of the precision with which that behavior is
specified.

Finally, the transformation of a collectively

suboptimal environment into a collectively optimal
environment will be represented here by the transformation
of a scarce resource over which collective rights are
defined into one over which private property rights are now
defined in a manner sufficient to ensure that the management
of that resource is collectively optimal.
This particularization can be stated explicitly here
as a proposition concerning the collective communication of
property rights messages, to be called the Private Property
Rights Corollary:

Rational people with collective rights to
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a scarce resource and with access to an effective, collective, political communication mechanism will produce, distribute and enforce private property rights messages that
are sufficiently patterned and sufficiently precise to
ensure that management of that resource is collectively
optimal.

It is assumed here, as was the case with the

Collective Communication Corollary, that the costs of
producing, distributing and enforcing these messages does
not exceed the benefit to be gained by each person from
collectively optimal management of the resource.

Market Failure
It is sometimes too costly to transform common property rights such as those illustrated by the case of the
commons, where access to a resource (unowned or publicly
owned) is open to all and where it can be converted into
private property through the appropriation or use of that
resource, into private property rights.

In fact, the costs

of defining and enforcing such private property rights may,
in the absence of any institution for excluding nonowners
from using the resource, appear to be infinite.

Moreover,

even where property rights can be efficiently defined and
enforced, the transaction costs involved in exchanging these
rights through a market may be so high as to make the establishment of such a market inefficient.
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Such cases can be characterized as examples of "market
failure"--in the sense that they represent conditions under
which a market would not be predicted to materialize among
rational individuals or, alternatively, conditions under
which a market would not be prescribed as necessary or sufficient for optimization.

In such a game-like environment,

it would not be rational for people to produce and
distribute private property rights messages since the costs
of enforcing these messages would be higher than the gain to
be realized through the communication and enforcement of
such rights.
Insofar as such a game-like environment is a comprehensive representation of all extant markets, this gain
represents a divergence between the apparent "social cost"
i.e., the cost to a society of individuals who could
coordinate their behavior in an efficient manner and the
private cost represented by the outcome of the game.

The

loss that appears to result from the realization of this
outcome in contrast to the benefit that it might be possible
to achieve is characterized in the economics literature as
an "externality", for it is an effect arising from the
action of some party to a market transaction that occurs
outside of the mediation of that market.
perhaps because externalities must be defined not only
in terms of an objective phenomenon, such as a market, but
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also in relation to an observer's model of an hypothetical
ideal, there are almost as many different classifications of
externalities as there are authors on the subject.

In

addition, numerous authors have taken pains to point out
relationships between externalities and other related
economic concepts such as spillovers, side effects, thirdparty effects, neighborhood effects, public goods and
collective goods.

Given this proliferation of

classification schemes and the resulting terminological
confusion, it seems best to avoid the subject of "goods"
(and "bads") or (dis)economies altogether and focus upon
property rights as defined over natural and other resources
and as communicated through social choice messages.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the Social
Theory of Collective Communication applied here abstracts
away from any distinction between producer and consumer.
rests solely upon a representation of the interaction
between two or more people and therefore is capable of
representing both of the cases analysed by Buchanan:
It is widely recognized that all jointconsumption relationships are themselves
externalities. In the strict sense, therefore,
the failure of contractual arrangements to
emerge may depend critically on the presence of
two potential externality relationships rather
than one. There may be an externality between
the "producer" of an effect and the "consumer",
but there may also be an externality among
separate "consumers." The second of these may
occur without the first, in which case we have
the standard collective-goods paradigm. Or the

It
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second of these may accompany the first, in
which case we have the collective or publicgoods paradigm plus an additional externality
relationship, that between the group of joint
consumers, considered as one party, and the
producer or generator of the effects in
question. voluntary action will not produce
fully Ifficient results in either of these two
cases.
In addition, the Social Theory of Collective
Communication eschews any reference to the many possible
reasons why this interaction might be too costly to
decompose efficiently and therefore why it might lead to
market failure and possible external (dis)economies.

Since

the model is entirely general in this regard, the
interaction between players can be variously interpreted as
due to the divorce of scarcity from ownership
(nonappropriability or nonexcludability), publicness
(jointness or collectiveness in consumption),
indivisibilities (lumpiness), or increasing returns to scale
in the relevant range of output.

Moreover, the problems

that make the decomposition of interactions associated with
these causes inefficient could include those associated with
the definition and enforcement of private property rights,
such as technical intractability, as well as those associated with the emergence of collective action or a competitive
market given such rights, such as the free-rider (or holdout) problem, which is known in another form as the problem
of information (or revealed preference), and the problem of
high transaction costs when large numbers are involved.

-93-

For example, when the common property resource involved is not a pasture or meadow as in Hardin's "tragedy" but
an oilfield, a fishery, a body of water or the atmosphere,
the process of "enclosure," that is of defining and enforcing the rights of specific users to particular portions of
that oil, fish, water or air, becomes extremely costly (or
virtually impossible).

Moreover, in the case of resources

like water or air which are used by a great many people,
informational problems and transaction costs are often
severe.

In the case where the common property resource

involves the atmosphere and where a factory has the right to
pollute the air, residents in the surrounding area would
have an incentive to collectively negotiate a fee in return
for which the factory would lower the level of pollution to
some mutually agreed upon level.

However, since all of the

nearby residents would benefit from any such reduction, each
has an additional incentive to get a "free ride" by not participating in such a negotiation or contributing to such a
payment.

On the other hand, if the local residents have

"amenity rights" in clean air and the factory is thereby
liable for any pollution it causes, that factory might be
motivated to pay those residents for the right to pollute up
to a certain level.

However, since the agreement of every

resident would be necessary, each could "hold out" for more
money from the factory than was accepted by his neighbor. In
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either case, the costs necessary for a market transaction to
occur might be higher than the benefits from that transaction.

Public Property Rights Messages
In such cases of "market failure" where significant
externalities appear to exist, it is appropriate to consider
whether another type of social choice message might result
in a more efficient solution to the problem.

In particular,

it is pertinent to investigate the possibility of exerting
direct control over the allocation of resources through
political communication such as an executive order,
legislative action, judicial rule-making, a referendum vote,
or the quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, quasi-executive
action of commissions or boards.
If the commons is represented as a collectively
suboptimal game-like environment, a public property rights
message (a message specifying and, at least in this case,
attenuating the right of the public to the common property
resource) would be represented by a new type of self-control
imposed directly upon the basic game-like environment.

Once

again, the Collective Communication Corollary may be applied
to make behavioral predictions.

In this case, however, the

relationship between private and public property rights messages must be made explicit.

This particular interpretation
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of the collective communication corollary will be stated
formally as a proposition concerning the collective production, distribution and enforcement of public property rights
messages, to be called the Public Property Rights Theorem:
In the case where the communication of private property
rights messages would not be collectively optimal, rational
people with collective rights to a scarce resource and with
access to an effective collective, political communication
mechanism will produce, distribute and enforce public

prop~

erty rights messages sufficiently patterned and sufficiently
precise to ensure that management of the resource will be
collectively optimal.
This proposition is stated in terms that have all been
rigorously defined above.

It is based on two assumptions,

the first of which is identical to the assumption underlying
the Private property Rights Theorem, namely, that the costs
of producing, distributing and enforcing these messages does
not exceed the benefits to be gained by each person from
collectively optimal management of the resource.
assumption, however, is something new.

The second

It is that when the

production of private property rights messages is
collectively optimal, the production of public property
rights would be less than collectively optimal.

This is due

to the fact that the information which is necessary for the
production of public property rights messages is dispersed,
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as described by Hayek:

"the peculiar character of the

problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely
by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which
we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated
form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate
individuals possess.,,12

In light of this fact, it would

seem that the cost of a communication mechanism for
retrieving that information and using it in the collective
production and distribution of social choice messages would
be directly related to the number of people from whom this
knowledge has to be collected and to the number of people to
whom the social choice message has to be distributed by that
mechanism.

The number of people who are involved in the

collective production and distribution of messages as
senders or as receivers, with those involved in both roles
counted twice, will be designated here as a resource called
the centrality of the communication system.
It will be taken as axiomatic in this dissertation
that any resource is costly and therefore that the more a
resource is used or the more resources that are used, the
higher the cost.

This assumption together with the defini-

tion of centrality as a resource entails a proposition, concerning the cost of collective communication, formally here
as the Dispersion Lemma:

the cost of a collective
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communication system is directly related to the centrality
of that system.
If it is assumed that the costs of centralizing
information are included in the costs of using the
collective political communication and enforcement mechanism
to produce and enforce public rather than private property
rights messages, these two propositions can be combined into
one and referred to as the Property Rights Theorem:
Rational people with collective rights to a scarce resource
and with access to effective collective political
communication and enforcement mechanisms will produce and
enforce property rights messages sufficiently patterned and
sufficiently precise to ensure that management of the
resource will be collectively optimal.

The Provision of Public Goods
Once property rights have been defined over resources,
they may legally be developed, used, exchanged, and, in
general, managed by those to whom the rights have been
assigned.

The management of private property resources is

typically defined as a private good (or service) and decisions regarding such goods are made within the context of
the market system in a competitive setting.

However, deci-

sions regarding the management of resources defined as
public property for the reasons described above are typically made through the political system and are described as

-98-

public goods and services.

The focus of analysis is placed

here on the reasons for the definition rather than the mere
fact.

Thus public goods are said to be characterized by two

properties:

(1) jointness of supply (indivisibility in pro-

duction) and (2) a high cost of excluding others (through
the definition and enforcement of private property rights)
from its consumption once it has been supplied.

These prop-

erties can range along a continuum, with a pure public good
being one whose consumption by one person does not effect
the amount of the good available to others and for which the
exclusion of others is so costly as to be virtually impossible.
While the management of common property resources such
as the land in Garrett Hardin's example discussed above
might in some cases be categorized as a public good, the
concept of public good is very abstract and covers the
management of such resources as national defense, public
education, health and welfare.

Indeed, the definition of

property rights through a political communication system,
whether these rights are defined as public or private, is
itself an example of the provision of a public good.
Thus it is not surprising to find that in a review of
the literature on public goods and social choice, Dennis
Mueller points out that "nearly all public goods, whose provision requires an expenditure of revenues, trust, or moral
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restraint, can be depicted with a strategy box analagous to
[Prisoner's Dilemmaj.,,13

Public Goods Messages
Another proposition more general than but analagous to
those articulated above dealing with the collective communication of property rights messages may now be generated to
describe the collective communication of messages regarding
the provision of public goods.

Since the concept of public

goods is so abstract and general as to cover all rational
political behavior, this proposition will be designated the
Political Communication Theorem:

rational people who con-

sume a public good and have access to effective, collective
political communication and enforcement mechanisms will communicate and enforce social choice messages sufficiently
patterned and sufficiently precise to ensure that the level
at which this good is provided is collectively optimal.

Methodological Issues
For any of these propositions to be applied to a concrete situation, reliable and valid operational definitions
must be provided of each concept mentioned in the propositions.

In particular, the dependent variables--pattern and

precision--and the independent variable--whether or not a
game-like environment is collectively suboptimal--must be
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measured.

While describing the pattern of behavior

prescribed or proscribed by a message would not appear to be
particularly difficult in principle, the concepts of
precision and collective suboptimality are more abstract and
therefore somewhat more difficult to measure.

The Measurement of Precision
Thus one major methodological issue regarding the
collective communication of property rights messages raised
by these propositions is how the precision of these messages
is to be measured.

This issue is cogently treated by

Ehrlich and Posner, who, writing in the area of economics of
law, have articulated a thesis similar to the Collective
Communication corollary, namely, "that the extent of
efficient precision of public rules, ... is, assuming no
externalities in the production of these rules, determined
so as to minimize social costs."

Specifically, they argue

that "an increase in efficient precision of the law reduces
the incentive to engage in and thus the social loss from, a
socially undesirable activity, including the opportunity
costs of foregoing socially desirable activities."

Ehrlich

and Posner also point out that "an increase in [the
precision of the law] reduces the total cost of law
enforcement activity directly through reduction in
litigation costs, and indirectly through the expected
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At

the same time, they note that "an increase in (the precision
of the law] always raises the cost of producing statutory
rules, including the social costs arising from overinclusive
and, sometimes, from underinclusive aspects of rules and
from their general rigidity.,,17
Although there are some minor differences in focus and
terminology, the work of Ehrlich and Posner and the Social
Theory of Collective Communication are closely related.
While Ehrlich and Posner are concerned with the balance
between rules promulgated by the legislative, executive and
judicial branches of government, an issue not addressed by
the Social Theory of Collective Communication, it is not the
major focus of their analysis.

While they deal solely with

what they call "public rules," property rights legislation
and rules prescribing resource allocation fall within that
general category.

While they speak of the efficient

precision of these rules rather than describing the
efficiency and the precision of these rules separately,
their analysis assumes the former and focuses almost
exclusively upon the examination of the latter.

Finally,

while the concept of minimizing social cost is not quite as
precise as that of collective optimality, the definition of
social costs used by Ehrlich and posner incorporates all of
what have been described here as communication and
enforcement costs.
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that these authors have some difficulty in operationalizing
the concept of "efficient precision":
It is difficult to define rigorously empirical
counterparts of the degree of precision of
different rules. Theoretically, the precision of
a given law can be measured by the number of
elementary situations or circumstances that are
identified by that law to be either included in
or excluded from the universe of circumstances to
which a sanction applies. Thus precision refers
to the information content of a law rather than
to the number of provisions included in a given
law (emphasis added).
The measure proposed by Ehrlich and Posner is, as they
note, not an operational definition, for it does not indicate how the units of analysis (elementary situations or
circumstances) are to be identified.

Even as a specific

theoretical definition, however, their measure is subject to
at least one major limitation:

it can only be applied to

situations or circumstances that are logically independent
of one another.

Consider the following sentences from a

piece of mineral rights legislation:

"No person shall

locate more than one claim on a vein discovered.
claim shall exceed 300 feet in length."

No quartz

Each of these

sentences might be considered as identifying an elementary
situation or circumstance.

Each constitutes a distinct

piece of information in that it removes uncertainty
regarding a separate situation or circumstance.

For

purposes of exposition, suppose that this uncertainty is
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phrased in such a way that it can be answered by either a
"yes" or a "no," e.g., (A) Shall any person locate more than
one claim on a vein discovered? and (B) Shall any quartz
claim exceed 300 feet in length?

These two questions can be

answered by anyone of four possible combinations of
answers, e.g., (1) "yes" on A and "yes" on B, (2) "yes" on A
and "no" on B, (3) "no" on A and "yes" on B, and (4) "no" on
A and "no" on B.
In contrast to this situation, consider another piece
of mineral rights legislation which stipulates that assessment dues must be paid and a receipt given for such payment
by a certain date in order for a miner to hold a claim.
consider the additional sentence:

Now

"Before the expiration of

the time for the payment of said assessment dues, said receipt shall be filed for record in the office of the County
Recorder of said county."

Once again, two basic questions

are being answered concerning what could be viewed as two
elementary situations or circumstances:

(A) Shall said

receipt be filed for record in the office of the County
Recorder of said county? and (B) Shall said receipt be filed
before the expiration of the time for the payment of said
assessment dues?

However, these two circumstances are not

logically independent, for a positive answer to question
(B) presupposed a positive answer to question (A).

Thus
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these two questions could be answered by anyone of three,
not four, possible combinations of answers:

(1) "yes" on A

and "yes" on B, (2) "yes" on A and "no" on B, (3) "no" on A
and "no" on B.

The combination of a "no" on A and a "yes"

of B is logically impossible.,
It would seem logical to regard an answer to the first
set of questions as providing more information than an
answer to the second set, insofar as there are more combinations of answers to the first set than to the second.

If

uncertainty is directly related to the number of possible
answers or combinations of answers to a given set of questions, with uncertainty being completely eliminated when
only one answer or combination of answers is possible, then
the identification of one particular combination of answers
in the first example provides for a greater reduction in
uncertainty than the combination of answers identified in
the second example.
Since the sentences in most pieces of legislation
typically identify many interdependent situations or circumstances, the need for a measure of information content that
is sensitive to these differences is crucial.

However, the

measure suggested by Ehrlich and Posner does not differentiate between independent and interdependent situations and
circumstances and would yield a value of 2 for both of the
examples cited above.

It might be possible to get around
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this difficulty by defining "an elementary situation or circumstance" in such a way that it incorporated all possible
qualifications and modifications.

However, since modifica-

tion and qualification are processes through which precision
is often increased, an operational definition of precision
that ignored these processes would appear to lack face
validity.
Table 1
A COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MEASURES OF PRECISION
First Example
Independent Circumstances
Circumstance

Second Example
Dependent Circumstances

A

B

A

B

Yes
Yes
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
No

Alternative
Answers
1.
2.
3.
4.

Number of
Circumstances

2

Bits of
Uncertainty

2

2

1.58

The measure of information upon which the Social
Theory of Collective Communication is based provides a
solution to this problem.

Assuming that all possible

combinations of answers are viewed as being equally likely
by a miner prior to passage of a law and assuming that
passage of that law reduces all of the uncertainty of that
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miner, this measure would yield results identical to the
measure proposed by Ehrlich and Posner, provided all
elementary situations or circumstances to which that measure
was applied were independent.

When applied to situations

or circumstances that are not independent, this measure
would yield results that were not as large as those produced
by the measure proposed by Ehrlich and Posner.
In the first example discussed above, when the two
situations or circumstances are independent, the measure of
information used in this dissertation would yield a value of
2 bits whereas in the second, where the two situations or
circumstances are not independent, it would yield a value of
1.58 bits, indicating that a smaller amount of uncertainty
is being removed in the second case than in the first.
These differences are summarized in Table

1.

The Measurement of Power
In addition to operational definitions of the major
dependent variables such as precision described in the
propositions which make up the Theory of Collective
Communication, application of this theory to concrete
situations would require an operational definition of the
independent variable as well.

This variable, the extent to

which a game-like environment is collectively optimal, is
defined here in terms of control, a concept which, like that
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of precision, can be measured by means of information
theory.
control is essentially a description of the relationship between preferences and the results of action in a
game-like environment.

This relationship is an important

one in the field of political science, where it is typically
described under the heading of "power".

The question of how

best to measure power is an important issue in this field,
and a wide variety of measures have been proposed.

In order

to get a sense of the applicability of the concept of control to specific situations and to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of information transmission as a measure of control, it is instructive to apply this measure to an example
and compare the result with those of related measures from
the literature of political power.
Among the miriad of indices of power that appear in
the literature, those that pertain most directly to a gametheoretic representation of social choice are the most
relevant here.

These include the Shapley-Shubik Index of

voting power, the Banzhaf Index of voting Power, and the
measures developed by James Coleman:

The Power of a Collec-

tivity to Act, the Power of an Individual to Prevent Action,
and the Power of an Individual to Initiate Action. 16
The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are both based
upon concepts of bargaining power, and they depend upon
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specific assumptions about the nature of the bargaining process.

The Shapley-Shubik index assumes that each individual

has an amount of power equal to the number of times he
performs a pivotal role in the formation of minimal winning
coalitions while the Banzhaf index assumes that an individual's power derives from the number of times his defection from a coalition would be critical to the outcome.
While as Banzhaf points out, the Shapley-Shubik measure can
be criticized on the grounds that joining a coalition is a
use of voting power, not a measure of it, "for it is reasonable to assume that each legislator will make the most
effective use of his voting power under the circumstances"
(emphasis supplied),17 both the Shapley-Shubik and the
Banzhaf measures are based upon the assumption that the outcome of a collective decision constitutes a good that can be
expected to be diVided up among the players who constitute
the winning coalition.

However as Coleman pOints out,

the situation posed by decisions in collective
bodies is ordinarily quite different. The
decision governs an action to be taken--or not
taken, depending upon the outcome--by the
collectivity, an action that has a fixed profile
of consequences for the members. Thus, since it
is not a question of a battle over the division
of the spoils, as assumed by the Shapley value,
one is not concerned directly ~~th the power of
members vis a vis one another.
Coleman proposes three alternative measures of power,
each based upon the proportion of certain relevant coalitions in a voting body that are winning.

Thus Coleman's
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measures of the power of a body to act, the power of an
individual to prevent action and the power of an individual
to initiate action are all more or less measures of the
power of members over the actions of the collectivity and
therefore over the outcomes of those actions.

The first

measure differs from all others in being a property of a
collectivity as a whole.

The second and third are somewhat

akin to Banzhaf's index in its focus on defections from
minimal winning coalitions, although like the first, they
distinguish differences that result in changing the direction of the action from those that simply prevent the coalition from acting.
The measure of control used in this dissertation is
even more directly a measure of the power of participants
over the actions of a collectivity and therefore over the
outcomes of those actions; for although it takes into account and can produce an equivalent of Coleman's power of a
body to act, it abstracts away from all his assumptions
about defecting from previously formed coalitions as well as
from the assumptions of Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf about
using the coalition formation or disintegration process as a
grounds for bargaining.

It is based upon the simple assump-

tions that all combinations and permutations of preferences
among members of a collectivity are equally likely, that
voting is a straightforward expression of preference and
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preferences of members and the actions of the collectivity.
The advantage of using what has been called here control as
a measure of power is that it can be used to describe the
proportion of information about the outcome that is gained
by knowing the preference of each member of a collectivity
individually and by knowing the preferences of each coalition, up to and including the grand coalition.

It should be

noted that all measures of coalitional control can be decomposed into the proportion exerted by the coalition as a
coalition and that proportion exercised individually by each
member of the coalition.

Moreover, although all of the

former measures may at times be disturbed by inflationary or
compensatory factors, measures describing coalitions of
equal size are still accurate indicators of control,
relative to one another.

Moreover, the control exerted by

the grand coalition is always a precise and cumulative measure that will be equal to one only when the collectivity
has total power to act.
These properties of the measure of control used in
this dissertation can be compared to those of the other measures described here by reference to an example, borrowed
from Brams,19 involving a three-person voting body (or committee) whose members have 1, 49, and 50 votes, respectively.

Assuming that a simple majority of 51 votes is needed
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to win passage of a measure, Table 2 below describes the
amount of power ascribed to each member (and to each coalition of members) by the various measures under discussion.
Table 2
A COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MEASURES OF POWER
Coali- Shapley/ Banzhof
tions Shubik

Power
to Act

Power
Power
Control
to
to
Prevent Initiate

V1 ...

0.16667

0.20000

-----

0.50000

0.00000

0.04500

V2 ..•

0.16667

0.20000

-----

0.50000

0.00000

0.04500

V3 .•.

0.66667

0.60000

-----

1.00000

0.66667

0.4562

-------

-----

-------

0.09375

-------

-----

-------

0.59375

-------

-----

-------

0.59375

-------

0.375

-------

0.75000

----VV
1 2
----V V
1 3
----VV
2 3
V V V
1 2 3

SOURCE: Values of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices
are from Steven J. Brams, Game Theory and Politics (New
York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 166.
It is clear that the ordinal distribution of power
among the three individual members is the same for all measures except for Coleman's Power to Act, which has no interpretation for individual members.

However, only control can

be measured for all coalitions (including single member
coalitions, double-member coalitions and the grand coalition
consisting of all three members).
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Thus while the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf measures and
Coleman's powers to prevent and to initiate action all suggest that power resides solely with the individual members
of the collectivity, the control measure indicates that the
collectivity exercises only slightly more than half the
total that is possible.

Clearly a measure such as this of

the power of a coalition, as a coalition, is a useful addition to the growing number of measures and approaches to
power simply because it makes explicit the amount of control
allotted by a political system to various coalitions.

More-

over, in comparison with the only other measure of power
exerted by the grand coalition, control appears to be a far
more realistic measure for a coalition which, as a coalition, can act 75% of the time, assuming that all permutations of preferences are equally likely.

Coleman's more

conservative measure appears to be unreasonably low due to
its focus upon the proportion of all possible coalitions,
including all minority coalitions (even the empty
coalition!) that are winning rather than on the number of
combinations of coalitions (permutations of preferences)
that result in a clear-cut decision.
This is not to say that control can replace the other
measures, for it cannot be used to illustrate the difference
between positive and negative action. that is brought out by
Coleman's measures, and it ignores the additional complication of bargaining power incorporated into the measures of
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Shapley, Shubik and Banzhaf.

Nevertheless, it should be

noted that if any information were available concerning
either the probability of various types of "strategic" (as
opposed to straightforward) voting behavior or the actual
effects of "bargaining" power upon the voting behavior of
the members of a deliberative body, the control measure
could be used to incorporate this information into a more
sophisticated measure than that presented here.
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the Social
Theory of Collective Communication can be effectively
particularized to describe a range of fairly specific
situations involving common property resource management.
Furthermore, it shows that the propositions of this theory
are consistent with those derived by researchers such as
Ehrlich and Posner in the economics of law.

Beyond this,

however, the Social Theory of Collective Communication
appears to be useful in addressing unresolved issues in
measurement, for it provides a consistent and valid
operational definition of the precision of a social choice
message as well as a realistic and versatile index of the
relation between preferences and the social choice messages
collectively communicated through a political mechanism.
The next chapter will be devoted to further consideration of the applicability of the Social Theory of
Collective Communication.

The focus of analysis will be on
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social rather than political forms of collective
communication and on theoretical, rather than
methodological, issues.
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CHAPTER III
SOCIAL FORMS OF COLLECTIVE COMMUNICATION

The hypotheses derived in the last chapter were all
based upon the assumption that the people involved had
access to an effective, collective political channel of communication.

In many real-world situations, this is clearly

an unrealistic assumption.

Social Problems and Solutions
In undeveloped areas of the world and in unorganized
collectivities there is often no established political
system.

In addition problems often arise which have

consequences for geographical regions that incorporate
several different polities, without anyone political system
being defined over the relevant portion of the globe.
Moreover, even where a political system exists there are
situations in which that system by itself may be incapable
of communicating the messages necessary to resolve a social
choice problem.

For example, in some political systems

participants have no formal mechanism through which to
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exchange votes on issues concerning which their preferences
are very intense.

In all these situations, societies

typically resort to what will be described here as social
forms of collective communication.

The Problem of Collective Action
The first type of situation can most clearly be
illustrated by the problem of collective action, as analysed
by Mancur Olson. 1 Olson notes that "the common or
collective benefits provided by governments are usually
called "public goods' by economists ...

students of public

finance have, however, neglected the fact that the
achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any
common interest means that a public or collective good has
been provided for that group."

Since, as Olson puts it,

"the provision of public or collective goods is the
fundamental function of organizations generally," the
question naturally arises as to whether, in the absence of
government, i.e. of a political system with a method for
determining and reasons for communicating and enforcing
common interests, organizations will be able to provide
public or collective goods.

Olson's finding is that "it

does not follow, because all of the individuals in a group
would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they
would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all
rational and self-interested.

Indeed," Olson argues,
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"unless the number of individuals in a group is small, or
unless there is coercion or some other special device to
make individuals act in their common interest, rational,
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their
common or group interests" (emphasis in original).2
The reason for this "tendency toward suboptimality,"
according to Olson, is that "a collective good is, by
definition, such that other individuals in the group cannot
be kept from consuming it once any individual in the group
has provided it for himself."

Olson pOints out that "since

an individual member thus gets only part of the benefit of
any expenditure he makes to obtain more of the collective
good, he will discontinue his purchase of the collective
good before the optimal amount for the group as a whole has
been obtained."

On the other hand, Olson notes that "the

amounts of the collective good that a member of the group
receives free from other members will further reduce his
incentive to provide more of that good at his own expense. ,,2

Constitutional Messages
While Olson's analysis is articulated through the use
of calculus, Russell Hardin has performed a game-theoretic
analysis of collective action "to demonstrate that the logic
underlying it is the same as that of prisoner's dilemma."
Hardin pOints out that "any analysis which prescribes a
solution for prisoner's dilemma must prescribe a similar
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solution for the game of collective action. ,,3

Moreover,

based upon an analysis of the game of collective action,
Hardin proves that the outcome where all players pay for a
collective good is a Condorcet choice from the set of realizable outcomes for that game.

A Condorcet choice is de-

fined (in its strong form) as an alternative that is
preferred by a majority to every other alternative or (in
its weak form) as an alternative that is preferred by a
plurality to every other alternative.
Hardin concludes that "it is rational in a world in
which distrust seems endemic to use sanctions to force all
members of an interest group to contribute toward the provision of the group interest," and he notes that "the existence of a Condorcet choice, which is by definition unique,
implies that a real world group could decide in favor of the
Condorcet choice over every other realizable outcome. ,,4
However, the ability of a group to make such a decision
depends upon their having access to a mechanism for collecting and processing information concerning individual
preferences, information that, as Hayek 5 has noted, is
dispersed throughout the membership of a social group.
Moreover, the ability of a group to act upon such a decision
depends crucially upon their having access to a mechanism
for communicating a message describing this decision to each
of the group members, for monitoring the behavior of each of
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these individuals, and for administering some form of sanction to those who violate any agreement reached and communicated collectively--even if this "sanction" is only the
communication of a message to all the other individuals
releasing them from this same agreement.
It is clear from Hardin's example that in a collectively suboptimal environment, it may be rational to set up
such a mechanism.

This same point is stated and proven in

slightly more general terms by the Collective Metacommunication Corollary.

Moreover, that corollary also paints out

that an effective collective metacommunication and enforcement mechanism is necessary in order for a collectivity to
communicate the messages necessary to establish such a
mechanism.
To apply the Collective Metacommunication Corollary to
this more specific situation, it is helpful to establish a
distinction between two types of mechanisms through which
social choice messages are collectively communicated and
enforced--those that are formally established to deal with
many issues in a systematic fashion and those that are set
up informally to handle issues on an ad hoc basis.

If it is

assumed that costs are associated with setting up collective
communication and enforcement mechanisms at any level, it is
rational, given the expectation that the collectivity will
need to resolve more than one such situation, to make use of
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a metacommunication and enforcement system once, i.e. on an
informal, ad hoc basis, in order to set up a formalized collective communication system that will deal systematically
with a large number of situations over time, rather than use
the metacommunication and enforcement mechanisms to setup
nonformalized collective communication and enforcement mechanisms each time a similar situation occurs.

For this

reason, collective communication and enforcement mechanisms
will nearly always be interpreted in this dissertation as
formalized and systematic.
A collective communication system whose membership and
operation are formally defined in terms of a representational formula and a decision-making procedure and whose
charge is to consider issues in a systematic manner as they
arise will be defined in this dissertation as a political
form of collective communication mechanism or a political
mechanism, for short.

An

informal and ad hoc mechanism, on

the other hand, will be described as social.

The aptness of

this distinction will become more apparent after describing
two other characteristics that follow from the primary
properties of formalization and systematization.
When the decision is made to establish a collective,
political communication channel, it is natural for a collectivity to consider voting rules other than unanimity.
again, this can be viewed in terms of cost.

Once

If, as suggest-

ed by The Dispersion Lemma, the costs of formulating and
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resolving issues can be assumed to vary directly with the
number of individuals who must agree with the formulation in
order for that issue to be resolved, it may well be that the
decrease in organizational costs resulting from a change in
the voting rule from unanimity to some sort of majority
would be worth more for each individual than the loss that
might be expected whenever that individual was in the
minority on an issue.

The possibility of such an accounting

can occur however only within the context of a formal system, for in setting up an ad hoc mechanism to deal with a
particular issue, it would not be rational for any individual who might be in the minority on that issue to agree to
anything less than a voting rule of unanimity.

Thus while

political systems typically utilize decision-making procedures other than that of unanimity, social forms of collective communication would rarely be based upon a criterion
other than unanimity.
The second additional characteristic that will be used
here to distinguish between political and social forms of
collective communication systems results from the systematic
fashion in which a political system addresses individual
issues.

Since issues arise at various points in time, they

are most often decided one at a time.

Occasionally a

political system may decide upon what is called "porkbarrel" legislation, a bill which pulls together a wide
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number of disparate measures.

Since there is a piece of

"pork" in the "barrel" for nearly everyone concerned, this
sort of legislation typically gathers a great deal of
momentum.

This may be why the process of putting together

such a piece of legislation is sometimes called "logrolling."

However, a political system is not generally

flexible in the way in which issues are taken up and
formulated.

A social form of collective communication

system, however, being less systematic in nature, can always
be set up to consider any combination of issues--even a
combination in which one or more issues are not yet fully
specified.
It should be apparent from this discussion that flexibility and unanimity should be added to informality and
spontainity as characteristics which will be used here to
distinguish social forms of collective communication.

It is

just these characteristics that explain why collective
metacommunication mechanisms are nearly always interpreted
here as social forms of collective communication.
It is now apparent that the implications of Hardin's
findings correspond roughly to those of the Collective
Metacommunication Corollary when that corollary is
interpreted in terms of the collective communication of
political constitutions or what will be called here constitutional messages, i.e., messages defining the nature of
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collective political communication and enforcement mechanisms.

This corollary can now be particularized as a

theorem concerning the collective communication of constitutional messages, to be called the Constitutional Theorem:
rational people who consume a public good and have access to
ineffective collective political communication and enforcement mechanisms and to effective collective social communication and enforcement mechanisms will produce,
distribute and enforce constitutional messages sufficiently
patterned and sufficiently precise to transform the
political mechanisms into effective collective communication
and enforcement mechanisms.

Effective collective

communication and enforcement mechanisms were defined in
Chapter I as mechanisms so structured as to make
collectively optimal outcomes possible.
This theorem has several implications which serve to
further demonstrate the usefulness of the Social Theory of
Collective Communication.

The first is that the

metacommunication and enforcement costs must be low enough
that the result of action in a game-like environment, when
self-control has been imposed on this environment and the
costs of this imposition have been taken into account, is
collectively optimal.

This implication, together with the

Dispersion Lemma described on page 96 of Chapter II,
suggests that the larger the size of the group, the less
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likely it is that self-control will be collectively optimal.
This observation is equivalent to Mancur Olson.'s finding
that larger groups are less likely than smaller groups to
act in their collective interests simply because of the
decrease in benefits relative to costs.

What's more, the

implication of the Constitutional Theorem with regard to the
enforcement of a collectively communicated constitutional
message clarifies and formalizes Olson's conjecture that
only a separate and 'selective' incentive will
stimulate a rational individual in a latent group
to act in a group-oriented way. In such
circumstances group action can be obtained only
through an incentive that operates, not
indiscriminately, like the collective good, upon
the group as a whole, but rather selectively
toward the individuals in the group" (emphasis in
original). 6
The Constitutional Theorem also clearly formalizes the
point implicit in Russell Hardin's work, namely that since a
political system incorporating a rule by simple majority can
be used to solve the problem of collective action, a society
of rational individuals faced with numerous problems of this
sort will establish such a system.

The Theory of collective

Communication thus incorporates and extends insights derived
from the literature on collective action.

Contractual Messages
While the collective communication and enforcement of
constitutional messages may provide effective political
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mechanisms in some game-like environments, such mechanisms
will not always be effective.

political mechanisms are most

often restricted to the consideration of one issue at a
time.

Therefore, they do not always have the flexibility to

solve problems where collective optimality depends upon a
consideration of more than one issue.

This type of problem

can occur when the preferences of two or more individuals as
well as the intensities of these preferences differ markedly
across several issues.

Information concerning these

differences in preference and preference intensity is
typically incorporated into a political process of
collective communication in several ways.

One involves the

consideration of two or more issues as one, a phenomenon
described earlier as "pork-barrel" legislation enacted
through "logrolling."

This allows participants to negotiate

agreements concerning which of various alternatives they
will jointly support.

A second involves the putting

together of positions on two or more issues into a platform
on which a candidate for office will run in such a way that
participants are able to bargain and negotiate compromises
that take preference intensity into account.

A third means

of incorporating preference intensity into a political
process is for participants to explicitly trade votes across
issues that are formally separate.

In a legislature where

it is not possible to package separate issues into one piece
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of legislation, the process of vote trading is the only one
open to participants whose preferences and preference intensities differ.

This process differs from the first·two in

that the social choices that result are not communicated and
enforced through the political mechanism, but are communicated as agreements or social choices articulated through
what will be described here as contractual messages.

The Problem of Coordinated Action
The type of problem to which contractual messages may
constitute a solution may be illustrated by the phenomena of
"step goods," as described by Russell Hardin.

In Hardin's

example, the public good to be provided has a fixed start-up
cost which must be shared by all who wish to participate in
the provision of the good.

Although both step goods and

nonstep goods can be represented as prisoner's dilemma-like
environments, they differ in that the provision of a nonstep
good depends upon whether or not anyone person has made a
contribution toward this provision whereas provision of a
step good depends upon whether or not the sum of all
contributions exceeds the start-up costs.

This specific

example illustrates a more general distinction between the
case where each contribution has a separate effect upon the
level at which a good is provided and the case where each
contribution does not have a separate effect but, rather,
interacts with other contributions in its effect upon the
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level at which a good is provided.
nonseparable

goods.

The latter are called

The provision of nonseparable public

goods creates problems representable in terms of a
nonseparable game-like environment.
The significance of a nonseparable game-like environment is, as Hardin demonstrates, the absence of a Condorcet
Choice (an alternative preferred to all others by a majority
or plurality) under certain circumstances.

using the

terminology of externalities rather than that of public
goods, Davis and Whinston illustrate the practical problems
that nonseparability can cause for the determination of
social welfare.'

They ask the reader to consider "two firms

in a purely competitive industry which are related through
their cost functions (external economies and diseconomies on
the production side)."

The authors then point out that in

the nonseparable case (where one firm's marginal cost is
defined in terms of the output of both firms), as in the
separable case (where each firm's marginal cost is defined
only in terms of its own output), "there is no reason to
expect the output which maximizes social benefit (meaning
the solution which minimizes joint profits in the assumed
competitive market) to be chosen."

In the separable case,

the solution lies in the imposition of per unit taxes and
subsidies through a political mechanism.

However, the

authors note that this may not work at all in the
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nonseparable case, for "whereas the separable case raised
only the problem of the misallocation of resources, the nonseparable case raises both the problem of misallocation of
resources and the problem of mal-coordination of decisionmaking. ,,8
It is this need for coordination that is solved
through the negotiation of a contract, a collectively
communicated message specifying the manner in which output
levels are to be coordinated.

These contractual messages

are communicated in an environment requiring unanimity.

It

is therefore not surprising that constitutional messages are
often viewed as a form of contract.

However, political

constitutions are messages typically used to constitute or
to reconstitute a political mechanism while political
contracts, as defined here, are messages typically used to
compliment or to supplement a political mechanism through
the exchange of votes across issues to be decided upon
separately through that mechanism.
Hardin's demonstration that the lack of a Condorcet
Choice is directly related to a property of game-like
environments that has been analysed here as nonseparability,
established a correspondence between this specific situation
and the Collective Metacommunication Corollary, when that
corollary is interpreted in terms of the communication of
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political contracts concerning the exchange of votes on the
provision of nonseparable public goods.

This corollary can

now be formally specified as a theorem concerning the
collective communication of contractual messages, to be
called the contractual Theorem: rational people who consume
a nonseparable public good and have access to ineffective
collective political communication and enforcement mechanisms and to effective collective social communication and
enforcement mechanisms will produce, distribute and enforce
contractual messages sufficiently patterned and sufficiently
precise to transform those political mechanisms into effective collective communication and enforcement mechanisms.
These two theorems taken together can be formally
integrated into a Social Communication Theorem: rational
people who consume a public good and have access to ineffective collective political communication and enforcement
mechanisms and to effective collective social communication
and enforcement mechanisms will communicate social choice
messages sufficiently patterned and sufficiently precise to
transform the political mechanisms into effective collective
communication and enforcement mechanisms.

Theoretical Issues
These theorems have several implications with regard
to the literature on social choice which serve to further
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demonstrate the applicability of the Social Theory of
collective Communication and the value of the mathematical
model upon which this theory is based.

vote Trading
The first implication has to do with the controversy
surrounding the practice of vote trading.

As Brams has

pointed out, "the conventional judgment on vote trading in
legislatures is one of severe disapproval."

On the other

hand, he notes that "it has recently been argued by a number
of scholars that vote trading is socially desirable because
it allows for the expression of degrees of intensity of
preferences."g
One reason for this controversy may be that vote trading can be paradoxical in at least two ways that have
directly opposite results.

In certain voting situations, it

may be rational for two people to make an agreement to trade
votes.

However, both people may be in a prisoner's dilemma-

like environment where they are each separately motivated to
defect from such an agreement; and yet if both do defect,
they end up with less than they might have achieved by
upholding the agreement.

This is one of the paradoxical

aspects of vote trading.
The other paradoxical aspect of vote trading can be
explained in terms of several situations such as the one
described above.

If each of these vote trading situations
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is defined across a different set of bills and if all the
people other than those involved in anyone particular
exchange are indifferent as between passage or defeat of the
bills involved, there is no further paradox.

However, as

soon as other people are no longer indifferent as to whether
the bills across which a particular bilateral trade is
defined pass or fail, the possibility exists that bilateral
trades which are collectively optimal for each pair of
traders would be collectively suboptimal when the interests
of a larger number of players were considered.

This situ-

ation is paradoxical in the sense that if the first paradox
can be overcome and all the bilateral trades take place, all
these voters may end up worse off than they would have been
had they not traded in the first place.
This second paradox can only occur, however, if trading is limited to bilateral exchanges, if each trade is
negotiated simultaniously and if each trade is irreversible.
In the Social Theory of Collective Communication, analysis
is abstracted away from the particular process through which
trades are negotiated.

However, it is assumed that trading

is not restricted to bilateral exchanges.

Therefore

contracts describing bilateral vote trades will only be
drawn up when, considering the communication and enforcement
costs involved, it is in the interest of all parties
involved to carry out such a trade.

That is to say,

contracts describing a set of trades would only be
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negotiated when they are collectively optimal for all the
people involved.

Moreover in environments where people

anticipate that in the long run contracts collectively
communicated by various subsets of individuals would not be
in their interest, it would be rational for these people to
collectively communicate messages proscribing such
contracts.
Ultimately, of course, this depends upon the nature of
the environment, including the span of time over which
trades are considered.

The contribution of the Social

Theory of Collective Communication is to explicitly consider
the possibility of exchanges between any number of people
and messages proscribing as well as prescribing contracts.
Through the communication and enforcement of such messages,
it is theoretically possible to avoid both vote trading
paradoxes.

The Paradox of voting
A second implication of the theorems derived here is
in regard to situations where even after all rational vote
trading has been contracted, there is no one pure set of
votes which leads to a result preferable to all others.
classic example of this is the "paradox of voting."

It

involves a set of voters whose preferences are such that
even under a system of simple majority rule with vote
trading allowed there is no Condorcet Choice.

A
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Kenneth Arrow has articulated this situation in its
most general form in his General possibility Theorem.
interprets this theorem as follows:

Arrow

"If we exclude the

possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then
the only methods of passing from individual tastes to social
preferences which will be satisfactory and which will be
defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are
either imposed or dictatorial."

He further defines

satisfactory to mean "that the social welfare function does
not reflect individual desires negatively ... and that the
resultant social tastes shall be represented by an ordering
having the usual properties of rationality ascribed to
individual orderings."lO
Recently, several papers on social choice theory have
described theorems which establish that the cyclicity of the
majority preference relation is generic and should be,
therefore, a pervasive phenomenon.

However, as a number of

public choice scholars have pointed out, these theoretical
results are contradicted by the empirical fact that cyclical
majorities are almost never observed and therefore do not
appear to be a practical problem. ll Grofman and Uhlaner 12
review various types and causes of stability and conclude
that all of the current analytical approaches fail to
correctly specify the alternative space from among which
choices are to be made, especially as that space is affected
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characteristics of the choice mechanisms themselves.
In contrast, the Social Communication Theorem is based
upon the explicit assumption that rational players will act
on the basis of their preferences for the characteristics of
alternative political communication and enforcement
mechanisms and that the choice of such a mechanism will
change the alternative space, thereby affecting the messages
communicated through the mechanism.

Moreover, even if the

choice of an effective political communication and
enforcement mechanism leads to a cyclical outcome, the
Social Theory of Collective Communication, based as it is
upon game theory, allows for nonparadoxical interpretations.
In a note, Arrow points out that the negative outcome
articulated in his General Possibility Theorem "is strongly
reminiscent of the intransibility of the concept of
domination in the theory of multi-person games.,,13

However,

as Robert Wilson has pointed out, game theorists have
transcended the concept of dominance to propose solution
concepts based upon the notion of stability, which can be
defined in terms of mixed or randomized strategies and
outcomes (i.e., stable sets) as well as pure strategies and
determinates outcomes (i.e., stable states).14

While Wilson

is not clear as to the meaning of randomized strategies
required, in general, by such solutions, the contribution of
the Social Theory of Collective Communication is to propose
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an interpretation both for randomization due to what Wilson
calls "contingent contracts" and randomization due to the
use of some random device.
The first constitutes a collectively communicated
contractual message which is completely in line with what
Arrow would call a satisfactory social welfare function.

A

real-world example would be the decision by the Israeli
Knesset after the 1984 election, when no one party could
gain a majority vote, to share power between the Labor and
the Likud parties, the chairman of one party to be Prime
Minister for the first 25 months and the chairman of the
other to be Prime Minister for the next 25 months.
In contrast to the use of contingent contracts,
randomization due to the use of some random device would
violate Arrow's assumption that the social state was not in
any way imposed, for it would involve the imposition of
information derived from a random device upon the
preferences of the members of a collectivity.

However, from

the perspective of the Social Theory of Collective
Communication, it is clear that such an "imposition" would
be rational in any game-like situation where the preferences
of those individuals did not contain sufficient information
to narrow the choice to one alternative, where people had
access to effective collective metacommunication and
enforcement mechanisms through which to prescribe such an
imposition, and where the communication and enforcement
costs did not exceed the benefit to be gained thereby.

This

-138-

finding is supported by the multitude of real-world social
situations in which participants make use of random devices
to aid in making decisions.

Draft lotteries, land lotteries

and lotteries used to assign rights to oil and other
resources, not to mention the flipping of a coin to make
decisions concerning the initial conditions in a variety of
games, are concrete examples.

The Size Principle
A third implication of the contractual Theorem has to
do with the number of people involved in the collective
communication of contractual messages.

If the political

communication mechanism is a majority rule voting system, it
might be possible for a minority who felt very strongly
about one issue to trade away their votes on enough other
issues to ensure that all other voters would vote in favor
of the positions taken by that minority of the first issue.
However, this would not be a collecti v.ely optimal result,
for only a majority of votes are needed to win on any issue
in this political system.

Therefore, it would be rational

for the minority on the first issue to trade away their
votes on only enough other issues so as to generate the
required majority.
This implication is similar to the "Size Principle"
developed by William Riker, which holds that in certain
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kinds of game-like environments, only minimal winning coalitions will occur. 15 Minimal winning coalitions, as the name
Suggests, are groups of people which, if those people vote
together on a political issue, are large enough to win under
the rules of the voting system, but which will cease to win
if even one member of that group refuses to vote together
with the others.
The prisoner's dilemma-like environment upon which the
contractual Theorem is based differs from the type of environment described by Riker in some respects.

Nevertheless,

people in both types of environment share the same motivation in coalition formation if it is assumed that the
benefit to be gained from communication and enforcement of a
contractual message for some reason varies inversely with
the number of people involved, after that number reaches a
certain level.
Riker and Ordeshook review empirical research on
various aspects of the Size Principle and find that the
evidence supports this principle except for cases involving
the additional effects of information and ideology.16

The

less information about the commitment of participants to a
coalition, the more the winning coalition exceeds the
minimum size.

Also, the stronger the ties of ideology are

between participants, the more the size of winning coalitions deviates from the minimum.

AS Riker and Ordeshook

-140-

explain it, "progress toward minimizing the size of winning
coalitions is impeded, on the one hand, by poor information ...•

On the other hand, progress towards minimizing

size is impeded by ideology. ,,17
Since the Size principle is based upon an analysis of
a game-like environment alone and does not incorporate any
kind of metagame-like environment through which to represent
the communication and enforcement of a contractual message,
the amount of uncertainty that exists concerning the
communication and enforcement of such a message and the
effects of this uncertainty can only be intuitively
assessed.

However, the mathematical model upon which the

Social Theory of Collective Communication is based does
incorporate quantitative measures of this type of
uncertainty and could quite easily be used to predict or
prescribe the optimal size of a coalition, given a certain
level of uncertainty.

Moreover, the Size Principle is based

upon the assumption that people in such an environment are
related only through the goal of forming minimal winning
coalitions, whereas the mathematical model underlying the
Social Theory of Collective Communication can be used to
describe the size of coalitions that would be expected given
apriori relationships of a certain strength based on
ideological or other ties.

Thus it appears that the Social

Theory of Collective Communication, as presently
constituted, incorporates and is supported by evidence
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demonstrating the Size Principle, while the model upon which
this theory is based is capable of generating theorems
sufficient to explain the "anomolous" effects of imperfect
information and ideological ties.
Specification of the Social Theory of Collective
communication in terms of the literature on constitutional
choice and vote trading in this chapter has resulted in
several specific theorems concerning various social forms of
collective communication.

In addition to these theorems,

however, the implications of this theory with regard to
various theoretical issues have been drawn out and examined.
It is apparent from this examination that the Social Theory
of Collective Communication can throw some light upon the
real-world social behavior that, with respect to current
social choice theory, is either controversial, as in the
case of vote trading, or contradictory, as in the cases of
randomization and of coalition formation in the presence of
imperfect information or ideological ties.
In the first three chapters of this dissertation the
general propositions that constitute a Theory of Collective
Communication have been described and shown to provide
satisfactory answers to basic research questions.

The

applicability of this theory has been demonstrated through
the derivation of additional theorems dealing with more
specific political and social forms of collective
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communication.

The implications of these more specific

theorems have been drawn out with regard to various
methodological and theoretical issues in the literature on
social choice and have been shown to be useful in shedding
some new light on these salient areas of confusion and
controversy.

The empirical validity of this theory has,

however, not yet been directly tested.

It is to this task

that the next three chapters are devoted.

-143Footnotes
IMancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 1415; Ibid., p. 15; Ibid., p.2.
2 Ibid., p. 35.

3Russell Hardin, "Collective Action as an Agreeable nprisoners' Dilemma," Behavioral Science 16 (1971): 479.
4 Ibid •
5Friederick A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic
"The Use 0 f Know 1 ed ge=7i:::nc:::.;s':;o::c:';ic.:e:-;tC:y~.'ii-"---==i-(c,;::C;;:h:'ii~c:-:a::g:';o::-:=:::
Regnory, 1948), p. 77.

ard er,

6 Olson, p. 5l.

7Russell Hardin, "Group Provision of step Goods,"
Behavioral Science 21 (1976): 101-106.
80tto A. Davis and Andrew whinston, "Externalities,
Welfare and the Theory of Games," Journal of political
Economy 70 (June, 1962): 255.
9steven J. Brams, Game Theory and Politics (New York:
The Free Press, 1975), p. 129.
10Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual
Values, 2nd edition (New H~a7.v~e~n~:~~Y~a~l~e~u~n=7i~v~e~r~s~i~t~y~P~r~e~s~s,
1963), p. 59.
Il For an excellent review of both the theoretical and
empirical literature, see Morris P. Fiorina and Kenneth A.
Shepsle "Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General
Possibility of a Science of politics," in political
Equilibrium (Studies in Public Choice; No.5), ed. Peter C.
Ordeschock and Kenneth A. Shepsle (Hingham, MA: KluwerNijhoff Publishing, 1982), pp. 49-64.
12Bernard Grofman and Carole Uhlaner, "Matapreferences
and the Reasons for Stability in Social Choice: Thoughts on
Broadening and Clarifying the Debate," Theory and Decision
19(1985): 31-50.
13

Arrow, p. 59.

14Robert Wilson "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Social
Choice," in Social Choice, ed. Bernard Lieberman (New York:
Gorden and Breach, 1971), pp. 393-407.

-144-

15williamH. Riker and Peter C. Ordershook, An
t;I~n""tc=r-::o-=d-=u'iic:;;t,;::i:;;oin,:;-;:;t:::0:-i;p;:;0:isii:.c;t-"i'oiv,.;;e:::;-=p....:o-=lii,<,ti-'ii~c;-;a:.::l,-,TihOie:-i0;.::rr-Y ( Eng 1 ewood Cl i f f s ,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973). Ibid., pp. 191-192.
16 Ibid ., pp. 188-201.
17 Ibid ., pp. 191-192.

CHAPTER IV
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS PARADIGM:

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Having developed in the last three chapters the rudiments of a theory of collective communication, it is appropriate at this point to initiate an investigation into the
empirical validity of hypotheses derived from this theory.
It is perhaps indicative of the advances made by this theory
that the body of empirical research that is most directly
related to this theory is adequate for testing only the very
first specific theorem developed here--the Private property
Rights Theorem.

Moreover, while some empirical research

does exist against which the Law of Requisite control, the
Political Communication Theorem and the Constitutional
Theorem can be tested, there is not enough relevant research
available to adequately verify propositions concerning
public property rights, the provision of public goods generally, or the communication of contractual messages.

For

this reason, the literature reviewed in this chapter and the
case study reanalysed and replicated in the next two chapters will be examined primarily with regard to the Private
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property Rights Theorem developed in Chapter II.

This

theorem states that rational people with collective rights
to a scarce resource and with access to an effective,
collective political communication mechanism will produce,
distribute and enforce private property rights messages that
are sufficiently patterned and sufficiently precise to
ensure that management of that resource is collectively
optimal.
Over the last two decades, literature has grown on the
subject of property rights and their relevance to the analysis of social problems that find their origin in resource
scarcity.

While this subject is not yet formally regarded

as a subfield of economics, there has been published both a
comprehensive survey of the literature on property rights
and an anthology of representative articles. 1 Moreover,
theoretical development in this area have been called "one
of the most important advances in economic theory that has
occurred in the post-war period," and described as
constituting a "paradigm," complete with a set of
fundamental questions which set the agenda for research. 2
Alchian and Demsetz, for example, find that three
questions are suggested by literature in the area of property rights:

"(1) what is the structure of property rights

in a society at some point in time, (2) what consequences
for social interaction flow from a particular structure of
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property rights, and (3) how has this property rights
structure come into being?"

The first and second questions

relate to variables and relations which in the Social Theory
of collective Communication are true by definition and by
assumption, respectively.

While the research in this area

directed toward answering these questions does provide
support for the underpinnings of the Social Theory of
collective Communication, only research directed towards
answering the third question bears directly upon the
validity of propositions developed here concerning
collective communication behavior.

Therefore, in this

chapter only the handful of empirical studies dealing with
the development of property rights will be examined for
evidence supporting or refuting the hypothesis to be tested.

Qualitative Research
The empirical studies to be reviewed here can be categorized as either qualitative (based upon observation of
whether or not variables of interest have changed in value)
or quantitative (including observations of how much one or
more of the variables have changed).

Research in the field

has only recently begun to move from qualitative to
quantitative studies.

The former will therefore, be

reviewed first.
Qualitative studies of the development of property
rights are quite wide-ranging.

Those reviewed here cover
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the development of property rights on two continents, in
three cultures and across eleven centuries.

Although these

works concentrate primarily upon private property rights and
the free enterprise system in the capitalist economies of
the western democracies, they do encompass a variety of
situations including (1) the transition, without prior
example, from an unconscious, culturally controlled system
of contracts to a more conscious, individually controlled
exchange system typified by the assumptions of rational
economic behavior; (2) the transfer of the market as an
institution from one culture to another; and (3) the
development of property rights through a variety of social
and political institutions within a market-oriented society
with the benefit of prior example.

The examination of

societies both with and without prior knowledge of how to
establish private property rights, with and without an
initial market-orientation, and (for the latter) both with
and without contact with other cultures who already have a
market orientation is important, for it provides a kind of
control for the effects of prior example, prior experience
and cultural contact, each of which, it could be argued,
might constitute a necessary and/or sufficient condition for
the development of property rights irrespective of the
structure of interests.

-149western Europe.
The work of a large number of economic historians on
various aspects of the development of property rights in
western Europe between 900 and 1700 has been woven together
by North and Thomas into an interpretive study of "the rise
of the western world."

The central argument of these

authors is that
efficient economic organization is the key to
growth; the development of an efficient economic
organization in western Europe accounts for the
rise of the west. Efficient organization entails
the establishment of institutional arrangements
and property rights that create an incentive to
channel individual economic efforts into
activities that bring the private rjte of return
close to the social rate of return.
Growth is defined here as a per capita long-run rise
in income; and given that the necessary property rights are
established, economic growth according to the North-Thomas
theory requires only that some part of the populace be
acquisitive.

The authors assume the latter and, in general,

examine the historical record for an association between the
development of property rights and subsequent economic
growth.

This association is taken as evidence that the

definition and enforcement of property-rights constitutes an
explanation for the rise of the west.
Implicit in their argument is a two-step model of
growth:

first, the possibility for more efficient organiza-

tion motivates some nation states in western Europe to
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these rights lead to more efficient economic behavior, as
measured by economic growth.

While most of the research is

focused upon the second step in this model--in part because
it is more susceptible to direct empirical proof-nevertheless this research does provide indirect support for
the logic of the first step, which is analogous to the
Private Property Rights Theorem.

To substantiate their

argument, North and Thomas examine in some detail the
developments of property rights in land and labor in Western
Europe from 900 to 1500 and in goods and services from 1500
to 1700.

They find that population growth combined with a

frontier movement during the High Middle Ages (lOth - 12th
centuries) made possible specialization and the growth of a
market economy which, in turn, provided a motivation for the
development and exchange of some form of private property
rights in labor and in land:
Before the development of a viable market
system, an agreement to share inputs had
provided both lords and vassals with their
desired consumption mixes at the lowest cost.
But now that the market could be used to
exchange goods, and money could serve to measure
the product, it clearly involved lower
transaction costs to set up a system of wages,
rents or shares by contract. The manorial
relationship had suffered an irreversible
change, and although the customs of the manor
reduced the speed of transition, the lords and
serfs, because a market existed, were
increasingly willing to commute labor dues to
money payments on an annual basis, and the l~rds
to rent out their demesnes (emphasis added.)
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becoming scarce and rising in value.

As North and Thomas

point out, "Feudal law did not recognize the concept of land
ownership.

Its basic characteristic was that several

persons had jurisdiction or held and shared particular
rights to the same piece of land."

However, "the increasing

economic role of land led gradually to fundamental changes
in land law."

In England, for example,

the rising real value of land provided incentives
to establish, reestablish, and define the claims
to land by rival groups in the society. Two key
statues in this regard were: Merton in 1235 and
westminster in 1285. These permitted the
manorial lord to enclose wasteland so long as
sufficient land was left for the tenants. Thus
the lords obtained the exclusive right to
substantial areas of the manor's land formerly
belonging to all of the inhabitants." 5
In addition, by the end of the thirteenth century
freeholders in England had acquired the right to sell land
by substitution.

The final result of this pattern of

changes in English common law "was fee-simple absolute
ownership of land and a free market for labor--two essential
preconditions for efficient resource allocation and,
ultimately, for economic growth.,,6
The commuting of labor to money and the renting out of
land by contract represent the first steps toward the development of private property rights in land and labor.

North

and Thomas find these developments directly related to the
prior development of a viable market system.

In addition,
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ownership of land and a free market for labor directly
linked to the real value of land.

Both findings clearly

support the Private Property Rights Theorem.

Moreover, it

is significant that North and Thomas are able to cite as
evidence two specific property rights messages and that the
particular circumstances they describe are those in which
rights to a common property resource exactly comparable to
the resource in Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" are transformed through such messages into private property rights.
However, while "the granting of alienability of land
(a key step in the

de~elopment

of fee-simple absolute owner-

ship) was accomplished in England, France, Anjou, Poites and
other areas to ensure that the Crown would not lose existing
feudal revenues, ... for identical reasons counter-productive
actions such as the multiplication of tolls, arbitrary confiscation, forced loans and many other similar devices, were
taken, which make for greater uncertainty with respect to
property rights.,,7

In part because of these actions, the

increase in productivity was not sufficient to outstrip
population growth; and western Europe was subject to the
Malthusian checks of famine and plague in the 14th and 15th
centuries.

These inefficient actions do not invalidate the

Private Property Rights Theorem, but serve, rather, to
illustrate the validity of the Law of Requisite Control

-153described in Chapter I:
self-control.

collective optimality requires

The crown heads of western Europe, who

largely controlled the development of property rights at
this time, were apparently torn between realization of
profits through actions that advanced the common interests
in economic growth and realization of profits through
actions that advanced their individual and immediate interests, while resulting in the retardation of economic growth.
As these disasters lowered the population level, the
value of labor increased.

Lords responded with the innova-

tion of lengthy leases, "which soon became life leases,
under which labor obligations were combined with customary
rent in one fixed rent contract" which led first by customary practice and then by legal consideration to the right of
inheritance.

According to North and Thomas, "the manorial

economy thus met its death:

labor services were now

irrevocably replaced by money rent payments; land was now
tilled by free tenants and/or by workers receiving money
wages, who were free to seek their best employment.,,8
while the substantial property rights in land and
labor that had evolved in Western Europe by the end of the
15th century provide support for the Private Property Rights
Theorem, North and Thomas note that
capital markets and the organization of commerce
were still burdened by usury laws and by the
ethical concept of a 'just' price, which could be
circumvented only by more expensive alternative
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arrangements. Product markets, especially for
manufacturers, were often monopolized and
outsiders prevented from entering the race. Few
inducements encouraged investment in research or
development.
The authors also point out that
even as private property rights came into
existence, their enforcement remained uncertain
and subject to the vagaries of the political
situation generated by the emergence of nationstates. The very process of economic and
political change was associated with additional
costs of uncertainty a~out what the future
arrangements would be.
It is apparent that the different rates at which property rights were defined over land and labor, on the one
hand, and capital and products, on the other, and the
different rates at which private property rights were
defined, on the one hand, and enforced, on the other, can
not be explained except by propositions more specific than
the Private Property Rights Theorem.

Moreover, such

propositions will have to incorporate the costs of creating
additional uncertainty regarding future changes in
fundamental economic and political institutions into the
concept of communication and enforcement costs.
Taking these uncertainties over enforcement and future
changes into account, North and Thomas note that "the greatest gains that could be achieved during the early modern
period were in improving the efficiency with which goods
could be exchanged."

Examining the historical record for
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various nation-states that now comprise western Europe.
England and the Netherlands altered their fundamental
institutional arrangements to exploit their opportunities
while France and Spain did not.

The rulers of all these

nation-states were motivated to establish new fiscal policy
by the need for more revenue.

However, differences in

political structure between, on the one hand, England and
the Netherlands--whose rulers were checked by representative
assemblies--and, on the other hand, Spain and France--which
were absolutist monarchies--Ied to contrasting sets of property rights that produced sustained growth in the Netherlands and in England and led to relative retardation in the
case of France and to stagnation and decline in the instance
of spain. 10 These differences would seem once again to
provide direct support for the Law of Requisite Control,
and, thus, indirect support for the Private Property Rights
Theorem.

In those countries characterized largely by self-

control, people were able to achieve through communication
and enforcement of property rights messages results that
were more collectively optimal than in those countries
controlled by strong monarchies.
Thomas and North have succeeded in demonstrating a
qualitative association between the development of property
rights and subsequent economic growth.

Their book and the
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validity for the Private property Rights Theorem, for the
Law of Requisite control and for the underlying assumption
that private property rights will lead in some cases to
efficient behavior and subsequent economic growth.

More-

over, while the North-Thomas model is not complex enough to
explain the differential behavior of nation-states in the
development of property rights from 1500 to 1700, just such
a difference is predicted by the Law of Requisite Control,
demonstrating not only the validity but also the usefulness
of the Social Theory of Collective Communication.
However, there are certain limitations to the support
provided by the work of North and Thomas . . As was pOinted
out above, the Social Theory of Collective Communication
cannot at present describe the rate at which property rights
evolve or explain differences between the rates at which
different kinds of property rights evolve.

Evidence

presented by North and Thomas that one type of property
rights evolves at the same time that another does not can
only be regarded as providing mixed support.
significant in this regard

It is

that the authors describe the

obstacles to devising a precise model to predict changes in
fundamental institutions as "formidable."
Another limitation is the admission on the part of
North and Thomas that their assumptions of profit maximization and perfect information do not always hold.

There is,
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in fact, a group of anthropologists, the "substantivists,"
who argue that conventional economic categories are largely
inapplicable to primitive society.

For example, based upon

a review of the literature on primitive economic and social
anthropology, Karl polanyi lists a number of widely
supported generalizations which contradict the assumptions
of the North-Thomas model:

(a) "the motive of gain is not

'natural' to man", (b) "to expect payment for labor is not
'natural' to man," (c) "to restrict labor to the unavoidable
minimum is not 'natural' to man," (d) "the usual incentives
to labor are not gain but reciprocity, competition, joy of
work, and social approbation."ll
In a paper outlining his theory of primitive society,
Richard Posner argues that this debate is a sterile one,
arising from an exclusively narrow view of what is economic.
Posner demonstrates that many of the distinctive and
apparently noneconomic institutions of primitive society can
.be explained as logical adaptations to uncertainty or high
information costs.1 2 It appears that the work of North and
Thomas is limited not so much by the need to explain the
existence of individuals whose behavior belies the
assumptions of economic man as it is by the need to document
the evolution of those attitudes that constitute what is
defined here as rationality and to demonstrate the
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relation of this evolution to changes in the level of
uncertainity and the cost of information.

Clearly, if the

Social Theory of Collective Communication is to be fully
supported by historical evidence regarding the fall of the
manorial system as analysed in the work of North and Thomas
it will have to take into account cultural as well as
political and social forms of communication and control.
Moreover the change in the motive of action on the part of
lord and serf alike from that of subsistence to that of gain
must be explained in more detail and, if possible,
documented with historical evidence.

North America
Although in most studies of the development of
property rights in North America the same limitations are
apparent, they have in some cases been avoided.

North and

Thomas apply a different version of their theory to the
economic history of the United States; but unfortunately the
focus of this theory is upon institutional arrangements, of
which the definition, enforcement and exchange of property
rights is only one example.

Moreover, their theory is

developed in this instance to predict two kinds of
phenomena:

the mix of individual, cooperative, and

governmental institutions and the lag time between the onset
of disequilibrating forces and the establishment of these
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new (or altered) institutions.

Since these are only

tangentially related to the concerns of the Social Theory of
collective Communication, this review will move on to other
studies.
One of the seminal articles in the literature on property rights development describes the development of rights
in hunting territory among the Montagnais Indians of western
Labrador.

In this study Eleanor Leacock explores and sup-

ports two hypotheses:

"first, that such private ownership

of specific resources as exists has developed in response to
the introduction of sale and exchange into the Indian economy which accompanies the fur trade and, second, that it was
these private rights--specifically to fur-bearing animals-which laid the basis for individually inherited rights to
land.,,13

Insofar as the introduction of a market economy

carried with it the possibility of more efficient behavior
and this possibility prompted the institution of private
property rights, the first of Leacock's hypotheses is
analogous to the Private Property Rights Theorem under
examination here.
Leacock demonstrates that alternative hypotheses are
untenable and that her own are valid with evidence
concerning rights to beaver and the differential protection
of property.

Moreover, while acknowledging the existence of

many contributory factors such as the development of steel
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traps, the cash economy, the increasing scarcity of game,
the influence of white hunters, colonization and, in general, the establishment of trading posts, and the husbanding
of small fur-bearing game, Leacock explains the basic dynamics of the process "by elaborating upon Herskowit's statement that it is the production for use rather than exchange
in primitive economies that focuses the attention on the
products of the land rather than the land itself."

She

finds that
formerly the Montagnais hunted cooperatively and
shared their game, which was immediately consumed
by the group .... Owing to the uncertainty of the
hunt, several families were necessarily dependent
upon each other, thus providing a 'kind of
subsistence insurance or greater security than
individual families could achieve'. With
production for trade, however, the individual's
most important ties, economically speaking, were
transferred from within the band to without, and
his objective relation to other band members
changed from the cooperative to the competitive.
With storable, transportable, and individually
acquired supplies--principally flour and lard--as
staple foods, the individual family becomes selfsufficient, and larger group living is not only
superfluous in the struggle for existence but a
positive hindrance to the personal acquisition of
furs . ... The family group begins to resent
intrusions that threaten to limit its take of
furs an~ develops ~4sense of proprietorship over
a certa~n area ....
Leacock also uses her own work with neighboring Indian
bands to throw light on the process of motivational change:
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This is not to say that individual landholding
patterns develop smoothly and easily as soon as
the fur trade becomes the economic basis of
Indian life. On the contrary, the Indians show
considerable resistance to giving up communal for
individualized patterns of living. My
informants at Natashquan were to some extent
aware of their dilemma, presented as they are
with the conflict between their desire to
increase their income and acquire the material
comforts they see available and their resistance
to changing basic patterns of everyday existence.
The relationship evident here between the psychic, social
and cultural costs of private property rights messages and
the time it takes for such messages to be produced, distributed and enforced is clearly one of the factors that a
dynamic theory would have to explain.

As Leacock notes,

The conflicts these compromises involve throw
light on the resistance to full-time trapping
which is otherwise somewhat puzzling in its
consistent reappearance in the historical
accounts of western Labrador--a resistance
hard to explain if the Indians already had
the segregated family hunting territory so
admirabl¥5suited to dependence on furtrading.
Leacock has thus described the process of motivational
change in some detail.

It is clear from her description

that, at least in this case, the change in motivation is not
a change from nonrational to rational behavior but from one
structure of interests in which collective behavior is
rational to another structure of interests resembling the
collectively suboptimal type of game-like environment in
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rights appears to be rational.

Leacock's work thus supple-

ments the findings of North and Thomas in providing support
for the assumptions of rationality that underlie the Social
Theory of Collective Communication.
Unfortunately, in contrast to the situation in western
Europe where written laws can be examined as evidence,
Leacock points out that "there is little in the early
accounts with which to piece together a dynamic picture of
the increasing individualization of hunting and trapping
which the new emphasis on fur-trading was presumably introducing into Montagnais socioeconomic organization.,,16
Nevertheless, she does find evidence for a gradual development from a purely temporal allotment of hunting territories
in the beginning of the 18th century through a seasonal
allotment system to the middle of the century when these
allotted territories were relatively stabilized.

Leacock

also reviews the results of her own study of land-holding
practices of neighboring Indian bands to corroborate her
claims.

In these bands, she has found

the beginning of private hunting grounds (or,
more properly, trapping grounds), now developing
as a result of the recent dependence on the fur
trade and reinforced by the example of the
western Montagnais and the permanent trap lines
of the whites. In this area the emphasis on
acquiring furs for exchange has but recently
superseded the emphasis on obtaining food for
consumption, with the apparent result that
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individualized hunting patterns moving toward
private "ownership" of land are only beginning to
replace co-~~erative patterns and communal
ownership."
Harold Demsetz makes extensive reference to Leacock in
his attempt at developing a theory of property rights.

He

finds her thesis consistent with the absence of similar
rights among the Indians of the southwest plains, where the
animals were primarily grazing species whose habit was to
wander over wide tracts of land, thus increasing the cost of
keeping them within established territorial boundaries.

He

also notes as corroborating evidence, that among Indians of
the Northwest, where forest animals predominate and some
trading in fur occured, highly developed private family
rights to hunting lands also emerged. 18
The work of Leacock is significant for it supports and
elaborates upon the findings of North and Thomas with regard
to the development of property rights in land among a people
whose economy was previously organized without a market and
motivated by desires other than that of individual material
gain.

The introduction of a market for goods which they can

produce and contact with traders and others who are motivated by gain rather than subsistence is even more clearly
shown by Leacock to be sufficient to initiate a change in
the structure of perceived interests which in turn leads to
an alteration in the definition and enforcement of property
rights.

On the other hand, Leacock's study is limited in
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that it only touches upon the process by which property
rights themselves are established.

In this regard she is

even less helpful than North and Thomas, who were at least
able to cite specific laws and edicts which articulated or
altered fundamental property rights.

Studies of tribal

societies, such as Ault and Rutman's investigation of
property rights in tribal Africa and Fender's analysis of
the use of common resources by the Crees of Saskatchewan,
provide additional qualitative support for the Private
property Rights Theorem but are subject to the same
limitations as the work of Leacock. 19
Anderson and Hill who studied with and drew upon the
work of North and Thomas, have incorporated further developments into their theory and applied it to the evolution of
property rights in the American west.

These authors base

their study on the more specific formulation of Alchian and
Allen, who predict that "the higher market value attaching
to goods with strong ownership rights spurs individuals to
seek laws that would strengthen private property rights.,,20
Assuming that the precision with which property rights are
defined is not at a collectively optimal level, this
prediction corresponds roughly to that articulated here as
the Private property Rights Theorem.
In order to narrow the analysis and overcome the
deficiencies of ad hoc theorizing, these authors choose
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enforcement activities expressed in terms of the traditional
marginal decision model of neo-classical economics-developments which make it possible, for the first time, to
articulate formal, quantitative relationships between the
relevant variables.

Anderson and Hill proceed to test their

theory by analysing the development of property rights
governing three important productive factors on the Great
plains:

land, livestock and water.

With regard to land, the authors note the relationship
between population growth from 1850 to 1900--an indication
of land scarcity--and the evolution of property rights in
land from "squatter sovereignty' in the 1860's and 70's
through popularly recognized rights to "an accustomed
range," to the Homestead, preemption and Desert Land Laws of
the 70's and 80's.

They also trace the growth of stock

growers associations which lobbied for the passage of state
and federal laws defining and enforcing such rights as well
as activities such as the introduction and adoption of
barbed wire during the 1870's and the resulting range wars.
Perhaps most significant, however, is their finding that
following the disastrous winter of 1886-87, when land values
declined due to reduction in herds, membership in some
stockgrowers associations declined and many stock laws were
repealed in the legislature due to decreased lobbying power
of the stock growers.

-166-

The historical evidence regarding the definition and
enforcement of property rights in livestock is similar in
its support for the model used by Anderson and Hill and, by
extension, the Social Theory of Collective Communication.
while they do not provide any quantitative data, the authors
note that as the cattle population of the Great plains
increased, definition of property rights took the form of
laws governing branding activity and collective roundups.
Moreover, a comparison with most midwestern states shows
that the registration of brands was not a national
phenomenon.

Once again, Anderson and Hill demonstrate that

as the value of livestock (in this case, horses) falls,
enforcement activity (in the form of keeping animals off the
open range) decreases.
Finally, as the value of mining increased in the west,
the value of water used in the mining process also rose; and
the authors cite the evolution of mining districts, miners
associations and mining courts which provided rules and
regulations defining property rights in water.
While Anderson and Hill find the historical evidence
consistent with their theory, they note that their tests
have been unsystematic and essentially qualitative:

"A more

rigorous test of our theory requires further qualitative and
quantitative research on asset values, resource prices,
production functions, laws and their dates, and court
decisions. ,,21
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Before turning to more quantitative studies, however
there are other qualitative piece of research on the
evolution of property rights that should be noted.

John

umbeck has examined the historical evidence concerning the
contracting behavior of miners during the California Gold
Rush.

He describes two types of contracts, a "sharing

contract" in which a group of miners pool resources and
split the profits and a "land allotment" contract in which a
group of miners claiming a certain amount of land would, in
turn, allot a particular piece of this land to each
individual in the group.

While these contracts might both

exist under some system of private property rights, they
represent, in and of themselves, the distinction between
public and private property rights, respectively.
Drawing on Cheung's Theory of Contract Choice, Umbeck
hypothesizes that "in choosing between contracts, each individual will attempt to minimize the variance in his income
subject to the constraint of ambiguity costs.,,22

He as-

sumes that a sharing contract reduces variance in income but
that the costs of enforcing a sharing contract increase
above that of the land allotment contract as the size of the
group increases.

If reduction of variance in income is as-

sumed to be preferred over no reduction, umbeck's hypothesis is analogous to the Property Rights Theorem described in
Chapter III.

The Theorem states "rational people with col-

lective rights to a scarce resource and with access to
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mechanisms will produce and enforce property rights messages
sufficiently patterned and sufficiently precise to ensure
that management of the resource will be collectively
optimal."

The relationship described here between group

size and enforcement is similar to the relationship
described by the Dispersion Lemma described in the same
chapter.

That lemma states "the cost of a collective

communication system is directly related to the centrality
of that system," where centrality is defined as "the number
of people who are involved in the collective production and
distribution of messages as senders or as receivers, with
those involved in both roles counted twice."
Judging from the observed behavior of California
miners, the shared contract worked well throughout 1848 and
the first part of 1849, but as soon as the 49'ers hit the
gold fields in the summer of 1849, the sharing arrangement
was replaced, as predicted, by the land allotment contract.
Umbeck's study thus helps to establish the validity of the
Social Theory of Collective Communication as applied on the
micro-level of analysis, extends Anderson and Hills' study
of property rights in the American west to include mineral
rights, and introduces the element of risk or income
variance into the calculation of the utility of various
types of property rights.
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One of the few authors to have recognized the need to
investigate the development of public property rights and
their relationship to private property rights is Harry N.
Scheiber.

Based upon an analysis of property rights,

regulation and eminent domain law in California and the Far
west region in the late nineteenth century, Scheiber notes
that "the doctrine of public rights warranted a variety of
governmental interventions (by use of the police power; by
use of takings through eminent domain; or even by invocation
of a concept of property that government held as a 'public
trust' for the good of the community)."

Other related legal

doctrines include that of properties and enterprises "vested
with a public interest," or "public purpose.,,23
while scholars who have examined the conflicts between
agriculture and other competing interests in the American
west and the role of the courts in resolving those conflicts
have come to believe that "the courts gave priority to
'dynamic property rights,' or entreprenurial interests in
the modernizing sector, over the rights of 'static
property,' which stood in the way of new technologies and
material progress," Scheiber argues that
to see the wholeness of law as it affected the
dynamics and institutions of agriculture, we need
to recall as well that law responded to claims
made for the public. Much as judges who where
pragmatic and 'progress-minded' may have bent the
law to instrumentalist ends, still neither
government nor private litigants' laywers
permitted them to overlook the mora12~r
constitutional claims of the public.
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While Scheiber does not attempt to explain these
examples of public property rights, he criticizes the
exclusive focus of the property rights literature upon
private property and calls for a "systematic analysis of
regulatory doctrines, as they were employed by the courts,
in the context of the larger policy process, in relation to
particular industries over relatively long periods. ,,25
Unfortunately, the studies that have been conducted of
regulated industries in the American West have evaluated
regulatory policy strictly in terms of the market value of
property, on the one hand, and the salaries of bureaucrats,
on the other, while paying no attention to the difficult-tomeasure benefits obtained from regulatory policies by other
groups or the perceived value of these private and "public"
interests on the part of the regulatory agencies.
One example of this type of study is Gary Liebcap's
examination of the assignment of property rights to the
western range by the Departments of Agriculture and the
Interior.

While

Liebcap is quite thorough in his analysis

of the impact of overgrazing upon the profitability of
ranching and of the fee and commission income of
bureaucratic officials, there is no analysis of the economic
value to the homesteaders of the policies of these agencies,
of the social and political value of the opportunities for
homesteading afforded by these policies, or of the
perception of these values on the part of the regulators. 26
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A second example is the study of Leibcap and Johnson
of timber policy in the Pacific Northwest in the nineteenth
century.

The authors demonstrate that restrictions placed

on the transferability of timberland resulted in the use of
fraud and theft by lumber companies which, in turn, resulted
in a dissipation of rents.

They ignore, however, the

possible value of this land to homesteaders and
" t s. 27
"
conserva t lonlS

It is clear that while there may be many examples of
the development of public property rights and of the
relationship between public and private property rights,
there are no available empirical studies which can be used
to examine the validity or applicability of the Social
Theory of Collective Communication.

Quantitative Research
It is important to note once again that the focus of
this review is on empirical studies which address the
question:
being?

How do property rights structures come into

Thus while there are numerous articles which examine

the negative consequences of common property rights in certain concrete circumstances and even some comparative work
which establishes a positive correlation between private
property rights and property values, none of these
quantitative studies takes time into consideration or
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with property rights as the dependent variable.
There are only two studies which can be described, at
least in part, as exemplifying systematically quantitative
research directly relevant to the hypotheses tested in this
dissertation.

The first presents sophisticated, systematic

data on the gains realized through the definition and
enforcement of property rights, while the second provides,
in addition, a quantitative index of the degree to which
property rights are defined and enforced, making possible
for the first time a statistical test of the relationship
between these variables.
While Anderson and Hill include in their article a
table describing census figures on the population of the
Plains states from 1850 to 1900, these provide only an indirect and unrefined indication of the changes in land
values.

Thomas Crocker, in contrast, has collected precise

data on 681 randomly selected sales of land in Polk County,
Florida from September, 1947 through June, 1966. 28 While
Anderson and Hill attributed changes in the value of land to
increased scarcity, Crocker focuses upon changes due to
damage to cattle and to citrus crops from air pollution resulting from fluorides released during the production of
phosphate fertilizers.

Therefore he collects data on the

amount of air pollution (the frequency with which each site
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periods from 1947 to 1964) and on a variety of other site
characteristics which might have a differential effect on
land value.

He then proceedes to regress the market price

of the sites onto his air pollution measure controlling for
other site characteristics, to arrive at coefficients
indicating the impact of air pollution on the differential
sale price of land.

While the author uses historical evi-

dence primarily to explain the changes over time in these
pollution coefficients, he also provides some insight into
the causal relation, predicted by the Private Property
Rights Theorem, between the expectation of collective
optimality and the collective communication of private
property rights messages.
Increases in pollution damage in the late 1940's due
to increases in the frequency of pollution dosages and in
the number of phosphate processing plants led to some
initial public attention to the problem between 1952 and
1954.

This damage is documented by statistically signifi-

cant negative pollution coefficients for the 1954-1956
period.

In 1955 an analysis of the problem appeared in a

technical journal, which led in turn to an increase in the
volume and number of complaints.

In response to the public

outcry, the state authorized in 1957 and funded in 1958 an
air pollution control district, which told the phosphate
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prospect of having to get emissions down to the 'minimum
technically feasible level' .,,29

This action in effect

defined the property rights of land owners in clean air.

It

resulted in an immediate rise in the relative value of pasture lands, for it was more efficient for phosphate companies to buy up these lands than to install emission
controls.

This move toward collective optimality is docu-

mented by a statistically significant positive pollution
coefficient for pasture land.

Interestingly, for various

reasons the cost of land planted with citrus trees was
higher than the cost of emission controls for the phosphate
companies and, while the relative value of this land did not
change, the absolute value of losses suffered by citrus
growers decreased.
The difference in the sign of significant pasture
pollution coefficients between the 1954-1956 and 1957-1959
periods and the difference in absolute magnitude of the
losses suffered by citrus growers between the same two
periods provides quantitative evidence of the collectively
suboptimal quality of the atmosphere in Polk County,
Florida, between 1954 and 1956, inclusive.

Therefore, the

establishment of an air pollution control district by the
state in 1957 offers support for the Constitutional Theorem
described in Chapter III as follows:

"Rational people who
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to effective collective social communication and enforcement
mechanisms will produce, distribute and enforce constitutional messages sufficiently patterned and sufficiently
precise to transform the political mechanisms into effective
collective communication and enforcement mechanisms."
The statement issued by that District in 1958 creating, in effect, private property rights in clean air offers
support for the Private Property Rights Theorem.

Moreover,

the increasing public outcry over the collectively suboptimal conditions of the environment documented by Crocker
helps to clarify the collective communication mechanism
through which a private property rights message is produced
in a representative democracy.

Finally, it is interesting

to note that although Crocker does not explicitly attribute
the collectively suboptimal situation prior to 1958 to the
prisoner's dilemma-like structure of interests created by
the collective rights of over three thousand citrus farmers
and cattle ranchers in Polk County, he does remark that they
"were too great in number and had interests too diverse to
permit effective allocation of decision-making and information processing. ,,30
Moreover, even had they been able to organize
effectively, Crocker recognizes that the informational,
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contractual and policing costs together with the necessary
emitter bribes (i.e. the communication and enforcement
costS) would have been greater than the expected receptor
gains (i.e. gross results).
Crocker's use of qualitative evidence concerning the
history of relevant actions and events together with his
quantitative measure of the changes in land values
attributable to air pollution provides more rigorous support
for the hypotheses advanced here than previous qualitative
studies.

However, the author notes that there were no

quantifiable measures of the ultimate determinates of
changes in the signs and amounts of damage coefficients:
"expected emissions, the views of the court and legislature
and executive authorities about the seriousness of the air
pollution problem, the willingness and ability of these
authorities to act, expected changes in pollution control
technology and phosphatic fertilizer production processes
and market, and receptor perceptions of pollution
effects.,,31
A more rigorous test of some of the hypotheses derived
within this dissertation is afforded by the work of Gary
Libecap on the evolution of mineral rights legislation in
the American west. 32 Although he has focused upon a
different part of the west than did Anderson and Hill,
Libecap has followed, at least in part, their call for
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further "quantitative research on asset values, resource
prices, production functions, laws and their dates and court
decisions. ,,33
As with the development of legal institutions and
policies regarding land, water and livestock, the evolution
of mineral rights legislation is typical of legal activity
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in America,
activity which concentrated on the transfer of a continent
of natural resources from public to private control.
Libecap's study focuses in general upon Nevada, a leading
mining state, and in particular upon the Comstock Lode, its
richest mining region.

As Libecap notes,

Nevada is important because portions of its
mining law were incorporated into subsequent
federal legislation. In addition, the Comstock
Lode was the first large scale, deep-vein mining
operation in the United states, and it was
incredibly productive, yielding nearly 34
$400,000,000 in gold and silver bullion.
The period covered by this study begins in 1858 with
the discovery of the Comstock gold and silver vein, runs
through the most productive years and ends in 1895 with the
virtual depletion of ore in this region.

Besides the

historical importance of this specific geographical region
at this particular time, there are two other reasons that
make a study of a mining frontier such as this appropriate
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as a test of the empirical validity of the Social Theory of
collective Communication.

In the first place, a study of

the mining industry makes possible the quantification of
resource or asset values, because mines have quantifiable
outputs which have been carefully recorded.

While there are

no quantitative data on resource prices or production functions, there are some qualitative indicators that can be
examined.

Moreover, there are also precise records of the

resultant body of collectively communicated social choice
messages, the content of which can be precisely analysed.
The historical record of the mining frontier thus offers
quantitative inputs and outputs to use in validating the
Social Theory of Collective Communication.
In the second place, the history of this mining frontier encompasses a sudden change in the economic environment
within the context of a society with no collective
communication mechanism or message system to guide behavior.
Also, aside from the mining industry, there were no other
industries or activities on a comparable scale which might
have inspired or influenced collective action in this area.
While some institutions, customs, and traditions, were
undoubtedly brought to Nevada from the mine fields of
California, the geographic isolation of this region together
with the extreme jumps in the value of mining make possible
a study of relatively strong forces which result in
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relatively rapid development under relatively controlled
conditions.

Such development takes much longer and is far

more constrained and contaminated by extraneous forces in
more "civilized" surroundings such as was the case in
western Europe.

The evolutionary record of institutions on

a frontier is a kind of time-lapse photography, speeding up
social development and allowing for the observation of long
behavioral trajectories under otherwise stable conditions.
For these reasons, the mining frontier in general and the
Comstock Lode in particular are especially appropriate as a
natural laboratory in which to study the collective production of communication and message systems.
Libecap's method in studying the Comstock Lode is to
apply to the historical record a model relating the value of
mine output to the precision of the legal rights system.
These variables are related by the assumption that there is
a cost associated with owner uncertainty and that the relation between owner uncertainty and legal precision is an
inverse one.

Thus the model predicts, as does the Private

Property Rights Theorem, rational individuals will produce
social choice messages describing the law to such a degree
of specificity that any further increase in specificity
would cost more than it would be worth in terms of reducing
owner uncertainty, while any decrease in specificity would
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mean a greater .loss due to the increase in uncertainty than
the savings realized.

In Libecap's words,

to determine the incentives mines owners would
have for changing the legal rights structure,
focus is placed on the net gains received by
them from laws of varying specificity and
enforcement. On the benefit side, greater
precision in the law increases the probabilitY3§
mine owner will maintain control of his claim.
Libecap identifies three methods by which greater
definition and enforcement of private property rights
reduces ownership uncertainty:
First, as individual rights and property
boundaries are more clearly defined, trespass
and theft can be more readily detected and
proven; second, state protection of private
rights can be more easily obtained as the
procedure for doing so is made clear; and third,
violators of private claims are more apt to be
found guilty when the obligations of enforcing
officials are exactly described.
However, Libecap also notes that
Increased precision in the law involves private
costs. Due to a lack of state or federal mining
law to borrow from, there are learning costs in
determining the appropriate statutory response
to new conditions. In addition, there are lobby
expenditures for influencing legislators,
judges, and other enforcing officials, and taxes
from government operations. Private costs are
likely to be affected by a number of factors
such as the physical nature of ore deposits,
existing institutional arrangements, and the
number of claimants involved. With these
private costs and benefits in mind the model
argues that mine owners will push for greater
precision in the legal rights structure as lo~g
as there are private net gains from doing so.
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Although there are no quantitative data on the costs
associated with ownership uncertainty or with its removal
and, therefore, net gains from increasing precision cannot
be calculated, Libecap seeks to "follow economic events
which would alter private costs and benefits and then
determine if the predicted changes in the law occur."
Libecap writes that
new ore discoveries would increase the benefits
of exclusive control. At the same time,
however, competition for the land would be
encouraged, leading to greater uncertainty.
Accordingly, as ore strikes occur, one would
expect lobby activity by claimants to make
mineral rights law more specific and enforcem19t
more elaborate as long as uncertainty exists.
This reasoning leads Libecap to two testable
hypotheses:
First, mineral rights law will be made more
specific and enforcement more elaborate as the
value of mine output increases due to ore
discoveries. Second, when the legal rights
structure is highly defined and enforced,
further increases in the precision of the law
will occur at a slower rate. This is because as
uncertainty is reduced the priva~g benefits from
additional legal change decline.
By making a number of ad hoc assumptions, the Private
Property Rights Theorem can be further specified in terms
similar to those of Libecap's two hypotheses.

For example,

if it can be assumed that (1) the expected value of output
for some future time period from the mines in the Comstock
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area is directly related to the amount of new ore discovered
and, thus, to the actual value of the output from all those
mines for some period of time in the immediate past, that
(2) all costs and benefits (other than the actual value of
mine output) including those of removing uncertainty are
stable, that (3) the amount of uncertainty facing mine
owners except for that removed through collective
communication remains stable, and (4) more elaborate
enforcement alone would not result in collective optimality,
and that (5) when the precision of a law is increased to a
collectively optimal level, enforcement of that law must be
made more elaborate in order for the rational behavior of
people subject to that law to be collectively optimal, then
Libecap's first hypothesis can be derived from the Private
property Rights Theorem.
If, in addition, it is assumed that (6) the increase
in mine output is steady over time, that (7a) increases in
specificity occur in equal units or (7b) can be measured on
an interval scale, and that (8) the assumption regarding
stability of costs and benefits does not hold after the
legal structure is "highly defined and enforced," when (9)
the net gain from removing uncertainty varies directly with
the level of uncertainty, then Libecap's second hypothesis
can also be derived from the Private property Rights
Theorem.

-183In addition to citing newspaper accounts and court
records which provide qualitative support for his hypotheses, Libecap uses quantitative data to examine the relation
between the changing value of mine output in this region and
two indices of the "annual-increase-in-precision" of mining
law, one due to statutes and the other to court verdicts.
Placing the content of mining law into fifteen categories,
he computes these indices as follows:
First, each statute and verdict was scanned to
see which of the fifteen categories were
covered; then within each category the
provisions of the statute or verdict were
compared to previous laws. If those provisions
were more detailed and precise in their
definition of rights, a point was assigned for
each category included. If the provisions were
essentially repeats of earlier legislation or
rulings without chang
in specificity, no
points were assigned. 39
The total number of pOints assigned by Libecap to each
statute or verdict thus depends upon the number of categories covered and refined.

The sum of points for all statutes

passed in a year and the sum of points for court rulings
given each year constitute the two indices.
Combining his two indices into a single measure of
"annual-increase-in-precision," Libecap regresses this
measure onto the value of mine output and several other
related variables.

The statistical evidence shows

that for the years 1858-1878, mine output was a
significant determinant of annual adjustment in
the precision of mining law. AS production rose,
prospectors obtained additional governmental
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1878, however, output had little effect on legal
change; instead, as hypothesized, the
accumulated body of law ... sufficiently
guaranteed rights and significantly deterred 40
additional refinements in the legal structure.
Libecap then regresses his combined indices against a
Gompertz function, which assumes that annual changes in the
precision of the law are determined by the current precision
of the law and the gap between the long run equilibrium and
the current level of precision.

The results are

significant, and the author concludes that
As long as ownership uncertainty existed, there
was pressure for further legal change. Indeed
the evolution of mineral rights law in Nevada
can be understood as an adjustment process to
reduce ownership uncertainty .... For any given
amount of mine output there appears to have been
short run equilibrium levels of legal support
where there were no new private gains from
further change. Additional ore strikes upset
each equilibrium by raising both the benefits
of exclusive control and ownership uncertainty.
The latter was due to increased competition for
the more valuable land. This led to lobby
activity for further legislative and judicial
guarantees until a new short run equilibrium was
reached. This progression continued until a
stable long run equilibrium of support was
obtained where uncertainty was minimal,
regardless of the amount of mine production. 41
Libecap's findings thus appear to offer strong quantitative support for his two hypothesis and, by extension, for
the Private Property Rights Theorem, from which these
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However, a closer look at

Libecap's findings reveals problems with his analysis; and a
closer look at the assumptions implicit in this analysis
raise problems with his interpretation.

These problems

weaken the support offered for the Social Theory of
collective Communication by Libecap's case study.
To test his first hypothesis, Libecap regresses his
indices against three measures of mine output:

current out-

put, lagged output and percent-change-in-output.

However,

there is never a statistically significant relation between
the indices and percent change in output; and neither current output nor lagged output is a statistically significant
determinant of the indices across the entire period 18581978.

To test his second hypothesis, Libecap regresses his

indices against the existing level of specificity.

A

negative regression coefficient during the period 1879-1895
appears to offer statistically significant support for this
hypothesis.

This support is undermined, however, by the

fact that assumption (6) regarding the steadiness of
increases in mine output, an assumption upon which this
hypothesis rests, is not upheld during that period of time.
Moreover, while a lowering of the rate with which specificity is increased at a time when mine output was increasing
might under some conditions still constitute evidence in
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support of this hypothesis, mine output was actually
decreasing during this period; and the lowering of the rate
of increase in specificity might have been due to that decrease.

Thus neither the first nor the second hypothesis

receive consistent and unqualified support from the data.
In addition, other assumptions inherent in hypothesis
2 and implicit in Libecap's analysis are not, in general
justified.

For example, assumption 7a (that specificity

increases in equal units) is dubious and assumption 7b (that
specificity can be measured on an interval scale) appears to
be false, at least insofar as Libecap's index is concerned.
Assumption 7a might, however, be relaxed to allow for the
somewhat more reasonable possibility that the distribution
of specificity across statutes and verdicts is random, but
this possibility is not considered by the author.
Assumption 8 (that it costs more to remove uncertainty after
the law is highly defined) provides no basis for a
determination of the critical level of specificity, while
assumption 9 (that the net gain from removing uncertainity
varies directly with the level of uncertainty) is never
supported by any evidence.
In addition to problems inherent in the conceptual
definition of Libecap's hypotheses, there are also problems
inherent in his operational definitions.

with regard to the

first hypothesis, Libecap has defined the relation between
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the specificity of mineral rights and the value of mine output as a dynamic one.

He measures specificity in terms of

annual changes and seeks an association between this and
mine output measured in annual terms such as dollar amounts
or percent changes.

However, the Unified Theory of Informa-

tion and Games upon which the Social Theory of Collective
communication is based is essentially static, as described
in Appendix A.

It deals with levels of specificity (or,

more accurately, uncertainty) rather than with changes, and
it stipulates a relation between the level of specificity
(certainty) and the outcome expected from a move such as
investment in mining.

True, such a theory can be used to

generate a prediction in comparative statics, e.g. that
different levels of uncertainty will be achieved by a
collectivity of rational individuals when faced with
different anticipated outcomes from mining investments, but
this prediction can only properly be tested by comparing two
similar populations on different mining frontiers or by
comparing the same population at two or more pOints in time.
To analyse specific changes over time in relation to changes
in anticipated outcomes is to go substantially beyond the
limitations of the theory into a dynamical region that
requires far more information than the Social Theory of
Collective Communication as presently developed has to
offer.
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There are other problems with the definition of the
dependent variable that affect both the reliability and
validity of these indices.

Libecap's combined index is

described as the annual change in specificity of relevant
statutes and verdicts, and is based upon an analysis of
categories of circumstances within specific statutes and
verdicts.

As a result this index is effected by two levels

of formal organization in addition to the informational
content of interest.

As an example, consider the cases

described in Table 3.
Table 3
AN APPLICATION OF LIBECAP'S INDEX
TO THREE HYPOTHETICAL CASES
case

laws/
year

a
b
c

1
1
10

categories/
law
1
10
1

circumstances/
category

total

index

10
10
10

1
10
10

10
1
1

The index can be applied to these cases simply by interpreting laws either as statutes or as verdicts.

A com-

parison of cases a and b demonstrates that where the total
number of circumstances specified by the law may be the
same, the index might take very different values due solely
to the distribution of these circumstances across categories.

A comparison of cases a and c demonstrates the same

thing with regard to the distribution of circumstances
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across laws.

If it is assumed that a measure of precision

should vary directly with the number of circumstances
specified in the body of legal messages produced during a
year, then Libecap's indices are unreliable measures of
precision insofar as they are sensitive to variations in the
form as well as the content of that body of law.

Although

he failed to see their significance, Libecap himself was
aware of these inconsistencies.

With reference to the

comparison of categories he writes that
in constructing the index, weighting schemes
could be used to reflect different magnitudes
of refinement. One statute might refine
existing legislation more dramatically than a
subsequent law, yet, under the procedure used
in this paper, both wou!~ receive 1 point for
each category affected.
The reliability of Libecap's index is also affected by
an element of subjectivity that creeps into their administration.

The index is based upon the systematic classifica-

tion of unspecified portions of legal text (described as
provisions) into one of 15 categories, each of which is
described in a phrase or two.

These descriptions are so

brief, however, that different readers are bound to make
different assumptions as to what is or is not to be included
in some of these categories.

Moreover, there is no apparent

logical relation between these categories; and compared with
various legal compendia and reviews of American mining law,
they appear not only to be ideosyncratic but incomplete.

-190-

Finally, as Libecap offers no explicit operational definition of crucial concepts such as "detail" or "precision" it
is impossible to tell just which provisions should be
considered more "detailed and precise" than or "essentially
repetitions" with respect to other provisions.
Libecap's analysis would have been more objective if
he had defined his categories in more detail, carefully
specified his unit of analysis, and made explicit his criteria for determining degrees of precision.

In addition, he

should have allowed for the possibility that a subsequent
law or verdict could be less precise than a former law and
thus avoided a built-in bias toward ever-increasing levels
of precision.

Finally, he might have established the reli-

ability of his instrument by testing it in some way.
Another problem with Libecap's indices is their
validity.

Since these indices are computed on the basis of

ordinal comparisons of the degree of precision contained in
various laws, a comparison of two values of one of these
indices yields valid information with respect to the fundamental concept of precision only on an ordinal scale.
However, analysis of the rate with which precision changes
necessitates information on an interval scale.

Unless one

explicitly makes an assumption such as (7a) about the amount
by which legal precision is increased, data such as provided
by Libecap's indices on the rate by which increases occur
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has no logical relation to the rate by which precision is
increased (and ownership uncertainty thereby reduced) and
therefore no relation to the net gain from such increases.
There may well be a fixed cost for any legal change, but the
benefits of any such change depend directly upon the amount
by which legal precision (and therefore ownership uncertainty) is changed.

Strictly speaking, Libecap's claim that as

uncertainty is reduced, the private benefits from additional
legal change decline is valid only if one is referring
specifically to equal amounts of additional legal change.
Since Libecap's indices measure change only on an ordinal
scale, however, his second hypothesis is of questionable
validity.

In that hypothesis, Libecap claims that when the

legal rights structure is highly defined and enforced,
further increases in the precision of the law will occur at
a slower rate, but it is the rate by which precision
increases, not necessarily the rate by which increases in
preCision occur, that will be slower.
There is also a problem with the independent variable,
mine output.

Libecap operationalizes this variable in terms

of annual dollar amounts and percentage change, both current
and lagged.

However, estimates of the potential value of

investment in mining may well have been based upon a longer
frame of reference than one year.

Moreover, the expected

value of investment may have included a comparison of annual
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output with amoving average.

The nature of this comparison

and the length of the moving average cannot be deduced from
the theory, but they could be arrived at inductively through
analysis of the data.
In conclusion, while Libecap's case study clearly offers, for the first time, quantitative support for hypotheses whose exact relation to the Social Theory of Collective
Communication can be shown, that support is not without its
limitations.

However, since Libecap's hypotheses are

operationalized in terms of variables that are not a part of
the Social Theory of Collective Communication and since the
questionable assumption upon which the second hypothesis is
based is also not a part of that theory, it is possible that
a reformulation of the Private Property Rights Theorem and a
reanalysis of Libecap's data using other operational
definitions may yield more substantive results.
possibility will be explored in the next chapter.

This
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CHAPTER V
THE CASE OF THE COMSTOCK LODE:

A SECONDARY ANALYSIS

In the last chapter, the empirical validity of various
theorems--particularly the Private Property Rights Theorem-derived as part of the Social Theory of Collective
Communication was tested against data from a variety of
research on a variety of subjects.

However, while the

general applicability of this theory to real-world
situations has thus been established to some extent, the
literature reviewed there does not provide a truly rigorous
test of specific hypotheses derived from those theorems.
Libecap's case study of the Comstock Lode comes close to
providing such a test; but, for reasons described above, his
findings suffer from limitations in reliability as well as
validity.
Therefore, in the next two chapters of this dissertation, the empirical validity of the Private Property Rights
Theorem and the more general Property Rights Theorem,
together with the Dispersion Lemma and the Constitutional
Theorem, will be tested more rigorously against both
-196-
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quantitative data (in the case of the first theorem) and
qualitative data (in the case of the others).

Moreover, the

private property Rights Theorem will be tested twice as a
source of specific empirical hypotheses:

once in Chapter V

through a secondary analysis of data generated by Libecap
and again in Chapter VI through a partial replication of
Libecap's case study of the Comstock Lode.

The Research Problem
A secondary analysis of Libecap's data is motivated in
part by problems inherent in the assumptions upon which his
hypotheses are based and in part by problems implicit in the
indices and definitions used by Libecap to operationalize
his hypotheses.

However, the derivation of his first

hypothesis from the Social Theory of Collective
Communication was shown in Chapter IV to be straightforward.
Therefore it will be redefined here in a slightly more
direct form, reoperationalized and tested again as
Hypothesis 1:

Mineral rights law will be made more precise

as mine output increases.

Libecap's second hypotheses will

be dropped, for it rests upon assumptions that are not part
of the Social Theory of Collective Communication,
assumptions which are unexamined and which, when they are
examined, do not always hold up against the data.

However,

any nonlinearity in the relationship posited by Hypothesis 1
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will be fully explored.

TO this end, assumption (7a) in its

relaxed version (that the distribution of precision across
statutes and verdicts is random) will be retained and
combined with a new assumption (10) that as a collectivity
of rational individuals proceeds to remove uncertainty
through the collective communication of social choice
messages, they will first address those uncertainties whose
removal will result in the largest net gain and turn later
to those uncertainties whose removal will result in less of
a net gain, either because they require larger collective
communication and enforcement costs to remove or because
their removal results in a smaller gross benefit, or both.
Together these assumptions entail a relationship denoted
here as Hypothesis 2:

As the legal rights structure becomes

more precise, the ratio of the level of precision to the
level of output will decline.
In addition, other hypotheses can be derived from the

Social Theory of Collective Communication and tested, at
least qualitatively, on Libecap's data.

One implication of

the Property Rights Theorem, incorporating as it does the
Dispersion Lemma, can be particularized in terms of mineral
rights and stated as Hypothesis 3:

If the costs of

centralized control necessary for definition and enforcement
of public property rights exceeds the cost of decentralized
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control necessary for definition and enforcement of private
property rights, a collectivity of rational individuals will
produce a system of private rather than public rights
messages.
The Constitutional Theorem developed in Chapter III
can also be specified in terms of the particulars of mineral
rights legislation and stated as Hypothesis 4:

If net gains

are possible through the collective communication and
enforcement of social choice messages, a collectivity of
rational individuals will develop collective political communication and enforcement mechanisms necessary and sufficient to communicate those messages.
Thus the research problem addressed here is to test
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4 by means of a secondary analysis of
data from Libecap's case study of the effect of the Comstock
Lode upon the development of mineral rights in Nevada.

Method
A secondary analysis of data from Libecap's case study
will necessitate the use of different measures of precision
in order to avoid the problems of reliability and validity
inherent in his indices and the problems incurred by using a
dynamic analysis to test an essentially static model.
Therefore the precision of mineral rights law will be
measured here in terms of several primitive but objective
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variables:

the number of statutes passed by the end of each

year, the number of verdicts reached by the end of each
year, and finally the number of statutes passed and verdicts
reached by the end of the year.

Since these measures are

even more general than those used by Leibcap, they will no
doubt include irrelevant and redundant laws and verdicts.
However in terms of objectivity, they are unassailable.
Line graphs describing mine output, Liebcap's indices,
and these additional dependent variables will be examined to
evaluate the usefulness of Leibcap's indices and to
determine if additional qualitative support exists for
Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Data on the number of statutes passed

and verdicts reached each year will be regressed against the
value of mine output to describe the degree of qualitative
support for Hypothesis 1.

Dummy variables specifying

appropriate periods of time will be entered into a multiple
regression to see how much quantitative support exists for
Hypothesis 2.

Finally, qualitative data from Libecap's work

will be analysed to determine the degree of support for
Hypothesis 3 and 4.
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Findings
QUalitative Evidence
As described by Figure 1, the value of output from the
mines on the Comstock Lode rose to a peak and then fell
three times.

The periods of increase were from 1858 to

1864, from 1869 to 1876 and from 1881 to 1888, with the
second peak far and away the highest, the first next and the
third being the lowest of all.
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-202Figure 2 describes annual increases in precision of
mining law due to statutes, as measured by Leibcap's index
and as measured by the number of statutes passed each year.
Both measures have been smoothed by using a two-year moving
average after 1866, in order to compensate for the fact that
the Nevada legislature met every other year after that date.
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This graph demonstrates that the index and the alternative

measure are remarkably similar.

Both rise in anticipation

of all three peaks in mine output.

Unlike Leibcap's index,

the number of statutes increases again after the initial
increase that anticipates the first peak in output, perhaps
indicating the presence of additional legislation that is
not as direclty related to the precision of mining law.
Both measures show increases concurrent with or after the
last peak in mine output.
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Figure 3.describes annual increases in the precision
of mining law due to supreme court verdicts, as measured by
Leicap's index and by the number of verdicts rendered.

Once

again, the similarity of these two measures is apparent.
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When Leibcap's two indices are combined into one and
compared, as in Figure 4, to the combined number of statutes
and verdicts passed each year, with both the annual increase
in precision due to statutes and the total number of
statutes passed smoothed by means of a moving two-year
average after 1866, the similarity of these two approaches

-205-

to the measurement of precision in mining law is remarkable.
It is apparent from all these comparisons, that Leibcap's
possibly subjective measures are not qualitatively different
from the more objective evidence provided by the simple
frequency with which statutes and verdicts are passed.
While it does not appear from this data that Leibcap's
indices are a major improvement upon the measures of
frequency as indicators of precision, it is possible that
increases in precision were evenly distributed or randomly
distributed across statutes and verdicts.

This would tend

to mask the difference between approaches.
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When the. number of statutes passed each year (smoothed
through use of a moving two-year average) is compared to the
number of verdicts reached each year, as in Figure 5, it is
apparent that the movement of one measure corresponds
roughly to the movement of the other, with the number of
verdicts lagging the number of statutes by several years.
In Figure 6 these two measures are combined into one
measure of precision in mining law and compared to the
annual value of mine output.

A correspondence between the

two variables is apparent, although much more apparent for
the first period than for the second or third.

FIG, 6. PF:[(:ISICn···J OF ~,..1It··J[RAL F:IC;HT:S
NE.\··A!.)A:

1858 TO 1895

.lter . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

Tv
II

)\

.30

I~

10·-

o

L\\ ~

\. "i

/;[1
.." i

\

~-''''!i''
,..-.l ..o(
i

58

o

r~

riil'~\'~"

15 ,.

5

\

051

~

j
,~-a/

\','.,

1\

'\

r",.,.'l··-"'·:OS·-....
,,l,,.
,"-6.
~
... ,--~.<I
11...

""

,.- "'.•'' . '
~

~

•

,

i

054

i

•

iii

67

f.ilNE OUTPUT/l MIL

70

i i i

7.3

~Lr

I

'I'

iii

705

79

S;;;:

+-

~

.l!I:-<"'::"
5.
,'......'~-.+--'+--...-""~

T

,

i

S5

STAllITES &

'

ii'

iii

SS

91

•....ERDICTS

•

,.

94

-207Nevertheless, this graph does provide some qualitative
support for Hypothesis 1.

It is also apparent that the

ratio of precision in mining law to mine output decreases
after the first peak, providing qualitative support for
Hypothesis 2.

Quantitative Evidence
Quantitative evidence is provided by regressing each
of the six measures of precision onto the measure of mine
The resulting coefficients of determination (R 2 ,S)

output.

and significance levels are described in Table 4.
Table 4
CORRELATION BETWEEN SIX MEASURES OF PRECISION
AND ANNUAL OUTPUT
Measure

R2
(INDEX)

SIGNIF

statutes

0.32923

0.01

0.29075

0.02

0.03848

Verdicts

0.37985

0.00

0.37973

0.00

0.00012

Combined

0.55466

0.00

0.44287

0.00

0.11179

R2
SIGNIF
(COUNT)

DIFFERENCE IN R2
(INDEX-COUNT)

NOTE: Data for the six measures of precision and data
for the measure of annual output were compiled from Gary D.
Leibcap, "Economic Variables and the Development of the Law:
The Case of Western Mineral Rights," Journal of Economic
History 38 (1978): 352-355, Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
The findings for the different measures of the dependent
variable reinforce each other and indicate a clear positive
relation between the levels of precision and output, thus
providing support for Hypothesis 1.

-208Moreover, while the similarity of the results for
Leibcap's indices and simple counts of statutes or verdicts
provides corroboration for Leibcap's analysis, the
difference between the two types of measures, especially
when applied to statutes and when combined into one index,
indicates that Leibcap's analysis of legal categories within
statutes and verdicts is an improvement, albeit a minor one,
over counts of the number of statutes and verdicts.
With regard to Hypothesis 2, Table 5, which describes
the change in the coefficient of determination attributable
to each of the dummy variables representing a period of
time, clearly indicates the presence of nonspecific
curvilinear components in the relationship.
Table 5
MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF PRECISION (OF STATUTES AND VERDICTS
COMBINED) ONTO ANNUAL OUTPUT AND THREE DUMMY VARIABLES
R2

Change in R2

Significance

Annual Output

0.05112

0.05112

.0179

Dummy 1 (1869)

0.36830

0.31718

.0003

Dummy 2 (1878)

0.41601

0.04771

.0511

Dummy 3 (1886)

0.44287

0.02686

.2160

Independent Variable

NOTE: Data for the measure of precision and data for
the measure of output were compiled from the same sources as
described in Table 4. Measures of significance are from the
final regression equation into which all variables have been
entered.

-209These findings indicate that 39.2% of the variation in
precision can be explained by the three dummy variables-31.7% by the first, 4.8% by the second and 2.2% by the
third.

The difference between a linear relation and the

nonlinear one incorporating the first two dumy variables
results in a F-ratio of 10.62 which, with 34 degrees of
freedom for the numerator and 2 degrees of freedom for the
denominator, is significant at the 0.05 level.

By running

separate regressions for each of the time periods described
by the first two dummy variables, it is possible to compare
the differences in slope to see to what extent they support
Hypothesis 2.

These slopes or ratios of change in precision

to change in output are described in Table 6 below, where
precision is measured in terms of the combined number of
statutes and verdicts and where output is measured in units
of $1,000,000.00.

Table 6
COMPARISON OF THE RATIO OF CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF
STATUTES AND VERDICTS COMBINED TO CHANGE IN
ANNUAL OUTPUT FOR DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS
Period

R2

Significance

Ratio Change from Period
(E-04)
I
II

I

1858-1868

0.52879

0.0112

6.73236

0.000000 ------

II

1869-1877

0.05905

0.5287

0.23153 -6.50083

0.0000

III 1878-1895

0.19264

0.0684

1.40969 -5.32267

1.1781

NOTE: Data for the measure of precision and data for
the measure of output were compiled from the same sources as
described in Table 4.
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The difference between time period I and the others clearly
provides some support for Hypothesis 2.

However, the

difference between time periods II and III runs counter to
the prediction of Hypothesis 2 and the lack of significance
for the second and third time periods further clouds the
evidence.
There is plenty of evidence (albeit qualitative) in
Libecap's findings to test Hypothesis 3 and 4.

Hypothesis 3

would be supported if the definition and enforcement of
public property rights was attempted and given up in favor
of private rights due to higher organization costs.

This

was, in fact, exactly the case with mineral rights in the
United states, in general, and in the west, in particular.
According to Libecap,
the policy of the National Government since 1785
had been to retain title to public mineral
lands in order to extract rents from them for
the "public purpose." Following this plan
Congress required that territories created from
the public lands not interfere with the disposal
of the domain by the United states. In
addition, the public mineral lands were not
included in the General Preemption Law of 1841
which outlines the transfer to private
individuals of title to the public domain.
Instead a system of leasing mineral rights was
established, but it proved to be unviable when
copper and lead deposits were discovered in the
Mid-west. High enforcement costs of Federal
claims led to the abandonment of leasing and to
the transfer of legal title to privatI claimants
in that portion of the United states.
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To document these claims, Libecap quotes President
polk, who stated in 1845 that "the system of granting leases
has proved to be

unprofitable to the Government ....

comparing the rents received by the Government with the
salaries and expenses during four years it was found that
the income was less than one-forth the expenses.,,2

Presi-

dent Polk recommended that those specific lands in the Midwest be open for sale, and laws were passed in 1846 and 1847
which allowed for the sale of lead and copper mines in
Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa and Arkansas.
All the mineral lands to the west of the Great plains
were unaffected by this legislation, but the failure of Congress to enforce its claims after massive California gold
discoveries, led the California Supreme Court to rule that
the Federal Government tacitly approved of private ownership.

Also Libecap points out, "enforcement •.. would have

been extremely costly considering the remote location of the
West Coast relative to the rest of the country and the state
of transportation and communication technology. ,,3

A system

of unofficial, local private ownership rights developed,
continued through the 1850's, and spread to Nevada when rich
ore strikes were made in 1859.

In 1866 the Federal Govern-

ment passed the Mineral Rights Law which supported
possessory rights and made provision for the transfer of

-212legal title to private owners.

With this act, mineral

rights became private property guaranteed by the Federal
Government.
As to Hypothesis 4, the historical evidence provided
by Libecap (and summarized in Table 7) concerning the development of increasingly larger governmental units capable of
defining and enforcing the increasingly precise mineral
rights through legislative and judicial messages during the
period when mine output rose, coupled with a decline in
governmental accessability (at the state level) at a time
when net gain from increasing precision might have declined
provides some qualitative support.
Table 7
HISTORICAL DATA ON GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND MINE OUTPUT
Governmental
Unit

Date
Annual Change in Mine Output
Established
in Thousands of Dollars

Mining Camps

1859

190

Territorial legislature

1861

1,500

State legislature
(in session annually)

1864

3,500

State legislature
1868
(in session biannually)

-4,297

NOTE: Data on the establishment of governmental units
and data on annual changes in mine output were compiled from
Gary Libecap, "Economic Variables and the Development of the
Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights," Journal of
Economic History. 38 (1978): 339-344 and 355, Table 2,
respectively.
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Discussion
The measures of specificity based upon statutes and
verdicts as units of analysis appear to avoid the
subjectivity inherent in Libecap's index.

The relationship

of these measures to annual output provides clear support
for Hypothesis 1 and, thus, for the Social Theory of
collective Communication.

They also support Hypotheses 2

and, to some extent, 3 and 4.

The nonlinearities that were

discovered in the relation between precision and output in
no way qualify the support for the Social Theory of
Collective Communication, because that theory predicts in
Hypothesis 1 only that the relationship will be a direct
one.

The derivation of Hypothesis 2, which concerns the

form of that relationship, is based upon additional, ad hoc
assumptions about the decision-making environment.
Nevertheless, it would be worth exploring these
nonlinearities further to see what can be learned about that
environment.
For example, explanations for the increase in the
ratio of precision to output in period III, as documented in
Table 6, can be generated by varying assumptions (2),
regarding stable costs of and benefits from the removal of
uncertainty, and (3), regarding stable amounts of
uncertainty.

One alternative (2a) might be that the net

gain from removing uncertainty increases during period III
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or (3a) the amount of uncertainty facing mine owners and
prospective investors decreases during period III, or both.
Given either of these assumptions, the ratio of precision to
output in period III should remain the same as in period II
or even increase, depending upon whether those changes were
enough to equal or surpass the increasing cost of uncertainty removal.

Another explanation would be afforded if (2b),

during period II, the net gain from removing uncertainty
decreased or (3b) the amount of uncertainty increased relative to periods I and III, for the slope of the regression
line would be expected to decline, perhaps even below that
of period III, which would be increased as the net gains and
amount of uncertainty returned to their previous levels.
Alternatively, if (2c) the net gains from removing
uncertainty increased during period I or (3c) the amount of
uncertainty decreased during period I, relative to periods
II and III, then not only would the slope of the regression
line for period I be greater than might otherwise be
expected, but the slope of the regression line for period II
would decrease as the costs of uncertainty removal increased
or the amount of uncertainty decreased again.

Finally, the

increases in precision in the period III described by
Libecap's data may include some legislation or court cases
that are motivated by interests other than those of the mine
owners.

For each explanation, the implications of each of

-215these assumptions with regard to changes in the slope of the
regression line will be conceptualized here as alternative
versions of Hypothesis 2.
It appears from an examination of qualitative evidence
provided by Libecap that there is support for Assumption
(2C).

One of the statutes passed in 1866, "An Act Concern-

ing the Location and Possession of Mining Claims," appears
to have been motivated not only by gains to be realized by
the removal of uncertainty regarding competition for mineral
rights among residents of the state of Nevada but also by
the losses that would be suffered were competition for mineral rights opened up to residents of all states.

The

significance of these losses is suggested by the state
Legislature in a memorial they sent to Congress in 1866.
Libecap quotes the legislators as writing that they have
heard with surprise and regret, that propositions
looking to the sale of the mineral (lands) of
this state and the Pacific Coast are being urged
upon you .... Such a course, if adopted, will
have the effect to retard and prevent the
develo~ment of the mineral resources of this
Court.
In a second memorial addressed to the same issue, the Nevada
Legislature points to the act in question as making any
Federal intervention unnecessary.

Moreover, Libecap also

quotes from the Report of the Senate Committee on Mines and
Mining Interests on Assembly Bill #22 to the effect that
they supported this bill not only as a means of providing
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greater security for mine investment but also as a means of
preempting Federal action regarding mineral rights which
would have a negative impact on local owners:
Such legislation on part of the Federal
government would be ruinous to the mass of people
of Nevada ... they could not become purchasers
because they could never successfully compete
with organized capitalists on such a basis ... It
is the opinion of your committee that the passage
of this Bill would be the most effectual means of
preventing such actions because it would render
it wholly unnecessary.
When congress passed a mining law later that year sanctioning and incorporating the rules and customs of miners as
codified, for example by statutes passed by the Nevada
Legislature, this uncertainty was effectively removed.
Clearly the response at the end of period I to this sudden
intrusion of additional uncertainty may well have caused the
slope of the regression line for period II, when that
uncertainty was no longer a factor, to decline below the
slope of the regression line for period III, as predicted by
Hypothesis 2, when that hypothesis is revised to include
assumption (2c).
There are other problems, however, which also need
attention.

The measures of specificity used in this secon-

dary analysis are based upon the unexamined assumption that
specificity is randomly distributed across statutes and
verdicts.

Clearly the problem of defining a more precise

unit of analysis must be met before full confidence can be
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placed in these findings.

Moreover, there is a certain

degree of subjectivity inherent in Libecap's determination
of which statutes and verdicts add to the specificity of the
law and the sample of laws and cases analysed here may in
some respects be unrepresentative.
Libecap himself notes that "the selection of pertinent
statutes and verdicts and the ordinal comparisons between
laws involve personal judgements.,,6

The set of categories

and, hence, the sample of laws upon which Libecap's data are
based includes those dealing specifically with the definition and enforcement of mineral rights as well as those
dealing with the definition and enforcement of property
rights in general.

The inclusion of these more general laws

opens up his sample to possible biases insofar as those laws
were influenced by interests of those other than the mining
industry.

On the other hand, enforcement of property

rights, as with the enforcement of other areas of law,
depends upon many more general legal provisions not included
in Libecap's sample.

Thus it may be that mining interests

were instrumental in passing laws other than those analysed
by Libecap.
On balance, it would seem that the first type of error
is more problematic than the second.

In the first place,

the inclusion of "irrelevant" laws lowers the efficiency of
the research process.

In the second, if those laws were
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randomly distributed across the period 1858-1895, they would
not effect the temporal trends established by the more
relevant laws; but such an assumption is not warranted.
Since Nevada was undergoing the transition from a frontier
territory to statehood during the early part of this period,
one would expect that legal provisions for the enforcement
of all interests would gradually increase in precision.
Thus, to the extent that Libecap's sample includes
irrelevant laws, i.e., laws that were influenced by interests other than those of the mining community, his indices
may be biased in the direction of Hypothesis 1, i.e., toward
an increase in precision at the same time mine output was
increasing.

On the other hand, to the extent that the

sample excludes relevant laws, i.e. laws which were
influenced by mining interests, the results may be biased in
the opposite direction.

Since it is difficult to say

exactly which provisions regarding the enforcement of the
law would reduce the uncertainty of a mine owner with regard
to his ability to capture the profits from investment in
mining activity, it would seem better to purposefully select
a more narrow category of laws concerning the definition of
mining rights, laws which can logically be said to best
represent the collective communication behavior of the
mining community.

-219In summary, the secondary analysis undertaken here of
data from Libecap's case study provides relatively
consistent support (both qualitative and quantitative) for
the Social Theory of Collective Communication.

Analysis of

the data reveals a relationship between the precision of
mining law as defined by statues and verdicts passed in the
territory and state of Nevada and the value of the output of
mixes in the Comstock region.

The percent of variation in

these measures of precision that can be explained by means
of mine output varies from 29% to 55%.

However, a

statistically significant relation holds across multiple
measures of precision for both statutes and verdicts, taken
separately and taken together, thus providing a clear
confirmation of Hypothesis 1.
When endogenous changes in the net gain to be realized
from an increase in precision and exogenous fluctuations in
the level of uncertainty are also taken into account (by
means of "dummy variables"), the level of explained
variation in the combined number of statutes of verdicts
rises by more than 39 percentage points supporting the
validity of Hypothesis 2 as revised to incorporate
assumption 2c.

Qualitative evidence in support of

Hypotheses 3 and 4 is also unequivocal.
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Although this evidence converges with and strengthens
the support offered by Libecap's findings for the Social
Theory of Collective Communication, the weakness of the
findings in the second and third time periods confirms what
was known from the start:

these alternative measures of

precision are incapable of discriminating between relevant
and irrelevant laws or between orignal and redundant
language.

Only a replication of at least part of this case

study will suffice to fully overcome these limitations, and
it is to this task that Chapter VI is devoted.
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1Gary D. Libecap, "The Evolution of Private Mineral
Rights: Nevada's Comstock Lode" (Ph.D. dissertation,
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4 Ibid ., p. 113.
5 Ibid ., p. 115.
6Gary D. Libecap, "Economic Variables and the
Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral
Rights," Journal of Economic History 38 (1978): 360.

CHAPTER VI
THE CASE OF THE COMSTOCK LODE: A PARTIAL REPLICATION
USING CONTENT ANALYSIS
Together with the other quantitative and qualitative
studies reviewed in Chapter IV, the findings and conclusions
of Libecap's case study of the effect of the Comstock Lode
upon mineral rights legislation in the territory and state
of Nevada offer some qualified support for the Social Theory
of Collective Communication developed in this dissertation.
Although Libecap's work makes possible, for the first time,
a quantitative test of the predicted relationship between
the precision of mineral rights law and the value of ore
from mines within the relevant area of jurisdiction, his
research suffers from limitations in both reliability and
validity.

The secondary analysis of Libecap's data des crib-

ed in Chapter V provides further support, but it also is
limited by the possibility of bias due to the application of
an imprecise unit of analysis to an over-inclusive body of
law.

In order to remedy this situation, part of the work

undertaken by Libecap will be replicated here using the
scientific technique of content analysis.
-222-
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The purpose of this chapter is to determine the
empirical validity of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, revised
to incorporate assumption (2c), by replicating Libecap's
case study while avoiding the limitations of his. research
method.

Hypothesis 1 was stated in Chapter V as follows:

mineral rights law will be made more precise as the value of
mine output increases.

Hypothesis 2, revised to incor-

porate assumption (2c), that mine owners were faced with an
exogenous increase in the cost of uncertainty early in 1866
followed by a corresponding decrease in cost after passage
of a bill on mineral rights later that year can be stated as
follows:

as the legal rights structure becomes more

precise, the ratio of the level of precision to the level
output will be lowered, with the difference between the
ratios for the period before 1866 and the period between
1866 and any subsequent date being greater than the difference between the ratios of that latter period and the period
following that date.

Since little difference was apparent

in Chapter V between the performance of statutes and verdicts as measures of precision and since the court is a less
direct channel for the communication of social choice messages than is the legislature, this replication will focus
solely upon legislation, broadly defined to include regulations and statues passed by the relevant mining district,
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Precision

will be measured by means of a content analysis of the elementary circumstances and situations mentioned in this
legislation.

By making the definition of these

circumstances explicit and by testing the agreement between
two coders independently analysing the same body of law, the
precision of the unit of analysis can be increased and the
element of subjectivity can at least be measured if not
reduced.

Restriction of this analysis to those

circumstances that make up the process by which a claim is
located and the definition of that process according to the
best available authority will improve the efficiency and
representativeness of the study.

Finally, by applying

Shannon's measure of entropy to the identification of these
elementary circumstances, the amount of uncertainty removed
or, equivalently, the amount of information provided each
year by increased precision in the law can be calculated in
a reliable and valid manner.

Thus the specific research

problem addressed here is to test the empirical validity of
Hypotheses 1 and 2 by describing the relation between the
informational content of mineral rights legislation in
Nevada and the monetary value of mine output in the Comstock
region of Nevada between 1858 and 1895, inclusive.
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The methodology to be used in this partial replication
is that of content analysis.

content analysis has been

defined as a technique "for making replicable and valid
inferences from data to their context. ,,1
technique can be described in four steps:

In this case the
unitization, sam-

pling, recording, and analysis.

unitization
The definition of recording units in this analysis of
mineral rights legislation has been borrowed from the work
of Ehrlich and Posner discussed earlier in Chapter II.
These units constitute the "elementary situations or
circumstances that are identified by that law to be either
included in or excluded from the universe of circumstances
to which as sanction applies.,,2

Moving from conceptual to

operational definition of these units, it would seem that at
least two different approaches are possible.

Ideally, the

legal text in question would first be unitized into statements which identify the elementary situations or (as they
will be referred to hereafter) circumstances mentioned
above.

These statements would then be coded as to the year

in which they were passed into law and the particular
circumstance(s) they identify within the universe of
sanction-related circumstances.
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This approach is problematic, however, because the
universe of circumstances about which it might be assumed
the typical mine owner was uncertain is nowhere enumerated,
making it impossible to construct a codebook for recording
the units of analysis.

Therefore, in this dissertation a

second approach is used, an approach which, to some extent,
overcomes this problem.

The concept of an elementary

circumstance is operationally defined here as anyone of
several grammatical units whose referents can be placed into
one of the descriptive categories used in a definitive,
authoritative treatise on American mining law.

Using this

definition, the relevant body of regulations and statutes is
unitized into elementary circumstances.

These circumstances

are then viewed as answers to a list of questions concerning
their identification, and this list of questions is used to
code the circumstances identified in each statute.
In this approach the list of questions functions as a
codebook, individual statutes constitute the context unit,
the elementary circumstances identified within a particular
statute are the units of analysis, and they are coded in
terms of the questions they answer and the year in which
that statute was passed into law.

The uncertainty

represented by the set of possible answers to each question
is then computed, and the informational content of the law
is described in terms of the amount of uncertainty that is
removed by the statutes that are passed into law each year.

-227-

The process by which the laws are unitized is described in detail in Appendix D.

It involves the transformation

of each sentence into a question and the analysis of each
question into syntactical components which contain no
elements joined through coordination and only those modifiers that are absolutely necessary for the circumstance
referred to in each component to be linguistically
identified as a member of a class of circumstances.

The

number of alternative answers to each question is then
computed based upon the number of elementary circumstances
in each sentence and upon the relations between them
established by means of coordination and modification.
This procedure is based upon the assumption that each
of the circumstances prescribed or proscribed by a law
constitutes an answer in the minds of those with a financial
interest in the mines on the Comstock Lode to a question of
some import with regard to the security of their mining
investments.

Hence the answer to each of these questions

provides information and thus effectively increases these
investors' monetary expectations or, equivalently, removes
uncertainty and thus effectively increases these investors'
expected returns from their investments.

Moreover, since

mine owners collectively were the only (or at least the
major) force pushing for new legislation on mineral rights,
it is assumpted here that the elementary circumstances
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identified in each mineral rights law are those that lead
to collectively optimal outcomes for the mining community as
a whole.
It is also assumed here that precision in the definition of property rights is increased through the identification of additional elementary circumstances and that precision is relative to the party responsible for (or concerned
with) the identification of these circumstances.

No matter

how much or how little modification is used in the
identification of a circumstance, it is assumed that less
would be inadequate while more would be impossible,
irrelevant or redundant for the purposes of those concerned.
Thus the language used to identify one elementary
circumstance will be considered equal in precision to the
language used to identify every other circumstance, for each
is just precise enough to identify a particular circumstance
as a member of a class of circumstances of concern to mine
owners and investors.
The complexity inherent in the unitization process is
such that the reliability of the process may be affected.
If other researchers were to replicate the procedures outlined above, but were to produce codebooks which differed
substantially from that described in Appendix D, the reliability of this study and, thus, the validity of the results
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Therefore to test the reli-

ability of the unitization process, two unitizers, including
the author, independently unitized the sentences of the laws
in the sample, using only the preceding description as a
guide.

Krippendorff's program for analysing agreement on

ratio-type data was used to determine how far above chance
the agreement of these unitizers was on the identification
of various grammatical .elements used in the unitization process, including nonrestrictive primary, secondary and tertiary modifiers and on the identification of relations
between these elements, i.e. the form and content of
segregatory, combinatory and contingent coordinations. 3
The agreement on all primary modifiers was found to be
95% above chance, on secondary modifiers 96% above chance
and on tertiary modifiers 55% above chance, while the agreement on coordinations ranged from a low of 83% above chance
to a high of 100% above chance.

The precise findings are

described in the first column of Table 8.

These figures

represent the percent of 83 units analysed with reference to
which observed co-occurences between unitizers can be
explained as perfect agreements rather than as what would be
expected strictly by chance.
These levels of agreement are not unacceptable.

Using

the policy guideline suggested by Krippendorff of reporting
only on variables whose reliability is above .8, data on 12
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of the 13 variables analysed here could be regarded as reliable enough to report. 4 Nevertheless, since there is no
guarantee that .8 is a meaningful level of reliability for
this particular study, and since agreement on tertiary modifiers was very low, the coders jOintly reunitized all those
items on which there had been an initial disagreement.

This

reunitization was based upon the realization that either a
mistake had been made by one or the other coder in applying
the set of instructions outlined above or an additional "ad
hoc" rule was needed in order to resolve an ambiguity not
clarified by the original instructions.

The set of ad hoc

rules is included in Appendix D.
The data were analysed again for agreement after the
ad hoc rules had been applied.

The results are described

below in Table 8, including those resulting from the initial
process, those resulting from the application of additional
ad hoc rules, the difference between the two and the remaining percent of disagreement due solely to errors.
The findings indicate that agreement at this point is
generally high on both the order of modification and on the
form and content of coordination.

Agreement on the number

of segregatory circumstances--the item that translates most
directly into the amount of uncertainty removed through the
collective communication of these messages--is above 95%
without the use of ad hoc rules and above 99% when such
rules are utilized.
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AGREEMENT DATA DESCRIBING THE UNITIZATION PROCESS
Item·

First
Unitization

Unitization
with ad hoc
rules

Change

ORDER OF
MODIFICATION
Primary

.9537

.9667

.0130

Secondary

.9606

.9954

.0348

Tertiary

.5555

.5555

.0000

Combined

.9646

.9690

.0044

FORM:
Segregatory
Contingent
Combinatory

.9674
.9515
.8263

.9925
.9556
.8263

.0251
.0041
.0000

CONTENT: SETS
segregatory .9839
Contingent
.8834
Combinatory 1.0000

.9883
.8834
1. 0000

.0044
.0000
.0000

.9920
.9428
.8401

.0055
.0000
.0000

COORDINATION

CONTENT: CIRCUMSTANCES
Segregatory .9865
Contingent
.9428
Combinatory .8401

The one item on which agreement is very low is tertiary modification.

However, Table 8 indicates that this dis-

agreement was due solely to errors on the part of coders,
and an examination of the coincidence matrix for the two
coders on this item reveals that out of a total of 83 modifiers (166 observations) the coders agreed that 78 of these
Were not and that 2 were tertiary modifiers.

There were
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of the small number of tertiary modifiers relative to primary and secondary. modifiers, these 3 mistakes appear to be
very costly.

When viewed in the context of the total number

of modifiers at all levels, however, they are far less
costly; for the agreement on combined modifiers is above the
95% level.

Moreover, in terms of computing amounts of

uncertainty, tertiary modifiers remove less uncertainty than
either secondary or primary modifiers.

Nevertheless, it

should be noted that, as might be expected, the higher the
level of modification, the more chance there is for error.
Two other findings emerge from Table 8.

The first is

that among forms of coordination, combinatory coordination
causes the most problems relative to the number of cases to
be analysed.

Agreement on the number of combinatory coordi-

nations was 82.63% and on the number of combinatory coordinated sets of circumstances, agreement was 84.01%.

In

neither case did the addition of ad hoc rules increase the
reliability.

Agreement on the number of combinatorily coor-

dinated sets of circumstances was perfect, but this is a bit
misleading, since there was only one of these cases.

To im-

prove agreement on this measure, more detailed instructions
regarding the interpretation of the conjunction "and" would
have to be developed, since this is by far the most common
conjunction used to indicate combinatory coordination, and
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yet its use does not always--or even usually--indicate this
type of coordination.

Nevertheless since errors with regard

to this type of coordination show up as disagreements with
regard to other types of coordination and since the level of
agreement in these areas is satisfactory, this is not seen
to be especially problematic here.
The last finding of note is that the rules of grammar
and syntax are not always sufficient to clarify the subject
!

of mOd~fication in legal writing.

Ad hoc rules, that is to

say, rtles adopted to resolve such ambiguity, were successful in raising the level of agreement concerning secondary
modifiers by more than three percentage points.

However,

although they increase the reliability of the instrument,
they may in fact decrease the validity of the study, insofar
as they introduce a bias into the data.
,

Where the contribu-

tion of such rules becomes substantive, the possibility of
such bias certainly should be investigated.

Sampling
The universe relevant for this study can be defined as
consisting of all those elementary circumstances which would
affect the return on investment in a mine in Nevada between
1860 and 1895.

This definition is based upon the assumption

that sanctions have been set up and that the legislative
process of interest consists solely of the identification of
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those specific circumstances which are either included in or
excluded from the universe of circumstances to which these
sanctions apply.

While this distinction between legisla-

tion concerning the setting up of sanctions and legislation
identifying sanction-related circumstances may appear somewhat artificial and while mine owners would obviously have
an interest in the former as well as the latter, it has the
advantage of focusing attention upon that legislation which
would be of interest

solely

to mine owners and, thus, of

excluding from the analysis any legislation that might be of
interest to, and therefore possibly influenced by, other
groups as well as the owners of mines.
Even with this relatively smaller universe, however,
there are too many elementary circumstances to be analysed
within the constraints of this dissertation.

The unit of

analysis used here (elementary circumstances) is far more
detailed than that used by Libecap (provisions), making it
necessary for the sample of laws to be smaller and more

effic~nt. There are two general approaches that can be
taken t
stances.

drawing a sample from this universe of circum0

draw a sample at random would involve either

the unitization of the entire body of law prior to selecting
a sample of circumstances, or the random selection of
circumstances still clustered into law.s or sections of laws.
strictly random selection would require more resources than
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are available while the clustered random sample would, at
the level of individual laws, greatly increase the random
error involved in calculation of the rate of increase in
precision since the total number of laws is far less than
the span of years across which they are to be analysed.
While some compromise might be reached, it would inevitably
involve more work and/or introduce more random error than
would a purposive sample.

Since the universe of circum-

stances can be divided into categories more or less closely
related to the definition of property rights, a purposive
sample consisting of all those circumstances most closely
related to the definition of property rights would be relatively easy to draw, would include no error due to random
sampling and would be systematically restricted to that body
of law most pertinent to the study at hand.
The validity of such a sample definition, of course,
depends upon the distinction between circumstances that are
more and those that are less closely related to the definition of property rights.

The distinction, as drawn here,

rests upon the fact that property rights are either defined
directly and assigned by a legislature to an individual or
group or, far more often, are defined by an individual or by
a group of individuals themselves through a process specified by that legislature and known as "locating a claim."
The topic of

locat~s

central to every compendium and

~
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treatise on American mining law, and its significance is
clearly and succinctly described by the authors of The
American Law of Mining as follows:

"The act of location

transfers possessory rights in the mineral lands of the U.
S. from the government to the locator. ,,5
Since the act of location is clearly crucial to the
definition of property rights, the sample of circumstances
to be considered in this partial replication will consist of
all those circumstances that describe this process or act,
together with all circumstances under which possessory
rights are directly and explicitly transferred by legislation to an individual or group of individuals.

While this

body of law will obviously be both relevant and efficient,
it will also be representative--not statistically
representative, as a sample of all mineral rights
legislation in Nevada between 1860 and 1895, but strictly
representative as a census of all mineral rights legislation
narrowly defined to include only legislation dealing with
the location of a claim passed in the same state during the
same time period.

Insofar as any case study can be said to

be representative, the results of this partial replication
will be representative, i.e., typical or illustrative of the
development of all property rights defined in an equally
strict or narrow fashion.
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The determination of which circumstances pertain to
the act of location and which do not will result from a twostage process.

First, each section of every law whose title

refers either to mining or to property rights will be
compared to a set of topical categories derived from the
titles, chapters and sections of The American Law of Mining.
If a section contains material that falls within one of
these categories, it will then be unitized.

In the second

stage of the sampling process, each of the questions
resulting from the unitization process will be given a code
indicating the topical category to which it corresponds.

If

any of the questions or any of the elementary circumstances
contained in a question on the master list do not correspond
to one of these categories, it will be removed.

when this

process is completed, the master list will constitute the
codebook to be used in the recording process.
The American Law of Mining is used in this study as an
authoritative source for the precise definition of the
sample.

A five volume treatise on mineral rights, it was

written and reviewed by a thirty-seven member team of mining
law experts from the law schools, the practice and the government.

Subsequent to its publication in 1959, it has been

periodically supplemented and updated.

While it is defini-

tive with regard to mining law of today, and thus
occasionally ignores a topic that was pertinent in the 19th
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century but is no longer so, it is arguably the most
authoritative and comprehensive description of mining law
available.

Topical categories for this study are taken

directly from six of the thirty titles in the treatise.
They include the following:

Title IV, prospecting and

Discovery; Title V, Mining Location; Title VI, Rights
Conferred by Location; Title VII, Maintenance of Claim after
Location; Title VIII, Abandonment, Forfeiture and
Relocation; and Title XXI, Liabilities Incident to Mining
and Milling Operations.

As can be seen, the first five

titles form a comprehensive and cohesive unit, while title
XXI was added to cover the circumstances regarding eminent
domain and easements, which, in 1959, were no longer part of
the rights of a locator and, hence, were described as
liabilities in a later title.

The chapters and sections of

each of these titles are kept intact, except when they
describe narrative material or material not written into
mining law until after 1900, in which case they have been
deleted, or where legal matters have been dropped, in which
case new sections were added within the appropriate
chapters.

A copy of this list of topical categories

describing the act of location is included as Appendix D.
Although it rests upon the authority of the American
Law of Mining, the sample of circumstances analysed in this
study is constrained by the mineral rights legislation in
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effect between 1860 and 1895.

That is to say, there is no

guarantee that this sample includes all elementary
circumstances affecting the return on mining investments
during that period.

It specifically does not include any

circumstance that was not perceived by mine owners (or their
representatives in the legislature) to be of interest.

Nor

does it include any circumstance that was perceived to be of
interest but was too costly (compared to its value) to be
identified in the body of law up to 1895.

The first

exclusion will render the findings useless only when it
comes to describing the level of uncertainty as defined from
some perspective other than that of the mine owners, but
will not effect the validity of the results regarding the
level of uncertainty among the mine owners.

The possible

exclusion of the circumstances most costly to identify
(relative to the value of their identification) would be a
serious limitation only if the variation in "benefits" from
mining investments were slight.

Fortunately, the variation

between 1860 and 1895 was more than enough to test the
implications of the theory; and although this exclusion
undermines the validity of the findings as a measure of the
absolute level of uncertainty among mine owners, it does not
affect their validity regarding the relative rate by which
that uncertainty changes, given the not unreasonable
assumption that the level of uncertainty due to these costly
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increase of uncertainty due to this costly type of
circumstance is randomly distributed across time.

Thus the

sample upon which this partial replication is based is not
only representative and efficient, but effective as well.
Once again, since the sampling procedure is relatively
complex, a test was run on the reliability of this process.
Two samplers independently drew a sample of laws from 1866,
one of the years covered by the study, drew a sample of
relevant sections from one of these laws, "An Act Concerning
the Location and possession of Mining Claims (Approved
February 27, 1866)," and analysed the questions and the
components of each question answered by this law as to which
were and which were not relevant.

The sample of relevant

laws drawn by the samplers was identical, indicating an
acceptable level of agreement.

Using Krippendorff's pro-

gram, agreement on the sections of the chosen law, on the
questions within the relevant sections and agreement on components of the relevant questions was computed and described
in Table 9 below. 6
Table 9
AGREEMENT ON RELEVANT SECTIONS, QUESTIONS AND COMPONENTS
IN THE SAMPLE OF MINERAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
SECTIONS

0.9566

QUESTIONS

0.7310

COMPONENTS

0.8886
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Agreement on the relevant sections is acceptable, with
only one error out of 47 sections.

Agreement on the

questions is a bit lower, although this is partially a
result of the fact that only the sections judged to be relevant were analysed into questions.

Thus there was only one

error out of the 50 questions analysed, but since only 4 of
these questions were judged by both not to be relevant, the
expected level of disagreement is quite high.

This particu-

lar error resulted in only one disagreement on the relevant
components of these questions, and since there were 10
components unanimously judged not to be relevant, the level
of agreement on this item is quite a bit higher.

The parti-

cular error involved appears to be a result of the tediousness of the sampling task at the level of questions and components, for it concerns the duty of a government official,
which is nowhere mentioned in the authoritative set of
categories.

Recording
Due to the care taken in unitization and sampling, the
recording process is relatively simple.
steps.

It consists of two

The first is to skim each section of each law

included in the sample and to determine which of the topical
questions are answered there.

The second step is to record

the code of each of .these questions, the amount of
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uncertainty removed by each of these questions and the year
in which the statute containing each of these answers was
passed.
Despite the fact that the content being analysed-elementary sanction-related circumstances--is fairly latent,
the formulation of this content in terms of answers to prefabricated questions renders the reliability of the recording process very high.

The instrument was tested by having

two coders--one of which had not been involved with the
sampling or unitizing--independently code the same law.
Agreement between the two was 100% above chance, indicating
that all the observed co-occurences between coders on the
circumstances identified in this law can be explained as
perfect agreements rather than as what would be expected
strictly by chance.

Analysis
In order to avoid the problems of inconsistency and
misinterpretation inherent in Libecap's indices of precision, this replication makes use of another measure,
Shannon's "entropy".

This measure has been interpreted as a

measure of "uncertainty" by Garner and McGill, Ashby and
others and will be described as such in this dissertation. 7
Shannon's measure is applicable to any well-defined
set of states such as, in this chapter, those social states
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defined by all unique combinations of relevant circumstances
either included in or excluded from the universe of circumstances to which a sanction applies.

Because it is a

logarithmic function, it allows for the computation of
amounts of uncertainty that remain proportional to the
number of elementary circumstances about whose status one is
uncertain.

Finally, since it will be assumed that prior to

the passage of a statute into law those with an interest in
mining the Comstock Lode would hold the probability that any
one unique combination of circumstances might be identified
in that statute as being equal to the probability that any
other unique combination might be so identified, this
measure can be computed by the formula

H = 10g2n ,where

n

denotes the number of unique combinations of elementary
circumstances and

H

is interpreted as the amount of

uncertainty in bits.
The derivation of this particular form of Shannon's
measure is described in Appendix D along with the procedure
by which this measure is applied to each question in the
codebook in order to take into account not only the number
of elementary circumstances identified in the answer to each
question, but also the various relations between these
circumstances established therein.

Once this form of

Shannon's measure has been applied to each question in the
codebook, the amount of information communicated to the mine
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owners by the law at any point in time can be found either
by subtracting the amount of uncertainty contained in the
questions that remain unanswered at that point in time from
the total amount of uncertainty contained in the master list
of questions before passing of any law or statute or, more
simply, by calculating the uncertainty contained in the
questions that have already been answered.

This measure--

the amount of information collectively communicated through
the law, (when the law is defined as the body of rules, laws
or statutes in effect at a particular point in time)--will
be used here in place of Libecap's indices of "precision."
The remainder of the analysis will follow that of Libecap
more closely in the use of regression for testing Hypotheses
1 and 2 regarding the relationship between the level of
precision provided by the law and the level of mine output
in the Comstock region.

Findings
Qualitative Evidence
When the information-theoretic measure of specificity
in mining law is compared to the frequency measure of
precision described in the last chapter and to the annual
output of the mines on the Comstock Lode, the value of the
former measure is immediately apparent.

In Figure 7, the

three peaks of information are clearly associated with the
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three peaks in mine output, again providing qualitative
support for Hypothesis 1.

Moreover, the relationship

between these two variables is much more clear than that
between the measure of precision and mine output, especially
for periods II and III.

The informational content of mining

law reaches a peak each time that mine output reaches a
peak; and then it drops to zero without showing either
lagged effects or effects of possibly unrelated increases in
mining law, as did the frequency measure of precision.
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It is also apparent from this graph that the ratio of
mine output to the informational content of mining law
decreases over time, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, although
once again, there is an increase in this ratio between the
second and third periods that is not explained by the
theory.
Although Figure 7 demonstrates that the informational
measure is clearly an improvement over the frequency measure
explored in the previous chapter, it is possible to improve
the relationship between mine output and mining law still
further. This can be done by making use of several simple
techniques to transform the data on actual, current mine
output into a measure that may approximate more closely the
expectations of mine owners regarding the future output of
mines on the Comstock Lode.

These techniques include the

use of a moving average and an envelope surrounding this
moving average, focusing upon the difference between the
actual output and these two other measures, and lagging
value of this difference.
Figure 8 describes current mine output, a five-year
moving average of that output and an envelope representing
150% of that moving average.

The logic behind these

measures is that a mine owner's expectations of future
output are not determined by the actual output of the mines
in anyone year.

Rather, an owner may start with an average
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of output over, say, the last five years. Of course, when
mine output increases over time, the current output will
exceed this moving average.

At first, when actual output

exceeds the moving average by as much as 150%, the mine
owner will anticipate that output would continue at a high
rate of increase and would push hard for legislation to
decrease uncertainty regarding the definition of a claim.
After the first major peak in mine output, mine owners
might be more sensitive to subsequent increases in the
actual output over the moving average.

Therefore, by the

time the actual output during the second and third periods
exceeded the moving average by 150%, all meaningful
decreases in uncertainty should have been accomplished.
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Finally, it might be argued that the lag between
expected output and information would decrease from, say,
three to zero years over time, as mine owners become more
efficient at stimulating the development and passage of new
legislation.
When the data on actual current mine output is
transformed using these techniques and values, the resulting
measure of expectation matches almost exactly the measure of
information, as demonstrated in Figure 9.
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-249Quantitative Evidence
Quantitative evidence is provided by regressing the
measure of information transmitted by the relevant statutes
onto the measure of expected output.

The measure of

information is incorporated both in its "rough" form and in
a "smoothed" version resulting from a three-year moving
average.

The resulting coefficients of determination,

significance levels and Durbin-watson statistics are
described in Table 10.
Table 10
CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPECTED OUTPUT AND
TWO MEASURES OF THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF MINING LAW
Measure

R

Significance

Durbin-Watson

Rough

0.31159

0.0003

2.31566

Smoothed

0.82347

0.0000

1.38480

NOTE: Data for the two measures of transmission were
generated by a content analysis of "Gold Hill District Laws"
in Gary D. Libecap, "The Evolution of Private Mineral
Rights: Nevada's Comstock Lode" (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 1976), pp. 34-35, and of the
relevant statutes in Laws of the Territory of Nevada (18611864) and Statutes of the State of Nevada (1864-1895). Data
for the measure of outputs were compiled from Gary D.
Libecap, "Economic Variables and the Development of the Law:
The Case of Western Mineral Rights," Journal of Economic
History 38(1978): 355, Table 2.
The relation between expected output and information
transmitted is much higher after smoothing, although both of
the resulting coefficients as described in Table 10 are

-250statistically significant and the Durbin-Watson statistics
for both dependent variables are statistically insignificant
at the 0.01 level.

These findings demonstrate a very

strong, very significant positive relation between expected
output and the information transmitted through the law, once
again providing substantial support for the first
Hypothesis.
The possibility of additional nonlinear aspects of the
relation was investigated next by introducing dummy
variables to represent portions of the scattergram where the
pattern might be expected to change slope and regressing the
smoothed transmission measure onto the expected output along
with these three dummy variables.

Table 11
MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF SMOOTHED INFORMATION
ONTO EXPECTED OUTPUT AND THREE DUMMY VARIABLES
R2

Change in R2

Expected Output

0.82347

0.82347

0.0000

Dummy 1 (1869)

0.82421

0.00074

0.1860

Dummy 2 (1878)

0.84097

0.01676

0.1238

Dummy 3 (1886)

0.84097

0.00000

0.9757

Independent Variable

Significance

NOTE: Data for the measure of transmission and data
for the measure of output were generated from the same
sources as in Table 10. Measures of significance are from
the final regression equation into which all variables have
been entered.

-251The results, described in Table 11 above, reveal that
these nonlinear components account for less than 2% of the
variance in information transmission, and for none of the
time periods is the difference in R2 statistically
significant.
Scattergrams for these three time periods were run
separately to determine the precise slopes of the regression
lines.

Table 12
COMPARISON OF THE RATIO OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION
TRANSMISSION (SMOOTHED) TO CHANGE IN EXPECTED OUTPUT
FOR DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS
Period

Time

Ratio

Change from
Period I
Period II

I

1858-1868

0.427107

0.000000

II

1869-1878

0.435327

-0.008220

0.000000

III

1879-1895

0.391604

-0.035503

-0.043723

--------

NOTE: Data for the measure of transmission and data
for the measure of output were generated from the same
sources as in Table 10.
The slope or ratio of information to expectation during
period III is, as predicted, less than that during period I,
but the slope during period II is greater than that during
period I.

However, the value of expectation during this

-252period was determined by the annual output as it varied
within an arbitrarily selected range of a 5 year moving
average and a 150% envelope.

It is perfectly possible to

decrease the ratio of these variables during this time
period simply by selecting a slightly higher range of
output.

The range that was used is far below that used

during the first period, so the closeness in value of the
ratios for periods I and II clearly support Hypothesis 2.

Discussion
The purpose of this chapter was to determine the
empirical validity of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 by
replicating Libecap's case study while avoiding the
limitations of his research method.
been fulfilled.

This purpose has now

By using linguistic criteria to

operationalize Ehrlich and Posner's concept of an elementary
circumstance, the unit of analysis has been more
specifically defined.

By using Shannon's measure of

uncertainty, the level of precision has been more accurately
described.

By using explicit procedures to analyse the

informational content of mineral rights law and by using
Krippendorff's program to analyse the agreement between
independent coders, the replicability of the research and
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the reliability of the instrument have been more clearly
established.

Finally, by limiting this study to statutes

dealing most directly with the definition of property
rights, the representativeness and efficiency of the sample
have been greatly increased.

All of these improvements

serve to strengthen confidence in the degree to which the
findings provide support for the Social Theory of Collective
Communication.
Quantitatively, the support for Hypothesis 1 is very
strong.

According to Table 10, the expected output of mines

in the Comstock region explains, as predicted, more than 80%
of the variation in the most conservative measure of
precision in the law on mineral rights, a figure that is
statistically significant beyond the 0.0001 level.

Although

the predicted deviation from linearity explains less than 2%
of the variation in the informational content of the law,
nonlinearities have already been taken into account by
transforming the annual output through the use of ranges of
different size and lags of different length, providing
support for Hypothesis 2.
The convergence of these findings with those of
Libecap's original study discussed at the end of Chapter IV
and with those of the secondary analysis of data from that
study described in Chapter V further strengthens the support
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provided here for the Social Theory of Collective
communication.

These findings are not only rigorous but

generalizable as well, for they are complimented by the
findings reviewed in Chapter IV of both quantitative and
qualitative studies on the development of property rights
under a variety of conditions.
There are several limitations to the support provided
by this work, however, which should also be pOinted out
here.

In the first place, the studies described in the last

two chapters all relate to a single case.

Thus while it may

be illustrative of property rights development in general
and, perhaps, typical of mineral rights development in the
American West, it is by no means representative in any
statistical sense of the collective communication of property rights messages.

While this lack of breadth is made up,

to some extent, by other studies reviewed in Chapter IV,
these are modest in number and, for the most part, qualitative in nature.
In the second place, the evidence described in the
last two chapters is relevant only to a few very specific
hypotheses.

Even when the literature reviewed in Chapter IV

is included, there is no research presented which tests such
propositions as the Public property Rights Theorem, the
Public Goods Theorem, or the Constitutional Theorem.

While
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no theory could be tested in its entirety by a single piece
or review of research, the Social Theory of Collective
Communication will not be completely validated until these
other propositions are subject to empirical tests.
perhaps most significant are the limitations inherent
in the procedure used to measure the informational content
of the law on mineral rights.

This procedure is based upon

the assumption that those who write and amend statutes
always adhere to the rules of grammar and punctuation (as
described by one particular authority) and that ambiguities
in such writing as regards the nature of modification or
coordination are so few that removing them in an ad hoc
fashion will not introduce a significant bias into the measure.

Based primarily upon logical rather than historical

evidence, it is assumed that the elementary circumstances
identified through linguistic criteria reflect accurately
the uncertainties and concerns of all those involved with
the mining industry, that the structure of and relation
between these circumstances is accurately reflected by the
grammatical and syntactical constructions used to identify
these circumstances, and that those involved with the mining
industry constituted at least the majority of all those with
an interest in mining legislation.

It is also assumed that

the order in which these elementary circumstances are
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identified in the law will be directly related to the
relative net gain associated with each circumstance.
While these assumptions all appear to be reasonable,
they should nevertheless be checked by further research on
contemporary property rights development, where the process
of collective communication can be studied in more detail
and where an assessment of the nature and level of the
uncertainties and concerns of those directly involved with
the process can be made without referring to the system of
messages whose content it is predicted will remove those
uncertainties in an order reflecting the level of those
concerns.

The research reported here does not go so far as

to assume what it purports to prove, i.e. that the level of
information concerning the circumstances of interest to mine
owners will vary directly with the level of output from the
mines, but it does assume that the circumstances
linguistically identified in the law are in fact those of
interest to mine owners.

Thus the enumeration of

circumstances by a process independent of that by which the
informational content of the law is analysed would add
another link to the chain of hard, quantitative evidence.
It should also be noted that the data upon which the
informational measures are based is clearly not without
imperfections.

The ambiguity and complexity of the

structure of legal prose is such that coders--even those
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with graduate-level educations--are not always able to agree
upon how to categorize that structure nor are they always
able to categorize that structure accurately when they do
agree in principle.

These difficulties, of which there is

ample evidence in the levels of agreement described by
tables 8 and 9, can only be eased through the further
refinement of analytical categories and the continued
elaboration of coding instructions.
Finally, while the implications of Hypotheses 1 and 2
regarding the existence, direction and form of the
relationship between expected output and informational
content have been supported by both qualitative and
quantitative analyses, the specific quantities which
optimize this relationship have been arrived at inductively
through analysis of the data.

These quantities should

ultimately be incorporated into the Social Theory of
Collective Communication and tested against other sets of
data.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation began by calling attention to a type
of social interaction in which the nature and role of messages is of central concern and yet to which little attention has yet been paid in the field of communications.

It

is hoped that the development here of a rigorous, mathematically based, empirically verified theory of collective communication will provide a much-needed introduction to this
area of communications research.

To conclude this study, it

is appropriate to summarize the work presented here and to
discuss its most salient strengths and limitations, suggesting thereby some of the areas in which additional research
is needed.

Summary
The research problem as stated in the Introduction to
this dissertation was to develop a theory of collective communication.

It was proposed that this theory be adequate to

provide an answer to the following questions:
1.

What types of social choice messages should be

communicated in order to realize common interests in
-259-
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different economic environments?
2.

What types of collective communication mechanisms

should be developed in order to communicate these
messages in these environments?
3.

What types of collective communication mechanisms

will be developed in different economic environments?
4.

What types of social choice messages will be com-

municated through these mechanisms in these
environments?

Questions land

2

are answered by the efficiency corollaries

together with the Optimality Theorem, all of which are described in Chapter I.

Questions 3 and 4 are best answered

by the Political Communication Theorem and the Social Communication Theorem, derived in Chapter II and Chapter III,
respectively, and tested, in part, in chapters IV through
VI.
It was proposed in the Introduction that a theory of
collective communication be developed in four steps:

l.

to derive from game theory and information theory
a Mathematical Theory of Collective Communication,

2.

to interpret that mathematical theory and to
derive from the resulting mathematical model a
Social Theory of Collective Communication,
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3.

to apply the Social Theory of Collective
Communication to some of the specific
prescriptive and predictive problems in the
literature on social choice, and

4.

to subject the specific implications of the
Social Theory of Collective Communication to
appropriate empirical tests.

The derivation of a mathematical model is accomplished in
appendices A through C.

Appendix A describes the mathemati-

cal and nonmathematical foundations of a unified theory of
information and games.

Appendix B and Appendix C build upon

these foundations by examining and interpreting the
transmission of information in the basic game and in the
metagame, respectively.

The derivation of a Social Theory

of Collective Communication is described in Chapter I.
Chapters II and III draw from the literature on social
choice game-theoretic models of certain relevant problems.
Application of the general theorems described in Chapter I
to these problems results in various specific theorems
which, together with those proposed in Chapter I, constitute
a rudimentary theory of collective communication.

The

empirical validity of this theory is then tested in Chapter
IV against a research tradition within the field of economic
history that deals with the development of property rights.
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This general test of the theory against a wide variety of
mostly qualitative research is followed in chapters V and VI
by more specific quantitative research concerning the development of mineral rights on the American mining frontier.
At several of the steps in the development of a theory
of collective communication, it has been possible to demonstrate the usefulness and power of this theory.

In Appendix

C, the Mathematical Theory of Collective Communication is
shown to generate a solution concept for Prisoner's Dilemma
that is more comprehensive, interpretable and precise than
others in the literature.

In Chapter II the Social Theory

of Collective Communication is shown to provide a measure
of precision that is both reliable and valid and a measure
of control that is both realistic and versatile.

In Chapter

III the Social Theory of Collective Communication is shown
to lead to conclusions regarding vote trading, randomization
and coalition formation that are supported by fact but not
derivable from current social theory.
In Chapter IV, research on the development of property
rights in a wide variety of settings is shown to support
various propositions of the Social Theory

of Collective

Communication, including the Private Property Rights
Theorem, the more general property Rights Theorem, the
Collective optimality Theorem, the Dispersion Lemma and the
Constitutional Theorem.

In chapters V and VI two specific
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propositions, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, both derived
from the Private property Rights Theorem, are shown to be
supported more clearly by quantitative evidence that is more
reliable than that provided by previous studies.

Discussion
Completion of the ambitious program summarized above
is, in and of itself, one of the strengths of this dissertation; for this research combines work on the development of
mathematical communication theory with a description of the
interpretation, application and implication of these
developments, including a review of relevant literature and
empirical tests of specific hypotheses.

This combination of

deductive and inductive methods approaches the ideal of
scientific method and avoids the extremes of both
empirically irrelevant theorizing and theoretically
impoverished empiricism.
A second major strength of the work presented here
lies in the contribution of original material to three separate areas of inquiry.

Firstly, the unified theory of

information and games described in appendices A through C is
a project anticipated by the inventors of game theory and
specifically suggested by Ross Ashby, a pioneer in the
development of information theory, but unrealized for over a
quarter of a century.

Secondly, the interpretation and
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testing of these mathematical developments in the form of a
Social Theory of Collective Communication constitutes a
systematic study within the field of communications of a
type of social interaction through messages that is ubiquitous, complex and absolutely crucial to modern society.
Finally, the reanalysis and replication of empirical research on the development of property rights is a significant contribution to the subfield of economic history; for
it incorporates theoretical and methodological advances that
make it possible to develop and test relevant hypotheses in
a manner more precise and reliable than ever before.
In addition to its breadth and originality, the work
presented here clearly demonstrates both reliability and
validity.

The theoretical propositions described in

chapters I through III have not only been logically validated through mathematical proofs but many of them have been
examined in light of empirical research in the literature on
property rights development.

This research covers eleven

centuries and two continents, and thus provides some
qualitative eVidence of the generalizability of these
findings.

Moreover, a reanalysis and partial replication of

the most rigorous piece of research in that literature
provides strong, statistically significant quantitative
support for several specific hypotheses derived from the
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Social Theory of Collective Communication.

In addition, the

reliability of this replication was checked at four separate
stages in the research process and was, in each instance,
found to be acceptable.
There are, to be sure, numerous limitations and shortcomings in the research reported here.

On the theoretical

level, the unification of game theory and information theory
has just begun.

It has far to go.

In particular, the pre-

sent theory is limited by the highly restrictive assumption
that all players have identical information about the game
at hand.

In this regard, it is far from a general theory.

A second limitation is the essentially static nature of the
theory in its present state.

Using this theory, it is

impossible to describe collective communication behavior
except when the behavior is in a state of equilibrium.
Future research should be directed at overcoming both of
these limitations.
Two other restrictive assumptions need to be relaxed
as well.

Both are tied to the central role played by the

concept of collective optimality.

Although Pareto

Optimality appears to be satisfactory as an operational
definition of this concept, it must be modified by the
addition of other assumptions, criteria and constraints in
order to more accurately reflect the variety of values and
the role of judgment in different game-like environments.

-266-

Finally, while collective optimality allows for pluralism in
terms of the number of players in a game, it is assumed here
that each player is able to evaluate strategies according to
a single criterion or at most a composite criterion.

The

applicability of this theory could be broadened if
collective optimality could be operationalized in a way that
would allow for multi-criteria decisionmaking on the part of
one or more players.
The application of the theory developed in this
dissertation has been explicitly limited to problems from
the field of social choice.

AS was indicated in the

Introduction, this theory has many other possible
applications on levels of interaction such as the mass
media, organizations and small groups.

Unfortunately the

focus of analysis here upon political systems has meant that
these investigations must be put off till later.

Moreover,

the necessity of testing the empirical validity of the
hypotheses derived in this dissertation has lead to a
concentration upon literature concerning property rights
messages.

It has thus not been possible to investigate the

usefulness of the Social Theory of Collective Communication
within any of the other applied fields such as conflict
resolution, participatory planning or collective bargaining.
These investigations as well as applications of this theory
to salient problems such as the nuclear arms race,
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inflation, pollution and resource depletion must await the
logically prior task of theoretical development and
validation.
The validation of the theory described here has also
been limited to some extent.

The research on property

rights against which this theory was tested is mostly qualitative in nature and modest in volume.

When quantitative,

it is focused primarily upon modern, Western societies.
Thus the Social Theory of Collective Communication has not
yet been as rigorously tested in as wide a variety of realworld situations as is possible.

There are also some

limitations to the case study that is reviewed, reanalysed
and replicated here.
study.

It is, first of all, only a case

It is focused primarily upon the development of

private property rights and collective, political
communication mechanisms and, thus, provides no test of
hypotheses concerning the development of public property
rights, the provision of public goods or the communication
of contractual messages.

FUrthermore, the replication of

this case study is based upon an operational definition of
precision which ignores the extent to which legal writing
may be ambiguous and even ungrammatical, which assumes that
mineral rights law reflects accurately the concerns of mine
owners both in substance and in salience, and which is not
100% reliable.
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Despite the efforts undertaken here to verify the
reliability of the research instrument and notwithstanding
the absolute strength and statistical significance of the
findings, full confidence should not be placed in the
validity of this theory at least until it has been
empirically tested in a wider variety of situations
involving the development of both public and private
property rights in situations where information about
strategies and preferences is not perfect, in situations
where collective communication, metacommunication and
enforcement mechanisms are not efficient or collectively
optimal, and in situations where it is possible to arrive at
a description of the interests of the members of a
collectivity that is more precise and less dependent upon
the body of messages they communicate than is the case in
this study.
Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that the evidence
presented here of the empirical validity of the Social
Theory of Collective Communication and of the logical
validity of the Mathematical Theory of Collective
Communication and of the potential for useful application of
both of these theories is sufficient to motivate the
continued development of a unified theory of information and
games and the use of mathematical modeling to study salient
social problems in the collective communication of social
choice messages.

APPENDIX A
INTRODUCTION TO A UNIFIED THEORY OF INFORMATION AND GAMES

The research reported in the first three of these
appendices concerns the development of a mathematical theory
that is applied and tested in the body of the dissertation
as a social, scientific theory.

The technical nature of

this research, which is far removed from that which is
typically considered under the rubric of social or human
communications research, necessitates that it be presented
in this fashion despite the fact that it constitutes the
logical foundation upon which the body of this dissertation
rests.
The mathematical theory developed here is derived
through the unification of game theory and information
theory.

The burden of these appendices, therefore, is to

demonstrate that the reasons for unifying these two theories
are compelling, that the axiomatic foundations of these two
theories are compatible, and that the results derived from
the unification of these two theories are logically consistent and clearly comprehensible when applied to social
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phenomena.

In Appendix A the relevant literature on game

theory and on information theory is reviewed in order to
present a rationale for the unification of these two
theories.

The foundation of both these theories upon

similar concepts of observation and of information is
reviewed, assumptions underlying the representation of
information transmission and behavioral equilibria in games
of strategy are explained, and the implications of these
assumptions for the analysis of human communication are
described and illustrated.

In Appendix B the transmission

of information in a basic game is analysed in relation to
the conditions necessary and sufficient for successful
regulation and for successful control of the outcome of that
game.

The findings described in Appendix B are so general

as to constitute a unified theory of information and games.
It is only in Appendix C that analysis is focused
specifically upon that part of this unified theory that can
accurately be called a mathematical theory of collective
communication.

Here the concept of collective optimality is

introduced and shown to entail collective self-control on
the part of all players in a game.

The concept of a

metagame is discussed, and the transmission of information
necessary and sufficient to ensure collective self-control
in a metagame and, thus, collective optimality in the basic
game is described.
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Rationale
The unification of game theory and information theory
is seen here as a first step in the development of a mathematical theory that will be used to model collective
communication.

However, the idea of a unified theory

emerges from a rather long history of comments on the
complementarity of these two theories.

In this section the

relevant literature on game theory and on information theory
(as it has been incorporated into cybernetics) will be
reviewed in order to establish the need for a unification of
these theories, to recognize the contributions of all those
who have directly or indirectly called for such a
unification, and to demonstrate the relevance of a unified
theory to fundamental problems of communications in general
and of collective communications in particular.

Game Theory
The theory of games of strategy is presented by its
founders, von Neumann and Morgenstern, specifically as a
mathematical instrument with which to develop a social
theory of economic behavior.

Recognizing the inadequacy of

descriptive economics as a basis for the mathematicization
of the subject and criticizing the overemphasis on calculus,
differential equations, etc. as the tools of a science whose
mathematical problems are so different from those that occur

-272-

in the physical sciences, the authors predict that
"mathematical discoveries of a stature comparable to that of
calculus will be needed in order to produce decisive success
in this field."l

The success of game theory, however, has

been far from decisive.
While von Neumann and Morgenstern repeatedly stress
that the limitations of the mathematical theory of games are
necessitated only by its preliminary nature, these limitations have remained a part of game theory, casting it into a
narrowly prescriptive or normative role and reducing its
value to that of an heuristic for the behavioral scientist.
As one psychologist has written, "the great philosophical
value of game theory is in its power to reveal its own
incompleteness. ,,2
AS described by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the
theory of games incorporates a basic assumption about the
distribution and processing of information that is patently
unrealistic:
... we cannot avoid the assumption that all
subjects of the economy under consideration are
completely informed about the physical
characteristics of the situation in which they
operate and are able to perform all statistical,
mathematical, etc., opera~ions which this
knowledge makes possible.
Thus, while the concept of information is essential to the
assumptions which underly game theory, and although the
rules of a game admit one limited type of "imperfect
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information" (certain participants may not possess certain
pieces of information), in general von Neumann and
Morgenstern "reject all other types, vaguely defined by the
use of concepts like complication, intelligence, etc."

This

unrealistic assumption of complete information is not the
result of a fundamental failure in logic or a basic
limitation in theory but, argue the authors, follows from a
well-recognized heuristic procedure:
let us state as a general excuse that our
procedure at worst is only the application of a
classical preliminary device of scientific
analysis: To divide the difficulties, i.e., to
concentrate on one (the subject proper of the
investigation in hand), and to reduce all others
as far as reasonably poss!ble, by simplifying and
schematizing assumptions.
Many authors have commented upon this limiting assumption.
Harsanyi, for example, remarks that "it has been a major
analytical deficiency of existing game theory that it has
been almost completely restricted to games of complete
information in spite of the fact that in many real-life
economic, political, military, and other social situations
participants often lack full information about some
important aspects of the 'game' they are playing."

However,

while their theory of games is based upon the limiting
assumption that all players are completely informed about
the game environment, the authors do consider information
processing and, thus, the concept of incomplete information
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to be "interesting in its own right", and they state that it
"should be considered separately from our present problem".
Moreover, when they are unable to resolve the complexities
of general, n-person games, they suggest a new approach to
theory development which takes into consideration
information processing characteristics such as an
individual's "power of discernment. ,,5
The need for a characterization of information processing on the individual or psychological level stems from the
fact that von Neumann and Morgenstern's "solution" to the
general n-person game yields a precise prediction only if
such a characterization is included in the analysis.

A

similar problem arises on the social level, however, due to
the fact that these solutions, according to the authors, are
not unique:
The often mentioned "circular" character of our
requirements makes it rather probable that the
solutions are not in general unique. Indeed, we
shall in most cases observe a multiplicity of
solutions. Considering what we have said about
interpreting solutions as stable "standards of
behavior" this has a simple and not unreasonable
meaning, namely that given the same physical
background different "established orders of
society" or "accepted standards of behavior" can
be built, all possessing those characteristics of
inner stability which we have discussed. Since
this concept of stability is admittedly of an
"inner" nature--i.e. operative only under the
hypothesis of general acceptance of the standard
in question--these different standards may
perfec ly well be in contradiction with each
other.

6
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To arrive at a unique solution, therefore, it is
necessary to include within the analysis a characterization
of standards of behavior such as equality, discrimination,
exploitation, transfers and tributes--standards of behavior
established by means of collectively communicated and
enforced agreements and understandings.

However, these

social phenomena are outside the formal framework of game
theory, and von Neumann and Morgenstern must include them in
the same way that they include psychological phenomena,
i.e., as auxiliary concepts:
We are trying to establish a theory of the
rational conduct of the participants in a given
game. In our consideration of the simple
majority game we have reached the point beyond
which it is difficult to go in formulating such a
theory without auxiliary concepts such as
"agreements," "understandings," etc. On a later
occasion we propose to investigate what
theoretical structures are required in order to
eliminate these concepts .... At any rate, at
present our position is too weak and our theory
not sufficiently advanced to permit this "selfdenial." We shall, therefore, in the discussions
which follow, make use of the possibility of the
establishment of coalitions outside the game;
this will include the hypothesis that 7 they are
respected by the contracting parties.
Insofar as agreements, understandings, etc. imply
social interaction, the need for a formal description of
communication within the context of a game is already
eVident in the initial presentation of game theory.

Lacking

such a description, von Neumann and Morgenstern are forced
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to rely upon ad hoc assumptions about information processing
on both an individual and social level to improve the
precision of their solution concept and to unite the theory
of 2-person, zero-sum games (in which communication is
irrelevant) with all other games (in which it is crucial).
The need for a formal description of communication
within the context of a game has been addressed throughout
the literature on game theory.

In their authoritative

survey of this literature, Luce and Raiffa point out the
relevance to social science of communication in games:
... as soon as the number of players exceeds two
there is the possibility for communication and
collusion among them, and in most games it is
possible for a player to increase his expected
payoff by collaborating with other players in the
choice of strategies. We feel that it is exactly
this feature of n-person theory which is (or
should be) of particular interest to the social
scientist.
Moreover, they single out the absence of a formal model of
communication as one of the major practical faults of
n-person game theory:
We should judge this omission of sociological
assumptions at the level of the normal form to be
one of the two major practical faults of presentday n-person theory, the other being the
previously mentioned static character. The task
of formalizing the communication process,
especially the prohibitions against
communication among the players, is far from
trivial. It appears that to include it in a
generalization of game theory will be an gxciting
major theoretical step. (emphasis added)
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A formal description of communication within game-like
environments is clearly necessary to compensate for the
omission of sociological assumptions in game theory, as
noted by Luce and Raiffa.

However, by describing com-

munication between a player and his environment, as well as
between one player and another, it might also be possible to
compensate for the omission of psychological assumptions
concerning phenomena such as intelligence, knowledge,
memory, or learning.
While most work on game theory has been characterized
by one of two assumptions--either that no communication and
therefore no collusion is possible or that all communication
and cooperation is possible--Luce and Raiffa propose a function representing social constraint upon admissible
coalition changes, seeking thus to focus attention upon the
"communication boundary conditions" between the extremes:
Intuitively, one senses that there are constraints in society limiting changes in coalition
structures and that these are to a large degree
non-rational. Nonetheless, one may conjecture
that these constraints are a source of
considerable social stability. Of course, one
wonders what there is about society that
introduces them, particularly if everyone is free
to bribe or, to be less evaluative, to compensate
others for their cooperation. It is doubtful
that there is a single answer, but we would argue
that one factor must be the expense and
difficulty of complex communication which
prevents players in a game from considering at
one moment any but the simplest modifications of
their alliance structures. Roughly speaking,
society seems to exhibit a form of "friction."
If such is the case, the problem then becomes
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one of formalizing these limitations on coalition
changes so that the resulting model is both
somewhat realistic and at15he same time
mathematically tractable.
The description of admissible changes in coalition
structure is a crude characterization of a communication
system.

Nevertheless it is interesting to note that in

response to criticism of the empirical validity of their
function, Luce and Raiffa propose to transform it into a
probabilistic function with properties not unlike a
statistical measure of information transmission:
... these probabilites would ... subsume a great
number of facts about ease of communication,
social limitations, intrtlectual limitations of
the players, and so on.
Finally, Luce and Raiffa go so far as to envision a
communication system with hierarchical feedback loops that
maintain what Ashby has described as "ultrastability":
... among those equilibrium states which are
likely to occur, there may be some which by our
usual standards, and so presumably by the
standards of those playing the game, would be
described as socially undesirable. Naturally, a
static theory must be ignorant of such
evaluations, but society is not. We should not,
therefore, be surprised to find apparently stable
states evaporating. One mechanism whereby this
may be effected without changing the underlying
game is to change the boundary conditions. We
may expect to find a dynamic interaction between
the equilibrium states given by a function and
the function itself--an interaction that first
produces a modification of the boundary
conditions and the modified boundary conditions,
in turn, determine some new and, hopefully, more
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desirable equilibria. The boundary conditions
may, first, be released to render the undesirable
equilibrium unstable, a£q later tightened to
produce new equilibria.
Despite suggestions such as these, the need to
integrate communication theory with game theory is still
unmet, as is apparent from a reading of more recent surveys
and contributions to the literature.

Rapoport, for example,

reveals the limitations of game theory quite clearly in his
effort to define the value of this theory for the behavioral
scientist:
It is natural to suppose that extra-gametheoretical considerations govern the formation
of coalitions, e.g., friendship ties, habits,
existence or non-existence of communication
channels, etc. The value of game-theoretical
analysis ought not to be underestimated because
of its inability to determine the most
"rational" coalition structure. On the
contrary, the value of the analysis is in the way
it enables us to "factor out," as it were, the
considerations related to the payoffs themselves
and to the bargaining potentials of the players
with reference to the payoffs alone; so that the
residual factors, not covered by this analysis,
but nevertheless of possible grea13importance in
actual situations, stand exposed.
It is significant, however, that despite his proposed
reduction of the role of game theory from the source of
predictive theory and descriptive hypotheses envisioned by
von Neumann and Morgenstern to a source of heuristic constraints upon other non-game-theoretic hypotheses, Rapoport
is critical of the "strategic mode of thought in game
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theory" and advocates a "higher game theory" focused upon
concepts such as equitable settlements, Kantian categorical
imperatives, collective rationality and conflict
resolution. 14

It is precisely at this level of analysis

that communication between players becomes crucial.
Game theory has progressed along several fronts by
making certain assumptions and including certain parameters
which describe communication conditions.

Nash and Harsanyi,

for example, have developed a bargaining theory based upon
the assumption of full and symmetric transmission of
information about all individual and group preferences and
preference intensities.

Aumann and Maschler describe a

bargaining theory which incorporates a variety of coalition
structures and a variety of levels of interaction from the
binary, developed further by Davis and Maschler, to the
n-ary, explicitly formulated by Horowitz. 15
other a priori constraints upon communication
conditions are developed in theories of arbitration such as
Shapley's and in theories of group decision making such as
Freimer and Yu's which also incorporates a parameter
describing levels of interaction.

Assumptions about

information distributed prior to the play of a game are
incorporated in terms of players' expectations, while
information obtained during the course of play is
represented in terms of changes in these expectations.

The
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bargaining theory of Cross goes farthest toward achieving a
dynamic representation of the feedback of information both
through the communication system and through the
environment. 16
The metatheory introduced by Howard has recently
stimulated a number of extensions that provide a variety of
solution concepts, each based upon a different "model of
play."

Each model represents the information available to

one player about how all players will play the game or, more
precisely, about how each player will respond to various
changes in strategy by another player, although the system
through which this information is communicated to the
players is never explained or described.

Unfortunately, it

is just such a description that is needed in order to
determine which of these metagame models (or which mixture
of models) is most relevant to a particular situation. 17
It is quite clear from these developments that the
effort to incorporate communication is vital to the continued development of game theory.

Even now the use of some-

thing like information theory is required to determine which
game-theoretic model is most appropriate and how it should
be specified.

Because the concept of information is promi-

nent in the formulation of the economic problem to which
game theory is addressed, it is perhaps to be expected that
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this concept would playa major role in the further development of that theory.

It is somewhat more surprising, how-

ever, to find that game theory can be used to solve
outstanding problems in, and suggest real-world applications
for various mathematical theories of communication such as
the theories of information, of regulation and of control,
known collectively as cybernetics.

cybernetics
In the past, several scholars have pointed out the
close relationship between game theory and cybernetics.
Wiener who was the first to use the term cybernetics to
describe what he called "the science of communication and
control," noted that game theory "represents a most
interesting study of social organization from the point of
view of methods closely related to, although distinct from,
the subject matter of cybernetics.,,18

Some years later,

Ashby conjectured that cybernetics and the theory of games
had a "close and exact relation," as indicated by two facts:

The first fact is that the basic formulation
of .•. the Table of outcomes, on which the theory
of regulation and control has been based ... is
identical with the "Pay-off matrix" that is
fundamental in the theory of games. By using
this common concept, the two theories can readily
be made to show their exact relation in special
cases.
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The second fact is that the theory of games, as
formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern, is
~somor~~ic with that of certain machines with
l.nput.
It is still true that, as Ashby pOinted out more than
thirty years ago, these relationships "have yet to be
explored and developed."

while there have been attempts to

make use of a game-theoretic framework in experiments
involving communication variables and efforts to make use of
the theory of games to describe the communication process,
there has been no systematic, formal integration of
cybernetics with the theory of games. 20
To explain the process of regulation in large complex
systems is one of the "outstanding problems" of social organization about which cybernetic theory might have something
to learn from the theory of games.

In confronting the pro-

blem of communication and control in such systems, Ashby
lays out two possible approaches.

One concerns certain

"ancillary regulations" or higher-order parameters whose
control will produce ultrastability in a multistable system.
Game theory provides explicit descriptions of the partially
joined or composed type of environment which results in multistability and, thus, may make it possible to explore the
functions of these ancillary regulations.
The other approach suggested by Ashby has to do with
the amplification of adaptation or the supplementation of
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selection through a hierarchical system of control.

Once

again, specific results will depend upon the investigation
of a variety of nondecomposable environments such as those
described by game theory.

Moreover, specific social inter-

pretations have been developed for many of these gametheoretic models, providing the theory of regulation with a
wealth of concrete applications for both deductive and
inductive analysis.
The integration of game theory with cybernetics will
also focus greater attention upon higher orders of
interaction such as are mediated through the collective
communication of social choice messages.

The mathematical

theory of communication as first presented by Shannon was
based upon a dyadic model involving one source and one
receiver.

Ashby and others subsequently demonstrated that

the formal description of information transmission is not
limited to a binary relation but may include n-ary,
multidimensional interaction as well. 21 However, lacking
models of specific social situations, this mathematical
theory of communication has stimulated very little empirical
research.
Higher-order interactions are also essential to game
theory which, in contrast to multivariate information
theory, is rich in real-world applications.

For example, an

n-person game may be defined as the n-ary interaction of
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players through a game environment.

To control the outcome

of this game, the players need a communication system with
at least as high an order of interaction as the environment.
The study of communication between players in a game
environment thus lends itself to an analysis of interaction
in situations characterized by group decision-making and
processes of social choice.
It is through such applications that a unified theory
of information and games will make a contribution to the
study of collective communication in particular and to
communications in general.

It is worth noting in this

regard that few of the popular nonmathematical communication
models are capable of describing higher-order interactions.
AS a consequence, numerous important symbolic media such as
monetary prices, voting procedures, social sanctions and
cultural rituals remain obscure or unexamined.

Moreover,

while a variety of separate disciplines have applied
disparate theoretical and methodological tools to analyse
different aspects of communication phenomena, the body of
descriptive communication theory remains impoverished by a
narrow focus upon binary relations.

Game theory, however,

provides models of social organization that cannot be
reduced to a collection of dyads.

Thus an integration of

game theory with information theory would help to transcend
the tangential and fragmentary analysiS fostered by a multidisciplinary approach and to encourage aninfradisciplinary
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perspective focused upon the analysis of information flows
through economic, political, social and cultural systems.
Although information theory provides precise measures
of quantities of information, it has been largely neglected
by organizational and decision-making theorists because it
lacks an evaluative dimension.

For example, in a recent

article on the information problem in decision-making,
Menges and Huschens remark that "the applicability of the
entropy concept in decision-making is very limited.

The

concept comprehends costs aspects of statistical information
transmission but neglects the much more ponderous costs of
the procurement of information.,,22

At the same time,

developments in information economics have had to rely
primarily upon the classical economic tools which can be
applied only in the context of a market for information, or
upon statistical models which reduce information to changes
in expected utility.

By ignoring mUltivariate and temporal

aspects of transmission, such models are incapable of
describing the relations among multiple decision makers and
other aspects of organization such as coordination,
regulation and control.

A unified theory of information and

games may be seen, thus, as an economic theory of
information applicable to all forms, levels and aspects of
organization, a theory capable of evaluating the flow of
information through markets as well as through other kinds
of social systems.
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In conclusion, it seems clear, as Ashby noted, "that
the theory of regulation (which includes many of the outstanding problems of organization in society) and the theory
of games will have much to learn from each other.,,23
Information theory offers formal models of social and
psychological conditions that are necessary for a
descriptive and dynamic theory of games, while game theory
describes the economic and ecological contexts within which
higher-order interactions and non-linguistic media can be
modeled.

Together they describe communication and social

control in nondecomposable environments and provide the
foundation for a mathematical theory of collective
communication.

Foundations
Preliminary to the development of a unified theory of
information and games it is necessary to demonstrate that
the fundamental concepts and basic assumptions underlying
information theory and game theory are compatible and
constitute the logical foundations for a single consistent
mathematical system.

These foundations will be set forth

below in sections on observation, information,
communication, transmission and equilibrium.

It will be

argued here that both information theory and game theory are
(explicitly or implicitly) founded upon the concept of
observation, that compatible assumptions concerning
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information and communication underlie both theories, that
communication in the context of a game is best defined in
terms of the transmission of relevant information and,
finally, that the focus of analysis in both game theory and
information theory is upon behavioral equilbria.

Observation
While the central role of the observer in both game
theory and information theory has not always been
recognized, it is important to describe this role in a
discussion of foundations because it determines the
empirical relevance, the theoretical scope and the
epistemological character of the unified theory of
information and games.

Moreover, the concept of observation

leads logically to that of information and hence to that of
communication, topics to be discussed in subsequent sections
of this appendix.

The central role of the observer in

information theory is only implicit in Shannon's original
exposition of the subject, for he writes from the
perspective of an engineer who is designing a communication
system and therefore from the point of view of one who is by
assumption an omnicient observer of that system.

For

example, he focuses analysis upon the fact that in a
communication system "the actual message is one selected
from a set of possible messages," which is significant,
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writes Shannon, because "the system must be designed to
operate for each possible selection, not just the one which
will actually be chosen since this is unknown at the time of
design. ,,24
Using information theory more as a tool for analysis
than for synthesis of communication systems, Ashby, on the
other hand, makes explicit the role of the observer.

When

describing the set of possibilities from which a message is
selected, Ashby too notes that "the information carried by a
particular message depends upon the set it comes from.

The

information conveyed is not an intrinsic property of the
individual message" (emphasis in original).

However, he

goes on to point out that a set can be characterized in
terms of its "variety" or the number of distinguishable elements it contains and that "a set's variety is not an intrinsic property of the set:

the observer and his power of

discrimination may have to be specified if the variety is to
be well defined" (emphasis added).25

Since an engineer has

(or should have) perfect knowledge of the set of possible
messages for which a communication system is to be designed,
the discriminatory power of that engineer is not a
significant problem for Shannon.

However, when the analysis

of communication is generalized beyond the field of
engineering, the discriminatory power of the observer
becomes crucial, because the set of possible messages is
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then viewed as a property of that observer rather than of
the real world.

Information becomes the description of a

relation between a message and an observer.
While game theory was not developed for the purpose of
designing systems, von Neumann and Morgenstern were forced
to make certain simplifying assumptions, one of which was
the assumption that all players in a game had "perfect
information" about that game.

This assumption meant that

the discriminatory power of players was not a significant
problem in game theory, as originally presented, and
therefore it was not necessary for an observer and his power
of discrimination to be explicitly defined.

Von Neumann and

Morgenstern appear confused about this, however, for after
having provided a great deal of information about the structure of a game, they suddenly consider it necessary to
create someone to embody all this information.

Thus they

interpret the partition which contains all the other
partitions describing the "rules" and play of the game up to
a particular move as "the pattern of information of a person
who knows everything that happened."

In a note they remark

that "it is necessary to introduce such a person since, in
general, no player will be in possession of the full
information. ,,26
The full implications of this interpretation are never
realized by von Neumann and Morgenstern, however.

As an
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example of a observer they select neither themselves as
authors and creators of game theory nor the readers whom
they address but "an umpire who supervises the course of the
play."

Soon the need for a "person who knows everything"

has been forgotten, and the role of umpire is redefined in
terms of the specific task of aggregating all chance events
into an "umpire's choice."

Information about the probabil-

ity distribution under which this choice is to be made is
then reinterpreted in terms of a mathematical expectation or
expected outcome.

The umpire is retained only to determine

the outcome of the play for each player, although this kind
of supervisory or enforcement function is never developed-perhaps because it is contained within and, hence, extraneous to a description of the play of a game.

It is not

surprising that the umpire has no further role to play in
game theory.

Moreover, his function as an observer has now

been completely forgotten, and all the information contained
in the definition of a game is explicitly redefined as
"reality" or "the objective facts":
The partitions which make up the
descriptions ... fall into two classes: those
which represent objective facts ... and those
which represz~t only the player's state of
information.
This transformation is made explicit in a final note which
states that the umpire's state of information "is an objective fact:

the events up to that moment have determined the

course of the play precisely to that extent.,,28
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As soon as the limiting assumption of perfect information is dropped, however, the conceptualization of a game as
the perception of an observer once again becomes necessary,
just as the need for conceptualizing information theory as
an observer-relative measure becomes clear when analysis
transcends the assumptions of communications engineering.
Since in general each player of a game may have a different
perception of that game, it is imperative to specify just
whose perception is being represented by a particular
description.

Thus the concept of observation is integral to

both game theory and information theory.

It is implicit in

any application and must be made explicit whenever analysis
transcends certain restrictive assumptions.

The foundation

of these theories on the concept of observation will have at
least three significant consequences for a unified theory of
information and games:

consequences with regard to the

interpretation of probability statements, the classification
of information systems, and the characterization of human
behavior.
In the first place, nothing in the description of a
game can any longer be represented as "an objective fact."
All the sets, partitions and probabilities which make up the
description of a game will have to be defined relative to an
observer.

This has profound implications, for it means that

probability statements must be interpreted as representations of the degree of belief of the observer in the

-293-

occurrence of a particular outcome, strategy or preference
ordering.

Of course, whenever such beliefs are grounded in

calculations of relative frequencies or class ratios, then
these probabilities can also be given a frequency or
empirical interpretation.

Similarly, whenever such beliefs

are grounded in the logical derivation of a unique result,
these probabilities can also be given a necessary or logical
interpretation.

However, once

the necessity of introducing

an observer into the representation of a game is recognized,
probabilites become statements by the observer of what that
observer believes and must, in general, be given a subjectivist or personalist interpretation.
Designation of an observer's personal beliefs as the
nonmathematical foundation for probability statements upon
which the theories of information and games are based was
suggested previously by Leonard Savage in his well-known
exposition of the personalistic interpretation of probability.

In this work Savage describes information theory as a

topic which is emphasized by the particular outlook and
interpretation implicit in a personalistic concept of
probability; and he describes game theory--in particular the
concept of utility due to von Neumann and Morgenstern--as a
theory which is implied by the same assumptions about the
behavior of a person faced with uncertainty as those from
which he derives his theory of personal probability.

29
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It is clear from Savage's discussion that both information
theory and game theory are philosophically compatible with
and logically related to the personalistic interpretation of
probability.
In his analysis of games of incomplete information,
Harsanyi makes use of subjective probability distributions
(probability vectors) to describe each player's
"expectations about the likely behavior of another player."
Regarding the Bayesian approach developed by Selten and
himself, Harsanyi remarks that "even though our solution
theory has direct applications to noncooperative games only,
it does have important implications also for cooperative
games, "such as those analyzed in this dissertation. 30
Therefore, probability statements made in the context
of a unified theory of information and games will be based
upon the assumptions articulated by Savage concerning the
ingredients of the decision problem, and the definitions and
postulates from which he derives a subjective probability
measure.

Such statements will be interpreted, following

Savage, as measures of the confidence that an observer has
in the truth of a particular proposition.

It will be

assumed that these statements exhibit coherence, as
described by Kyburg and SmokIer, and that such statements,
when they are not reducable to frequentist or logical
statements, can in some cases be empirically derived and
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validated by means of a ranking procedure such as that
described by Smith. 31
The appropriateness of applying this interpretation to
probability measures can be best understood in terms of the
heuristic role played by probability in a unified theory of
information and games.

This theory attempts to analyze the

decisions people make when faced with uncertainity about
various aspects of game-like situations.

Mathematical

probability is useful in analyzing the structure of belief
underlying this type of decision-making.

This is not to say

that people in a game-like situation are always conscious of
having a probabilistic belief structure or that they can
articulate their beliefs in terms of probabilities or even
that they find a description of these probabilities to be
meaningful.

It is merely to assert that people do take

action in these situations and that this type of
representation is one way for an observer to analyze the
process of decision-making into components which are
amenable to manipulation according to the rules of logic.
This in turn makes it possible for the observer to prescribe
the type of action which is logically consistent in such
situations.
The role of mathematical probability in this theory is
thus to describe the beliefs of an observer about a gamelike situation and about the people in that situation,
including their beliefs--not necessarily conscious beliefs,
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directly articulated beliefs or even beliefs that these
people or the observer would find intuitively meaningful
but, rather, beliefs which might underlie the decisionmaking process of people faced with uncertainity about a
game-like situation, in the sense that these people behave
as if they held beliefs in this form.

Representing these

beliefs in terms of probability statements is useful to an
observer in helping to determine which course of action is
the most logically consistent.

If, in the final analysis,

an observer is not able to provide through any means, either
direct or indirect, the probabilities required by this
theory, then it will simply be of no use to that observer.
This is most likely to occur in cases where the observer
finds it difficult to imagine making a choice or expressing
a preference between alternatives.
It is also important to understand that the most
logically consistent course of action, given a particular
description of a game, may not necessarily be the best
course of action.

The probability measures incorporated in

the unified theory of information and games are based upon
the observer's knowledge of the game-like situation.

They

describe that subjective knowledge, not the situation
itself.

Different observers may have widely different

concepts of and knowledge about the nature of that
situation.

Moreover, an observer may also know whether
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this knowledge .is more or less complete and, if the
knowledge is too incomplete, the observer might even wish to
increase that knowledge and revise the description of the
game prior to taking any other course of action.

This

aspect of decision-making under uncertainity has been
analyzed extensively under the rubric of Bayesian decision
theory. 32
Nevertheless, whenever an observer makes a decision
regarding what action to take, that decision must always be
based upon that observer's knowledge of the situation.

It

is this fact that makes the personalistic form of
probability the most appropriate one for this context.
Moreover, various

problems and paradoxes have been found to

occur whenever other interpretations of probability are
applied in a decision-making context.

The objective

interpretation of probability is defined in terms of the
limit of a relative frequency as the number of observations
of a process goes to infinity.

Since, in practice, the

number of observations of any process never approaches
infinity, there are no probabilities that are truly
objective.

In addition, whenever the decision concerns a

process that is new, there are no previous observations, and
whenever the decision involves a process that cannot be
repeated, an objective measure of probability is simply
impossible.
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Logical measures of probability when applied to
decision-making situations also incorporate some element of
subjectivity.

Practical situations allow for the

introduction of a vast number of factors, many of which are
usually extraneous to the process which has been analyzed.
Also, factors that have been included in the analysis can
often be structured in different ways by different
observers. 33 By comparison with both objective and logical
probability measures, personalistic probability, although it
neither simulates the subjective experience of decisionmaking nor attempts to describe the objective situation
facing a decision-maker, appears to be the most useful in
determining the logically consistent action to be taken by a
person faced with uncertainity in a game-like situation.
This usefulness, however, is limited to situations in which
an observer can articulate beliefs in probablistic terms,
can remember, analyze or at least imagine the alternative
courses of action available to each person in a game-like
environment, the alternative outcomes of these actions and
the alternative preferences of each player for these
outcomes.

This suggests that a unified theory of

information and games based upon personalistic probability
will be most useful when applied to actual situations
involving a limited number of players with a limited number
of alternative strategies leading to outcomes that have been
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experienced previously by the observer or that differ only
incrementally from the status quo.
Recognition of the observer who describes a game also
has significant implications with regard to the communication of that description.

Communication of any kind--

information retrieval and processing as well as
transmission--is never without cost.

It requires a

commitment of (usually limited) resources and, therefore, is
only undertaken by a rational person in anticipation of some
sort of net gain (however vaguely defined in a time and
place however remote from the present).

Since a game is a

description of a structure of interests and the combinations
of behavioral alternatives which might be expected to
realize (with more or less success) those interests and
since the acts of observation and description might be
described as strategies leading to the realization of some
sort of interest, it appears that not only are all players
in a game environment observers of the environment, but all
observers are, in fact, players as well.

The observers of a

game, whether they develop a description or analyze that
description, are all participatory observers.
The representation of a game can thus be viewed as
self-generating, for it results from an act of description
arising out of--but at the same time only knowable within-the context of a game.

It is in this respect like all

social theory; for, as Richard Howe has put it:
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There is an inescapable self-referential and thus
paradoxical aspect of any theory of society as a
whole, for the theory is constructed within the
very object that it is to describe, and its
descriptions c~~nge that object--society--even as
they are made.
According to Norbert Wiener, however, the social sciences
are somewhat unique with regard to this self-referential
aspect:
All the great successes in precise science have
been made in fields where there is a certain high
degree of isolation of the phenomenon from the
observer .... It is in the social sciences that
the coupling between the observed phenomenon and
the observer is hardest to minimize. On the one
hand the observer is able to exert a considerable
influence on the phenomena that come to his
attention .... On the other hand, the social
scientist has not the advantage of looking down
on his subjects from the cold heights of eternity
and ubiquity .... In other words, in the social
sciences we have to deal with short statistical
runs, nor can we be sure that a considerable part
of wh~t wJSobserve is not an artifact of our own
creat~on.

One way to come to grips with paradoxial problems
caused by the self-referential aspects of social science is,
as Francisco Varela has described in the calculus of selfreference,36 to turn the theoretical system in upon itself.
By incorporating the observer of a system into the
description of that system, a larger system is thus
described that possesses a certain comprehensiveness or
closure with respect to information.

The rules of the game

now can describe all the information received, processed,
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and transmitted by both the modeler and the modeled,
including information transmitted between the two.

Of

course this new degree of closure will extend only so far as
the states of nature that are recognized by the modeler.

As

far as the effect of any unrecognized state is concerned,
this theory has no knowledge to contribute.

This is not,

however, a unique limitation; for no scientific theory can
offer statements about concepts that are not recognized by
some observer.

Moreover, it means that this theory is

behaviorally grounded, that it constitutes an analytical
methodology based upon a descriptive reality, and that it
incorporates all the limitations in knowledge, imputation,
memory and attention of decision makers and the decisionmaking process.
By incorporating the observer of a game into the
description of that game, game theory also allows for a
certain degree of autonomy with respect to behavior.

The

incorporation of feedback from an observer to the players in
a game environment entails the possibility that those
players may very well react so as to disprove the
observations that are thus communicated.

This point has

been formalized by Nigel Howard as an "Existential Axiom:"
... if one human being has a theory which predicts
how he or another will behave, the latter has a
choice whether to follow that theory or anM70ther
theory with the same domain and co-domain.
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Of course this apparent "freedom of will" on the part
of all players in a game is constrained by the information
these players possess about the states of nature, precisely
because it is on the basis of some such information that
they must act.

Therefore one of the most likely actions (or

reactions) of an observer of a game-like environment who is
not pleased with an analysis of the behavior that would be
rational for players in such. a game would be to seek more
information about that environment.

This suggests that a

unified theory of information and games based upon
personalistic probability may best serve to support the
process through which a problem is formulated and solved by
interacting dynamically with the decision makers rather than
by supplying the decision makers with absolute prescriptions
or definitive predictions developed in isolation from the
problem-solving process.
The concept of observation, which is fundamental to
both game theory and information theory, thus entails
subjectivity with regard to the interpretation of
probabilites, closure with regard to the transmission of
information, and autonomy with regard to the behavior of
players in a game.

In the analysis which follows, a unified

theory of information and games based upon subjective
probabilities will be developed to enclose and thereby to
eliminate certain logical paradoxes in the analysis of
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social choice and, hopefully, to provide greater freedom in
the realization of higher-order interests.

Information
The progression from observation to information is a
logical one since the study of a game as perceived by an
observer is, in fact, an analysis of the information
available to the observer.

Moreover, information is clearly

a most fundamental concept underlying any attempt to unify
game theory with information theory.

In this section the

concept of information as it appears in game theory is shown
to be compatable with the operational definition of this
concept in information theory.

Shannon's measure of

"entropy" and its relation to information are discussed, and
an axiomatic definition of the elements of a mathematical
game necessary for the application of information theory is
set out and justified.
The concept of information occupies a prominent
position in the definition of a mathematical game proposed
by von Neumann and Morgenstern.

Having begun with several

progressively general, formal descriptions of the properties
of a game, von Neumann and Morgenstern conclude the
introductory section of their work by offering a rigorous,
axiomatic definition of a game in set-theoretic notation.
Their use of the theory of sets is significant not only for
the elegance and transparency that these symbols lend to a
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representation of the combinatorial possibilities which
describe the interplay of decisions on the part of players
in a game environment but also, as the authors point out,
... because of the logistic interpretation which
can be put upon them. Let us begin with the
interpretation concerning sets. If
[2 is a set of objects of any kind, then
every conceivable property--which some of these
objects may possess, and others not--can be fully
characterized by specifying the set of those
elements of D
which have this property ....
Instead of correlating the subsets of f2
to
properties in D ... we may equally well
correlate them with all possible bodies of
information concerning an--otherwise undetermined--element of
Indeed, any such
information amounts to the assertion that this-unknown--element of
[2
possesses a certain-specified--property. It is equivalently
represented by the set of all those elements of
which possess this property; i.e. to which the
given information has narrowed the range of pos38
sibilities for the--unknown--element of [2
.

D

.

Although von Neumann and Morgenstern clearly understand that information can be represented by a process of
selection, they specifically designate the particular subset
to which a "range of possibilities" is narrowed as "actual
information."

Moreover, they introduce a second concept,

the "pattern of information," to represent a partition of
the set of possibilities into mutually exclusive subsets,
each of which constitutes an alternative piece of "actual
information," i.e.
A partition is a system of pairwise mutually
exclusive bodies of information--concerning an
unknown element of [2 --none of which is absurd
in itself. In other words: A partition is a
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preliminary announcement which states how much
information will be given later concerning an-otherwise unknown-.,.element of D ; i. e. to what
extent the range of possibilities for this
element will be narrowed later. But the actual
information is not given by the partition--that
would amount to selecting an element of the
partition, since such an elemen~9is a subset of
i.e. actual information.

D'

While they use the term "information" in several different ways, von Neumann and Morgenstern have represented
the theory of games by means of the same formal elements
upon which information theory is based:

the subset that is

selected and the set of possibilities from which it is
chosen.

If, in the preceeding quotation, the words "actual

information" are replaced by "actual message," and "partition" by "a set of possible messages" it will be seen by
comparison with the following passage from The Mathematical
Theory of Communication how closely this conceptualization
of information resembles that of Shannon:
The significant aspect is that the actual message
is one selected from a set of possible messages.
The system must be designed to operate for each
possible selection, not just the one which will
actually be chosen since this is unknown at the
time of design.
If the number of messages in the set is finite,
then this number or any monotonic function of
this number can be regarded as a measure of the
information produced when one message is chosen
from the set, all choices being equally likely.
As was pointed out by Hartley, the most natural
choice is the logarithmic function. Although
this definition must be generalized considerably
when we consider the influence of the statistics
of the message and when we have a
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continuous range of messages, we will in all 40
cases use an essentially logarithmic measure.
while von Neumann and Morgenstern use the term "information"
to describe both the set of possible messages and the message that is actually sent or received, this term is used in
information theory to refer to the relation between the set
and subset.

Thus it appears that the work of Hartley and

Shannon on information theory is very closely related to the
concept of information as utilized by von Neumann and
Morgenstern in their presentation of game theory.
The particular "measure of the information produced
when one message is chosen from the set," generalized by
Shannon to consider the statistics of messages in a discrete
channel, is calculated

BY
2:
i=l

the formula

(A.1 )
Pi log 2 Pi
where P1 is the probability of occurrence of the first
of n possible messages. 41 This measure was called "entropy"

H(M)

by Shannon, but has subsequently been referred to as
"uncertainty;" for it seems logical to say that when one
message is chosen from a set of possible messages, a certain
quantity of uncertainty is removed, thereby producing an
equivalent quantity of information.

Thus the amount of

information that a message can produce for an observer when
that message is selected from a set of possible messages is
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equivalent to the amount of uncertainty produced for that
observer by the set of possible messages.
Of course one can be uncertain about many other things
besides messages, and while Shannon only applies his measure
H to sets of messages, he defines it in terms of the
abstract set of probabilities Pl, ... ,Pn.

It is clear that

the measure H can be applied to (and interpreted as the
uncertainty of an observer about) any set of elements with
which there is associated a corresponding distribution of
probabilities.

For example, were such a distribution

associated with one of the partitions which von Neuman and
Morgenstern use in their axiomatic definition of a game,
Shannon's measure could be applied to measure the
uncertainty of an observer about the components of the game
represented by that partition.
It is clear that in order to apply Shannon's measure
to the various components of a game, a number

Pi describ-

ing the probability of occurrence of each subset

i

of

every partition in the axiomatic definition of that game
must be found within, derived from or added to that definition.

To fully unify the theories of information and games,

it will be necessary to specify all the informational implications of the extensive formulation of a game, including
not only the descriptive aspects of game theory, i.e., the
"rules of the game", but also the predictive aspects or play
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theory, i.e., the definition of utility and the solution
theory constructed from it to describe "rational" behavior.
However, in the analysis which follows, which is based upon
the normalized form of analysis in game theory, it will only
be necessary to measure the information produced by the
choice of a strategy, the determination of an outcome and
the description of a preference relation.

Therefore, a

unified theory of information and games will be based here
upon the following axiomatic definition of the elements of a
game:
1.

for every player a number

element in the set

S

Si

denoting each

of strategies available to that

player,
2.

for each of these strategies for every player, a

number

P(Si)

denoting the probability with which

that strategy will be chosen;
3.

for every player, a function describing the pos-

sible outcomes for that player of each combination
strategies;
4.

for each outcome

0i

in the set

outcomes for every player, a number

°

of possible

P(Oi)

denoting

the probability with which that outcome will occur;
5.

for every player, a set

P

of relations describ-

ing all the possible relative preferences of that
player as between all pairs of possible outcomes of
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every combination of strategies including all possible
pairs of probability distributions defined across the
set of possible outcomes;
6.

for each of the relations

every player, a number

P(P i )

Pi

in the set P for

denoting the

probability with which that relation will describe the
preferences of that player.
The nature of each of the entities incorporated in
this definition is axiomatic, i.e., they are all "givens."
They are justified mathematically insofar as they are
necessary and sufficient for the logical derivation of a
unified theory.

They are justified scientifically insofar

as they can be operationalized and interpreted in a
meaningful way.
In support of this axiomaticization it should be noted
that most of these entities are included by von Neumann and
Morgenstern in their formal definition of game theory.

Out-

comes, strategies and preference relations all appear in
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior and have obvious
empirical counterparts.

The distribution of probabilities

across sets of outcomes and sets of strategies is also
undertaken and given an empirical interpretation by these
authors.

Only the concept of a probability associated with

a preference relation is new to this treatment, and even
this concept can be derived from a suggestion made by von
Neumann and Morgenstern.
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uncertainty concerning the outcome of a game is
incorporated into the definition of a game by von Neumann
and Morgenstern in terms of the "umpire's choice," and is
formally denoted by probabilities distributed over the set
of possible outcomes for each player in a game.

Uncertainty

concerning each player's choice of a strategy is introduced
in the form of a "statistical" or "mixed" strategy, formally
denoted by probabilities distributed across each of the
"strict" or "pure" strategies available to a particular
player.

However, uncertainty concerning each player's pre-

ferences is never recognized by the authors and their representation of preferences in terms of a utility scale or payment schedule never includes probabilities. 42
Mathematically it is not difficult to associate a
partition and a probability measure with the concept of a
preference relation.

In fact, this development can be based

upon the suggestion by von Neumann and Morgenstern in a
discussion on bargaining that the fineness of a utility
scale may differ from one player to another:
So we observe for the first time how the
ability of discernment of a player-- specifically
the fineness of his subjective utility scale--has
a determining influence on his position in
bargaining with an ally. It is therefore to be
expected that problems of this type can only be
settled completely when the psychological
conditions referred to are properl¥3and
systematically taken into account.
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In order to derive a probabilistic representation of
preferences it is necessary to consider the implications of
"fineness" when applied in a certain way to outcomes or
utilities measured on a nominal scale.

Suppose a player

were unable to distinguish, apriori, between the outcomes a
and b but considered them together as one outcome, denoted
here as "c".

Suppose further that this player were to pre-

fer a third outcome d to "c" whenever "c" was actually a but
were to prefer "c" to d whenever "c" was actually b.

The

preference of this player for "c" over d would then vary
according to the frequency with which a occurred relative to
b.
AS long as it is not assumed that players have,
apriori, perfect information concerning all possible outcomes, this formulation seems intuitively plausible.
Indeterminancy in one's preference as between two events
often is due to a lack of information as to the exact
consequences of each event, including all their possible
contingencies.

When we do have a distinct preference, we

sometimes act upon it only to find, at a later date, that
there were contingencies of which we were unaware and of
which an awareness now causes us to alter our preference.
Also, we rarely have the resources to determine exactly all
the consequences of every possible action on our part, so
that a certain degree of indeterminancy might even appear to
be "rational".
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This formulation would also seem plausible as a
representation of the multidimensionality of a player's
subjective utility scale.

Indeterminancy in one's

preference as between two events may also be due to a lack
of information as to whether one outcome (C) should be
compared to another (d) along one or another of two
incommensurable dimensions (a and b).

Our preference for

outcome cover d would thus vary according to the relative
frequency with which it became relevant to compare c and d
along dimension a rather than b.

This particular

interpretation would also apply to a single decision-maker
who, as Sen has suggested, might have not one but a variety
of preference relations arranged along a continuum from the
completely personal or subjective to the completely
impersonal or ethical.

Finally, this interpretation would

apply equally well to a game-like situation in which a
player was used to denote a role, such as President of the
United States.

As Hardin has noted, changes in leadership,

i.e., in the person who plays the role of President, are
associated with changes in preferences, changes which an
external observer might represent in terms of probabilistic
preferences. 44
This formulation would allow, thus, for all the
instances of human error, ignorance, complexity and caprice
that make a determinate representation of a player's
preferences unrealistic from the point of view of that
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player.

Moreover, it would help to overcome the assumption

of complete knowledge of one player's preferences on the
part of another player, which is an even graver restriction
on the applicability of game theory to problems such as
arbitration.

As Luce and Raiffa point out:

In most situations, a player's preferences are
only partially known to his adversaries, and
falsification of one's true feelings is an
inherent and important bargaining strategy. An
arbiter, to be successful, must skillfully ferret
out at least a part of the truth. This reality
is seriously idealized in game theory, and
thereby the theory is severely restricted. This
is not to say it is useless in all situations,
but only that there is always the fear that he
real problem may have been abstracted away.

45

A probabilistic representation of preference might
seem to disturb the mathematical structure of utility
theory, in which the completeness of a player's preference
relation is axiomatic.

If, however, a player's preferences

are viewed as being determined or fixed with respect to a
specific instance, occurrence or realization of the outcomes
being compared, but as changing with respect to certain
other instances, occurrences or realizations of these
outcomes, repeated implementation of the operations
described by von Neumann and Morgenstern might result in the
construction of several different utility scales and might
also help to determine of the probability with which each of
these scales could be used to represent the player's actual
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preferences.

This same procedure could be used, of course,

to represent the uncertainty with which one player's
preferences (and utility scale) are viewed by another
player.
While it may be possible in this way to derive a
probabilistic representation of a player's preference
relation, it is likely that over time this player will
develop a more generalized perception of preference which
might be transformed into a probabilistic representation
through one of the procedures described by Savage for
generating a subjective probability distribution.

However

this representation is arrived at, it will be interpreted
here as a description of the preference of a player by an
observer, a description which that observer considers to be
meaningful, for whatever reason.
The representation of a game within the context of a
unified theory of information and games can be modeled after
the matrix used in the normal form of analysis in game
theory.

The set of strategies available to each player

together with a distribution of probabilities across that
set are arrayed along the different dimensions of the matrix
and the resulting set of outcomes together with a
distribution of probabilities defined across that set are
described within the corresponding cells.

This information

is described in Table A.l for a two person game between
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and 2, resulting in four possible outcomes, a, b, c, and d.
The probabilities corresponding to each strategy and each
outcome in this example are described parenthetically.

Table A.1
A TWO-PERSON, TWO-STRATEGY GAME IN NORMAL FORM
X

1(0.1)

2(0.9)

1(0.5)

a(0.05)

b(0.45)

2(0.5)

c(0.05)

d(0.45)

Y

H(O)

= 1.467 bits

HS

=

0.467 bits

=

1.0 bits

x

HS
Y

The preference relation of each player in this or any
game could be represented by means of a series of orderings
that describe all the permutations of the set of possible
outcomes, with a distribution of probabilities across the
series.

An illustration is provided in Table A.2, where the

preferences of the players in the game described in Table
A.l above are presented.
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TWO PROBABLISTIC PREFERENCE RELATIONS

orderings

Player X

Player Y

abc d
a b d c

0.5

a c b d
a c d b
a d b c
a d c b
b a c d
b a d c

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0

0.0

b d a c
b d c a
cab d

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

cad b
c b a d
c b d a

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

c d a b

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

c d b a

0.0

0.1

d abc
d a c b

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

d b a c
d b c a

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.9

0.0
0.0

0.1

b c a d
b c d a

d c a b
d c b a
H(P x )

1. 36 bits

0.0
0.0

H(P )
y

=

0.467 bits
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measure the amount of uncertainty represented by any
particular description of a game, with regard to the outcome
of that game or to the preferences of (or strategy to be
chosen by) any particular player in the game.

In the game

described in Table A.l, for example, application of the
uncertainty measure described in expression A.l reveals that
H(O), the observer's uncertainty regarding the outcome of
this game, is 1.467 bits.

H(Sx)' uncertainty regarding the

strategy to be chosen by player X, is 0.467 bits, while
H(Sy)' the observer's uncertainty regarding the behavior of
player Y, is 1 bit.

Finally, according to Table A.2, H(P x )'
the observer's uncertainty regarding the preferences of

player x, is 1.36 bits, which exceeds H(P y )' the 0.467 bits
of uncertainty regarding player Y's preferences.
The process of associating probabilities and
uncertainty measures with entities in the foundation of game
theory results in a more general representation of the
information provided by the description of a game then that
presented by von Neumann and Morgenstern.

For the first

time it allows for the possibility of less than "perfect"
information concerning preferences as well as strategies and
outcomes.

A generalization such as this is sorely needed if

game theory is to be successfully applied to the analysis of
social systems, for nothing so betrays the origins of game
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theory in the parlor and the schoolyard as the assumption of
perfect information.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern justify

the study of conventional games such as Tic, Tac, Toe;
stone, Paper, Scissors; Matching Pennies; Poker; Bridge;
Backgammon; and Chess on the grounds of empirical
methodology:
Our method is, of course, the empirical one: We
are trying to understand, formalize and
generalize those features of the simplest games
which impress us as typical. This is, after all,
the standard met~gd of all sciences with an
empirical basis.
However, while there is little dispute concerning the rules
of these "simplest" garnes, due to the existence of authorities such as Hoyle, there is no authority to whom one can
turn for the rules of more complex political, economic and
cultural "games."

This is primarily because they differ

from the former in more than degree of complexity.

Human

behavior is certainly rule-governed in many situations, but
conventional knowledge of these rules, on the one hand,
especially as they regard the set of possible strategies,
anterior moves, possible outcomes and their utilities, and
the completeness and stability of these rules, on the other
hand, is less than perfect.

Communication
The axioms described above imply a profound reorientation of game theory.

What is proposed is to forego all
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assumptions about "perfect" information--to forego in particular those pertaining to knowledge of the "physical characteristics" of either the game environment or of the players.
The implications of such a proposal are far-reaching,
especially with regard to communication.

When information

is "perfect," communication is irrelevant; but "imperfect"
information

allows for the possibility that this

information can be improved through communication.
Moreover, if players know that their information is
"imperfect," they may be motivated to communicate.

In this

section the role of communication in game theory is
reviewed.

This review leads to the conclusion that the

focus of analysis here must be narrowed from social
interaction through messages in general to social
interaction through messages that transmit relevant
information.
It should be noted that this concern with "imperfect"
information is not, in fact, a radical departure from the
program of von Neumann and Morgenstern.

A close reading of

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior reveals that von
Neumann and Morgenstern never meant to suggest that the
information available to a player in a game was not bounded
by that player's discernment of the game environment or
ability to process that information.

Their assumption to

that effect is not categorical and is introduced in an
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heuristic spirit appropriate to the initial presentation of
a complex theory.

Within their axioms, they provide for a

lack of knowledge on the part of a player at any point in
the play of a game about any and all preceding moves,
including his own; and they explicitly describe the
uncertainty of all players about the outcome ultimately
determined by a particular play of the game.

Moreover, they

recognized at the very start the implications of this
uncertainty with regard to the need for the agents
comprising a single player such as a team to communicate
among themselves.

They also take note of the advantage that

would accrue to any player who could retrieve information
about the strategy of his opponents.

The concept of mixed

or statistical strategies is specifically introduced in
recognition of the need of a player to prevent communication
with his opponents.

Finally, at the conclusion of their

book, these authors make yet another suggestion as to the
significance of uncertainty on the part of one player about
the utility of an outcome, relative to the information
contained in his opponents' utility scales.

The

introduction of partitions and probability distribution into
every aspect of game theory is simply a continuation of this
trend toward a complete axiomatic specification of how the
game environment appears to each and every player.
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The introduction of probability distributions is especially significant, however, for it makes it possible to
measure the communication of information within a game.
Interestingly, this concern with communication is also
foreshadowed in the early development of game theory.

When

introducing their theory of two-person, zero-sum games,
von Neumann and Morgenstern base it upon the normal form of
analysis and the explicit axiomatic assumption that, with
regard to selecting a strategy, "each player must make his
choice in absolute ignorance of the choices of the others."
Then they proceed to develop their theory by contradicting
the very assumption upon which it is based:
Indeed, the rules of the game ... prescribe that each
player must make his choice (his personal move) in
ignorance of the outcome of the choice of his
adversary. It is nevertheless conceivable that one of
the players ... "finds out" his adversary, i.e., that he
has somehow acquired the knowledge as to what his
adversary's strategy is. The basis for this knowledge
does not concern us; it may (bu47need not) be
experience from previous plays.
Next, von Neumann and Morgenstern attempt to "legitimize" this heuristic procedure on the grounds that the
theory they are constructing will itself constitute a
message enabling one player to "find out" the other (and
visa versa):
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Let us now imagine that there exists a complete theory of the zero-sum, two-person game
which tells a player what to do, and which is
absolutely convincing. If the players knew such
a theory then each player would have to assume
that his strategy has been "found out" by his
opponent. The opponent knows the theory, and he
knows that a player would be unwise not to follow
it. Thus the hypothesis of the existence of a
satisfactory theory legitimizes our investigation
of the situation when a plaY~8's strategy is
"found out" by his opponent.
Finally, having achieved such a theory, von Neumann and
Morgenstern justify it by an independent, direct proof that:
each player is fully protected against having his
strategy found out by his opponent if he can use
the mixed strategies ... instead of the pure
strategies .... This remains true if the player
who finds out his opponent's strategy uses the
[pure strategies] while only the player whose
strategy is being found out enjoys the protection
of the [mixed strategies] .... Both players--and
particularly the player whose strategy happens
to be found out--may not forego with ~~punity the
protection of the [mixed strategies].
The implication of these findings is that even if the
strategy of a player in this severely restricted class of
games is "found out," i.e. even though the communication of
this theory makes possible the contradiction of an axiom
upon which it is founded, it makes no difference.

Paradoxi-

cally the inconsistency in the assumptions creates no inconsistency in the results.
An

application of Shannon's measure of uncertainty to

the case where a mixed strategy chosen by one player (for
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convenience let's say a mixed strategy described by a horizontal probability distribution across the set of pure
strategies) is found out by or communicated to another
reveals that this paradox is grounded in the use of the
word "communication" to mean two different things.

Assuming

that the second player has, apriori, no reason to believe
the first player's choice of one pure strategy more likely
than his choice of any other pure strategy, information
concerning the particular mixed strategy selected by the
first player provides the second with absolutely no
information about the pure strategy that will (eventually)
be chosen.

Even in a 2-person zero-sum game, the

transmission of this kind of information would be decisive.
Thus the solution concept of von Neumann and Morgenstern can
be viewed as allowing for the possibility of communication
so long as the messages that are communicated are irrelevant
or, if relevant, contain no information about the pure
strategy to be chosen for any of the players.
Moreover, in all those games in which learning a
rational opponent's strategy would constitute a definite
advantage, von Neumann and Morgenstern point out that "it
would be difficult to see how a theory of the game should be
constructed without some additional hypotheses as to who
finds out whose strategy."SO

Because two-person, zero-sum

games are the only category of games in which communication
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of a rational opponent's strategy is irrelevant, it is the
only class of games in which the theory of von Neumann and
Morgenstern describes a solution that is unique.

In the

large majority of games, however, communication of this kind
matters a great deal; and, the more it matters, the less
their theory is able to narrow down the range of possible
choices.
Clearly, the next step in the development of game
theory must be to allow for and to describe precisely the
transmission of relevant information between players, and,
what is more important, to describe precisely the effects of
this kind of communication.

Since the solution concept of

von Neumann and Morgenstern proscribes the transmission of
such information, their contribution to game theory will be
clarified but not diminished.

Moreover, the transmission of

information in those games where it is so crucial, including
the information generated by the development of any theory
of games, will now be explicitly taken into account.

It

should be clear from the preceeding analysis that the
transmission of information simply cannot be ignored if a
solution is to be found for the general, n-person game.

Transmission
It is apparent from the preceeding analysis of the
work of von Neumann and Morgenstern that the concept of communication as social interaction through messages is so
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ambiguous as to. allow for the possibility of paradox.
Therefore the mathematical theory of collective
communication described here is founded upon a particular
type of communication, the communication of messages which
result in the transmission of information to one player
about the pure strategy to be chosen by another player.
Precise measures of the information communicated by this
type of message will now be presented, along with measures
of the information transmitted by social choice messages.
Analysis will then shift to the effects of the latter type
of communication upon behavioral relations between the
players in a game and, finally, to the technical limitations
of these measures.
The amount of information about the strategy chosen by
one player that is transmitted to another through the
communication of a message can be precisely described by
means of an information-theoretic measure such as T(M:S y )'
where M denotes the set of possible messages,
denotes
the set of pure strategies available to player

and the

term as a whole denotes the amount of information in bits
transmitted on the average to an observer about the strategy
to be chosen by or for player

y

,when the observer

receives one of the messages.

The value of this term may be

computed by means of the following identity:
(A. 2)
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where

H(Sy)

denotes the uncertainty for the observer as to

which of the strategies available to player
chosen, and

HM(Sy)

y

will be

denotes the average uncertainty for the

observer that remains after having received one of the
messages in the set

M.

The value of these terms can be

computed by means of appropriate extensions of expression
A.l.

If the observer of the game described in Table A.1
above received a message which caused the representation of
the game to change to that in Table A.3 below, then by
comparing the uncertainty of the observer about the
representation of the behavior of player Y in Table A.1 with
the uncertainty of the observer about player Y in Table A.3,
it can be determined that this mesage has conveyed

1

bit of

information about player y's behavior to that observer,
i. e. ,

T(M:S y )

=

H(Sy) - HM(Sy)

=

1 - 0 bits
1 bit

Table A.3
A TWO-PERSON, TWO-STRATEGY GAME AFTER RECEIVING

A MESSAGE ABOUT THE BEHAVIOR OF PLAYER Y

x
1(0.1)

2(0.9)

1(1.0)

a(O.l)

b(0.9)

2(0.0)

c(O.O)

d(O.O)

Y

-327-

In this dissertation, analysis will be focused upon
the effects of a more narrowly defined type of communication, the communication of social choice messages.

Social

choice messages will be represented in game-theoretic terms
as messages which contain information about the pure
strategies to be chosen by two or more players.

This type

of communication can be described by means of an
information--theoretic measure such as

T(M:Sx'Sy) , where

M denotes the set of possible messages,
of pure strategies available to player

Sx denotes the set
x

set of pure strategies available to player

denotes the
y, and the term

as a whole denotes the amount of information in bits
transmitted on the average to an observer about the
strategies to be chosen by player

x

and by player

y

and

about the relation between these strategic choices, when the
observer receives one of the messages.

The value of this

term may be computed by means of the following identity:
(A. 3 )

where the first two terms on the right can be computed by
means of expressions analogous to A.2 and the third by means
of the following identity:
(A. 4 )

Analysis in this dissertation concerns primarily the
content of messages and the effects of communicating those
messages, for these effects are viewed as motivating the
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process of communication itself and therefore of primary
concern.

Hence attention will be focused largely upon the

behavior of players in the game, as described by terms such
as TM(Sx:Sy)' second from the right in expression A.4.

By

definition,
(A.S)

where HM(Sy)

denotes the average uncertainty of the

observer after receiving a message as to which of the
strategies available to player

y

will be chosen and

HMS (Sy) denotes the uncertainty that remains, on the
x
average, after receiving a message and after knowing which
of the strategies available to player X has been chosen.
The value of these terms can be computed by appropriate
extensions of expression A.l.

If the observer of the game

described in Table A.l above received a message which caused
that representation to change to the one described in Table
A.4 below, then by comparing the uncertainties of the
observer about the behavior of the players in each of the
two representations according to expression A.3, it can be
determined that this message has conveyed 0.11 bits of
information about their behavior to that observer, i.e.,

=

0 + 0 + 0.11 bits

= 0.11 bits
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Table A.4
A TWO-PERSON, TWO-STRATEGY GAME AFTER RECEVING
A SOCIAL CHOICE MESSAGE

x

Y

1(0.1)

2(0.9)

1(0.5)

a(O.I)

b(0.4)

2(0.5)

C(O.O)

d(0.5)

The term TM(Sx:Sy) thus describes the relation between
the behavior of player X and player Y, contingent upon the
message M.

However, since every relation considered here

was most probably established by the receipt of some sort of
message, it is possible to simplify the analysis
considerably by making the contingency of the relations
be~ween

players upon messages implicit.

will, henceforth, be dropped.

Thus the symbol M

The value of the resulting

term T(Sx:Sy) can be computed by an expression analogous to
A.2, namely
(A.6 )

where H(Sy) denotes the amount of uncertainty of an observer
as to the strategy to be chosen by player Y and HS (S )
x y
denotes the average uncertainty of that observer when the
strategy to be chosen by player X is known.

The value of

these terms can, in turn, be computed by means of
appropriate extensions of expression A.l.
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As applied to the game described in Table A.4, this
expression would reveal that after receiving the message, a
relation between player X and player Y was established whose
strength was 0.11 bits, i.e.,
H(Sy) - HS (Sy)

x
: 1 - 0.89 bits
=

0.11 bits

In this dissertation it is understood that a relation
between players can be established either inadvertantly
through the communication to them of a message about "the
rules of the game," e.g., through individual decisions made
in response to information about conflicting interests, or
deliberately through the communication to them of a social
choice message, e.g., through a mutual agreement reached by
those players in response to information about (and for the
purpose of realizing) their common interests.
Because all relations are described by information
theory in terms of the transmission of information-relations between the strategic behaviors of two players as
well as relations between the communication behavior of
(receipt of a message by) one player and the strategic
behavior of another player--the strength of this
relationship between the strategic behavior of players X and
Y is measured in terms of the amount of information
transmitted to an observer about the strategy chosen by
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player Y when the strategy chosen by player X becomes known,
or visa-versa.

In Appendix B this relation will be viewed

as representing both the content and the effect of
prescriptive messages about social choices, i.e., it will be
assumed that social choice messages will be perfectly obeyed
(or enforced), and thus that the behavior prescribed by such
a measure and the behavior resulting from the communication
of such a message will be identical.

In Appendix C,

however, the costs of enforcing prescriptive messages will
be introduced into the analysis and a distinction will be
drawn between the content (or syntactics) and the effect (or
pragmatics) of a social choice message.
When the focus of analysis is placed precisely upon
the relations between players and the probability
distributions underlying information-theoretic terms such as
T(SX:Sy)' a fundamental difference between the unified
theory of information and games and the theory of 2-person,
zero-sum games emerges.

It lies in the consideration of

"mixed" or "jointly statistical" strategies.

A jointly

statistical strategy can be conceptualized as a distribution
of probabilities across the product set of the strategies
available to all subsets of players in a game environment.
It can be interpreted in a manner similar to the standard
interpretation of individually statistical or mixed
strategies, i.e. as the selection (for instance by two or
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more players in concert) of a probability distribution
according to which joint strategies will be chosen from the
product set of individual strategies.

However, this

representation also lends itself to interpretation as a
limit of the relative frequency with which the various pure
strategies of two or more players occur together across
plays of an iterated game.

For example, the outcome of the

game described in Table A.4 as compared to that described in
Table A.I, could only have been achieved through the
selection of a jointly statistical strategy.
In a two-person, zero-sum game, communication such as
might result in the selection of a jointly statistical
strategy has no rational justification.

However, in other

game environments, jointly statistical strategies achieved
through the communication and enforcement of social choice
messages can be used to enlarge the set of outcomes
realizable through the independent selection of statistical
strategies and, thereby, to ensure the realization of
otherwise unattainable outcomes, especially interests held
in common by many or all players.
Since a game generally involves more than two players,
it is fortunate that the concept of transmission has been
generalized to include a description of higher-order relations (relations established between three or more people,
for instance) that are not decomposable into a collection of
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Until recently, the appropriate measure

was thought to have been

Q, as developed by McGill, Garner
and McGill, Ashby, and Krippendorff. 50 Q was thought to be

an appropriate measure, at least for nonnegative values,
because when added to transmission terms of a lower order,
it enabled the calculation of the total amount of
transmission in a system of any number of variables, i.e.:
T(A:B:C) = T(A:B)+T(A:C)+T(B:C)+Q(A:B:C)

(A.7 )

and, generally,
T(A:B: ... :N)

L

L

T(I:J)+
Q(I:J:K)
IJ€ S
IJKE. S
+
LQ(I:J:K:L)+ ... +Q(A:B: ... :N)
IJKLE S

=

(A.8 )

where IJ€ S denotes all unique pairs of variables, I#J , in
the set

S,

S= A,B, ... N ; IJKE. S denotes all unique

triples, etc.
Although it was known from the first that

Q

at times

took on negative values, the significance of this fact has
been slow to emerge.
negative)

McGill first stated that positive (or

Q values in a 3 variable system indicated simply

"a gain (or loss) in information transmission between any
two of the variables due to additional knowledge of the
third variable.,,52

This is, of course, true--as far as it

goes--for it is a direct interpretation of the identities
Q(A:B:C)

=

TA (B:C)-T(B:C)

= TB(A:C)-T(A:C)
=

TC(A:B)-T(A:B)

(A. 9)
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Unfortunately, the two terms on the right of each equal sign
are both deceptively simple.

When there is transmission

between two pairs of variables, let's say

T(A:B)

and

T(B:C) , transmission between the remaining pair represented
by the last term on the right,

T(A:C)

in this example,

will be greater than zero if information can be transmitted
from the first variable through the second variable to the
third.

In addition, however, that same transmission term

T(A:C)

may describe a relationship between

and above that which depends upon

A

and

Cover

B .

The conditional transmission term,

TB(A:C)

in the

example used above, on the other hand, will contain this
second quantity of information but will not contain the
first.

In addition, however, this conditional transmission

term also describes any transmission between the three
variables that cannot be explained by reference to any two
of them.

Thus the

Q term is, in fact, quite complex and

contains both the amount of information dependent upon all
the variables as well as a "correction factor" for any
information that is transmitted indirectly from
B ) to

A

(through

C.
When McGill and Garner compared their multivariate

information theory (which they called uncertainty analysis)
to the analysis of variance, they wrote that "the negative
interaction term can be thought of as due to a negative covariance term that may attenuate or exceed the positive
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Unfortunately it is obvious that an

interaction term can be negative only in the case where a
negative "covariance term" exceeds the positive interaction
effect.

Moreover, while Garner and McGill are correct in

stating that a negative "covariance term" would "attenuate
or exceed a positive interaction effect," nevertheless the
full implication of this statement--namely, that neither a
negative nor a positive

Q

measure may accurately measure

the total amount of interaction--is not made clear due to
their focus upon the case where the

Q

term is negative.

The mistaken impression that positive and negative

Q values

require qualitatively different interpretations was passed
on in the literature until recently when Krippendorff
presented a counterexample proving that "Q

measures fail

to distinguish between the distributional properties of
interaction and the accounting artifact of overdetermination.

Being influenced by both but in opposite directions,

Q -measures cannot serve as valid indicators of either

phenomena. ,,54
It is clear now that

Q

measures cannot be used

directly but must be decomposed into their component parts,
one part indicating the true amount of interaction and
another describing a "correction" term equal to the amount
of "overdetermination."

For the purposes of this

dissertation, however, it is necessary only to deal with
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systems of three variables and with models which describe
binary relations between two of the three pairs of
variables, i.e., with models without "loops."
will be possible here to decompose

Q

Therefore it

measures into

conditional and unconditional transmission measures, as in
expression

A.9, and to interpret the first as a measure of

interaction and the second as a measure of "indirect"
transmission between the third pair of variables.

For

example, when expression A.7 is applied to the game
described in Table A.S with the Q term decomposed according
to expression A.9, the result can be interpreted as
indicating a direct, binary relation between the behavior of
players A and B and another direct, binary relation between
players Band C.

However, since the value of the

conditional transmission term TB(A:C) is zero, there is an
indirect, binary relation between A and C but no indication
of an interraction between all three players, i.e.,
T(A:B:C) = T(A:B) + T(B:C) + T(A:C) + TB(A:C) - T(A:C)
1 + 1 + 1 + 0 - 1

= 2 bits
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Table A.5
A THREE-PERSON, TWO-STRATEGY GAME WITHOUT INTERACTION

•rr
1(0.5)

a(0.5)

b(O.O)

2(0.5)

c(O.O)

d(O.O)

Ig(O.o)

A

.\v.Uj

h(0.5)
2(0.5)

1(0.5)
2(0.5)

1(0.5)

C

B

On the other hand, the result of applying the same
formula to the game describe in Table A.6 can be interpreted
as indicating a tertiary relation or interaction between all
three players but no direct or indirect relations between
any pair of players, i.e.,
T(A:B:C)

= T(A:B) + T(B:C)
=0 + 0 + 0 + 1 =

+ T(A:C) + TB(A:C) - T(A:C)

0

1 bit
Table A.6

A THREE-PERSON, THO-STRATEGY GAME HITH INTERACTION
ern
1(0.5)

a(0.25)

b(O.O)

2(0.5)

c(O.O)

d(0.25)

g(0.25)

A

'<''')

h(O.O)
2(0.5)

1(0.5)
2(0.5)

1(0.5)

C

B

In previous work on games such as those described
above, the conditional transmission term in expression A.9
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has been used inductively to describe the extent to which
unconditional transmission measures overdetermine the
transmission in a system.

In the work presented in this

dissertation, however, the term will be used deductively to
describe the extent to which one variable indirectly
determines another.

These two different uses of the same

term are neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive, for
in both cases this term describes the amount of information
transmitted across an intervening variable or variables as
well as across two or more relations.

Equlibrium
Although the applications of information theory
suggested above presuppose the existence of variety in
preference relations, strategic behavior and outcomes, and
thus carry with them the implication that these preferences,
strategies and outcomes might change over time, this
calculus is entirely statistical and, in that sense, does
not explicitly describe the actual process of change.
Moreover, it will be argued in this section that the basic
applications of Shannon's measures of uncertainty and
information transmission described in equations A.2 through
A.9 do not require any more dynamic a conceptualization of
the actual play of a game than does von Neumann and
Morgenstern's concept of mixed or statistical strategies.
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The foundations of a unified theory of information and games
are thus without contradiction, for the messages described
by such a theory are restricted to those whose communication
results in a behavioral equilbrium.
In game theory the concept of a solution involves the
notions of stability and equilibrium in the sense that a
particular combination of pure, mixed or conditional strategies or a set of such combinations may be defined as a
solution if and only if it can be demonstrated that, given
the structure of the game environment, there is no player
who will benefit by changing his strategy to one outside
those described by the "solution."

Thus while a more

complete form of game theory would be able to describe the
precise movements of the system through time, the theory of
games as initially presented by von Neumann and Morgenstern
is essentially static, according to the authors, and
contains only the rudiments of a dynamic theory:
We repeat most emphatically that our theory is
thoroughly static. A dynamic theory would
unquestionably be more complete and therefore
preferable. But there is ample evidence from
other branches of science that it is futile to
try to build one as long as the static side is
not thoroughly understood. On the other hand,
the reader may object to some definitely dynamic
arguments which were made in the course of our
discussions .... We think that this is perfectly
legitimate. A static theory deals with
equilibria. The essential characteristic of an
equilibrium is that it has no tendency to change,
i.e. that it is not conducive to dynamic
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developments. An analysis of this feature is, of
course, inconceivable without the use of certain
rudimentary dynamic concepts. The ~~portant
point is that they are rudimentary.
The static character of game theory is perhaps most
clearly illustrated by the fact that for all practical
purposes, analysis of a game is focused upon a single play
of that game.

AS a consequence, the probabilities

distributed across the set of "pure" strategies available to
each player are not interpreted by von Neumann and
Morgenstern as describing the relative frequencies with
which that player selects these strategies as play of the
game is repeated but as describing the chances for each of
those strategies of being chosen during one play of the
game, and the distribution itself is defined as a
"statistical" or "mixed" strategy chosen by that player from
among a set of such strategies during that one play.

The

implication of conceptualizing a probability distribution as
a type of strategy is that this distribution must be
invariant.
The information-theoretic assumptions regarding
probability distributions are more precise in their
articulation and no less rigorous in their implications with
regard to invariance.

In order to compare these two sets of

assumptions, it is helpful to interpret the probabilities
underlying information theory and the assumptions regarding
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those probabilities as pertaining not to the behavior of
players in a game over time but rather to the behavior over
time of a random device (such as a die, a table of random
numbers or a spinner) used by those players to select pure
strategies for one play of the game.

Thus in applying

information theory to the analysis of a game, it will be
assumed that when various alternative strategies are chosen
in succession by such a device, the choice process can be
represented as a Markov Chain, in which choice of a strategy
is either independent of all other choices or is permitted
to depend upon the choice directly preceding it (and only on
this choice).

However, since the preceeding choice can be

formulated to include any number of preceeding choices, the
real significance of this assumption is that the behavior of
the device must be described in terms of its observed state.
A slightly more restrictive assumption upon which the
application of information theory rests is that these
strategic choices are "ergodic":

they each may be selected

at any point in a sequence of choices, and they all will
definitely be selected more than once within a finite number
of choices.

Technically speaking such choices are called
aperiodic, persistent, non-null states. 56 The significance
of this mathematical property for a mathematical theory of
collective communication is that the device being used is,
in certain ways, stable.

For one thing, the set of
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strategies from which a device chooses is closed under the
choice process, that is, a device will not suddenly choose a
strategy across which the set of probabilities was not
defined.

Also, as the number of choices increases, the

probability with which anyone strategy is selected
approaches an equlibrium value that is independent of the
strategy selected to start out with; and, thus, separate
sequences of choices show a statistical homogeneity.
perhaps the most important information-theoretic
assumption is that the ergodic probabilities on which it is
based are, in fact, equilibrium values.

That is to say,

these probabilities are stationary or invariant, and when
used to describe the behavior of a random device, it is
assumed that they will not change over time.
Each of these assumptions can be seen to describe some
aspect or type of stability in the distribution of
probabilities.

Clearly they are compatible with the concept

of a mixed strategy; and while the theory of information
characterizes more precisely than does the theory of games
the probabilities upon which it is based, these theories are
founded upon logically consistent assumptions concerning the
equilibrial nature of the behavior they describe.
Thus the unified theory of information and games will
be a theory of static equilibria under dynamic conditions.
When the game environment is fixed, the solution to that
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game constitutes an equilibrium, and the implications of
this assumption about the game environment will be drawn out
in Appendix B as a theory of statics.

As the game envi-

ronment changes, however, so too will the equilibrium representing the solution to that game.

The implications of such

changes will be drawn out in Appendix C as a theory of comparative statics.

Since nonequilibrial and variable

conditions are represented in the unified theory of
information and games by their invariant or stable aspects,
communication will be represented here as the collective
production and distribution of messages that result in
behavioral equilibria.
The purpose of this appendix has been to introduce the
idea of a unified theory of information and games.

An

argument has been set out that articulates compelling
motivations and compatible foundations for the measurement
of information transmission within a game of strategy.

In

addition, pertinent research has been reviewed, basic
assumptions have been described, and fundamental concepts
have been defined and illustrated.

Given this introduction,

theorems can now be derived to describe the transmission of
information necessary and sufficient for behavioral
equilibrium in a game-like environment -- a task to be taken
up in Appendix B.
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APPENDIX B
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN THE BASIC GAME

Having laid the ground work for a unified theory of
information and games in Appendix A, attention will now turn
to an exposition of the first level of analysis:
theory of statics.

a general

While the focus here on stability is in

part entailed by the assumptions regarding equilibrial
conditions that underlie both information theory and game
theory, as was described in Appendix A, it is also a logical
starting point for the development of a new behavioral
theory.

Moreover the study of statics in the social

sciences is motivated to some extent by the important
historical role played by statics with regard to the
development of mechanics and dynamics in the physical
sciences.
Findings on statics will lead into an examination of
comparative statics in Appendix C, where the focus will narrow to an indepth analysis of a particular type of dynamic
equilibrium.

This type of dynamic equilibrium will be
-349-
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interpreted in terms of collective communication.

The

generality of Appendix B is justified thus by the need to
show the relationship between new developments and existing
theory and by the need to lay a secure foundation for the
mathematical theory of collective communication developed in
Appendix C.

However, while the research described in this

Appendix can be used to suggest the potential scope of a
fully unified theory of information and games, the theory
described in Appendix C represents only one of the many
possible components of a completely developed and fully
unified theory of information and games.
On the first level of analysis, information theory is
used to describe stability in the outcome of a game, the
relation between this stability and the behavior of players
in that game, the relation between the behavior of players
in a game and the preferences of these players, and finally
the relation between these preferences and stability in the
outcome of that game.

The relation between stability and

behavior is analysed here under the rubric of regulation.
The relation between preferences and behavior is described
here as rationality and is analysed together with the
relation between preferences and stability under the rubric
of control.
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REGULATION
stability is described here in terms of an observer's
uncertainty as to what the outcome of a game will be, i.e.
by the term

H(O)

The closer this term is to zero, the

closer the outcome of the game is to a stable state in the
eyes of the observer.

There are, of course, many possible

sources of stability.

For this reason, analysis in this

appendix will consider separately each of the processes that
delimit or determine the value of

H(O).

These processes

will be formally defined as types of regulation in a series
of theorems.

Associated with each theorem will be a set of

correspondence rules and a resulting interpretation.

The

first mention of each theorem and its interpretation will be
underscored for easy reference.

The statement and

interpretation of each theorem will be followed by a formal
proof together with an example to illustrate the
applicability and significance of the theorem.

Prior to the

presentation of these theorems, however, the relevant work
of Shannon, Ashby and Conant will be reviewed and shown to
constitute a valid, although severely restricted,
prototheory of information and games.

EXisting Theory
The concept of a mathematical theory of collective
communication based upon the unification of game theory and
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information theory can be seen as a further development of
the research tradition begun by Claude E. Shannon's The
Mathematical Theory of Communication, established by W. Ross
Ashby in An Introduction to Cybernetics, and advanced by
Roger C. Conant in his articles on the theory of regulation.
Because several game theorists have made significant
contributions to a unified mathematical theory, as evidenced
by Appendix A where the foundations for such a theory were
derived from the initial formulation of the theory of games
and economic behavior, the work presented here represents,
in fact, a convergence of two different research traditions.
Nevertheless, this appendix will begin with a review of
relevant findings in the mathematical theory of
communication, regulation and control, findings which are
more fully developed in this regard and which lead directly
into the more recent developments.

Shannon
The first step toward a unified theory was taken
almost inadvertently by Shannon in his original presentation
of "the mathematical theory of communication."

In the

derivation of his FUndamental Theorem for a Discrete Channel
with Noise, Shannon needed an appropriate measure of noise.
For this purpose, he developed the concept of equivocation
and proved that this was the proper conceptualization of
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noise by means of his Tenth Theorem.

This theorem gives, as

shannon himself noted,
a direct intuitive interpretation of the equivocation and also serves to justify it as the
unique appropriate measure. We consider a
communication system and an observer (or
auxiliary device) who can see both what is sent
and what is recovered (with errors due to nOise).
This observer notes the errors in the recovered
message and transmits data to the receiving point
over a "correction channel" to fjmable the
receiver to correct the errors.
The underdeveloped state of the unified theory can be
explained, in part, by the fact that Shannon was primarily
concerned not with the problem of efficient regulation but,
rather, with the problem of efficient coding.

His descrip-

tion of a correction channel in this theorem was merely a
by-product of work on problems more salient to the
communications engineer.

However the significance of

Shannon's Tenth Theorem was not lost on Ashby, who viewed it
as a general principle dominating all work with complex
systems:
In this matter I do not think enough attention
has yet been paid to Shannon's Tenth Theorem ....
Shannon's theorem says that if a correction
channel has capacity H, then equivocation of
amount H can be removed, but no more. Shannon
stated his theorem in the context of telephone or
similar communication, but the formulation is
just as true of a biological regulatory channel
trying to exert some sort of corrective control.
He thought of the case with a lot of message and
a little error; the biologist faces the case
where the "message" is small but the disturbing
errors are many and large. The theorem can then
be applied to the brain (or any other regulatory

-354-

and selective device), when it says that the
amount of regulatory or selective action is absolutely bounded by it capacity as a channel
(author's emphasis).

z

Ashby
Having grasped the general implications of Shannon's
Tenth Theorem, Ashby formally initiated the development of a
unified theory of information and games.

In his book on

cybernetics, Ashby explains the process of regulation in
terms of a table that he interprets as a game with two players, D and R, a set of "moves," 1, 2, and 3, one set for
each player and a set of different "outcomes," a, b, and c,
jointly determined by various combinations of "moves.,,3
Table B.l

ASHBY'S "TABLE OF OUTCOMES"
R

D

1

2

3

1

b

a

c

2

a

c

b

3

c

b

a

According to the usage established by von Neumann and
Morgenstern and followed in this paper, the possible choices
for a game in normalized form are described as "strategies,"
each in turn consisting of a set of conditional actions, one
of which is to be taken at every "move" or decision point in
the extensive form of the game.

Also the entries in each
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cell of a game matrix (corresponding to the elements in each
position in Table B.l) typically represent "payoffs," describing ordinal- or interval- scale utilities instead of
"outcomes," which, as in Ashby's table, correspond to
nominal-scale utilities.
While these terminological and scaling differences are
but of minor significance, there are two important distinctions between Ashby's table of outcomes and the payoff
matrix describing a two-person game.

In his game-

theoretical interpretation of this table, Ashby makes two
fundamental assumptions:

(1) he stipulates that player D

must choose a strategy before player R, and (2) he assumes
that R always knows exactly which strategy D has chosen
before he makes his own strategic choice.
tions are well known in game theory.

These two condi-

The first defines a

"majorant game" (for player R) and the second denotes a game
with "perfect information."

It is important to realize,

however, that while these assumptions are absolutely central
to Ashby's presentation, they are neither typical nor
trivial assumptions in the theory of games.

The development

of a unified theory of information and games thus depends,
in part, on the relaxation of these restrictive assumptions,
which is one goal of this appendix.
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Analysing the structure of this majorant game with
perfect information, Ashby shows that
If no two elements in the same column are equal,
and if a set of outcomes is selected by R, one
from each row, and if the table has r rows and c
columns, then the variety in the selected set of
outcomes c~nnot be fewer than ric (author's
emphasis) .
This means that if and only if c, the number of strategies
available to R, can be increased relative to r, the number
of strategies available to D, the minimum possible amount of
variety in the set of outcomes can be lowered:
This is the Law of Requisite variety. To put it
more picturesquely: only variety in R can force
down the variety due to D; onl vari;ty can
destroy variety (author's emp!! SiS).

g

If variety is measured logarithmically, if the same
conditions hold, and if
variety in

D,

VD' VR ' and Vo denote the
R, and in the outcome, respectively, the Law

of Requisite variety (LRV) , as Ashby demonstrates, can be
formulated as
V;'V-V
o
D
R

(B.1 )

To show that the LRV is not a trivial outcome of the tabular
form, Ashby generalizes it to the case where the variety is
spread out in time and the selection process is incessant.
If variety is now measured in terms of Shannon's entropy and
if, when

R

is fixed or given, the entropy in

less than that in

0

is not

D, i.e.,

'"

Ha(D)

(B. 2)
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where

Rand

sets and

0

.D

are defined by their respective strategy

by the set of outcomes, the LRV can be

formalized in this way:
H(O) '"= H(D) + HD(R) - H(R)

(B.3 )

This inequality can now be interpreted as representing
a limiting condition on the uncertainty of the outcome of a
majorant game with perfect information.
determinant function of

R

is a

D, the minimum value of

H(O)

be forced down below that of
the value of

H(R).

formation between

H(D)

When

can

only by an increase in

That is, when the transmission of inD

and

R

is maximized,
(B. 4)

then
H(O)

>

H(D) - H(R)

(B. 5)

Moreover, if
H(R) = H(D)

(B.6 )

then the condition expressed by (B.2) becomes a trivial one,
i.e.
~(O) ;; 0

(B.7 )

and the uncertainty in the outcome of the game is minimized,
i. e.

H(O) ;; 0 bits

(B. 8)

The relation described by expression B.3 is of great
importance in the study of regulation and control, for when
R

is defined as a regulator,

D

as a disturbance, and

0
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as the output of a system that is to be regulated, the LRV
demonstrates that "R's capacity as a regulator cannot exceed
R'S capacity as a channel of communication. ,,6
In the context of a majorant game with perfect
information, however, uncertainty within the set

R

can be

interpreted as a measure of the political, social, economic,
physiological or other material resources available to this
particular player or coalition of players.

Moreover, it

might also serve as a measure of psychological resources
such as discernment, discrimination, imagination,
creativity, learning, intelligence or knowledge (with regard
to the set of mutually exclusive actions that could be taken
in a game-theoretic situation to counter the strategy chosen
by another player).

While strategies are commonly used by

game theorists to represent "physical" variables, the
concept of uncertainty thus adds a new "mental" dimension to
game theory.

In addition, the relationship between the

strategic resources available to one player and the
resources available to another, relative to their control
over the outcome of the game, has never been so forcefully
expressed nor so clearly explained as it is by the Law of
Requisite Variety.
Ashby is aware, however, that the LRV described by
expression B.3 is incomplete; and he points out that in the
case where the value of

R

is fixed, uncertainty in the
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outcome as described by the LRV might be inflated (e.g.
because different values of
of some value of

0).

D

might result in repetition

Supposing that variety is measured

logarithmically and that within each column of the table of
outcomes, each element appears k

times instead on once,

Ashby reformulates the LRV as
Vo ~ VD - log k - V
(B.9 )
R
He then makes a similar modification of expression B.2 by
supposing that

(B.10)
where

K

represents the binary log of

k.

Ashby states

that given this assumption, the minimum of

H(O) becomes

H(D) - K - H(R)

(B.ll)

Although Ashby characterizes it as a "worthwhile
extension," this modification is not entirely satisfactory,
for it hasn't yet been generalized to include the case where
variety in
values of

D, when
Rand

Rand

0

are fixed, varies across the

0; and thus it cannot be described in

information-theoretic terms.

Expression B.ll is of limited

applicability, for it assumes that the variety in
same for all values of

Rand

O.

D

is the

Moreover, uncertainty in

the outcome may be deflated either implicitly, by means of
co

an addition to the assumptions described by expression B.2,
or explicitly, by adding a term to the LRV as described by
expression B.3, but not by both simultaniously, as Ashby
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suggests.

Finally, this modification does not effect the

restrictive assumptions of temporal asymmetry (that
choose a strategy before
D's

D must

R) and perfect information (that

choice of a strategy is always known to

R) which also

serve to limit the applicability of B.II.

conant
Picking up where Ashby leaves off, Conant uses a derivation of the explicitly extended form of the LRV which,
presented in its simplest form and expressed in terms of the
symbols used by Ashby, appears as
V ""
= T(R:D) + K

where

V

(B.12)

is used to denote the "value" of the regulator,

i.e. the amount of uncertainty in the outcome set which

R

suppresses by its activity beyond that which it could
suppress by taking a fixed value and
of

K

is the binary log

k, now used to denote the "multiplicity" of the relation

mapping the values taken by a regulator and a disturbance
into a set of outcomes, i.e. the largest number of times an
entry is repeated within any column of the table of
outcomes.
that, where

°

Conant thus differs from Ashby in the assumption
k

differs across values of

Rand

0,

Rand

are assumed to take on those values which yield the

largest number of repeated entries in a payoff matrix or
table of outcomes. 7
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conant then applies this expression to the case where
information is not always "perfect", showing that "regulation is limited by the mutual information, or transinformation, between

D and

R.

The transmission of information

is ... an essential component of regulatory processes.,,8

The

importance of this work is underscored by Ashby, who states
that
Conant ... has proved the fundamental theorem
(superseding the "law of requisite variety") that
the capacity of any device or system as a
regulator cannot exceed its capacity as a
transmitter of information. The relation between
regulation and transmission was proven by him, gin
fact, to be not just possible but fundamental.
Based upon this theorem, Conant is able to draw a
fundamental distinction between error-controlled
regulation--a common type of regulation that assumes some
deviation from an ideal or norm--and cause-controlled
regulation--a less well-known but theoretically perfectible
type of regulation.

Nevertheless, although he transcends

Ashby's assumption concerning the fixed value of

K, Conant

does not generalize Ashby's extension of the LRV into a
purely information-theoretic expression.
across values of
term

Rand

Where

K varies

0, Conant bases his use of the

K upon the implicit assumption that the values of the

regulator and the outcome have been fixed, once and for all,
thereby prohibiting the application of information-theoretic
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measures, which ar.e averages computed across all values of
the relevant variables.
In addition, although he discards the assumption of
perfect information, Conant does not remove the assumption
of temporal asymmetry.

This latter restriction prevents him

from realizing the implications of his theorem with regard
to a unified theory of information and games, for as Conant
himself points out (with reference to a disturbance
a regulator

Sand

R):

... it rules out situations, such as games, in
which S can change its behavior so as to oppose
the regulation; it also rules out situations such
as bribery, in which R can influence the
behavior ~O S so as to attain favorable
outcomes.
In order to develop a unified theory that can describe
information flows in a variety of games and prescribe
possible solutions to a variety of social choice problems,
i.e. a mathematical theory of collective communication, it
is necessary to remove the restrictive assumption of
temporal asymmetry and to replace the arbitrary term

K by

an information-theoretic measure.

New Developments
c

The limitations inherent in the work of Ashby and
Conant are due to assumptions and formulations that are ad
hoc in nature.

Therefore they will simply be ignored in the
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work described .here.

It is quite possible to forgo the

assumption of temporal asymmetry because the terminology of
information theory is not specific with regard to time.

A

transmission term that describes a relation between two
variables, for example, does not itself indicate which of
the two variables occurred first or whether they occurred
simultaniously.

Moreover, while the sender of a message

must transmit that message before anyone can receive it, if
the message is collectively communicated, the process of
transmission might involve simultaneous behavior on the part
of two or more senders.

Finally, the focus of analysis here

is on the behavioral effects of communication, especially
the organization of behavior in a game-like environment.
Such behavior is typically represented by means of the
simultaneous choice of strategies.

There is, thus, no

reason, either theoretical or empirical, why the assumption
of temporal asymmetry cannot simply be dropped.
Similarly, the assumption that variety in the value of
the disturbance conditional upon the observer's knowledge of
the value of the regulator and the outcome of the game is
the same across all values of the regulator and across all
outcomes or is fixed at its minimum is not a part of
information theory and therefore just as easy to forgo.
conditional uncertainty term

HRO(D)

can be used to

describe the binary log of this same conditional variety

The
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averaged across all values of the regulator and all outcomes
of the game.

Since, prior to play of the game, an observer

would have no way of knowing which specific value of

R

was

to be chosen, not to mention what the outcome of the game
was to be, to make use of an average value such as this
seems more reasonable than to use one particular value, such
as Ashby and Conant do.

Moreover, systematic use of average

values makes it possible to couch the entire expression in
the terminology of information theory and thus to achieve
both consistancy in application and clarity in
interpretation.
Having dropped the restrictive assumptions of existing
theory, the next goal of this appendix will be to describe
precisely each of the various ways in which stability in the
outcome of a game-like process can be achieved.

This

description will take the form of a series of theorems, each
of which will be articulated, interpreted, illustrated and
logically validated.

In these theorems attention is focused

upon logical relations between the elements of a
mathematical game in the normalized form of analysis
augmented, as in Appendix A, by parenthetical distributions
of probability.

The elements of interest include the

strategies available to players in the game, the possible
outcomes resulting from play of that game, and the
preferences of these players as between these alternative
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outcomes.

The relations through which the choice of a

strategy by each player in a game leads to stability in the
outcome of that game will be used here to define regulation.
Similarly the relations through which the preferences of
each player in a game influence the achievement of such
stability will be used here to define control.

Hence the

logical relations under investigation are those that
describe the processes of regulation and control.

Modes of Regulation
These theorems incorporate distinctions between
different modes of regulation and different sources of
regulation, distinctions which must be clarified prior to
describing the theorems themselves.

Three modes of action

through which regulation can be achieved are distinguished
in this dissertation:
relational action.

individual action, joint action and

In the situation described by Table B.2,

a game consisting of two players whose strategy sets
(denoted by A and B, respectively) both contain two
strategies (denoted by 1 and 2), four outcomes (denoted by
a, b, c, and d), and the observer's belief as to the
occurrence of each strategy and each outcome (denoted by the
probability figure associated parenthetically with the
symbol denoting each strategy or outcome), each player is
able to reduce uncertainty about (and thus to regulate) the
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outcome of the game simply by choosing a strategy.

Such a

relation between a player's strategy set and the outcome set
of a game will be used to describe the potential of that
player to regulate the outcome of that game through an
individual mode of action and will be described in certain
circumstances by an unconditional transmission term such as
T(A:O) or T(B:O).
Table B.2
POTENTIAL FOR INDIVIDUAL AND RELATIONAL
ACTION IN A FOUR-OUTCOME GAME
B

1(0.50)

2(0.50)

1(0.50)

a(0.25)

b(0.25)

2(0.50)

c(0.25)

d(0.25)

A

T(A:O)

=

1.0 bits

T(A:B)

=

0.0 bits

TB(A:O)

=

1.0 bits

When a player such as

A

T(B:O)

TA(B:O)

=

1.0 bits

1.0 bits

chooses a strategy such as

1, a situation described by Table B.3, this potential
c

disappears.

The absolute amount of regulation that is

actually exercised can only be determined, therefore, by
comparing the same transmission term at two different points
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in time to ascertain the amount of potential regulation that
has been used up.

A comparison of Tables B.2 and B.3, for

example, reveals that

A

has exercised 1 bit of regulation.
Table B.3

RESULT OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION
ON THE PART OF ONE PLAYER IN A FOUR-OUTCOME GAME
B

1(0.5)

2(0.5)

1(1.0)

a(0.5)

b(0.5)

2(0.0)

C(O.O)

d(O.O)

A

T(A:O)

0.0 bits

T(B:O) = 1.0 bits

T(A:B) = 0.0 bits
TB(A:O) = 1.0 bits

TA(B:O)

1.0 bits

There are other games, however, such as that described
in Table B.4, in which there are only two outcomes, a and b,
and neither player is able to reduce uncertainty about (and
thus to regulate) the outcome of the game by choosing a
strategy, i.e. through unilateral or individual action.
Only when both players choose a strategy, i.e. through
multilateral or joint action, is uncertainty in the outcome
reduced.

Such a relation between the product of the

strategy sets of two or more players and the outcome set of
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a game will be.used to describe the potential of those
players to regulate the outcome of that game through a joint
mode of action and will be described in certain
circumstances by a conditional transmission term such as

Table B.4
POTENTIAL FOR JOINT AND
RELATIONAL ACTION IN A TWO-OUTCOME GAME
B

1(0.50)

2(0.50)

1(0.50)

a(0.25)

b(0.25)

2(0.50)

b(0.25)

a(0.25)

A

T(A:O)

= 0.0 bits

T(A:B)

= 0.0 bits
1.0 bits

0.0 bits

T(B:O)

TA(B:O)

=

1.0 bits

As with the potential for regulation through
individual action, the potential for regulation through
joint action disappears as it is exercised.
example, player

A

and player

B

If, for

simultaniously (jointly)

select strategy 1, the potential for joint regulation will
be reduced to zero, as described in Table B.S.
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RESULT OF JOINT ACTION
IN A TWO-OUTCOME GAME
B
1(1.0)

2(0.0)

1(1.0)

a(1.0)

b(O.O)

2(0.0)

b(O.O)

a(O.O)

A

T(A:O)

=

0.0 bits

T(A:B)

=

0.0 bits

TB(A:O)

0.0 bits

T(B:O)

TA(B:O)

0.0 bits

=

0.0 bits

A comparison of tables B.4 and B.5 reveal that 1 bit of
regulation has been exercised through joint action.

It

should be noted that even though both players in the game
described earlier in Table B.2 might have acted jointly, as
did the players in Table B.5, the resulting decrease in the
potential for regulation apparent in Table B.6 will be
attributed to individual action, since it is the sum of what
might have been achieved through two individual actions.
The potential for regulation through joint action is
defined, thus, not in terms of the time frame within which
players actually select a strategy, but in terms of what it
is possible to achieve through joint action above and beyond
the sum of all potential regulation through individual
action.
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RESULT OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION ON THE PART OF BOTH PLAYERS
IN A FOUR-OUTCOME GAME
B

1(1.0)

2(0.0)

1(1.0)

a(1.0)

b(O.O)

2(0.0)

c(O.O)

d(O.O)

A

T(A:O)
T(A:B)

=

0.0 bits

T(B:O)

= 0.0 bits

0.0 bits

TB(A:O) = 0.0 bits

0.0 bits

Finally, it may be possible for players in a game such
as that described by Table B.2 or in a game such as that
described by Table B.4 to reduce uncertainty about (and thus
to regulate) the outcome of that game by choosing not a
strategy but a relation between their strategies.

The

potential of those players to regulate the outcome of those
games through a relational mode of action will be described
by a conditional transmission term such as

TA(B:O).

The

exercise of this potential will be described by a decrease
in the value of this term accompanied by a simultaneous
increase in the value of a transmission term such as
T(A:B).

If, in a situation such as that described in Table

B.2, the players agree to choose the same strategy, but do
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not decide upon which, Table B.7 reveals that the potential
for relational regulation will have been reduced to zero.
Table B.7
RESULT OF RELATIONAL ACTION
IN A FOUR-OUTCOME GAME
B

1(0.5)

2(0.5)

1(0.5)

a(0.5)

b(O.O)

2(0.5)

C(O.O)

d(0.5)

A

T(A:O)

=

1.0 bits

T(A:B)

1.0 bits

TB(A:O)

0.0 bits

T(B:O)

1.0 bits

TA(B:O) = 0.0 bits

Likewise, if, in a situation such as that described by Table
B.4, the players agree to choose the same strategy, Table
B.8 reveals that the potential for relational regulation
will have been reduced to zero.

In both cases, 1 bit of

regulation has been exercised through a relational mode of
action.
In summary, the difference between individual and
joint regulation depends upon the structure of a game, and
c

is illustrated here by the difference between tables B.2 and
B.4.

The difference between individual and relational

regulation depends not upon the structure of a game but upon
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RESULT OF RELATIONAL ACTION
IN A TWO-OUTCOME GAME
B
1(0.5)

2(0.5)

1 (0.5)

a(0.5)

b(O.O)

2(0.5)

b(O.O)

a(0.5)

A

T(A:O)

0.0 bits

T(A:B)

1.0 bits

TB(A:O)

0.0 bits

T(B:O)

0.0 bits

TA(B:O)

0.0 bits

the way a game is played and is illustrated here by the
difference between tables B.3 or B.6 and B.7.

Finally the

difference between joint regulation and relational
regulation also depends upon the way a game is played and is
illustrated here by the difference between tables B.5 and
B.8.

Sources of Regulation
A second distinction that is incorporated into the
theorems which make up the unified theory of information and
games is that between two qualitatively different sources of
regulation:

a controller (simple or compound) and a

disturbance. In order to give these theorems as broad an
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interpretation as possible, any player whose preferences are
known and taken into account by an observer in the analysis
of stability is interpreted here as a controller.

For

example, any player viewed as a rational or economic man (as
is typical of mathematical games) would constitute one type
of controller.

Any player whose preferences, from the point

of view of an observer, are not known or, if known, are not
taken into account by that observer in the analysis of
stability is interpreted here as a disturbance.
It should be noted that a player's preferences may not
be known because that player represents some natural or
artificial system that cannot be said to have preferences.
However, when players represent subjects capable of having
preferences, the distinction between controller and
disturbance is arbitrary and depends solely upon the point
of view of the observer.

This interpretation, unlike that

of Ashby and Conant, recognizes that while there is a
fundamental opposition in the view of an observer between a
controller and a disturbance, regulation is achieved by
means of relations of which any player--even one viewed as a
disturbance--may be capable.

Finally, because the relation

between controllers is essential to the study of collective
communication, the nature of a compound controller will be
examined here in depth.

However, the additional complexi-

ties introduced by consideration of a compound disturbance
are irrelevant to this dissertation and will be ignored.

-374-

The various combinations of the three modes of
regulation with these two sources of regulation result in
eight distinct types of regulation, as described in the
typology in Table B.9.
Table B.9
TYPOLOGY OF REGULATION
MODE
SOURCE

INDIVIDUAL

SIMPLE/SINGLE
CONTROLLER
COMPOUND
CONTROLLER

Direct
-----

External

DISTURBANCE

----SIMPLE/SINGLE
CONTROLLER & DISTURBANCE

COMPOUND
CONTROLLER

----&

JOINT
-----

Internal
-----

RELATIONAL
-----

Internal
-----

Indirect

Indirect

Combined

Combined

DISTURBANCE

Although the joint mode of regulation and the relational
mode of regulation are conceptually distinct in this
typology, it is convenient in the derivation of informationtheoretic expressions to give them both the same label
whenever they derive from the same source, insofar as they
are both described by the same conditional transmission
term.

Thus the theorems which follow this discussion define

and describe not eight but five types of regulation:
direct, indirect, external, internal and combined.
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An Uncertainity Limit in One-Person Games Without
Disturbance
It seems appropriate to begin by describing the simplest and most fundamental type of regulation--that in which
a controller, acting alone, successfully reduces the variety
of outcomes of a process representable as a game.

This de-

scription will be designated Theorem 1:

is used

if

H(O)

to denote the uncertainty of an observer about the outcome
of a one-person game and if

H(C)

is used to denote the

uncertainty of that same observer about the strategy of the
player

C, then an upper limit on uncertainty about the

outcome of that game is described by the inequality.
H(O) ;; H(C)

(B.13)

It should be noted that the concept of a one-person
game (strictly defined) does not appear in the literature on
mathematical games.

With only one player involved, it

cannot be classified as a game of strategy, which requires
at least two players cast as opponents, and it cannot be
classified as a game of chance or a game against nature,
both of which are sometimes called one-person games but
which require at least two players, one of them a person and
the other representing chance or nature as a disturbance.
Nevertheless, as long as it is possible for a process
representable as a mapping to transform two or more distinct
inputs which an actor might control into two or more
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distinct outcomes (as between which an actor might have a
preference), that process will be described here as gamelike.
Significantly, such a process corresponds to what is
commonly called a "game of skill."

Pinball machines,

carnival games such as tossing balls, coins, or darts, and
puzzles of all kinds:

crossword, jigsaw, mazes, etc. are

all widely known types of games than can be described as
games of pure skill.

Whether one wins or loses such a game

depends upon one's skill at playing the game and,
theoretically, involves no element of either chance or of
strategy on the part of an opponent.
what is more important, however, is the fact that
virtually every game of chance and every game of strategy
involve some element of skill or intelligence, some need to
draw upon psychological or mental resources, even if only to
remember,
movements.

to make calculations or to coordinate physical
Despite the fact that skill is arguably the most

pervasive element in the play of many commonly recognized
games and an extremely salient characteristic of most gamelike processes, it has not been mathematically modeled
before, due to the assumption of perfect information which
simply ignores this interesting and important feature of the
"real world."
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Keeping in mind that uncertainty is directly related
to variety, i.e., to the number of different possibilities
(in this case outcomes or strategies) known to the observer,
then if

C

is viewed as the set of strategies available to

a controller and

0

as the set of outcomes of a game-like

process, this theorem can be interpreted to mean that in an
environment without disturbance, i.e. where a controller
acts alone, the variety of strategies available to that
controller sets an upper limit on the variety of outcomes of
a game-like process.
Consider, for example, a maze consisting of two paths:
one leading to a dead-end and the other leading to the goal.
Assuming that a player attempting to solve the maze has
absolutely no skill at this game and, in the view of an
observer, is equally likely to choose either path, the
variety of possible strategies and the variety of possible
outcomes are both two.

Now supposing a thoroughly skilled

player attempts to solve the same maze and, in the view of
the observer, is absolutely certain to select the correct
path.

This second player would effectively reduce the

variety of possible strategies from two to one.

Theorem 1

shows that the variety of possible outcomes would also be
reduced from two to one.

Interestingly, the same result

would obtain, if the "skilled" player were thought (by the
observer) to select the incorrect path with absolute
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certainty--an example of the perverse use to which skill can
be put but not, it should be clear, of a lack of skill.
A more general interpretation that takes into account
intermediate levels of skill can be achieved by defining the
extent to which an observer's uncertainty about the value of
a variable is minimized as the stability of that variable.
stability at a particular point in time could be precisely
measured by subtracting the observer's uncertainty about a
variable at that time from the maximum uncertainty possible
for that observer about that variable.

Keeping in mind that

stability varies inversely with uncertainty, Theorem 1 can
now be interpreted to mean that the stability of the
controller in a one-person game-like process sets a lower
limit on the stability of the outcome of that process.

This

interpretation can be illustrated by means of the same maze
and the situation (as described in Table B.lO) where a
totally unskilled player (denoted by
it.

C) attempts to solve

An observer might reason that this player was equally

likely to choose either path (with a probability of 0.5)
and, therefore, according to the calculations in Table B.lO,
that observer's uncertainty about the controller's actions
would measure one bit.

Since this is also the maximum

Possible uncertainty for that variable, the controller's
stability would be zero.
distinct outcomes:

At the same time, there are two

a winning outcome (the goal) and a
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losing outcome (the deadend), each having a probability of
occurrence of 0.5.

Thus the uncertainty of the observer

about which outcome will obtain would also measure one bit
and outcome stability would also be zero.
Table B .10
A TWO-PATH MAZE IN ABSENCE OF REGULATION
Path #1 (0.5)

goal

(0.5)

Path #2 (0.5)

deadend (0.5)

C

H(O)

=

H(C)

1.0 bit

If a more skilled player were now to attempt to solve the
maze and if, in view of the observer, the chances of this
player choosing the correct path were 0.91 while the chances
of his choosing the incorrect path were 0.09, then the
observer's uncertainty regarding the controller would,
according to the calculations in Table B.ll, be reduced from
one to 0.43 bits, and the controller's stability would
increase correspondingly from zero to 0.57.

Theorem 1

demonstrates that the upper limit of the observer's
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the game would also be
reduced from one to 0.43 bits while the stability of the
outcome would increase at its lower limit from zero to 0.57.
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A TWO-PATH MAZE UNDER DIRECT REGULATION

Path #1 (0.91)

goal

(0.91)

Path #2 (0.09)

deadend (0.09)

C

H(O)

=

H(C)

=

0.43 bits

This example differs from the first in that the actual
variety of strategies and of outcomes remains the same (at
twO) from one player to the other.

However, the consistency

or stability with which the correct path would be chosen
increases dramatically from the first player to the second
(in the eyes of the observer) and functions as a lower limit
on the consistency or stability with which the goal of the
maze, the correct or winning outcome, would be realized.
The interpretation of this theorem in terms of stability is
thus more general than the interpretation in terms of
variety.
By comparing the behavior of two different players in
the same game, this example also demonstrates a relation
between outcome stability and regulation.

When the

stability of the controller changes, so too does the
stability of the outcome, at its lower limit.

Therefore,

the stability of the outcome at its lower limit at a
particular point in time depends upon the extent to which
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that stability has been changed by prior changes in the
stability of the controller.

If direct regulation is

defined as the procedure through which or extent to which
the lower limit of the stability of the outcome of a gamelike process has been changed by a change in the stability
of the controller (in the view of an observer), then
Theorem 1 can be interpre.ted to mean that in a one-person
game-like process, the stability of the outcome depends, at
its lower limit, upon direct regulation.
while the meaning of this theorem, whether interpreted
in terms of variety, stability or regulation, is so basic as
to be immediately obvious, the significance of the theorem
lies in the extension of mathematical analysis to a new
class of games and to a fundamental feature of nearly all
game-like processes.

Solving a maze is a relatively easy

problem which serves merely to illustrate this theorem in
the simplest of terms.

Theorem 1 applies, however, to all

problems whose solution is dependent primarily upon the
ability of a player to retrieve, process and act on the
basis of information about options rather than upon either
luck or the relative resources and skill of an opponent.
This theorem is also the first if not the foremost
o

step in the development of a unified theory of information
and games, and thus it helps to underscore several important
points concerning the nature of regulation:

first, that the
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object of regulation on the part of a player in a
mathematical game is the outcome of that game not, for
example, the actions of another player; second, that the
result of regulation is stability in the outcome not, for
instance, the attainment of a particular outcome; and third
that instability in the behavior of a player (as viewed by
an observer) may be a major source of instability in the
outcome, regardless of whether or not that player has been
designated a regulator.
The proof of Theorem 1 is as follows.

The total

amount of information transmitted within a one-person game
described in terms of the set of strategies available to a
player C and the set of possible outcomes
definition, T(C:O).

0

is, by

By rearrangement the identity
T(C:O) = H(O) - HC(O)

(B.14)

H(O) = T(C:O) + HC(O)

(B.1S)

becomes

Since

C

has been represented as a player in a one-person

game, it is assumed that
(B.16)

thus
H(O)

=

T(C:O)

(B.17)

H(O) = H(C) - HO(C)

(B.1S)

H(O) ;; H(C)

(B.19)

Q.E.D.
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An uncertainty Limit in n-Person Games Without Disturbance
corollary to this theorem is Theorem 2:

if

H(O)

is

used to denote the uncertainty of an observer about the
outcome of an n-person game, if
the

H(C 1 )

is used to denote

uncertainty of the observer about the strategy of
n

[
i=3

HC C
C
(C.) is used to
1 2··· i-l ~

denote the sum of the uncertainties of the observer about
the strategy of player

c i ' as

i

varies from 2 to n,

conditional upon knowledge of the strategies of player C1
and any other previously enumerated player or players,
respectively, then an upper limit on outcome uncertainty is
described by the inequality

n
(B.20)

If each player in this game is viewed as a component
of a compound controller and if the outcome is viewed as the
result of an n-person game-like process, then this theorem
can be interpreted to mean that in an environment where each
component acts in the face of possible disturbances
introduced by the actions of the other components, i.e.,
where a controller is compound and in the absence of any
o

other disturbance, the variety of strategies available to
one component plus the variety of strategies available to a
second component, conditional upon knowledge of the strategy
selected by the first, plus the variety of strategies
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available in turn to each of the other components, each
conditional upon knowledge of the strategy or strategies
selected by the previously described group of components,
set an upper limit upon the variety of outcomes of an nperson game-like process.
The extent to which the uncertainty of an
observer about one variable is reduced by knowledge of one
or more other variables will be defined here as the
coordination between these variables.

Taking into account

the fact that a term describing the uncertainty of an
observer about one variable conditional upon the knowledge
of the values taken by two or more other variables describes
the coordination between all combinations of these variables
which include the first plus one or more of the other
variables, and keeping in mind that a decrease in a
conditional uncertainty term can indicate either a reduction
in the corresponding unconditional uncertainty (i.e. an
increase in stability) or a reduction in the conditional
uncertainty alone (i.e. an increase in coordination), or
reduction in both, Theorem 2 can be interpreted to mean that
the stability of each component of a compound controller in
an n-person game-like process without disturbance and the
o

coordination between all combinations of two or more
components of that controller set a lower limit on the
stability of the outcome of that process.
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If internal regulation is defined as the procedure
through which or extent to which the stability of the
outcome of a game-like process has been changed by a change
in the coordination within all combinations of components of
a compound controller, then Theorem 2 can be interpreted to
mean that in an undisturbed environment with a compound
controller, the stability of the outcome of an n-person
game-like process depends, at its lower limit, upon direct
regulation or internal regulation or both.
These interpretations apply to all games demonstrating
some communality of interests and, thus, could be
illustrated by a mixed-motive game, whose structure elicits
both cooperation and competition, or by a game of pure
coordination such as one of the so-called "new games," whose
structure elicits cooperation without competition.

However,

having illustrated Theorem 1 by reference to a commonplace
diversion (the maze), thus demonstrating that a unified
theory of information and games can accurately describe a
simple cultural activity, it seems more appropriate to
illustrate Theorem 2 by reference to a salient behavioral
process that is not a game but that resembles a game in
structure, thus exploring the application of a unified
theory to complex social phenomena.

Moreover, while the

analysis of a widely-recognized game was appropriate as an
illustration of Theorem 1 for it demonstrated clearly that
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mathematical analysis was being extended in that theorem to
a new class of games, the two classes of games to which the
Theorem 2 applies have already been well-researched in the
literature on mathematical games.

The significance of this

theorem is not that it describes a new class of games but
that it provides a new measure of behavior in game-like
contexts.

It makes possible for the first time the analysis

of regulation within social processes that resemble either
mixed-motive games or games of pure cooperation.

Therefore,

this second theorem will be illustrated not with a game, as
such, but with a game-like, social process:

the problem of

a bi-lateral arms race.
This is a topic of increasing concern today to many
people.

To reduce the problem to its bare essentials,

suppose that the process involves two countries such as the
United states and the Soviet Union, suppose that each
country can choose either to escalate or not to escalate its
development, testing and deployment of strategic nuclear
weapons, suppose that if both escalate, the outcome (in the
view of an observer) will be a nuclear war, suppose that if
one does not escalate while the other does the result will
be domination of the former by the latter, and that if both
o

choose not to escalate, the result will be peaceful
coexistence.

In the opinion of the observer there are,

thus, two strategies available to each player and four
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possible outcomes, as described in Table B.12 with the
players, United states and Soviet Union, denoted
respectively by C1 and C2 and the strategies, escalation and
non-escalation.
Table B.12
AN ARMS RACE IN THE ABSENCE
OF REGULATION
C

Escalation
(0.50)

2

Non-escalation
(0.50 )

war
(0.25)

domination
of C2 (0.25)

domination
of C1 (0.25)

peace
(0.25)

Escalation
(0.5)
C1
Non-escalation
(0.5)
H(C 1 )

= 1.0 bits

+ HC (C 2 ) = 1.0 bits
1

H(O)

= 2.0 bits

If the possibility of a holocaust is viewed by the
observer as being less desirable than domination, say, of
the U.S. by the Soviet Union, then the structure of
interests here resembles a game of "Chicken" and has no
logically stable equilibrium.

In such a situation there

would be no reason to expect regulation of any kind:

all

strategies and all outcomes would be equally likely. Applied
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to this game-like

~rocess,

Theorem 2 shows that the

observer's uncertainty about the outcome could be as high as
two bits.
On the other hand, if an observer thought that war was
preferable to being dominated (or believed that mutual
escalation would not lead to war but to mutual deterrence),
an outcome with a high cost but preferable--assuming the
observer to be aligned with the west--to domination of the

u.s.

by the Soviet Union), the structure of interests would

resemble the game of "Prisoner's Dilemma" and would lead
logically to a stable equilibrium of mutual escalation, as
described in Table B.l3.
Table B.13
AN ARMS RACE UNDER
DIRECT REGULATION
C

Escalation

Escalation
( 1. 0 )

c

(0.0)

war

domination
of C 2 (0.0)

domination
of Cl (0.0)

(0.0)

H(C l )
+ HC (C 2 )

= 0.0

bits

0.0 bits

1

H(O)

= 0.0

Non-escalation

(1. 0)

( 1. 0 )

Non-escalation

2

bits

peace
(0.0)
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In this situation, the observer might expect each
country, independent of the other, to make a decision to
escalate.

Each would thereby reduce the variety of their

strategies to one and outcome uncertainty, according to
Theorem 2, would be reduced through direct regulation to
zero.
Suppose, however, that representatives from each
country meet and reach an agreement on control of strategic
weapon systems.

In addition, assume that the observer

believes the probability of either side complying with that
agreement (whether due to lack of political support,
deliberate aggression, an unexpected--on the part of the
observer--interpretation of vague language, or a disparity
between the terms of the agreement as negotiated by the
representatives and the terms of the game-theoretical model
as defined by the observer) to be

0.8, the probability of

both sides complying with the agreement to be

0.7 , the

probability of a violation of the agreement on either side
without detection or, if detected, without response to be
0.1 , and the probability of both sides violating the
agreement (either independently or because one side detects
a lack of compliance on the part of the other side and
responds in kind) to be

0.1.

These assumptions are

described in Table B.14 along with calculations which
indicate that the observer's uncertainty about each
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country's strategy would measure

0.72

bits while his

uncertainty about one country's strategy conditional upon
knowledge of the other country's strategy would be 0.64
bits.

Theorem 2 shows that the observer's uncertainty about

the outcome would be no greater than

1.36 , due to the

effects of both direct and internal regulation.
Table B.14
AN ARMS RACE UNDER DIRECT AND INTERNAL REGULATION
C

Escalation
(0.2)
Escalation
(0.2)

war
(0.1 )

Non-escalation

domination of
C by C2 (0.1)
1

(0.8)

H(C 1 )
+ HC (C 2 )
1

H(O)

2

Non-escalation
(0.8)

domination of
C2 by C1 (0.1)

peace
(0.7)

0.72 bits

= 0.64 bits
= 1. 36

bits

Alternatively, the observer might believe that neither
country was any more likely to comply with the agreement
than to violate it; that if one side complied, the other
would also; and that if one side violated the agreement, the
other would detect the violation and violate the agreement
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as well.

Such a situation, described in Table B.15, would

result in an uncertainty of one bit as to the strategy of
either country but an uncertainty of zero bits as to the
strategy of one country conditional upon knowledge of the
strategy of the other.

Theorem 2 shows that uncertainty

about the outcome would be reduced through internal
regulation alone to no more than one bit.
Table B .15
AN

ARMS RACE UNDER INTERNAL REGULATION
Escalation
(0.5)

H(C 1 )
+ HC (C 2 )

Non-escalation
(0.5)

war
(0.5)

domination
of C 2 (0.0)

domination
of C1 (0.0)

peace
(0.5)

Escalation
(0.5)

Non-escalation
(0.5)

c2

= 1.0

bits

0.0 bits

1

H(O)

= 1.0

bits

These examples demonstrate that internal regulation as
defined above exists, that it acts either together with
direct regulation or alone, and that in either case, it can
result in a qualitatively different outcome either from no
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regulation or from direct regulation alone.

In Table B.15

internal regulation increases the probability of peace from
0.0 (in the case of direct regulation alone) to 0.5 (when
internal regulation acts alone) while in Table B.14, where
both internal and direct regulation are active, the
probability of peace is raised to

0.7.

Clearly internal

regulation (the amount of relevant coordination achieved by
negotiating, communicating and enforcing an agreement) is an
extremely important aspect of human behavior in game-like
situations.
The significance of Theorem 2 is that it contains a
precise measure of this behavior and that it describes the
effect of this behavior upon the outcome of a game-like
process.

In so doing, it illustrates an approach to

regulation unlike that of either Ashby or Conant.

This

approach is based not upon the relation between a regulator
and a disturbance, but upon the relation between the
components of a compound controller--upon a recognition that
the components of a compound controller, taken together, can
themselves constitute a source of disturbance.

It allows

for the possibility of regulation based upon a communality
£

of interests rather than upon a unilateral evaluation, which
is inappropriate in any game other than a game of chance (or
a game against nature) and which, in mixed-motive games, can
actually lead to an unsatisfactory outcome such as a costly
arms race or the possibility of a nuclear holocaust.
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While none of the particular representations of an
arms race depicted here may be true or accurate historical
descriptions

in any objective sense, they illustrate the

relevance of the Theorem 2 to uniquely social phenomenon
such as agreements and understandings, conventions,
standards of behavior, contracts, coalitions, norms, rules,
conformative behavior, cooperation and what will later be
described as self-control.

These social phenomena are as

essential to the analysis of human behavior as are the
psychological and physiological phenomena described earlier
under the rubric of skill.

Both were assumed away by the

founders of game theory but are reintroduced here through
the integration of game theory and information theory.
The proof for Theorem 2 begins as did the last proof
with an analysis of the total amount of information
transmitted within the game, in this case an n-person game
without disturbance, i.e. with the identity
T (C 1 : C2 : ... : ... : Cn : 0)

=

T (C 1 : C2 : •.. Cn ) + T (C 1 ,C 2 ' ... , Cn : 0)
(B.21)

Since, by definition,

and, by assumption,
HC C ···C (0) = 0 bits
1 2

(B.23)

n

therefore,
H(O)

(B.24)

-394Substitution of B.24 into B.21 yields
T(C 1 ,C 2 :···:Cn :O) = T(C 1 :C 2 : •.. :c ) + H(O)
n
which through reorganization yields

(B.25)

(B. 26 )

By decomposition,
H(O)

=

H(C 1 ,C 2 ,···,Cn ) - Ho (C 1 ,C 2 , ... ,Cn )

(B.27)

and thus
H(O)

(B.28)

Again, by decomposition

• •. +
thus

(B.29)
n

H(0)

-;

H (C1 ) + HC (C 2 ) + L H
(C i )
i-3 C1 ,C 2 ""C i _ 1
1

(B.30)

Q.E.D.
An

Uncertainty Limit in Two-Person Games with a Fixed

controller
It might appear from these first two theorems as if
the outcome of a game-like process could be

successfully

regulated simply by fixing the controller so that it could
take only one action.

However, while such a controller

might be successful at direct and internal regulation,
another possible source of stability in the outcome is
described in Theorem 3:

if H(O) is used to denote the
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uncertainty of an observer about the outcome of a two-person
game, if H(D) is used to denote the uncertainty of an
observer about the strategy of a player

D, and if the

strategy chosen by the other player C is fixed, then an
upper limit on outcome uncertainty is described by the
inequality
H(O) ~ H(D)
If

D

is viewed as a disturbance, if

a controller and if

0

(B.31)

C

is viewed as

is viewed as the outcome of a 2-

person game-like process, then this theorem can be
interpreted to mean that in a disturbed environment with a
fixed controller, i.e. where a controller's action does not
change, the variety of outcomes of a game-like process may
be as high as the variety of strategies available to a
disturbance.

In other words, fixing the controller may not

stabilize the outcome; for in an environment where the
controller is fixed, the stability of the disturbance sets a
lower limit on the stability of the outcome of a 2-person
game-like process.
External regulation will be defined here as the
procedure through which or extent to which the stability of
the outcome of a game-like process has been changed by a
change in the stability of the disturbance.

Thus Theorem 3

can be interpreted to mean that in a disturbed environment
with a fixed controller, the stability of the outcome
depends, at its lower limit, upon external regulation.
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An example which can be used to illustrate Theorem 3
as well as the next two theorems in this appendix is that of
a stockmarket.

In this example a particular stockmarket is

viewed as a two-person game-like process, with the actions
of the investment community serving as the strategies chosen
by a controller, with all unexpected occurrences that affect
the economy such as political and economic actions of other
countries, the weather, natural disasters, scientific
discoveries, etc. serving as acts or strategies of nature,
and with the total return on a portfolio of stocks (defined
as including the capital gain or loss that would accrue from
sale of the stock and the dividend yield) serving as the
outcome.
This stockmarket is described in Table B.16, with the
strategies of the investment community (denoted by C)
characterized as increasing, decreasing or holding steady
the demand for stocks, and the strategies of nature (denoted
by D) characterized as events in the internal or external
environment which have effects upon the earnings of these
companies that are either beneficial, detrimental or
neutral.

The direct effect upon the outcome of the

investment community is assumed here to be at least three
times the magnitude of the direct effect of nature, which is
manifest only through

the dividend yield and only if the

effect of nature upon earnings is passed on by management to

-397stockholders through changes in dividend yields.

The

resulting outcomes are denoted in Table B.16 by a series of
ordinal numbers indicating the relative preference of the
investment community for one or another outcome.
Table B.16
A TWO-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET
UNDER FIXED CONTROL
D

Beneficial
effect
(0.33)

C

Neutral
effect
(0.33)

Detrimental
effect
(0.33)

Increased (0.0)
demand

4(0.00)

3(0.00)

2(0.00)

steady
demand

1(0.33)

0(0.33)

-1(0.33)

Decreased (0.0) -2(0.00)
demand

-3(0.00)

-4(0.00)

(1.0)

H(O)

= H(D)

1.58 bits

Assuming that the action of the controller is fixed,
say, at holding demand steady and that the strategies of
nature are all equally likely, an observer's uncertainty
about the outcome of the game according to Theorem 3 could
be as great as 1.58 bits.

However, if nature were to select

a strategy, say, with a beneficial effect, this theorem
shows that, according to the calculations in Table B.17, the
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observer's uncertainty about the outcome is reduced through
external regulation to zero.
Table B.17
A TWO-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET
UNDER FIXED CONTROL AND EXTERNAL REGULATION
D
Beneficial
effect
(1. 0)

C

Neutral
effect
(0.0)

Detrimental
effect
(0.0)

Increased (0.0)
demand

4(0.0)

3(0.0)

2(0.0)

Steady
demand

(1.0 )

1(1.0)

0(0.0)

-1(0.0)

Decreased (0.0)
demand

-2(0.0)

-3(0.0)

-4(0.0)

H(O)

H(D)

0.0 bits

The meaning of this theorem, like that of Theorem 1 is
so basic as to be immediately obvious.

However, it

clarifies the fact that any player in a game may be able to
regulate the outcome of that game, even if that player is
characterized as a disturbance.
The proof for Theorem 3 begins with the total amount
of transmission within a two-person game, described in terms
of the set of strategies available to a player C and the set
of strategies available to another player D and the set of
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possible outcomes
C

0, i.e., with the term T(C:D:O).

Since

is assumed to be fixed,

o

(B. 32)

T(D:O) + T(C:D,O)

(B.33)

T(C:D,O)
and the identity
T(C:D:O)

=

becomes
T(C:D:O)

=

T(D:O)

(B.34)

Transmission in this game can now be described by the
identity
T(D:O)

= H(O) - HD(O)

(B.35)

which, by rearrangement, becomes
H(O)
Since the value of

C

(B.36)

is fixed apriori and since C and D

are players in a two-person game, it can be assumed that
HCD(O) = HD(O) = 0

(B.37)

Thus, by substitution,
H(O)

=

T(D:O)

H(O) = H(D) - HO(D)
H(O) ;; H(D)

(B.38)
(B. 39)
(B.40)

Q.E.D.

An Uncertainty Limit in Two-Person Games with a Disturbance
Significantly, a controller may attempt to reduce
variety in the outcome by selecting a strategy that, together with the strategy selected by the disturbance, will
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ensure a consiStent or certain outcome.
different result obtains.
Theorem 4:

In this case a

This result will be described in

if H(O) is used to denote the uncertainty of an

observer about the outcome of a two-person game, if H(D) is
used to denote the uncertainty of an observer about the
strategy of a player D, and if HD(C) is used to denote the
uncertainty of an observer about the strategy of a player C
when the strategy of D is known, then an upper limit on
outcome uncertainty is described by the inequality
H(O)

(B.41)

If C is viewed as a controller, D as a disturbance and
o as the outcome of a game-like process, then this theorem
can be interpreted to mean that in a disturbed environment
with a simple controller, the variety of strategies
available to the disturbance together with the variety of
strategies available to the controller conditional upon
knowledge of the strategy selected by the disturbance set an
upper limit on the variety of outcomes of a two-person gamelike process.

Keeping in mind that any decrease in a

conditional uncertainty may result from a decrease in the
corresponding unconditional uncertainty or a decrease in the
conditional uncertainty, or both, the stability of the
outcome can be said to depend, at its lower limit, upon the
stability of the disturbance and of the controller together
with the coordination between the controller and the
disturbance.

-401A final interpretation is possible if indirect
regulation is defined as the procedure by which or extent to
which the stability of the outcome of a game-like process
has been changed by a change in the stability of the
controller, conditional upon the disturbance.

Thus Theorem

4 can be interpreted to mean that in a disturbed environment
with a single controller, the stability of the outcome, at
its lower limit, depends upon external regulation or direct
regulation or indirect regulation or some combination of
these.
Table B.18
A TWO-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET IN THE ABSENCE
OF REGULATION
D

Beneficial
effect
(0.33)

Neutral
effect
(0.33)

Detrimental
effect
(0.33)

4(0.11)

3(0.11)

2(0.11)

(0.33)

1(0.11)

0(0.11)

-1(0.11)

Decreased (0.33)
demand

-2(0.11)

-3(0.11)

-4(0.11)

Increased (0.33)
demand
C Steady
demand

H(D)
+ HD(C)

H(O)

=

1.58 bits
1.58 bits

= 3.16 bits

-402These interpretations can be illustrated by a
stockmarket, the same example that was used to illustrate
Theorem 3.

The assumption of fixed control will now be

relaxed, leaving both nature and the investment community
free to vary their selection of strategies.

Table B.18

describes such a stockmarket in the absence of any
regulation.
Table B.19
A TWO-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET UNDER
DIRECT REGULATION
D

C

Beneficial
effect
(0.33)

Neutral
effect
(0.33)

Detrimental
effect
(0.33)

Increased (0.0)
demand

4(0.00)

3(0.00)

2(0.00)

Steady
demand

(1.0)

1(0.33)

0(0.33)

-1(0.33)

Decreased (0.0)
demand

-2(0.00)

-3(0.00)

-4(0.00)

H(D)

=

+ HD(C)

H(O)

1.58 bits
0.00 bits

=

1.58 bits

-403According to Theorem 4, an observer's uncertainty
about the outcome of this process could be as great as 3.16
bits.

However, the choice of a strategy, say, of holding

demand steady, on the part of the investment community, as
described in Table B.19, would, according to the theorem,
reduce this uncertainty limit to 1.58 bits through direct
regulation.

In addition the theorem shows that the

selection of a strategy on the part of the investment
Table B.20
A TWO-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET UNDER
INDIRECT REGULATION
D

C

Beneficial
effect
(0.33)

Neutral
effect
(0.33)

Detrimental
effect
(0.33)

Increased (0.33)
demand

4(0.33)

3(0.00)

2(0.00)

Steady
demand

(0.33)

1(0.00)

0(0.33)

-1(0.00)

Decreased (0.33)
demand

-2(0.00)

-3(0.00)

-4(0.33)

H(D)

= 1.58 bits

+ HD(C)

0.00 bits

H(O)

1.58 bits

-404community that was based upon accurate information about
nature, as described in Table B.20, could also reduce the
observer's uncertainty limit to 1.58 bits through indirect
regulation.
While each type of regulation can operate alone, it is
more likely that they would operate together, as in Table
B.21.

Assuming that the market enters a period when the

actions of nature are either beneficial (with a probability
of 0.7) or neutral (with a probability of 0.3), that the
Table B.21
A TWO-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET UNDER
EXTERNAL, DIRECT AND INDIRECT REGULATION
D

C

Beneficial
effect
(0.7)

Neutral
effect
(0.3)

Detrimental
effect
( 0 .0)

Increased (0.5)
demand

4(0.5)

3(0.0)

2(0.0)

Steady
demand

(0.5)

1(0.2)

0(0.3)

-1(0.0)

Decreased (0.0)
demand

-2(0.0)

-3(0.0)

-4(0.0)

H(D)

0.879 bits

+ HD(C) = 0.605 bits

H(O)

1.484 bits

-405investment community in anticipation of a "bull" market
selects a mixed strategy of increasing demand (with a
probability of 0.5) and of holding demand steady (with a
probability of 0.5) and, in addition, that the community
increases demand only when the effect of nature is
beneficial, Theorem 4 predicts that an observer's
uncertainty concerning the outcome will be equal to or less
than 1.48 bits, a reduction of 1.68 bits from the maximum
possible uncertainty.
The difference betwen the values of H(D) in Table 18
and Table 2;1 shows that the mixed strategy of nature serves
to reduce the uncertainty limit by 0.70 bits through
external regulation.

The difference between the values of

HD(C) in the same two table shows that 0.975 bits of
uncertainty are removed through a combination of direct and
indirect regulation.

Since the mixed strategy of the

investment community would change the value of H(C) from
1.58 bits to 1 bit, it serves to reduce the value of HD(C)
by the same amount, 0.58 bits, through direct regulation.
It is thus through indirect regulation that the remaining
0.40 bits of uncertainty in the value of HD(C) and thus in
the outcome are removed.
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This example demonstrates that indirect regulation is
a different type of regulation from either external or
direct.

It is similar in form to internal regulation; but

involving as it does coordination between a controller and a
disturbance, it cannot in general be achieved by means of a
mutually negotiated, communicated and enforced agreement.
Rather, it is usually dependent upon the controller's
knowledge of the strategy selected by the disturbance.
This is regulation by the engineer and by the system
designer.

It is regulation by the military strategist who

relies upon "intelligence" about the enemy.

It is

regulation by the coach whose game plan is based upon
scouting reports of the opponent, by the corporate executive
who makes use of industrial espionage or environmental
scanning, by the card player who sneaks a look at an
opponent's cards.

It is regulation by an observer who views

the controller as distinct from the system to be controlled.
Clearly, indirect regulation has applications in the
analysis of social systems.

However, it is equally clear

that indirect regulation is neither the sole source of
stability nor is it the most significant source of stability
in social systems.

The emphasis upon indirect regulation in

previous work on cybernetics is simply inappropriate when
applied to the analysis of social systems.
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The proof for Theorem 4 follows from the decomposition of

T(C:D:O), a term describing the total amount of

information transmitted in the game:

= T(C,D:O)

T(C:D:O)

+ T(C:D)

(B.42)

Since
T(C,D:O)

H(O) - HCD(O)

=

(B.43)

and, by the rules of the game,
(B.44)
then, by rearrangement,
H(O)

=

T(C,D:O)

(B.4S)

Substitution of the identities
T(C,D:O) = H(CD) - HO(CD)

(B.46)

and
H(CD)

= H(D)

+ HD(C)

(B.47)

into expression B.4S results, after rearrangement, in
H(O)

(B. 49 )

H(O)

"" H(D)
Q.E.D.

+ HD(C)

(B.SO)
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An uncertainty Limit in n-Person Games with a Disturbance
In order to be completely general, excluding only the
case where the disturbance is compound, it is necessary to
consider the situation with a disturbed environment and a
compound controller.

Regulation in this case is described

by Theorem 5: if H(O) is used to denote the uncertainty of
an observer about the outcome of an n-person game, if H(D)
is used to denote the uncertainty of that observer about
n

.L

the strategy of player D, if HDC (C 2 ) +
HDC C ···C. (C i )
I
l=3
I 2
l-I
is used to denote the sum of the uncertainties of the
observer about the strategy of player Ci (where i varies
from 2 to n) conditional upon knowledge of the strategies of
players D and CI ' and any other previously enumerated player
or players, respectively, then an upper limit on outcome
uncertainty is described by the ineguality
n

H(O)

L
i=3

HDC C ···C
(C. )
I 2
i-I l
(B.51)

If D is viewed as a disturbance, if each Ci is viewed as a
component of a compound controller and if 0 is viewed as the
outcome of an n-person game-like process, this theorem can
be interpreted to mean that in a disturbed environment with
a compound controller, the variety of strategies available
to a disturbance together with the variety of strategies
available to one component conditional upon knowledge of the
strategy selected by the disturbance, and the variety of
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strategies available in turn to each of the other
components, each conditional upon knowledge of the
strategies selected by the disturbance and the previously
described component or group of components, set an upper
limit on the variety of outcomes of an n-person game-like
process.
Keeping in mind that a decrease in a conditional
uncertainty term can indicate a decrease in the
corresponding unconditional uncertainty, a decrease in the
conditional uncertainty alone or a decrease in both, Theorem
5 can be interpreted to mean that the stability of the
disturbance in an n-person game-like process together with
the stability of each component of a compound controller and
the coordination within all combinations of two or more
elements from the set containing all components and the
disturbance set a lower limit on the stability of the
outcome of that process.
Combined regulation will be defined here as the
procedure through which or extent to which the stability of
the outcome of a game-like process is changed by a change in
the coordination between all combinations of three or more
elements consisting of two or more of the components of a
o

compound regulator and the disturbance.

Thus Theorem 5 can

be interpreted to mean that in a disturbed environment with
a compound controller, the stability of the outcome, at its
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lower limit, depends upon external regulation or direct
regulation or internal regulation or indirect regulation or
combined regulation or some combination of these.
Consider once again the example of a stockmarket.
suppose that it is viewed not as a two-person game but as a
three-person game between an individual investor, the rest
of the investment community and nature, with the individual
investor choosing between the strategies of holding onto the
stocks in a portfolio, selling the stocks in that portfolio,
or buying more shares of the stocks in the portfolio and
with the investment community and nature choosing between
the same strategies as before.

The outcomes resulting from

each combination of strategies might best be described once
again in terms of the potential value (the total return) of
the portfolio to the individual investor.

The decision to

hold stocks in the portfolio would result in ordinally
ranked outcomes identical to those described earlier in
tables B.17 through B.21.

The decision to sell the stocks

in the portfolio would reverse the sign of each outcome,
i.e. any return due to appreciation or increase in dividend
yield would be lost while any loss due to depreciation or
decrease in dividend yield would be avoided.

Since the

potential return would only be realized if the investor were
to buy the same stocks back again after they changed in
value, the value of each outcome will be reduced by the

-411amount of two brokerage commissions, one for the sale of the
stocks and one for the repurchase.

Finally, if it is

assumed that a decision to buy more shares means that the
investor will double his holdings of each stock in the
portfoliO, that decision will result in a transformation of
the original outcomes by a multiple of two, minus one
brokerage commission for the purchase of the additional
shares.

Assuming that the difference between all ordinally

sequential outcomes in the two-person game is greater than
the cost of two commissions, taking the behavior of the
individual investor into account will result in 27 ordinally
distinct outcomes as described in Table B.22
Assuming that an observer has no reason to believe
that the individual investor, the investment community or
nature are any more likely to choose one of their strategies
over another, that observer will have 1.58 bits of
uncertainty about the behavior of each of these three
players, 1.58 bits of uncertainty concerning the choice of a
strategy by the investment community conditional upon
knowledge of the strategy chosen by nature and 1.58 bits of
uncertainty concerning the choice of a strategy by the
individual investor conditional upon knowledge of the
strategies chosen by nature and the investment community.
According to Theorem 5 that observer's uncertainty about the
outcome of the game-like process will be equal to or less
than 4.74 bits.
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Table B.22
A THREE-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET IN THE
ABSENCE OF REGULATION
C1

C2

D
Beneficial
effect
(0.33 )

Neutral
effect
(0.33 )

Detrimental
effect
(0.33 )

10(0.037)

7(0.037)

5(0.037)

(0.11 )

(0.037)

0(0.037)

-3(0.037)

Decreased (0.11 )

-5(0.037)

-6(0.037)

-10(0.037)

-12(0.037)

-9(0.037)

-7(0.037)

(0.11)

(0.037)

-2(0.037)

1(0.037)

Decreased (0.11 )
demand

3(0.037)

6(0.037)

6(0.037)

Increased (0.11)
demand

12(0.037)

11(0.037)

9(0.037)

(0.11)

(0.037)

-1(0.037)

-6(0.037)

Decreased (0.11)
demand

-11(0.037)

-13(0.037)

<-14(0.037)

Increased (0.11 )
demand

steady
demand

Hold

stocks
(0.33)

demand

Increased (0.11)
demand
Steady
demand

Sell

stocks
(0.33 )

Steady

demand

Buy

stocks
(0.33)

H(D)

- 1.56 bits

+

~(Cl)

• 1.58 bits

+

~

1
H(O)

(C 2 ) - 1.56 bits
-

4.74

bits
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The effects of external regulation, direct regulation
and indirect regulation have already been illustrated in
terms of this example, so only internal regulation, combined
regulation and the action of all five kinds of regulation
will be illustrated here.

To begin with, assume that the

individual investor is able to forecast the action taken by
the investment community and to act on that knowledge by
choosing the most appropriate strategy in each case with a
probability of 0.9, i.e. that the individual decides to buy
with a probability of 0.9 when demand increases, to hold
with a probability of 0.9 when demand holds steady, and to
sell with a probability of 0.9 when demand decreases.

In

addition assume that with a probability of 0.1 there is
absolutely no relation between the actions of the individual
and the actions of the investment community.

Under these

circumstances, as described in Table B.23, an observer would
have 1.58 bits of uncertainty about the strategies of
nature, of the community, and of the individual investor and
1.58 bits of uncertainty about the strategy chosen by the
community conditional upon knowledge of the strategy of
nature.

However, that observer would only have 0.24 bits of

uncertainty about the strategy of the individual investor
conditional upon knowledge of the strategy chosen by the
investment community and, therefore, would have the same
amount of uncertainty about the strategy of the individual
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Table B.23
A THREE-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET
UNDER INTERNAL REGULATION
Cl

D

Incre!lsed (0.017)

C2

Beneficial
effect
(0.33)

Neutral
effect
(0.33)

10(0.0057)

7(0.0057)

5(0.0057)

2(0.1000)

0(0.1000)

-3(0.1000)

Detrimental
effect
(0.33)

demand
Steady

(0.300)

demand

Hold

stocks
(0.33)

Decreased (0.017)

-5(0.0057)

-8(0.0057)

-10(0.0057)

Increased (0.017) -12(0.0057)
demand

-9(0.0057)

-7(0.0057)

2(0.0057)

1(0.0057)

demand

Steady
demand

(0.017)

-4(0.0057)

Sell

stocks
(0.33)

Decreased (0.300)
demand

3(0.1000)

6(0.1000)

Increased (0.300)

12(0.1000)

ll(O.lOOO)

9(0.1000)

4(0.0057)

-1(0.0057)

-6(0.0057)

8(0.1000)

demand
Steady
demand

(0.017)

Buy

stocks
(0.33)

Decreased (0.017) -ll(0.0057) -13(0.0057)
demand
H(D)

- 1.58 bits

• 1.S8 bits
+ Ru(C l )
+ Hoc (C 2 ) - 0.24 bits

1

H(O)

- 3.40 bits

-14(0.0057)

-415conditional upon knowledge of the strategies of both the
community and nature.

According to Theorem 5 outcome

uncertainty would be reduced, at the upper limit, from 4.74
bits to 3.40 bits through

regulation.

i~ternal

In order to illustrate combined regulation in its pure
form, it will be assumed that the individual investor has no
crystal ball to provide him with knowledge about the future
actions of the investment community but has, rather, a good
understanding of how that community will react to the
effects of nature upon the economy.

Therefore, it will be

assumed that the individual investor bases his choice of a
strategy upon knowledge of this relation.

This type of

three-way or tertiary relationship is one example of
combined regulation and is illustrated by Table B.24, which
is based upon three assumptions:

(1) that the individual

investor will hold stocks whenever nature's effects are
beneficial, neutral or detrimental and, at the same time,
the investment community's strategy is to reduce, hold
steady or increase demand, respectively; (2) that the
individual investor will sell his stocks whenever nature's
effects are beneficial, neutral or detrimental and, at the
same time, the investment community's strategy is to hold
steady, increase or decrease demand, respectively; and (3)
the individual investor will buy additional shares whenever
the effects of nature are beneficial, neutral or detrimental
and, at the same time, the investment community's strategy
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Table B.24
A THREE-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET
UNDER COMBINED REGULATION
C1

D

C2

Beneficial
effect
(0.33)

Neutral
effect
(0.33 )

Detrimental
effect
(0.33)

10(0.006)

7(0.006)

5(0.100)

(O.ll)

2(0.006)

0(0.100)

-3(0.006)

Decreased (O.ll )

-5(0.100)

8(0.006)

-10(0.006)

-12(0.006)

-9(0.100)

-7(0.006)

-4(0.100)

-2(0.006)

1(0.006)

Increased (O.ll)
demand
Steady
demand

Hold

stocks
(0.33 )

demand

Increased (O.ll)
demand
Steady
demand

(O.ll)

Sell

stocks
(0.33 )

Decreased (0.11 )

3(0.006)

6(0.006)

8(0.100)

12(0.100)

11(0.006)

9(0.006)

4(0.006)

-1(0.006)

-6(0.100)

demand

Increased (O.ll)
demand
Steady

(O.ll)

demand

Buy

stocks
(0.33)

Decreased (O.ll )
demand

-ll(0.006) -13(0.100)

H(D)

• 1.58 bits

+ Ho(C 1 )

- 1.58 bits

.. Hoc1 (C 2 )

- 0.24 bits

H(O)

- 3.40 bits

-14(0.006)
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is to increase, decrease, or hold demand steady,
respectively.

Under these conditions, the results are

similar to those of the previous example, except that the
observer's uncertainty about the individual investor is
reduced only through knowledge of the strategies of both
nature and the investment community, taken together.
Finally, the aggregate effect of all five types of
regulation upon the outcome of a stockmarket game is
described in Table B.25, which is based upon the following
assumptions:

(1) nature chooses a mixed strategy of

beneficial, neutral and detrimental effects with
probabilities of 0.5, 0.25, and 0.25, respectively; (2) the
investment community chooses a mixed strategy of increasing,
holding steady and decreasing demand with probabilities of
0.5, 0.25 and 0.25, respectively, (3) the investment
community is able to increase demand, hold it steady, and
decrease it when nature's effects are beneficial, neutral
and detrimental, respectively, with probabilities of 0.4,
0.15, and 0.15, respectively; (4) in all other cases the
probability of any particular combination of strategies is
0.05; (5) the probability of the individual investor's
holding, selling, and buying stock is 0.25, 0.25 and 0.5,
respectively; and (6) the pattern of cooperation between the
individual and the community of investors described in Table
23 and the pattern of cooperation between the individual,
the community of investors and nature described in Table 24
are upheld, each with a probability of 0.5.
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Table B.25
A THREE-PERSON, THREE-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET UNDER
FOUR TYPES OF REGULATION
C1

D

C2

Beneficial
effect
(0.50)

Neutral
effect
(0.25)

Detr imental
effect
(0.25)

10(0.000)

7(0.000)

5(0.025)

2(0.025)

0(0.150)

-3(0.025)

Decreased (0.025)
demand

-5(0.025)

-8(0.000)

-10(0.000)

Increased (0.025)

-12(0.000)

-9(0.025)

-7(0.000)

-4(0.025)

-2(0.000)

l(O.OOO)

Increased (0.025)
demand
Steady
demand

(0.20)

Hold

stocks
(0.25)

demand
Steady
demand

(0.025 )

Sell

stocks
(0.25)

Decreased (0.20)

3(0.025)

6(0.025)

8(0.150)

l2(0.400)

ll(0.025)

9(0.025)

4(0.000)

-1(0.000)

-6(0.025)

demand

Increased (0.45)
demand
Steady
demand

(0.025)

Buy

stocks
(0.5)

Decreased (0.025)

-ll(O.OOO)

-13(0.025)

demand
H(D)

- 1.50 bits

+ Ho(C 1 )

- 1.15 bits

+

c

Hoc

1

H(O)

(C 2 ) • 0.30 bits

- 2.95 bits

-14(0.000)

-419The uncertainty of the observer about the strategy of
nature is now 1.50 bits, uncertainty about the strategy of
the investment community conditional upon knowledge of the
strategy of nature is 1.15 bits, and uncertainty about the
strategy of the individual investor conditional upon
knowledge of the strategies of both the investment community
and nature is 0.30 bits.

According to Theorem 5 the

uncertainty of the observer about the outcome of this gamelike process has been reduced, at its upper limit, from a
maximum of 4.74 bits to 2.95 bits through the effects of
direct, external, internal, indirect, and combined
regulation.
Further analysis of this increase in stability through
a comparison of the values of H(D), H(C), HC (C 2 ) and HD(C),
1
in Tables B.22 and B.25 and through comparison of the values
of H(C) and HD(C) in Table B.25 reveals that the observer's
uncertainty about the outcome has been reduced, at the upper
limit, by .08 bits through external regulation on the part
of nature, by .08 bits through direct regulation on the part
of the investment community and .35 bits through indirect
regulation on the part of the investment community, by .84
bits through internal regulation (coordination between the
G

individual investor and the investment community) and by .44
bits through combined regulation (coordination on the part
of nature, the investment community and the individual
investor, take together).
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If one were presented with the data described in Table
B.2S without access to Theorem 5, it would clearly be
difficult to identify the various sources of stability in
the outcome of this game-like process, much less to separate
out and measure the precise effect of each of them.

Thus

the primary significance of this theorem is that through
repeated application it makes it possible to analyse the
sources of stability in the context of a complex, game-like
process.

As the example of a stockmarket demonstrates, each

type of regulation described in this theorem can be
distinguished from the others by the structure of the
relationship which it describes.

Each type of regulation

can act alone or in combination with any of the others, and
each type of regulation can be applied to an empirical
situation.
The proof of this theorem follows from expression B.SO
in the proof for the last theorem,
H(O) ~ H(D) + HD(C)

If the identities
(B.S2)
and

n
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are substituted into B.SO, the result is
n

H(O)

Q.E.D.
These five theorems are all related to one another in
that they each describe the limiting effect of one specific
type or several specific types of regulation upon stability
in the outcome of a game-like process, where both regulation
and stability are measured in terms of uncertainty.

Each

theorem describes the ways in which, at its lower limit, the
stability of the outcome of a particular kind of game can be
achieved or explained.

While in general each type of

regulation may occur in concert with any of the others, the
theorems articulated above each describe a unique
combination of types that can occur in a particular type of
game.
Although the stability of certain variables is in one
way or another an essential aspect of regulation, stability
alone is insufficient to determine the precise degree to
which regulation, in any of its forms, is successful.

For

that determination it is necessary to describe in more
detail the association or relation between these variables.
Relations in information theory are described by
transmission terms.

These terms measure the strength of a

relation by means of the amount of information about one
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variable that is transmitted to an observer through that
relation when the observer knows the value of the other
variables.

The amount of such information is computed, with

reference to an observer, as the difference between the
amount of uncertainty about the value of one variable and
the amount of uncertainty about that same variable that
remains after the value of one or more other variables is
known.

Thus each of the limit theorems articulated above in

terms of stability has as a corollary a more general theorem
in which measures of the stability of variables
(uncertainty) are incorporated into more comprehensive
measures of the relations between variables (information
transmitted).

These theorems each describe the effect of a

particular relation or group of relations (a specific type
or several specific types of transmission) upon the outcome
of a game-like process.

Regulation in One-Person Games Without Disturbance
In Theorem 1 outcome uncertainty is said to be
governed by B.13, the inequality
H(O) ~ H(C)
Consider now Theorem 6:

Outcome uncertainty in a one-person

game without disturbance is governed by the equality
H(O)

=

T(C:O)

(B.SS)
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where T(C:O) is used to denote the information transmitted
to an observer about the outcome 0 of the game when the
strategy selected by the player C is known, or vice versa,
and where H(O) is defined as before.

Since expression B.SS

is identical to expression B.17 in the proof of the Theorem
1, this theorem is subject to the same proof.
This corollary may initially appear somewhat difficult
to interpret; for if

C

is viewed as a controller, it

suggests that stability in the outcome of a game-like
process varies indirectly with the strength of the relation
between that controller and the outcome.

It might seem,

paradoxically, that only if there is no relation between the
controller and the outcome

(and therefore no opportunity

for direct regulation) would that outcome be stable.
However, it should be noted that if, through play of the
game, the controller approaches an equilibrium characterized
by the selection of one particular strategy, the outcome
will approach a stable state whose value will depend upon
the particular strategy that is selected.

At this point in

time the strength of the relation between that controller
and the outcome should appear to approach zero, for it is no
longer possible for either the controller or the outcome to
vary, and thus for one to effect the other.

Alternatively,

the apparent paradox can be explained in terms of the
mathematically trivial case of a one-person game without
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disturbance where the actions of the player have no impact
upon the outcome of the game.

In this case the outcome

would be stable by definition.
Theorem 6 can be interpreted more clearly by
decomposing the transmission term in B.SS according to the
identity
(B.S6)

T(C:O) = H(O) - HC(O)

If the controller were initially characterized by complete
instability, then the observer would have no knowledge of
the strategy to be chosen by that controller.

uncertainty

about the outcome in this situation would be described by
H(O).

However, if the controller subsequently were to

become completely stable, knowledge of the single (pure)
strategy selected by this controller might decrease the
observer's uncertainty about the outcome, which would now be
described by HC(O).

The difference between these two

measures, according to expression B.S6, is equivalent to the
transmission term

T(C:O) and represents the total amount

(in terms of uncertainty) by which it would be possible for
a controller to increase stability in the outcome of a game.
From this point of view (i.e., a priori), Theorem 6 can be
interpreted to mean that stability in the outcome of a oneperson game-like process without disturbance is determined
by the amount of direct regulation it is possible to achieve
through play of the game, i.e., by the potential for direct

-425regulation embodied within the variables and relations which
comprise that game.
In Appendix C of this dissertation, direct regulation,
as with the other forms of regulation, will be measured in
this way and viewed as part of the definition of a game,
part of the "rules."

Since games are typically defined on

the basis of a logical analysis of the players and their
possible strategies, outcomes and preferences, outcome
stability as described by

H(O)

will reflect the range of

possible outcomes; and direct regulation as described by
T(C:O) will reflect the range of possible regulation.
Direct regulation will not mean that a player must choose a
particular strategy or even that he must choose a single
(pure) strategy.

It will merely describe a particular

constraint upon the extent to which the stability of the
outcome can be directly increased by a controller.
Of course expression B.55 can also be applied after
play of a game has concluded.

From this point of view

(i.e., a posterior) Theorem 6 can be interpreted to mean
that stability in the outcome of a one-person game-like
process without disturbance is determined by the amount of
direct regulation, if any, that has not already been
exercised and therefore is still possible after play of the
game.
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Finally, by applying expression B.SS both before and
after play of a game, it is possible to measure the actual
amount of direct regulation that has been exercised by a
controller in a particular instance.

Such an application

might prove useful in analysing the findings of empirical
research based upon a game-theoretical hypothesis or in
arriving at an initial definition of a game that accurately
describes what is known about the behavior of the players in
that game.

In the examples which follow in this Appendix,

outcome uncertainties will be measured in this way to
illustrate the differences between various types of
regulation.
When viewed before or after play of a game, regulation
measures a possibility and when in terms of the difference
between these two, regulation measures an actuality.

From

either point of view, the theorem can be interpreted to mean
that stability in the outcome of a one-person game-like
process without disturbance is determined by direct
regulation.
The relation between outcome stability and the
stability of the controller was also described in Theorem 1,
but there it was described only at the lower limit of
outcome stability.

This corollary provides additional

information that can be used to define more precisely the
term "direct regulation" and to describe more completely the
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relation between stability in the outcome and in the
controller.

The exact nature of this relation can be seen

by decomposing the term
T(C:O)

T(C:O)
=

to yield the following:
(B.S7)

H(C) - HO(C)

where HO(C) denotes the uncertainty of an observer about the
strategy of C when the outcome of the game is known.

The

term HO(C) thus serves to measure the amount of uncertainty
about the controller that remains after (and is, thus,
extraneous to) play of the game.

The difference

H(C) -

HO(C), on the other hand, serves to measure the amount of
uncertainty that is removed by (and is, thus, essential to)
play of the game.

Expressions B.SS and B.S7 reveal that the
-

stability of the controller can change independently of the
stability of the outcome by the addition or subtraction of
extraneous uncertainty.

Similarly, outcome uncertainty can

change independently of the stability of the controller by
means of a transformation of extraneous uncertainty into
essential uncertainty and vice-versa.
Since change in the stability of the controller due
solely to a change in the extraneous uncertainty would have
no effect upon the stability of the outcome, this extraneous
uncertainty must be subtracted from the observer's total
uncertainty about the controller in order to arrive at a
more precise measure of the potential for effective
regulation.

By reference to expression B.57, direct

-428regulation can now be more clearly understood as describing
change in the stability of a controller, but only when that
stability is corrected for any instability in the controller
that remains after the outcome is fixed.
Insofar as it differs from the corresponding limit
theorem, Theorem 6 can be illustrated by a maze consisting
of four paths, three leading to dead ends and one to the
goal.

When an unskilled player attempts to solve the maze,

an observer would have 0.815 bits of uncertainty about the
outcome, as described in Table B.26.

The two bits of

uncertainty an observer would have about the controller are
corrected here for the 1.185 bits of uncertainty that are
extraneous, leaving only the amount of uncertainty that are
essential to play of the game.
Table B.26
A FOUR-PATH MAZE IN THE
ABSENCE OF REGULATION

C

Path #l (0.25)

goal

Path *2 (0.25)

dead end

Path it3 (0.25 )

dead end

Path iI4 (0.25)

dead end
H(C)

H(O)

=

2.000 bits

- HO(C)

1.185 bits

T(C:O)

0.815 bits

(0.25)

(0.75)
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A skilled player who consistently selects the correct
path would reduce the observer's uncertainty about the
outcome to zero through direct regulation, as is described
in Table B.27.

In the case of this four-path maze,

application of the corresponding limit theorem would have
described a reduction of two bits of uncertainty, a result
which is inflated by the amount of the extraneous
uncertainty.
Table B.27
A FOUR-PATH MAZE
UNDER DIRECT REGULATION
Path l/l

(1.

0)

goal

Path #2 (0.0)

dead end

Path #3 (0.0)

dead end

Path #4 (0.0)

dead end

(1. 0)

C

H(O)

=

H(C)

0.0 bits

- HO(C)

0.0 bits

T(C:O)

0.0 bits

(0.0)

Regulation in Two-Person Games Without Disturbance
In Theorem 2 outcome uncertainty is said to be
governed by B.20, the inequality
n

L

i=3

HCC ' ' ' C
(C.)
I 2
i-I l
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However, consider Theorem 7:

Outcome uncertainty in a two-

person game without distribution is governed by the
eguality.
n
••• C
(C. :0)
H(O) = T(CI:O) + TC (Cz:O) + L T
CIC z
i-I ~
I
i=3
where T(Cl:O) is used to denote the information

(B

.58)

transmitted to an observer about the outcome when the
strategy of C is known, or vice-versa, where
l
n

TC C ···C

L

1 Z

i-I

(C. :0) is used to denote the
~

i=3
information transmitted to that observer about the outcome,
when the strategy of player Ci (as i varies from Z to n) is
known, conditional upon the strategy of C and of any other
I
previously enumerated player or players, respectively, and
where H(O) is defined as before.
This expression can be decomposed in a manner similar
to the previous theorem to reveal that the stability in the
outcome of an n-person game-like process without disturbance
is determined by the potential for direct and internal
regulation, i.e.,
H(O)

=

H(O) - HC C ···C (0)
1 Z

(B.59)

n

However, the transmission terms in expression B.58 can also
be decomposed according to the identities
(B. 60)

(B.6l)

-431and
n

\' TC C ···C
(C. :0)
i~3
1 2
i-I ~
n

- i~3 HCIC2···Ci_l0(Ci)

(B.62)

These expressions reveal that the potential for direct and
internal regulation is determined by component stability and
coordination within a compound controller but only when that
stability and that coordination are corrected for
uncertainty that remains after the outcome is fixed.
Theorem 7 can now be interpreted to mean that the stability
of the outcome of an n-person game-like process is
determined by direct regulation or by internal regulation or
by both.
However, it now appears that internal regulation can
be achieved through a means other than what was described
earlier as coordination.

If the conditional uncertainty

terms preceded by plus signs in expressions B.61 and B.62
are decomposed according to the identities
(B.

HC C .•. C.
1 2

~-l

+

(C i )

=

n

b4

63)

H(C 1 C2C3 ) - H(C 1 ) - HC (C 2 )
1

[H(CIC2···Ci)-H(Cl)-HCl(C2)
-H

C1 C2 ... Ci _ 2 (C.~-l )]
(B.64)
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it is clear that internal regulation can also be determined
by the stability of all combinations of components of the
compound controller (relative to the stability of one
component and to the coordination of all combinations of
components).

The stability of a combination of variables,

i.e., the minimization of a observer's uncertainty about two
or more variables taken together, above and beyond that
accounted for by the stability of any single variable and
the coordination of any combination of varibles, will be
defined here as multistability.
Multistability is to be distinguished here from the
stability of a single variable, i.e., the extent to which
the uncertainty of an observer about one or more variables,
taken separately, is minimized.

Since the conditional

uncertainty terms on the far right of expressions B.60, B.61
and B.62 can be decomposed in a similar fashion, it is clear
that the potential for internal regulation may be determined
by multistability within a compound controller, but only
when that multistability is corrected for multistability
that remains after the outcome is fixed.

Internal

regulation can thus be more clearly understood as describing
change in the coordination or multistability within a
compound controller, but only when that coordination or
multistability is corrected for any coordination or
multistability within that controller that remains to be
realized after the outcome has been fixed.
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The difference between these two types of internal
regulation can perhaps be clarified by noting that internal
regulation through coordination would be indicated by a
transmission of information from one component of a compound
controller through thel relation between that component and
another component or group to the outcome of a game-like
process while internal regulation through multistability
would be indicated by an interaction between two or more
components of a compound controller and the outcome of that
game-like process, i.e., by a transmission of information
from a relation between two or more components of the
compound controller to the outcome of the game-like process.
In order to establish the necessary relation between
components, multistability requires a certain amount of
uncertainty in the controller that is extraneous with regard
to direct regulation.

Because it fails to correct for

extraneous uncertainty in this regard, Theorem 2 does not
differentiate between effects due to stability and effects
due to multistability which actually occur beneath the limit
of outcome uncertainty imposed by strategic uncertainty.
However, Theorem 7 does correct for extraneous uncertainty
in calculating direct regulation and thus can distinguish
between the effects of stability and those of multistability
in a compound controller.

Theorem 7 can now be interpreted

to mean that the stability of the outcome of an n-person
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game-like process is determined by direct regulation or
internal regulation (through coordination or multistability)
or both.
The examples used to illustrate the Theorem 2 allowed
only for the possibility of direct regulation and internal
regulation through coordination.

The structure of the arms

race game is such that interaction between the strategies of
both nations and the outcome is not present and, therefore,
internal regulation through multistability is not possible.
Consider, however, the same arms race only viewed through
the eyes of an observer who believes that domination of one
country by another (especially when based upon a superiority
in "first-strike" nuclear weapons) would lead inevitably to
war while either mutual escalation or deescalation would
lead (through deterrence or disarmament, respectively) to
peace.

Although the number and nature of strategies

available to each country in this first-strike arms race are
the same as in the more retaliatory arms race described
earlier, this observer perceives not four but two possible
outcomes from play of the game:

war and peace. According to

the calculations in Table B.28, Theorem 7 shows that in the
absence of regulation, the observer's uncertainty about the
outcome would be equal to one bit.
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Table B.28
A FIRST-STRIKE ARMS RACE IN THE
ABSENCE OF REGULATION

Escalate
C1

(0.5)

Deescalate (0.5)

Escalate (0.5)

Deescalate (0.5)

peace

(0.25)

war

(0.25)

war

(0.25)

peace

(0.25)

T(C1:O)

0.0 bits

+ TC (C 2 :0) = 1.0 bits

1

H (0)

- 1. 0 bits

This table also indicates that there is no potential
for direct regulation in this game as presently constituted.
To verify that this is in fact the case, suppose the
observer were convinced that one country was sure to
escalate.

According to the calculations in Table B.29, this

theorem shows that the observer's outcome uncertainty would
still be equal to one bit.

A unilateral increase in

stability on the part of one or the other country has
absolutely no effect here upon the stability of the outcome,
for direct regulation in this case at this point in time is
simply not possible.
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Table B.29
A FIRST-STRIKE ARMS RACE WITH
UNILATERAL ACTION

C1

Escalate (0.5)

Deescalate (0.5)

Escalate

(1. 0)

peace

(0.5)

war

(0.5)

Deescalate

(0.0)

war

(0.0)

peace

(0.0)

T(C1:O)

= 0.0

bits

+ TC (C 2 :O) = 1.0 bits

1

H(O)

1.0

bits

In contrast to this, consider the effect of
multistability.

If these countries were to agree upon a

deescalation without allowing for any means of verification,
and if the observer felt the odds of compliance were 8:2
the part of either country, the calculations in Table B.30
reveal that the observer's outcome uncertainty would drop
one-tenth of a bit (from 1 to 0.9 bits).

Since this drop

cannot be decomposed into separate portions each resulting
from the action of one of the countries, it must be
attributed to multistability on the part of both countries
taken together.

on
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A FIRST-STRIKE ARMS RACE UNDER
INTERNAL REGULATION THROUGH MULTISTABILITY

Escalate
C1

(0.2)

Deescalate (0.8)

Escalate (0.2)

Deescalate (0.8)

peace

(0.04)

war

(0.16)

war

(0.16)

peace

(0.64 )

T(C 1 :O)

=

0.18 bits

+ TC (C 2 :0)
1

=

0.72 bits

H(O)

- 0.90 bits

Interestingly, the introduction of internal regulation
through multistability now makes possible 0.18 bits of
direct regulation, as can be seen from the unconditional
transmission term in Table B.30 and from the calculations in
Table B.31, where (in the eyes of the observer) one country
has unilaterally increased the likelihood that it will
escalate from 0.2 bits to 1.0 bits while the other country's
strategy has not changed.

Table B.31 reveals that this

action has the effect of reducing the observer's outcome
uncertainty from 0.9 bits to 0.72 bits through direct
regulation.
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A FIRST-STRIKE ARMS RACE UNDER DIRECT REGULATION
AND INDIRECT REGULATION THROUGH MULTISTABILITY
C

Escalate
C1

(1.

0)

Deescalate (0.0)

2

Escalate (0.2)

Deescalate (0.8)

peace

(0 . 2 )

war

(0.8)

war

(0.0)

peace

(0.0)

T(C 1 :O)

=

0.0 bits

+ TC (C 2 :O) = 0.72 bits

1

H(O)

- 0.72 bits

On the other hand, if both countries adhere to the
agreement with a probability of 0.8, if in addition they
come to an agreement on a procedure for verifying compliance
with the treaty, and if this procedure increases the
likelihood that they will both choose the same strategy
(from 0.64 to 0.67 for deescalation and from 0.04 to 0.07
for escalation), then the observer's outcome uncertainty
will be reduced an additional 0.08 bits (from 0.9 bits as in
Table B.30 to 0.82 bits as in Table B.32), which can be
attributed to internal regulation through coordination.
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A FIRST-STRIKE ARMS RACE UNDER INTERNAL REGULATION
THROUGH MULTI STABILITY AND COORDINATION

Escalate
C1

(0.2)

Deescalate (0.8)

Escalate (0.2)

Deescalate (0.8)

peace

(0.07)

war

(0.13)

war

(0.13)

peace

(0.67)

0.12 bits

T(C 1 :O)
+ TC (C 2 :0)
1

H(O)

=

0.70 bits

- 0.82 bits

If one country now unilaterally increases its odds of
deescalating from 0.8 to 0.9, Table B.33 reveals that, as a
result, the observer's outcome uncertainty will be reduced
an additional 0.05 bits (from 0.82 to 0.77 bits) through
direct regulation.
A comparison of Table B.29 with tables B.30, B.32 and
B.33 demonstrates that in Table B.33 a total of 0.23 bits of
outcome uncertainty have been removed by means of bilateral
agreements and unilateral actions:

0.18 bits through

internal regulation (0.1 bit through multistability and 0.08
bits through coordination) and 0.05 bits through direct
regulation.

It should be noted, however, that the amount of

reduction in outcome uncertainty attributed to one or
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A FIRST-STRIKE ARMS RACE UNDER DIRECT REGULATION AND
INDIRECT REGULATION THROUGH MULTI STABILITY AND COORDINATION
C

2

Escalate (0.2)
Escalate
C1

(0.1 )

Deescalate (0.9)

Deescalate (0.8)

peace

(0.035) war

(0.065)

war

(0.165) peace

(0.735)

T(C 1 :O)

=

0.07 bits

+ TC (C 2 :O) = 0.70 bits

1

H(O)

- 0.77 bits

another type of regulation is determined here solely on the
basis of the sequence in which strategic or relational
actions are taken by one or both countries.

If this

sequence were altered, the attributions would also change.
For example, if one country unilaterally shifted its
probability of deescalation from 0.8 to 0.9 after the arms
race was placed under internal regulation through
multistability, as described in Table B.30, but prior to the
addition of internal regulation through coordination, as
described in Table B.32, this would result in a reduction of
outcome uncertainty due to direct regulation of 0.08 bits
instead of 0.05 bits, as described in Table B.34.

The

subsequent addition of internal regulation through
coordination, as described in Table B.33, would now reduce
outcome uncertainty by 0.05 bits instead of 0.08.

-441Table B034
A FIRST-STRIKE ARMS RACE UNDER DIRECT REGULATION
AND INDIRECT REGULATION THROUGH MULTISTABILITY
C

Escalate
C1

(Dol )

Deescalate (009 )

2

Escalate (002)

Deescalate (DoS)

peace

(0002)

war

(00 OS)

war

(OolS)

peace

(0072)

T(C 1 :O)

=

DolO bits
0072 bits

+ TC (C 2 :O)

1

H(O)

- 00S2 bits

Lastly it is important to point out that the terms of
expression BoSS, which comprises Theorem 7, describe the
combined effects of direct regulation and internal
regulation (through both coordination and multistability),
and if this expression were used to describe a game at only
one point in time, it might not be possible for these
different effects to be separated outo
The proof for this theorem follows from expression
Bo17 in the proof for Theorem 1
H(O)

=

T(C:O)

Given that
C

(B06S)
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then substitution of the identities
(B.66)
and

(B.67)
yields
H(O) = T(CI:O) + TC (C 2 :O)
n
I

+ \' TC C
C
(C i : 0)
I 2··· i-I -

k3

(B.68)

Q.E.D.

Regulation in Two-Person Games with a Fixed Controller
In Theorem 3, outcome uncertainty in this situation is
said to be governed by B.31, the inequality
H(O) ~ H(D)
In contrast consider Theorem 8:

Outcome uncertainty in a

two-person game with a fixed controller is governed by the
equality
H(O) = T(D:O)

(B.69)

where T(D:O) is used to denote the information transmitted
to an observer about the outcome of a game when the strategy
chosen by D is known, or vice versa, and H(O) is defined as
before.

Since expression B.67 is identical to expression

B.38 in the proof of Theorem 3, this theorem is subject to
the same proof.
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Decomposition of the transmission term T(D:O) yields
the equality
T(D:O)
which indicates that if

(B.70)

D

is viewed as a disturbance and 0

as the outcome of a game-like process, external regulation
can be more clearly understood as describing a change in the
stability of the disturbance, but only when that stability
is corrected for any instability in the disturbance that
remains after the outcome is fixed.

Theorem 8 can now be

interpreted to mean that the stability of the outcome of a
two-person game-like process with a fixed controller is
determined by external regulation.
This theorem differs from the corresponding limit
theorem only in that it includes a correction for extraneous
uncertainty in the disturbance.

This type of uncertainty

can be illustrated in terms of the strategies available to
nature in the two-person stockmarket game with a fixed
controller as described above in Table B.16.

If the

strategy described as an action by nature having neutral
effects is replaced by two separate strategies, one
describing actions having mixed effects (both beneficial and
detrimental) and another describing actions having no
effects whatsoever upon the economy, if it is assumed for
purposes of comparison that an observer expects the
controller to hold demand steady no matter what and expects
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probability of 0.165, while the probabilities with which the
other two strategies are selected remain unchanged at 0.33
each, and if it is assumed that both of the new strategies
have exactly the same effect upon the outcome as the
strategy they are replacing, then according to the
calculations in Table B.35, although the uncertainty of the
observer about the strategy of nature and, thus, the
potential for external regulation have increased from 1.58
(as in Table B.16) to 1.91 bits, these 0.33 additional bits
of uncertainty are subtracted out as extraneous to the
outcome.

The observer's uncertainty about the outcome and,

hence, the potential for external regulation remain
unchanged at 1.58 bits.

Regulation in Two-Person Games with a Disturbance
In Theorem 4, regulation is said to be governed by
expression B.45, the inequality
H(O) ~ H(D) + HD(C)
Compare this to Theorem 9:

Outcome uncertainty in a two-

person game with a disturbance is governed
by the equality
H(O)

T(D:O) + TD(C:O)

(B.71)
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A TWO-PERSON STOCKMARKET
WITH A FIXED CONTROLLER
D

Beneficial
effects

C

(0.33)

Mixed
effects
(0.165)

Neutral
effects
(0.165)

Detrimental
effects
(0.33)

Increased
demand
(0.0)

4
(0.000)

3
(0.000)

3
(0.000)

2
(0.000)

Steady
demand
( 1. 0 )

1
(0.330)

0
(0.165)

0
(0.165)

-1
(0.330)

Decreased
demand
(0.0)

-2
(0.000)

-3
(0.000)

-3
(0.000)

-4
(0.000)

H(D)

1.91 bits

HD(C)

- HO(D)

0.33 bits

- HOD(C)

T(D:O)

= 1.58 bits

TD(C:O)

0.00 bits

= 0.00 bits
0.00 bits

+ TD(C:O) = 0.00 bits

H(O)

1.58 bits

where TD(C:O) is used to denote the information transmitted
to an observer about the outcome, conditional upon the
strategy of

D, when the strategy of C is known, or vice

versa, and where H(O) and T(D:O) are defined as before.
Since expression B.71 is identical to expression B.46 in the
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same.
If 0 is viewed as the outcome of a two-person gamelike process, if C is viewed as a controller, if n is viewed
as a disturbance and if the term

Tn(C:O)

is decomposed

according to the identity
(B.72)

then it becomes apparent that indirect regulation can be
more clearly understood as describing change in coordination
between the controller and the disturbance, or change in the
multistability of the controller and the disturbance, but
only when that coordination or multistability is corrected
for any coordination between or multistability of the
controller and the disturbance that remains to be realized
after the outcome if fixed.
Theorem 9 can now be interpreted to mean that the
stability of the outcome of a two-person game-like process
with a disturbance is determined by direct regulation or by
external regulation or by indirect regulation (through
coordination or through multistability) or by some
combination of these.
This theorem differs from the corresponding limit
theorem in that it describes the effect of indirect
regulation through multistability and incorporates
corrections for both extraneous cooperation and extraneous
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multistability.

These measures can be illustrated by

reference once again to the two-person stockmarket game.

If

it is assumed that there are four strategies available to
nature, as described in Table B.35, if the strategy of
holding demand steady on the part of the investment
community is now replaced by two strategies, the first
describing a mixture of increased and decreased demand and
the second describing a lack of change in the demand for any
stock, if it is assumed for purposes of comparison that the
observer expects the investment community to select each of
these new strategies with a probability of 0.167 while the
probabilities with which the other two strategies are
selected remain the same at 0.33 each, if the new strategies
for both nature and the investment community have exactly
the same effect upon the outcome as the strategies they are
replacing, and if it is assumed that while the two new
strategies for the investment community, taken together, are
coordinated with the two new strategies for nature, taken
together, there is no observed coordination within these two
sets of new strategies, then according to the calculations
in Table B.36, although the uncertainty of an observer about
C conditional upon

D

has increased from 0.0 bits (in

Table B.35) to 0.33 bits, these 0.33 bits of uncertainty are
subtracted out as extraneous to the outcome.

Thus the

potential for further indirect regulation through

-448coordination and/or multistability remains unchanged at 0.0
bits, as does the observer's uncertainty about the outcome
at 1. 58 bits.
Table B.36
A TWO-PERSON, FOUR-STRATEGY, EIGHT-OUTCOME STOCKMARKET
UNDER INDIRECT REGULATION THROUGH COORDINATION
D
Beneficial
effects
(0.334)

Mixed
effects
(0.167)

Neutral
effects
(0.167)

Detrimental
effects
(0.334)

Increased
demand
(0.334)

4
(0.334)

3
(0.000)

3
(0.000)

2
(0.000)

Mixed
demand
(0.167)

1
(0.000)

0
(0.083)

0
(0.083)

-1
(0.000)

Steady
demand
(0.167)

1
(0.000)

0
(0.083)

0
(0.083)

-1
(0.000)

Decreased
demand
(0.334)

-2
(0.000)

-3
(0.000)

-3
(0.000)

-1
(0.334)

C

H(D)

=

- HO(D)
T(D:O)

=

HD(C)

0.33 bits

- HOD(C)

1.58 bits
0.00 bits

+ TD(C:O)
H(O)

1. 91 bits

=

1.58 bits

0.33 bits
=

0.33 bits

TD(C:O) = 0.00 bits
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The effect of multistability on the part of the
investment community and nature can be illustrated if the
four outcomes resulting from various combinations of the two
new strategies for each player are differentiated in a
manner such as the following.

It will be assumed that no

change in the demand for any stock together with acts of
nature that do not effect the economy will result in an
outcome ranked

o.

A mixture of increased and decreased

demand together with acts of nature that do not effect the
economy and no change in the demand for any stock together
with acts of nature that have a mixture of beneficial and
detrimental effects will both result in an increase in the
value of the portfolio of stocks, to be given a rank of 1.
This would reflect an ability on the part of the investment
community to increase demand in stocks whose economic
performance is above average while decreasing demand for
stocks whose performance is below average and an assumption
that the investment community generally holds those stocks
that will benefit from acts of nature.

Finally, it will be

assumed that a mixture of increased and decreased demand
together with a mixture of beneficial and detrimental
effects will result in a value given a rank here of 2,
reflecting an ability on the part of the investment
community to increase demand for stocks that will benefit
from acts of nature and vice versa.

If the ranks of all
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Table B.37 indicate an additional potential for 0.334 bits
of direct and external regulation (through stability) and
therefore 0.167 bits of indirect regulation through
multistability or a total of 0.501 bits of regulation
attributable to some combination of these.
Table B.37
A TWO-PERSON, FOUR-STRATEGY, ELEVEN-OUTCOME STOCKMARKET
UNDER INDIRECT REGULATION THROUGH COORDINATION
D
Beneficial
effects
(0.334)

Mixed
effects
(0.167)

Neutral
effects
(0.167)

Increased
demand
(0.334)

6
(0.334)

5
(0.000)

5
(0.000)

4
(0.000)

Mixed
demand
(0.167)

3
(0.000)

2
(0.083)

1
(0.083)

-1
(0.000)

Steady
demand
(0.167)

3
(0.000)

1
(0.083)

0
(0.083)

-1
(0.000)

Decreased
demand
(0.334)

-2
(0.000)

-3
(0.000)

-3
(0.000)

-4
(0.334)

Detrimental
effects
(0.334)

C

H(D)
- HO(D)
T(D:O)

= 1. 914 bits
= 0.167 bits

= 1. 747 bits

+ TD(C:O) = 0.334 bits
H(O)

2.081 bits

HD(C)
- HOD(C)

0.334 bits
0.000 bits

TD(C:O) = 0.334 bits
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say, so as to create some beneficial and detrimental effects
with a probability of 0.334, or if the investment community
selects a mixed strategy by electing, lets say, to increase
demand for some stocks while decreasing demand for others
with a probability of 0.334, outcome uncertainty will be
reduced by 0.167 bits through external or through direct
regulation, respectively.

However, if both actions occur

simultaniously, outcome uncertainty will be reduced a total
of 0.507 bits, 0.167 bits of which can be attributed to
indirect regulation through multistability, as described in
Table B.38.
These examples serve to illustrate the concepts of
extraneous coordination and both essential and extraneous
multistability as they are applied to indirect regulation.
They confirm the fact that the Theorem 9 is more
comprehensive then the corresponding limit theorem and thus
of greater significance.

Moreover this theorem incorporates

several different kinds of regulation and, as a result,
provides some insight into the relationships between them.
In the first place, it is apparent from expression B.71 that
external regulation of the outcome (by a disturbance),
described by change in the first transmission term to the
right of the equal sign, and direct regulation of the
outcome (by a controller), described by change in the second
transmission term, are totally independent of one another.
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A TWO-PERSON, FOUR-STRATEGY STOCKMARKET
UNDER INDIRECT REGULATION THROUGH
COORDINATION AND MULTISTABILITY
D

C

Beneficial
effects
(0.33)

Mixed
effects
(0.33)

Increased
demand
(0.334)

6
(0.33)

5
(0.0)

5
(0.0)

4
(0.0)

Mixed
demand
(0.167)

3
(0.0)

2
(0.33)

1
( 0.0)

-1
(0 . 0 )

Steady
demand
(0.167)

3
(0.0)

1
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

-1
(0.0)

Decreased
demand
(0.334)

-2
(0.0)

-3
(0.0)

-3
(0.0)

-4
(0.33)

H(D)

=

- HO(D)
T(D:O)

+ TD(C:O)
H(O)

Neutral
effects
(0.00)

1.58 bits

HD(C)

0.00 bits

- HOD(C)

=

1. 58 bits

=

0.00 bits

=

1.58 bits

TD(C:O)

Detrimental
effects
(0.33)

0.00 bits
=

0.00 bits
0.00 bits

Thus any action taken by a controller to regulate the
outcome directly will have no effect upon the extent to
which that outcome is directly effected by a disturbance,
and vice versa.
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While indirect regulation through multistability has
been defined here as an increase in outcome stability over
and above any increase the would result from a unilateral
increase in the stability of a controller or a disturbance,
and thus indirect regulation through multistability is, by
definition, independent of direct regulation or external
regulation, both direct regulation and external regulation
limit the potential for indirect regulation through
coordination (and vice versa) by reducing the value of the
first conditional uncertainty term in the identity
TD(C:O) = HD(C) - HOD(C)

(B. 73)

External regulation and indirect regulation through
coordination both reduce the value of this term without at
the same time effecting the value of H(C), while direct
regulation reduces the value of H(C) and therefore the value
of HD(C) as well.
In addition to this competitive relationship with both
direct and external regulation, indirect regulation through
cooperation also competes with indirect regulation through
multistability.

Coordination reduces the value of the

conditional transmission term in B.71 TD(C:O) without
effecting the unconditional transmission term T(D:O), while
multistability of

C

and

may also reduce the latter.

D always reduces the former and
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competitive, not in the sense that they are used by players
in play of a game but rather in the sense that they are
constrained by the total amount of information within a
particular game that can be transmitted (uncertainty that
can be removed) through regulation.

While this quantity can

be partitioned it cannot be exceeded.
Nevertheless, if a two-person game with a disturbance
were a majorant game for the controller and if that
controller had some information as to the behavior of the
disturbance, then an increase in the amount of indirect
regulation through coordination at the expense of external
regulation or indirect regulation through

multistability

would describe the process by which or extent to which the
controller was making use of this information to manipulate
the outcome of a game whose outcome would otherwise depend
to some extent upon the strategy chosen by the disturbance.
This can be seen more clearly if the identity
TD(C:O)

=

TC(D:O) - T(D:O) + T(C:O)

(B.74)

is substituted into expression B.71, yielding
H(C)

=

T(C:O) + TC(D:O)

(B.75)

The exercise of indirect regulation through coordination
reduces the value of the conditional transmission term in
this expression and thereby reduces the potential for
external regulation and indirect regulation through
multistability as well.
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It is in this particular set of circumstances that the
unified theory of information and games is most closely
related to the work of Ashby and of Conant.

This relation

can be shown more clearly by substituting the identities
TD(C:O)

= TC(D:O) - T(D:O)

TC(D:O)

+ T(C:O)

(B.76)

= HC(D) - HOC(D)

(B.77)

H(D) - T(D:C)

(B.78)

HC(D)
and
T(D:C)

=

(B.79)

-H(C) + HD(C)

into expression B.71 to yield
H(O)

= H(D) - H(C) - HOC(D) + T(C:O) + HD(C) (B.80)

and, thus,
H(O) ~ H(D) - H(C) - HOC(D)

(B.81)

This expression is equivalent to B.ll, Ashby's Law of
Requisite variety,
H(O) ~ H(D) - H(R) - K
but without his restrictive assumptions.

The regulator,

denoted by R in B.ll, has been designated a controller and
denoted by C here in order to allow for the fact that the
disturbance D, by choosing a strategy, also acts as a
regulator; and the ad hoc term

K

in B.ll has been replaced

here by the more general (and more appropriate) conditional
uncertainty term HOC(D), which describes the average noise
or equivocation in D which might otherwise have inflated
H(O).

It should thus be apparent that within the context of
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the unified theory of information and games developed here,
Ashby's law is a partial description of the relationship
between indirect regulation through coordination and
external regulation as they apply to the special case of a
two-person game between a simple controller and a
disturbance in an environment representable as a majorant
game with perfect information for that controller.
Expression B.80 can also be rearranged, with the help
of the identities
T(C:O) = H(O) - HC(O)

(B.82)

and
HD(C) - H(C) =-T(D:C)

(B.83)

to yield the equality
H(D) - HC(O) = T(C:D) + HOC(D)

(B.84)

Conant's definition of the value of a regulator,
(B.86)

where H*(O)

is used to denote the minimum uncertainty in 0

when the value of C is permanently fixed, and the inequality
H*(O) ~ H(D)

(B.87)

can now be used to transform B.84 into the following
expression
~

v = T(C:D) + HOC(D)

(B.87)

which is equivalent to B.12, Conant's theorem describing the
effect of transmission between a regulator and a disturbance
V ~ T(R:D) + K
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but without his restrictive assumptions.
regulator, denoted in B.12 by

Once again the

R, has been replaced by a

controller, denoted here by C, and the ad hoc term K in B.12
has been replaced here by the conditional uncertainty term
HOC(D).
Theorem 9 and its corresponding limit theorem are thus
more general than the previous findings of Ashby and Conant.
In addition the limit theorem is more useful, for it
describes an upper limit rather than a lower limit on
outcome uncertainty, while Theorem 9 is more informative,
being an equality rather than an inequality.

The

significance of Ashby's law lies in the forcefulness with
which it is articulated and the narrowness with which it is
focused upon the specific conflict between a controller and
a disturbance in very special circumstances of particular
interest to systems engineers and theoretical biologists.
However, this forcefulness and specificity are obtained by
abstracting the relation between controller and disturbance
away from all the qualifications and variations inherent in
the more general situation under consideration here.

In

contrast to this early work, the significance of Theorem 9
is that, on the one hand, it helps to clarify the exact
nature of these early findings and to enumerate all the
assumptions that underly them and, on the other hand, it
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presents the relationship between controller and disturbance
in more general terms applicable to a wider variety of
problems.

Regulation in n-Person Games with a Disturbance
In Theorem 5, regulation is said to be governed by
expression B.51, the inequality

The corollary to this is Theorem 10:

n

Outcome uncertainty in

an n-person game with a disturbance is govered by the
equality

n
TDC C
C
(C.:O)
1 2'"
i-I ~
(B.88)

n

.L

where TDCl (C 2 :O) +
TDCIC2"'Ci_l (Ci:O) is used to denote
the information trans~itted to an observer about the
outcome, conditional upon the strategy of D and C

j

(where

= 1, ... ,i-l), when the strategy of Ci is known, or vice
versa, where H(O), T(D:O) and T~i:O) are defined as

j

before.

If D is viewed as a disturbance, if C through C
1
n
are viewed as components of a compound controller, and if
the last two transmission terms are decomposed by means of
the equalities
n
TDC (C 2 : 0) = HDC (C 2 ) - HODC (C 2 )
1
1
n
1
~ T C C
C
(C.:O) =
H C C
C
(C.)
L
D 1 2'" i-I ~
i=3 D 1 2'" i-I ~
i=3
n

L

-

~ H
i~3
ODC I C2 ",C i

_1

(C.)
~

(B. 89 )
(B.90)
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then this expression suggests that combined regulation can
be more clearly understood as describing change in the
coordination between or multistability of one component of a
compound controller and the disturbance together with one or
more other components of that controller, but only when that
coordination or multistability is corrected for any
coordination or multistability that remains to be realized
after the outcome is fixed.
Theorem 10 can now be interpreted to mean that the
stability of the outcome of an n-person game-like process
with a disturbance is determined by external regulation or
direct regulation or internal regulation or indirect
regulation or combined regulation or some mixture of these.
This theorem differs from the corresponding limit theorem in
that it describes the effect of combined regulation through
multistability and incorporates corrections for both
extraneous cooperation among and extraneous multistability
of the disturbance and one or more combinations of
components of a compound controller.
These measures can be illustrated by further transformations of the three-person stockmarket described in
tables B.22 through B.25.

If, in a 3-person game between an

individual investor, the rest of the investment community
and nature, it is assumed that there are four strategies
available to nature and to the investment community as

-460described in tables B.36 through B.38, if the strategy of
holding stocks by the individual investor is now replaced by
two strategies!

the first described as holding the same

amount of capital in stocks but transforming a portfolio
through trading and the second described as holding the same
amount of capital in stocks by keeping exactly the same
portfolio without any trading, if it is assumed for purposes
of comparison that the observer expects the investor to
select each of these new strategies with a probability of
0.167 while the probabilities with which the other two
strategies are selected remain the same at 0.334 each, if
the new strategies for this investor, for the investment
community and for nature all have exactly the same effect
upon the outcome as the strategies they are replacing, and
if it is assumed that while each of these sets of new
strategies is coordinated with the others, there is no
observed coordination within any of these sets of
strategies, then according to the calculations in Table
B.39, Theorem 10 reveals that although the extra strategies
have increased the uncertainty of an observer about both the
strategy of C1 conditional upon D and the strategy of C2
conditional upon D and C1 by 0.334 bits (compared with Table
B.24), in each case these 0.334 bits of uncertainty are
extraneous to the outcome.

The potential for further

combined regulation through coordination or multistability
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Table B.39
TWO SECTIONS OF A THREE-PERSON. FOUR-STRATEGY.
TWENTY-ONE OUTCOME STOCKMARKET UNDER
COMBINED REGULATION THROUGH COORDINATION
D

BenefiCial
effects
(0.112)

Mixed
effects
(0.056)

Neutral

Detrimental

effects
(0.056)

effects
(0.112)
5
(0.0500)

C2

Increased
demand
(0.056)

10
(0.0030)

7
7
(0.0015) (0.0015)

Mixed
demand
(0.026)

2
(0.0015)

(0.0125) (0.0125)

Steady
demand
(0.026)

o
o

0

-3
(0.0015) Trade

stocks
(0.167)

2
(0.0015)

(0.0125) (0.0125)

-3
(0.0015)

-5
(0.0500)

-8
-8
(0.0015) (0.0015)

-10
(0.0030)

10
(O.OOlO)

(0.0015) (0.0015)

demand
(0.026)

2
(0.0015)

(0.0125) (0.0125)

Steady
demand
(0.026)

2
(0.0015)

0
(0.0125) (0.0125)

(0.167)
-3
(0.0015)

-5
(0.0500)

-8
-8
(0.0015) (0.0015)

-10
(0.0030)

0

Decreo!!sed

demand
(0.056~

7

Mixed

o

7

0

o

5
(0.0500)

-3
(0.0015)

Decreased
demand
( 0 .056)

T(D:O)

• H(D)
• 1.914 - 0.334 • 1.56 bits

• Ho(C 1 ) - HOD (C1 )
• 1.914 - 0.334 • 1.58 bits

+ __________~.~0~.~5~7~4~-~0~.~3~34~.~0~.~2~'~b~it~s~

H(O)

• 3.40 bits

KeeF

stocks

-462or both remains unchanged at 0.0 bits, and thus the
observer's uncertainty about the outcome remains unchanged
at 3.40 bits.
The effect of multistability on the part of the
individual investor, the investment community and nature can
be illustrated if the eight outcomes resulting from various
combinations of the two new strategies for each player are
differentiated.

It will be assumed for this purpose that

the combinations of new strategies on the part of nature and
the investment community have outcomes that are ranked as in
tables B.37 and B.38.

In addition, however, trading stocks

will in the case of each combination make for an outcome
ranking higher (by three) than the corresponding outcome of
simply keeping the same portfolio.

If the ranks of all

other outcomes are adjusted accordingly, Theorem 10
demonstrates that, according to the calculations in table
B.40, outcome uncertainty has increased from 3.40 bits to
4.235 bits.

This difference indicates that there is now a

potential for removing a total of 0.835 additional bits of
outcome uncertainty through various kinds of regulation.
A comparison of the values of the terms T(D:O) and
TD(C 1 :O) in tables B.39 and B.40 shows that a total of 0.501
bits of outcome uncertainty can be removed through increases
in the stability of the disturbance and the controller,
i.e., by means of external regulation and direct regulation
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Table B.40
TWO SECTIONS OF A THREE-PERSON. FOUR-STRATEGY
THIRTY-SIX OUTCOME STOCKMARKET UNDER
COMBINED REGULATION THROUGH COORDINATION
C1

D

effects
(0.056)

effects
(0.056)

Detrimental
effects
(0.112)

(0.056)

15
(0.0030)

12
(0.0015)

12
(0.0015)

10
(0.0500)

Mixed
demand
(0.028)

7
(0.0015)

5
(0.0125)

(0.0125)

Increased
demand

Steady
demand
(0.028)

Mixed

Neutral

Beneficial
effects
(0.112)

4

C2

-3
(0.0015) Trade

stocks
(0.167)

7
(0.0015)

4
(0.0125)

3
(0.0125 )

-3
(0.0015)

(0.056~

-5
(0.0500)

-8
(0.0015)

-8
(0.0015)

-10
(0.0030)

(0.056)

15
(0.0030)

12
(0.0015)

12
(0.0015 )

10
(0.0500)

(0.028)

7
(0.0015)

2
(0.0125)

1
(0.0125)

-3
(0.0015)

Steady
demand
(0.028)

7
(0.0015)

1
(0.0125)

0
(0.0125)

(0.167)
-3
(0.0015)

-8
-5
(0.0500)
(0.0015)
T(D:O)
• H(D) - HO(D)

-8
(0.0015)

-10
(0.0030)

Decreased
demand

Increase
demand
Mixed
demand

Decreased
demand
(0.056)

• 1.914 - 0.167 - 1. 747 bits

+ T (C 1 :O)
D

- Ho(Cl ) - HOD (C 1 )
- 1.914 - 0.000 - 1.914 bits

+ TDC (C 2 :0)
1
H(O)

• Hoc1 (C 2 )

- HODe (C 2 )
1

_ 0.574 - 0.000 • 0.574 bits
- 4.235 bits

Keep
stocks

-464(on the part of either component).

Of this amount, 0.334

bits of outcome uncertainty (the difference between the
corresponding values of TD(C 1 :O» could also be removed
through coordination, i.e. by means of indirect regulation
through coordination of D and C1 , by means of indirect
regulation through coordination of D and C2 or by means of
internal regulation through coordination of C1 and C2 .
Subtracting 0.501 bits from 0.835 bits leaves a
potential for removing 0.334 bits of outcome uncertainty
through coordination or through multistability, the
difference between the corresponding values of
TDC (C 2 :O) in tables B.39 and B.40. Since the new
1
strategies of C2 introduce 0.334 additional bits of outcome
uncertainty of which 0.167 can be removed directly, it is
only possible to remove an additional 0.167 bits of the
remaining uncertainty through combined regulation.

The

final 0.167 bits can also be removed by means of either
indirect regulation or internal regulation.
If nature, the investment community and the individual
investor now act simultaniously to select mixed effects,
mixed demand and trading, respectively, and the old
strategies, each with a probability of 0.334, while the
other strategy in each of the new pairs is chosen with a
probability of 0.0, a comparison of the calculations in
Table B.41 to these in Table B.40, according to this
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Table B.41

TWO SECTIONS OF A THREE-PERSON, FOUR-STRATEGY,
TWENTY-SIX OUTCOME STOCKMARKET UNDER COMBINED REGULATION
THROUGH COORDINATION AND MULTISTABILITY
C

D

Beneficial
effects
(0.112)

Mixed
effects
(0.112)

Neutral
effects
(0.00)

Detrimental
effects
(0.112)

demand
(0.112)

15
(0.006)

12
(0.006)

12
(0.000)

10
(0.100)

Mixed
demand
(0.112)

(0.0018)

Increased

7

5

(0.037)

4

(0.037 )

2

-3
(0.018 )Trade

stocks
Steady
demand
(0.00)

(0.000)

(0.000)

3
(0.000)

-5
( 0 .100)

-8
(0.060)

-8
(0.000)

15
(0.0)

12
(0.0)

12
(0.0)

7

4

(0.33)
-3
(0.000)
-10
(0.060)

Decreased
demand
(0.112~

10
(0.0)

Mixed

demand
(0.0)

7

2

1

(0.0)

(0.0 )

(0.0)

-3
(0.0) Keep

stocks
Steady
demand
(0.0)

7

(0.0)

Decreased
demand
(0.0 )

T(D:O)

-5
( 0.0)
• H(D)

1
(0.0 )

(0.0)

(0.00)
-3
(0.0)

-8
(0.0)

-8
(0.0)

-10
(0.0)

o

• 1.58 - 0.00 • 1.58 bits
• Ho(C1 ) - HOD (C1 )
- 1.58 - 0.00 • 1.58 bits

+ Toe (C 2 :O) - Hoc (C2 ) - HOoe (C2 )
1 1 1
H(O)

- 0.24 - 0.00 - 0.24 bits
- 3.40 bits

-466theorem, reveal that outcome uncertainty is reduced a total
of 0.835 bits and is again equal to 3.40 bits.

External

regulation according to a comparison of the values of T(D:C)
accounts for 0.167 bits; and thus direct regulation on the
part of each component could account for 0.167 bits,
totaling 0.501 bits due to stability.

Of the remaining

0.334 bits attributable to multistability, 0.167 bits is
described by TD(C 1 :O) and 0.167 by TDC (C 2 :O). Thus
1
combined regulation accounts for at least 0.167 bits while
the remaining 0.167 bits are attributable to either internal
regulation or to indirect regulation through multistability
of C1 and D or of C2 and D.
The proof for this theorem follows from the identity
T(C,D:O) = T(D:O) + TD(C:O)

(B.91 )

Since
T(D:O) = H(O) - HD(O)

(B.92)

TD(C:O) = HD(O) - HCD(O)

(B.93)

and since, by the rules of the game,
HCD(O)=O

(B.94)

expression B.91 reduces to
T(C,D:O) = H(O)

(B.95)

and, by B.91
H(O) = T(D:O) + TD(C:O)

(B.96)

Since, by assumption,
(B.97)

-467substitution of B.97 into B.96 yields
H(O) = T(D:O) + TD(C I C1 2 , ... C :0)
n
substitution of the identity

+ \'
L..

i=3

TDC C
C
(C.:O)
1 2'" i-I l.

(B.98)

(B.99)

into expression B.97 yields the equality
H(OA = T(D:O) + TD(Cl:O) +
+

L
i=3

TDC C
C
(C. :0)
1 2 ' " i-I l.

(B.IOO)

Q.E.D.
Theorems 6 through 10 as described above can be used
to define various forms of regulation, to explain the role
of each form and to examine the relation of one form to
another in different kinds of game-like processes.

The role

of each type of regulation and the relations between them
should be apparent from the progressive development,
interpretation, illustration and analysis of the theorems;
but the definitions are summarized in Table B.42 for easy
reference.
While the theorems articulated above describe the
transmissions that are required for various forms of
regulation, these forms of regulation do not describe the
particular constraints imposed through such transmissions.
They indicate the processes through which and the extent to
which outcome uncertainty may be reduced through the
behavior of one or more players in a game, but they provide
no information about the value to a player or group of
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Table B.42
FIVE TYPES OF REGULATION
DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL
DEFINITION

NAME
external
(for D)

LIMIT
<

T(D:O)

=

H(D)

direct
(for C )
I
indirect
(for C & D)
I
direct
(for C )
2
indirect
(for C & D)
2
internal
(for C C )
I 2
combined
(for D, C & C )
I
2
direct
(for C )
i
indirect
(for C & D)
i
internal
(for all
[T
C
C
(C.:O)
DC I 2'" i-I ].
combination
of C's whic
include C )
i
combined
(for D and all
combinations
of C's which
include C )
i

"H

C C
C
(C. )
-L D I 2'" i-I ].

:::0

-469-

players of the outcome that results from such behavior or
about the ability of that player or group to realize an
outcome that is in some sense preferred.

In other words,

the transmission terms that describe regulation are
necessary but not sufficient to describe control.
Complete control of the outcome of a game on the part
of a player or group does not, in and of itself, determine
the particular outcome that will result from play of that
game.

It does not even guarantee that the outcome resulting

from play of the game will be one of a set of outcomes that
are preferred in some sense by that player or group, for
control is a relation between a set of preference relations
and a set of outcomes that can be exercised in either a
straightforward or perverse manner.

For example, if

outcomes are ranked by frequency of occurrence and
preference relations are transformed into preference
orderings, the direction of the relation between these two
ordinal scale variables could be either direct (positive) or
inverse (negative).
In order to describe the probability of a particular
outcome (or set of outcomes) resulting from play of a game
under a certain pattern of control, it is necessary to make
additional assumptions.

The nature of the control

relationship will be examined in the remainder of this
appendix, while the nature of these additional assumptions
will be explored in the next.
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control
In order to describe the conditions required for
successful control of the outcome of a game-like process, it
is first necessary to introduce a variable describing
different sources of control.

The sources of interest here

are the preferences of the players in the game, and it will
be assumed in this appendix that each of these preferences
can be described in accordance with the formulation of Sen
as a binary relation defined over the set of outcomes for
each player. 11 Moreover, it will also be assumed that the
definition of a game entails the selection for each player i
of one of a finite set Pi of possible preference relations
j
Pi ' where j=1,2, ... ,m, i.e.,

Pi = tPil,Pi2"",Pim}

(B.IOI)

control and Stability
The extent to which player

i

exerts control over the

outcome of a game can be described in terms of the amount of
information transmitted to an observer about that outcome
when the particular preference relation of player
known, or vice versa.

i

is

Such an amount must be interpreted as

an absolute measure of control, which is defined here as the
strength of the relation between the preferences of a person
or group of people and the outcome of a game-like process.
This definition of control allows for an exact description of

-471-

the relation between control and stability in the outcome of
an n-person game in Theorem 11:

if P is used to denote the

set of preferences of all players (except D), i.e., if, in a
game with an n-component controller, P= ~ PC ~ , ... , Pc '1 .L
1
2
n~
if T(P:O) is used to denote the information transmitted to
an observer about the outcome of a game when the preferences
of all players (except D) are known, or vice versa, and if
H(O) is defined as before, then a lower limit on uncertainty
about the outcome is described by the inequality
H(O) :; T(P:O)

(B.102)

If the transmission term in this expression is viewed
as a measure of control and 0 is viewed as the outcome of a
game-like process, then this theorem can be interpreted to
mean that the control exerted in a game-like process sets a
lower limit on the uncertainty of an observer about the
outcome of that process and, thus, that the control exerted
in a game-like process sets an upper limit on the stability
of the outcome of that process.

As with each of the

regulation theorems, the relationship described by Theorem
11 only makes sense when the transmission term on the right
of this expression is interpreted as a measure of potential
control.

It is through the realization of this potential

that outcome uncertainty is brought down and stability is
thus increased.

Just as the potential for regulation is

reduced (and actual regulation is increased) by a decrease
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in uncertainty about the strategy to be chosen by a player,
so too the potential for control is reduced (and actual
control is increased) by a decrease in uncertainty about the
preference relation of a player.

The amount of control that

is actually exercised can, thus, be described as the
difference between transmission terms before (at time t 1 )
and after (at time t 2 ) the definition of the preference
relations of each player i.e., by T(P t :0) - T(P t :0).
1
2
Theorem 11 provides several significant insights into
the nature of control.

For example, the analysis of control

within the context of a game implies that the definition of
that game, specifically the definition of players'
preference relations, can no longer be regarded as
axiomatic, i.e., taken for granted.

The process by which an

observer becomes informed about a player's preferences must
now be seen as a process of communication which is not
necessarily instantaneous, not necessarily perfect (i.e.,
free of noise), and not necessarily complete prior to play
of the game.

The significance of this interpretation is

that the transmission term T(P:O) can now be used to
represent, in part, the knowledge an observer has (or is
capable of having) about his own preferences or those of
other players.

This knowledge is crucial to the way the

game is played, as von Neumann and Morgenstern belatedly
recognized in their discussion (described in Appendix A) of
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"the ability of discernment of a player--specifically the
fineness of his subjective utility scale."

only when the

observer's knowledge of the preferences of all players is
perfect, can control be completely exercised.

This

knowledge of these preferences (or the lack thereof) can be
a significant constraint on the exercise of control.
The direction of the inequality in expression B.I02
implies that there are other intervening variables which may
limit not the exercise but the impact of control upon the
stability of the outcome.

In the first place, the degree of

control that a player or group exercises is not completely
determined by knowledge of the preferences of the players in
the game but is dependent, in part, upon the existence of a
disturbance and the amount of external regulation exercised
by that disturbance in that game; for the disturbance is, by
definition, a player for whom preferences are meaningless or
nonexistent or whose preferences, if they exist, are unknown
or ignored by the observer.

In addition, knowledge of the

preferences of the players in a game provides information
about the behavior of these players only if the observer
knows how these preferences are related to that behavior.
Thus analysis of control within the context of a game also
implies that a description of (or belief as to) the nature
of behavior is as important as a description of (or belief
as to) the nature of the game-like environment within which
that behavior occurs.

-474Finally, outcome stability depends upon the regulation
exerted by all players (including any disturbance); and
control in a game is not necessarily commensurate with the
regulatory potential of a player or group viewed as a
controller.

For all these reasons, control on the part of a

simple or a compound controller cannot, in general,
completely determine stability in the outcome and, thus, the
particular value of that outcome.

Therefore, this theorem

can be interpreted to mean that in general, stability in the
outcome depends, at its upper limit, upon control.
The proof for this theorem follows from the decomposition of
the term

T(P:O)

according to the identity
T(P:O) = H(O) - Hp(O)

(B.l03)

thus
H(O)

~

T(P:O)

(B.l04)

Q.E.D.

The example of a two-path, two-outcome maze such as
that described above in Table B.lO can also be used to
illustrate this control theorem.

Assuming that through

observation or theory an observer has come to believe that
the coordination between a player's behavior in such an
environment and his preference relation is perfect, i.e.
that Hp(C) = 0.0 bits, then in the case where the observer
has no knowledge of the player's preference relation, i.e.,
has no reason to believe that the player prefers one outcome
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(say the goal) over the other (the deadend), Theorem 11,
according to the calculations in Table B.43, reveals that
the observer's uncertainty about the outcome will be 1.0 bit
at its upper limit and that the potential for control is at
its maximum of 1.0 bit.
Table B.43
A TWO-PATH MAZE
IN THE ABSENCE OF CONTROL
P

Goal
Preferred
(0. 5 )

Deadend
Preferred
(0.5)

Path ill
(0.5)

goal
(0.5)

goal
(0.0)

Path #2
(0.5)

deadend
(0.0)

dead end
(0.5)

C

H(O)
- Hp(O)
T(P:O)

1.0 bits
=

0.0 bits
1.0 bits

If the observer now receives some information about
the player's preferences and comes to believe that the
probability of his preferring the goal over the deadend is
0.8 (and the probability of his preferring the deadend over
the goal is 0.2), then this theorem reveals, according to
Table B.44, that outcome uncertainty can be no greater than
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0.72 bits.

The 0.28 bit decrease from the outcome

uncertainty limit in Table B.43 is attributable to actual
control; and since there is no disturbance in this
environment, the remaining potential for control is equal to
the remaining outcome uncertainty, 0.72 bits.
Table B.44
A TWO-PATH MAZE
UNDER PARTIAL CONTROL
P

Goal
Preferred
(0 . 8 )

C

Deadend
Preferred
(0.2)

Path #1
(0.8)

goal
(0 . 8 )

goal
(0.0)

Path #2
(0.2)

dead end
(0.0)

deadend
(0.2)

H(O)
- Hp(O)
T(P:O)

0.72 bits

= 0.00 bits
0.72 bits

Control Through Regulation
Assuming that, as is always the case in game theory,
there is no direct relation between the preferences of
players and the outcome of the game, these preferences and
that outcome can only be indirectly related through the
regulatory behavior of the players in the game.

The exact
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relation between control and regulation can be described by
Theorem 12:

if all terms are defined as before, then in

general outcome uncertainty is governed by the equality
T(P:O) = TD(C1 :O) - TpD (C1 :O)
+ TDC (C 2 :O) - TpDC (C 2 :O)
nIl
+
T
C
C
(C.:O)
i=3 DC 1 2"" i-I 1

L
n

- i=3
L TpDc1C2'"

(B.I0S)

C
(C.:O)
i-I 1

The salient feature of this expression is that each
term is paired with a similar term that is, in addition,
conditional upon

P.

Thus each of the three terms

describing different types of potential regulation is paired
with a similar term describing the potential for those types
of regulation that remain after the preferences of all
players (except D) are known.

The difference between each

such pair is a measure of the extent to which these types of
regulation have been exercised through knowledge of
preferences, i.e., of the extent to which control has been
exercised through these types of regulation.

Thus if 0 is

viewed as the outcome of a game-like process, if players C1
through Cn are viewed as controllers and player D as a
disturbance, this theorem can be interpreted to mean that
control over the outcome of a game-like process is exercised
through direct regulation or internal regulation or indirect
regulation or combined regulation or through some
combination of these.
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It should be noted that so long as the transmission
terms in B.I0S that are conditional upon

P

together with

other variables describe only relations that are not
actually determined by

P

and these other variables, the

value of each pair of terms used to describe different types
of control will be non-negative.

The value of these terms

can be more easily interpreted if expression B.I0S is
transformed by means of the identities

and

n
\'

l~3

TDC C

1 2""

,

C

i-I

( C. : 0 )

~

into
T(P:O)

=

TD(P:O) - TC D(P:O) + T
(P:O) - TDC C (P:O)
n I l
1 2
+ \' TDC C ···C
(P:O) - \' TC C
C D(P:O)
(B.I09)
i~3
1 2
i-I
i~3 1 2'" i

Hc

If there is no interaction between P, 0 and any combination
of the other variables, each pair of terms in this
expression will be non-negative and if the difference
between the terms in any pair is positive, it will be
interpretable as a measure of the strength of a indirect
relation established between P and 0 by means of a mutual

--- .. _-

/
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relation with some relevant combination of C. 's conditional
l.

upon the disturbance, e.g., in the case where strategy
choices are determined by preference relations and, at the
same time, outcomes are determined by strategy choices, with
both relations conditional upon knowledge of the
disturbance.
If the value of any of these pairs of terms were to be
negative, it would indicated an interaction between 0 and p
together with some combination of the other variables, e.g.,
in the case where a preference relation determines not the
choice of a strategy but the particular relation between the
choice of a strategy and the outcome.

However, since the

relation between strategies of all players, including any
disturbance, and outcomes in game theory is typically
independent of the preferences of the players who are
represented having preferences, this type of interaction is
not likely.
The proof for this theorem follows from expression
B.I03,

T(P:O)

=

H(O) - Hp(O)

H(O) can be defined in terms of regulation by means of
expression B.IOO).

Hp(O) can be defined in similar terms by

applying Garner and McGill's rule of uniform subscripting to
the same expression.
yields

Substitution into expression (B.I03)
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T(P:O)

T(D:O) - Tp(D:O)
+ TD(CI:O) -TpD(CI:O)
+ TDC (C 2 :O) - TpDC (C 2 :O)
n 1
I
+\'T DCC
C
(C.:O)
i~3
1 2'" i-I ~
n
- \' T
(C '0)
i~3 PDC C ",C _
i 1 i'
I 2

(B.llO)

Since preferences have, by definition, no direct impact
whatsoever on the disturbance, the first pair of
transmission terms can be eliminated, i.e.,
T(D:O) - Tp(D:O) = 0

(B.lll)

leaving
T(P:O)

TD(Cl:O) - TpD(Cl:O)
+ TDC (C 2 :O) - TpDC (C 2 :O)
n 1
I
+LTDCCC
C
(C.:O)
i=3
I 2'" i-I ~
n

-I~=3 TPDC1 C2'"

(B.ll2)

C
( c. : 0 )
i-I ~

Q.E.D.
A reformulation of expression B.I06 as an inequality,
i. e. ,

T(P:O)
(B.ll3)
suggests another interpretation of this theorem.

The

combined value of the terms on the right of this inequality,
indicating the total amount of potential regulation, place
an upper limit on the value of the term on the left,
indicating the total amount of potential control.
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conversely, a decline in the combined value of the terms on
the right of this inequality due to an increase in actual
regulation will force a commensurate decrease in the value
of the term on the left, at its upper limit, indicating an
increase in actual control.

Thus whether interpreted in

terms of potential or actual values, Theorem 12 can be
interpreted to mean that regulation sets an upper limit on
control or, in the words of Ashby, perfect regulation makes
possible complete control.
To illustrate this theorem, it is useful to refer once
again to the two-path maze.

In the example described in

tables B.43 and B.44, it was assumed that the player's
choice of a strategy was perfectly informed by his
preference relation, i.e., that Hp(C)
therefore, that T(P:O)

=

1.0 bit.

=

0.0 bits and

This relation between a

player's preference relation and his behavior is necessary
for rational behavior, i.e. for a player to choose that
strategy which is most likely to lead to a preferred
outcome.

However, this relationship might also describe

behavior that is irrational, i.e. characterized by a choice
of strategy leading to a less preferred outcome.

For this

reason such a relationship will be used here to describe
rationalized behavior, i.e. behavior that is linked, in
either a straightforward or a perverse manner, to a
preference relation.
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was thus assumed that behavior was perfectly rationalized
and, also, that the potential for regulation was perfect,
i.e., that T(C:O) = H(O) = 1.0 bit.

However, uncertainty

concerning the player's preference relation H(P) was assumed
to vary from 1.0 bit to 0.72 bits.
In this example it will again be assumed that the
player's behavior is perfectly rationalized.

However, the

potential for regulation will now be varied, while all
uncertainty concerning the player's preference relation will
be removed.

In this example, therefore, it will be assumed

that the player prefers to reach the goal but that he is
Table B.45
A TWO-PATH MAZE
IN THE ABSENCE OF POTENTIAL REGULATION
P

Game U
(0.5)

C

Game #2
(0.5)

Path #1
(0.5)

goal
(0.25 )

goal
(0.25)

Path #2
(0.5)

dead end
(0.25)

dead end
(0.25 )
1.0 bits

H(O)
- HC(O)
T(C:O)

=

1.0 bits

=

0.0 bits
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uncertain as to which of two games (versions of the maze) he
is playing:

one in which path #1 leads to the goal and one

in which path #2 leads to the goal.

This situation is

described in Table B.45 along with calculations which
indicate that, according to Theorem 12, the player has no
potential for regulation of the outcome and this lack of
potential regulation results in a commensurate lack of
potential control.
If uncertainty concerning which game is being played
is now eliminated, Theorem 12 reveals, according to the
calculations in Table B.46, that the player now has the
potential to reduce outcome uncertainty completely through
direct regulation and, thus, has 1 bit of potential control.
Table B.46
A TWO-PATH MAZE
WITH PERFECT POTENTIAL REGULATION
Game #1
(1. 0)

Game #2
(0.0)

Path U
(0.5)

goal
(0.5)

goal
(0.0)

Path #2
(0.5)

deadend
(0.5)

dead end
(0.0)

C

H(O)
- HC(O)
T(C:O)

1.0 bits
=

0.0 bits
1.0 bits
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The significance of this theorem is two-fold.

First,

it helps to clarify the relation between regulation and
control.

Second, like Theorem 11, it shifts attention away

from the process through which a game is played and directs
it toward the process through which a game is defined.

An

observer's beliefs concerning the regulatory relationship
between strategies and outcomes are shown here to be crucial
with regard to the possibilities for control.

control Through Rationalization
While the preceding theorem describes the dependence
of control upon regulation, control is also dependent upon
rationalization, that is, upon the relation between each
player's preferences and that player's choice of a strategy.
This relationship is described by Theorem 13:

if TD(P:C11

is used to denote the information transmitted to an observer
about the strategy of player C1 conditional upon knowledge
of the strategy of the disturbance when the preferences of
all players except D are known, if the terms TDC (P:C2~
n
1
TDC C
C
( P : C.)a_c=r.::e:.....:::u.::s.::e",dc....::t:.::0c....::d:.::e:=;n",o:..:t:..::e:.....::t::.h:.::e:.....::s:.::u",m,---"o::..::f:........:t:.:h=e
i=3
1 2'" i-I
1information transmitted to an observer about the strategies

L

of each player Ci ' i=l •.. n, conditional, respectively, upon
knowledge of the strategies of the disturbance and of all
previously enumerated players when the preferences of all
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players except D are known, then outcome stability is
governed by the inequality,
T(P:O) '"= TD(P:C l ) +
TDC (P:C 2 )
n
1
+\'TDCC
C
(P:C.)
i~3
1 2··· i-l
~

(B.1l4)

If players Cl through Cn are viewed as a compound controller
and if rationalized behavior in a game-like context is
defined as the choice of a strategy where the choice process
is directly informed by the preferences of the chooser, then
this theorem can be interpreted in a manner similar to that
of the previous theorem to mean that rationalized behavior
sets an upper limit upon control or perfect rationalization
makes possible complete control.
The proof for this theorem begins with a decomposition
of each pair of terms in expression B.112.

For example con-

sider the terms which describe control through direct
regulation
[HD(Cl)-HOD(Cl)]
[HpD(C l ) - HOPD(C l )]

(B.llS)

Rearrangement of terms yields
(B.ll6)

Corresponding equalities can be generated for the other
pairs of terms in expression B.112.

Elimination of all

negative terms on the right hand side of these equalities
yields expression B.109.
Q.E.D.
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This theorem can be illustrated by reference, once
again, to the two-path maze.

This time it will be assumed

that both the knowledge of the player's preference relation
and the potential for regulation (across both versions of
the maze) are perfect while the degree of rationalization
will vary.
Assuming first that the goal preferred by the player
corresponds to outcome
outcome

b

a

in one version of the maze and to

in another version of the maze and that the
Table B.47
A TWO-PATH MAZE
WITH A NON-RATIONAL PLAYER
P

Outcome b
preferred

outcome a
preferred

Path ill
(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

a
(0.25 )

a
(0.25)

C

Path #2

b

b

(0.25)

(0.5)

(0.25)

H(C)
- Hp(C)

T(P:O)

T(P:C)

1.0

bits

=

1.0 bits

=

0.0 bits

-487observer believes there to be no relation whatsoever between
the player's preferences and his behavior, Theorem 13,
according to the calculations in Table B.47, reveals that
the potential for control will be zero.
However, if the situation changes and the observer now
believes the player to be perfectly rational, Theorem 13
asserts, according to the calculations in Table B.48, that
complete control is now possible.
Table B.48
A TWO-PATH MAZE
WITH A RATIONAL PLAYER
P

Outcome a
Preferred
(0.5)

Outcome b
Preferred
(0.5)

Path #1
(0.5)

a
(0.5)

a
(0.0)

Path #2
(0.5)

b

b

(0.0)

(0.5)

C

H(C)
- Hp(C)

T(P:O)

=

T(P:C)

= 1.0 bits
0.0 bits

1.0 bits
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This theorem thus clarifies the relation between
control and rationalization and, as with the preceding two
theorems, serves to emphasize the importance, with regard to
the possibility of controlling the outcome of that game, of
assumptions concerning the nature of behavior derived from
observation of or theories about play of a game.
Theorems describing stability in the outcome of a game
in terms of various kinds of regulation and control have now
been stated, interpreted, validated and illustrated.

In

addition the precise nature of these concepts has been
defined and the exact relations between them have been
described.

Taken together, these theorems constitute a

unified theory of information and games at the level of
statics.
The regulation theorems derived above have been used
to describe the conditions necessary and sufficient for
stability in the outcome of a game-like process while the
control theorems articulated here have been used to describe
the conditions necessary but not sufficient for that process
to stabilize around a particular value (or set of values).
By applying these thirteen theorems to games of different
structure, the implications of those structural differences
with regard to regulation and control have been be assessed
and compared.

Similarly by applying these theorems to

representations based upon different theories or assumptions
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about the process through which games are defined and
played, the implications of those different assumptions or
theories with regard to regulation and control have been
assessed and compared.
The theorems articulated above incorporate the earlier
findings of Ashby and Conant but go beyond them in removing
restrictive assumptions, systematizing arbitrar$y
formulations, clarifying underlying assumptions and
describing both regulation and control in the more general
terms appropriate to a wider range of inquiry.

In addition,

the collective nature of regulation has been demonstrated,
and a fundamental distinction has been drawn between control
and disturbance, based upon the observer's knowledge of
preference relations.

Terms have been introduced into the

analysis of game-like process which are appropriate for the
measurement of physiological, psychological and social
aspects of cultural, political and economic phenomena, and a
distinction between coordination and multistability has been
introduced to describe apparently similar but actually
divergent types of behavior.

Finally, the focus of analysis

in game-like environments has been extended to include a new
class of games and a fundamental feature of all game-like
processes, as well as the processes through which
preferences are defined, rationality is deduced and
regulatory relationships, which constitute the very
structure of a game, are described.
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Despite these advances, however, the unified theory of
information and games set forth in this appendix is still
basically descriptive in nature, limited in application to
games in which the potential for regulation has already been
fixed and the possibility for control has already been
determined.

It is the goal of the next appendix to raise

the analysis of information transmission within game-like
contexts to the level of predictive theory by relaxing the
assumption that constraints upon regulation and control are
immutable features of the game environment.

In so doing,

the focus of analysis will shift from a general theory of
statics derived to describe more fully the relations among
people in a game-like environment to a specific theory of
comparative statics designed to assess more precisely the
special effects of collective communication and the
particular problems of social choice.

This more specific

theory will be constituted as a mathematical theory of
collective communication.
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APPENDIX C
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN THE METAGAME
In the last appendix measures were developed to
describe information transmission within a mathematical game
and, in particular, the various types of regulation and
control required or responsible for stability in the outcome
of that game.

In general, these measures serve to emphasize

the collective aspects of regulation and control.

However,

none of them provides a description of collective
communication or a solution to problems of social choice,
for it is only in terms of the transformation of control
that collective communication can be clearly defined and the
problems of social choice can be effectively solved.

This

appendix, therefore, will turn from describing patterns of
control to predicting the transformation of those patterns,
i.e., from statics to comparative statics.
The further development of a unified theory of
information and games in the form of a mathematical theory
of collective communication is described in four sections.
In the first section, the concept of collective optimality
-492-
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is introduced as a standard of comparison against which to
evaluate different patterns of control.

In the second

section, the pattern of control necessary for players in a
game to achieve collectively optimal outcomes is defined as
a type of self-control.

Collective optimality is viewed in

the third section as an incentive in terms of which the
transformation of control can be explained, and the process
of transformation is modeled as a metagame and interpreted
as the collective communication of social choice messages.
In the fourth section, metagames of a higher order are
discussed and incorporated into theorems which describe the
transformation of control through the collective
metacommunication of social choice messages.
As in the preceding appendices, all major conclusions
are articulated in the form of theorems accompanied by
interpretation, illustration and proof.

Taken together,

these theorems constitute a mathematical theory describing
the transmission of information in a metagame.

Finally, by

giving these theorems a completely social interpretation in
Q~apter

One, they are transformed into a scientific theory

capable of describing the collective communication of social
choice messages and of answering the questions with which
this study began.
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Collective Optimality
A basic motivation behind the development of game
theory was the need to describe and to explain how human
behavior is organized in an institution such as a social
exchange economy.

The information-theoretic measures of

regulation and control developed in Appendix B can be used
to describe the organization of human behavior in such an
environment but cannot, however, be used to explain such
organization; for regulation and control are incorporated as
givens into the rules of the basic game and into the
assumptions about or observations of the behavior of players
in that environment.
The first step in moving beyond the limitations of the
basic game is to recognize that a preference relation
constitutes a system of values and therefore that the
relation between preferences and the outcome of behavior in
a game-like situation is useful not only for the purpose of
describing a pattern of control but also for the purpose of
evaluating that pattern.

The general goal of this first

section is, thus, to develop a concept of value in
which different patterns of control can be compared.

terms of
The

rationale behind the particular concept developed here,
collective optimality, will first be described in detail,
followed by a formal definition in terms of the theories of
information and games of the type of collective optimality
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described by Pareto.

This section will then conclude with

the presentation, interpretation, illustration and
validation of a theorem which formally describes the process
of optimization and which suggests the pattern of control
necessary for achieving Pareto optimality.

Rationale
The concept to be used in evaluating patterns of
control must fulfill two objectives of paramount importance.
The first is that this concept must be defined in terms of
information theory (or in terms of the probability
distributions which underlie information-theoretic measures)
in order that the unified theory of information and games
developed in Appendix B can be raised to the level of
prediction without the incorporation of exogenous, ad hoc
measures.

The implication of this condition is that the

concept of value to be used must describe the form of the
relationship between preferences and outcomes and not the
content of that relationship, the specific outcome of
behavior in a particular game.

The concept of optimality

appears to meet this condition; for given a probabilistic
description of rational behavior, optimality can be
described as a particular relation between preferences and
outcomes.
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The type.of optimality to be considered here must
also, however, be collective in nature, incorporating
information about the preferences of more than one player;
for behavior motivated by an individualistic concept of
value is part of the very problem addressed in this
dissertation.

A concept of value based upon the preferences

of one individual is clearly appropriate in games of chance
(games against nature) where there is only one person and
that individual's gain means a loss to no one.

Such a

concept may also be appropriate in those games of strategy
(inessential games) in which it is possible for every player
to obtain an outcome that is individually optimal, and even
in those games of strategy (games of pure coordination) in
which optimization for one player coincides exactly with
optimization for all.

However, an individualistic concept

of value is not necessarily appropriate in other games where
what is optimal for one individual is not optimal for
another.

Moreover, in an important and well-researched

class of games (known as games of Prisoner's Dilemma) which
resemble in structure many social choice problems and which,
therefore, are central to the work undertaken here, rational
behavior based upon an individualistic concept of value
inevitably results in an outcome that is less preferred on
the part of all concerned than another outcome which, given
a collective concept of value, might be obtained.
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While the concept of collective optimality appears to
be acceptable, insofar as it satisfies the stipulations
that, because of the type of problems addressed in this
dissertation, it be definable in term of information theory
(or probability theory) and that it be characterized as a
collective rather than individualistic phenomenon, there are
other reasons that make this concept even more compelling.
First there is a whole set of practical problems that make
any concept of individual or unidimensional optimality
inappropriate.

For example, any strategic theory based upon

an individualistic concept of value, if it becomes known to
more than one player, is no longer effective.

Given the

obvious motivation for and numerous real-world examples of
espionage and "intelligence," to take the individualistic
approach is, in the long run, self-defeating.
Moreover, most decision making in game-like
environments is made in a social or political context
characterized by pluralism, e.g., by a multiplicity of
decision-makers, goals and criteria, as well as conflicting
and multidimensional objectives that are subject to various
and inconsistent definitions.

In such contexts, it has

generally been recognized that the neoclassical microeconomic model of a single rational decision maker using a
unitary concept of optimization is inadequate.

The emphasis

here on collective optimization is thus very much in tune
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with the movement toward more bounded models of
rationality.l

In this regard, it should also be noted that

the foundation of this mathematical theory upon the concept
of the observer, as described in Appendix A, and upon the
measurement of imperfect and inappropriate information, as
described in Appendix B, serves to underscore the potential
of this theory for the descriptive analysis of disjointed,
incremental, remedial, situational and constrained decisionmaking.
Another consideration is ethical in nature.

While

strategic analysis in a 2-person zero-sum game, which
represents interpersonal conflict at its most extreme, may
not allow for any non-individualistic alternatives, the
morality of applying an individualistic method of evaluation
to games where some commonality of interests exists is
certainly questionable.

This is especially evident in light

of current debate over the nuclear arms race, for game
theorists using individualistic concepts of value and
rationality have played a significant role in developing and
justifying the policy of nuclear deterrence that has led to
the arms race.

John von Neumann, founder of game theory and

a member of several influential governmental advisory
committees, was a staunch advocate for this policy and even
argued at one time that the united states should launch an
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all-out preemptive nuclear attack upon the U.S.S.R.,
possibly the most horrendously genocidal policy ever
proposed in the history of human relations.
On a more theoretical note, a collectively optimal
process can be defined and implemented in such a way that it
does not lead to an outcome that is less than what any
player could expect to receive from play of a game based
upon an individualistic concept of value.

Given this

particular definition, collective optimization leads to
results that are identical to the results of individual
optimization in situations where it is possible for each
player to receive an outcome that is individually optimal,
while in other situations it sometimes leads to outcomes
that are preferred over those resulting from individual
optimization.
However, while collective optimality is an appropriate
concept for practical, ethical and theoretical reasons,
while it is characteristic of many real-world collective
communication mechanisms and a widely accepted criterion in
the literature on social welfare, it has been criticized for
being too weak, for ignoring certain distributional and
ethical issues, for disregarding human limitations with
regard to processing large amounts of information, and for
assuming that people can foresee all the possible
consequences of various alternatives. 2 While these
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limitations are all very real, it seems quite likely that
many of them can be overcome simply by adding to the
standard of collective optimality additional criteria with
distributional implications and further qualifications
concerning, for example, the kinds of preferences that are
admissible, the amount of information about the preference
relation that is applied in the choice of a pattern control,
and the degree to which a pattern of control may be
transformed between plays of a game.

These additions and

qualifications appear to be relatively minor refinements
that might be undertaken in later work once the basic
theoretical structure has been completed.

For this reason

and due to the other considerations mentioned above,
patterns of control will be evaluated in this dissertation
on the basis of whether or not they make it possible for
players in a game-like situation to behave in a manner that
can be described as collectively optimal.

Pareto Optimality
One of the oldest and most general concepts of
collective optimality was formulated by Pareto in 1897 and

G

is called, alternatively, the unanimity principle or Pareto
optimality. 3 It is based upon the concept of Pareto
preference, which is described by Sen in terms of the
following rule:

in a society with two alternative social
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situations x and y, "if at least one individual strictly
prefers to x to y, and every individual regards x to be at
least as good as y, then the society should prefer x to y.,,4
When this rule is fulfilled, x is described as Pareto-wise
better than y.

It should be noted at the outset that this

abstract formulation does not exclude the case when x and y
each consist of a probability distribution defined across
two or more social situations.

Thus Pareto preference can

be applied to "expected" outcomes resulting from "mixed"
strategies as well as to "actual" outcomes resulting from
"pure" strategies.
Pareto optimality is defined by Sen in terms of a set
of alternatives X from which choice would have to be made.
"An alternative x belonging to that set will be described as
Pareto optimal if there is not another alternative in the
set which is Pareto-wise better than x.,,5

Alternative x is

Pareto optimal, therefore, if there is no other alternative
that everyone regards to be strictly better than x.
To formalize the definition, a collective preference
relation R is first defined by means of the individual
preference relation Ri as follows:
(C. I)

where R is used to denote the binary relation of "weak"
preference (meaning "at least as good as") both in
individual and collective preference.

The relation of
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"strict" collective or Pareto preference, denoted by P, is
now defined in terms of this "weak" collective preference
relation:
xPy -> [xRy

&~(yRX)

1

(C. 2)

For any n-tuple of "weak" individual preferences, R1, ... ,R n ,
an element x 0 is pareto-optimal in 0, according to Sen, if
and only if
(C. 3 )

The set of Pareto optimal outcomes in

° is

called the Pareto

optimal set and will be denoted here by P(O,R).
The Pareto optimal set will only be nonempty if Pareto
preference is finite and transitive.

Finiteness appears to

be a behaviorally realistic assumption.

Transitivity, on

the other hand, is not as realistic an assumption in terms
of an individual preference relation.

However, since Pareto

preference is much weaker (i.e., includes many fewer
distinctions) than anyone individual preference relation,
the possibility of a Pareto preference being intransitive
(i.e., cyclical) is much lower than the probability of an
individual preference relation being intransitive.

For

intransitivity in Pareto preference to occur, e.g., for aPb,
bPc, and cPa, the "weak" preference relations of each
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individual would have to contain exactly the same
intransitivity, since
aPb <-> [Vi:

aRib

&

bPc <-> [Vi:

bR.c
l

&

cPa <-> [Vi:

cRia

&

Ji: '"" (bRia)]

3i: '"" (CRib)]
3i:--- (aRiC)]

(C. 4)
(C.5
(C. 6 )

The assumptions of finiteness and transitivity do not appear
to be unrealistic at the collective level of Pareto
preference, and therefore it can be assumed that the Pareto
optimal set will be nonempty.

Optimization
Having selected Pareto optimality as a basic standard
for the initial evaluation of patterns of control, it is now
appropriate to begin an examination of the relation between
these two concepts.

The approach taken here will be to

first analyze the actual process of optimization, that is,
to determine exactly what behavior on the part of the
players in a game, as individuals, would result in an
outcome that is pareto optimal.
formally described in Theorem 14.

This finding will be
Then, in the next section

of this appendix, the precise pattern of self-control
necessary for rational players to behave in this way will be
described, and the concept of rational behavior will be
defined in such a way that the relation between control and
Pareto optimality (assuming players to be rational) can be
formally defined as Theorem 15.
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If a game is characterized by a pattern of complete
control, i.e., where
H(O)

=

(C.7)

T(P:O)

and where that control is exercised through direct
regulation so that one player can determine whether or not
the outcome of the game is Pareto optimal, that player may
or may not act in such a way as to ensure that the outcome
of the game is, in fact, Pareto optimal.

This is because

each player is assumed to act only on the basis of that
player's preferences and has no motivation (other than what
is already incorporated into the definition of those
preferences) to choose an outcome which, while satisfying
that player's own preferences, also results in the best
possible outcome under the circumstances for all other
players.

The same holds true if complete control through

direct regulation is divided up among some or all of the
players except that, in addition, it may not be possible
even for one player to realize the outcome which would be
best for that player.

Therefore, for play of a game to

result in a Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for a
game to be characterized by some pattern of control other
than complete control through direct regulation.
G

In order to determine just what can and what cannot be
delegated to the direct control of a particular player, it
is necessary first to examine the definition of Pareto
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preference.

As between any two outcomes, one can be

identified as being Pareto-wise better than the other if
(1) every player believes the first to be at least as good
as the second and (2) at least one player regards the first
as strictly better than the second.

Clearly if, as between

a pair of outcomes over which player i has control, every
player believes the first to be at least as good as the
second, then condition

1

would be fulfilled.

If, in

addition, player i has a strict preference for the first of
these two outcomes, then condition 2 would be fulfilled.
Moreover, given the choice between strategies leading to
these two outcomes, player i would be motivated to behave in
such a way that the resulting outcome would be the Pareto
preferred outcome.
However, an outcome is defined as Pareto optimal not
if that outcome is Pareto preferred over all others but if
there is no other outcome that is Pareto preferred over the
first.

Therefore, to achieve Pareto optimal outcomes, the

pattern of control in a game must be such that each player
can ensure that if all other players believe one outcome to
be at least as good as (or even better than) a second and
that player has a strict preference for the first outcome,
o

then the second outcome would not result from play of the
game.

Put another way, Pareto optimality is ensured if the

patten of control is such that each player can limit the set
of
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possible outcomes to all outcomes except those as compared
to which there is a second outcome for which all other
players have a weak preference and that player has a strict
preference.

In this way each player will act to exclude

those outcomes that would not be Pareto optimal when the
preferences of that player, as well as all others are taken
into consideration, and play of the game will result by this
process of elimination in an outcome that is Pareto optimal.
This observation can be formally defined and shown to
be logically valid if, from the perspective of each player
i, every outcome OJ is viewed within the context of a subset
of outcomes that include OJ and any other outcome that is
viewed by all players other than i as being at least as good
as OJ.

This will be called player i's evaluation set for

Qj

outcome OJ will denoted a maximal outcome for player

.

An

i if there is no other outcome in player i's evaluation set
for OJ that is strictly preferred to OJ by player i.
Finally, all those outcomes OJ that are maximal outcomes for
player i within that player's evaluation set for OJ are to
be called the partially Pareto optimal set for player i.
Excluded from the partially Pareto optimal set for player i
will be every outcome compared to which there is another
that all players regard as being at least as good as the
first and that at least one player (player i) regards as
being strictly better than the first.

As with Pareto
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optimality, partial Pareto optimality applies to all
probabilistic mixtures of outcomes, including those in which
one outcome is believed to occur with a probability of 1.0.
The significance of this set is formally described by
Theorem 14: if P(O,R) is used to denote the Pareto optimal
set of outcomes in 0 with respect to the collective
preference relation R and if

01 is

used to denote the

partially Pareto optimal set of outcomes in 0 for player i
with respect to the collective preference relation R, where
xRy <--> [Vi:

XRiy]

(C.9 )

then the relation between the pareto optimal set and the
partially Pareto optimal set for player i, when i varies
from 1 to n, is described by the equality

oin O~()

...

()O~

=

P(O,R)

(C.lO)

This theorem can be interpreted to mean that the
Pareto optimal set is equal to the intersection of the
partially Pareto optimal sets of all players in a game.

As

an example, consider the two-person game described in
Table C.l, where the outcomes in each cell are ranked on an
ordinal scale, first with reference to the preferences of
player x and then with reference to the preferences of
player y, with an outcome ranked 3 being more preferred than
an outcome ranked 2, and so forth.

An examination of the

Pareto optimal set P(O,R) and the two partially Pareto
optimal sets O~ and O~ described below the game matrix will
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show that P(O,R) contains the outcome that is contained in
both

oi and

O~ and only that outcome.

Table C.l
PARETO AND PARTIALLY PARETO OPTIMAL SETS
IN A TWO-PERSON GAME
Y

x

a

b

c

a

1,1

1,2

1,3

b

2,1

2,2

2,3

c

3,1

3,2

3,3

op
op

X

=

Y

P(O,R)

) (3,1),(3,2),(3,3l3

i (l,3),(2,3),(3,3)J
[ (3,3)

The proof for this theorem follows from the definition
of the partially Pareto optimal set for player i.

An

outcome x is contained within the partially Pareto optimal
set for player i if and only if it is a maximal outcome with
respect to player i's evaluation set for outcome x, denoted
here by Ei(O,R,x), i.e.,
x E 01

-::> ~ [

Jy E.

Ei (0, R, X): yP i xl

(C.ll)

According to expression C.2, the strict preference relation
in C.ll can be decomposed into two conditions regarding weak
preference relations, i.e.,
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Since only one of the conditions, yR.X
and
~

~

(xR.y),
~

must be false for the statement as a whole to be true, the
first condition yRix may be either true or false so long as
the second

condition~

(XRiy) is false.

In fact, player i

may have either a strict or a weak preference for an outcome
x, as compared to the other outcomes in the evaluation set
for x, for x to be considered maximal.

So the condition

yRiX will either be false or true, respectively, while the
condition

~(XRiY)

will be false in either case.

Now by definition all the other outcomes in the
evaluation set for x are viewed to be at least as good as x
by all the players other than i, i.e.,
(C.l3 )

where m denotes all players other than i.

The logical

relationship between the preferences of this group and the
preferences of player i is such that
(C.14)
whereas
yRix & yRmX

->

yRx

(C.15)

Since the value of the first term on the left is always the
same as the value of the term on the right, the term yRix
can be generalized to yRx, thereby including all players
without altering the validity of expression C.12.

Together

with expression C.13 this implies that
xf. 0l->r--[JYE. Ei(O,R,x): yRx &~(XRiY)l

(C.16)
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All the outcomes in the game that are considered by
all players other than i to be at least as good as x are by
definition in player i's evaluation set for outcome x.
Therefore, expression C.16 can be generalized over all
outcomes in the set 0, i.e., since
~

[ J z E.

0,

¢

Ei (O,R,x): ZRmX]

(C.l?)

~

(ZRx)

(C.la)

This implies that

and thus that
(C.19)
where m is used as before to denote all players other than
i.

Expression C.16 can therefore be generalized, yielding
x ~

[j

oJ?l -:>

y E. 0: yRx

(C. 20 )

Finally, since by definition

---> xRy

Vi: xRiy

(C.21)

then for every outcome x in the intersection of the
partially Pareto optimal sets for all players i (and only
for those outcomes), expression C.20 implies that
~

[Jy f. 0:

yRx

&

r--

(xRy)]

(C.22)

Therefore, by the definition of collective preference in
C.2, expression C.22 implies that
~

[3 YE.

0: yPx]

(C.23)

which is the definition given in expression C.3 for a Pareto
optimal element x in 0.

Since expression C.22 applies to

every outcome in the intersection of all partially Pareto
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optimal sets, and to only those outcomes, this intersection
is isomorphic with the Pareto optimal set, i.e., for all
outcomes x,

xE. 01'

i=1, •••

,n

-> xE..

P(O,R)

(C. 24)

Therefore,
0i(10~(1 ... no~

= P(O,R)

(C. 25)

Q.E.D.

SELF-CONTROL

Theorem 14 clearly points toward the type of control
that is necessary for the outcome of a game to be
collectively optimal.

It is apparent from this theorem that

if the players in a game can determine that the outcome of a
game will fall within their partially-Pareto optimal set,
then, given the proper motivation, play of the game will
result in an outcome which falls within the intersection of
these sets.

This notion must now be formalized and

logically validated.
When a particular player has control over the outcomes
which that player receives, the pattern of control will be
described as involving individual self-control for player i,
i.e., when, for player i,
(C. 25)

When a group m of two or more players can be defined
as joint actors and when that group has control over their
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control will be described as involving collective selfcontrol for the group m, i.e., when, for all proper subsets
of players k in the group m,
(C.

26)

When either expression C.25 or C.26 or both hold true for
all players in the game, the pattern of control will be
described as total self-control.

When
(C.2?)

while
T(Pi:O j ) = 0.0 bits
for all players or groups i,j

m,

i~j,

(C.28)
the pattern of

control will be described as one of complete self-control
for all the players j in group m.

Finally, when expressions

C.2? and C.28 hold true for all players in a game, then the
pattern of control will be described as one of complete and
total self-control.
It is clear from the previous analysis of optimization
(and will be proven later) that the pattern of control
necessary for Pareto optimality in a game must involve some
type of self-control for the players in that game.

The

questions addressed in this section are, first, what pattern
of self-control is necessary; second, what set of outcomes
must self-control be defined over; third, what assumptions
concerning rational behavior are necessary for players in a
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game under this pattern of control to achieve Pareto
optimality; and, fourth, how much of this type of selfcontrol is necessary for rational players to achieve Pareto
optimality.

Dominance
Expression C.I0 in Theorem 14 reveals that any
nonempty subset of the intersection of all partially Pareto
optimal sets will be a Pareto optimal subset of outcomes.
Therefore, for Pareto optimality it is necessary for the
players to be able to determine that play of the game
results in some nonempty subset of each set of partially
pareto optimal outcomes.

However, it is also necessary that

the outcomes in these nonempty subsets be such that they
will motivate rational players to behave so as to ensure
that the outcome of the game will in fact fall within these
subsets.
The type of outcome that motivates a player in this
way will be described here as a dominant outcome for player
i and will be defined as an outcome in 0, the set of all
possible outcomes, resulting (by definition) from the choice
of a particular strategy on the part of each player, that is
at least as good, with respect to the preference relation of
player i, as any other outcome in 0 that would result from a
change in the strategy chosen by player i, it being assumed
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that no other player alters his strategy.

For example, in

the two-person game described in Table 61, outcomes (3,1),
(3,2) and (3,3) are all dominant outcomes for player X,
while outcomes (1,3), (2,3) and (3,3) are all dominant
outcomes for player Y.
The formal definition of a dominant outcome depends
upon prior definition of the alternative set to outcome x
for player i as a set of all the outcomes which result from
the same strategies on the part of all other players that
produce outcome x and from all possible strategies on the
part of player i, including the one that produced outcome x.
This set will be denoted here by Ai (0, x).

An outcome x can

now be defined as dominant for player i if it is viewed by
player i as being at least as good as any other outcome in
the alternative set to x for player i, i.e., an outcome x in

o is a dominant outcome for player i if and only if
(C. 29 )

An outcome will be defined as strictly dominant for
player i if it is viewed by that player as being better than
any other outcome in the alternative set to x for player i,
i.e., an outcome x in A1 (O,x) is strictly dominant if and
only if
(C.30)

The set of all outcomes in 0 that are dominant for
player i will be defined as the dominant set for player i
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and will be denoted by 0i'

If at least one outcome in that

set is strictly dominant, the dominant set will be described
as the strictly dominant set for player i and will be
denoted by o~.

Any subset of dominant outcomes that

includes at least one strictly dominant outcome will be
designated a strictly dominant set.
For example, in Table C.l all dominant outcomes are
strictly dominant.
C~2

However, in the game described in Table

the outcomes (1,3), (2,4) and (5,5) are dominant

outcomes for player x, and outcomes (3,1), (4,2), and (5,5)
are dominant for player Y, but only outcome (5,5) is
strictly dominant for each player.

The dominant set for

each of these players include this outcome and is,
therefore, the strictly dominant set as well.
Table C.2
STRICTLY DOMINANT SETS
IN A TWO-PERSON GAME
Y

X

a

b

c

a

1,1

2,1

3,1

b

1,2

2,2

4,2

c

1,3

2,4

5,5

oP x
op

=

Y

P(O,R) =

1(5,5)}

OS

1(5 ,5 )J

OS

[(5,5))

X

Y =

1(1,1), (1,2), (1,3)
(2,1), (2,2), (2,4), (5,5)}
(1,1),(2,1),(3,1),
( 1 , 2 ) , ( 2 , 2 ) , ( 4 , 2 ) , ( 5 , 5 )]

!
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Those outcomes that are partially Pareto optimal for
player i and that constitute a strictly dominant set for
player i will be referred to here as player i's strictly
dominant, partially Pareto optimal set, denoted by

oSl'

i. e. ,

(C.31)
In the games described in Tables C.1 and C.2, all partially
Pareto optimal outcomes for each player are strictly
dominant outcomes for that player.

However, when this is

not the case, players may be indifferent as between a set of
outcomes that are partially Pareto optimal and a set that
are not, or they may even prefer a set of outcomes that are
not all partially Pareto optimal.
Table C.3 is an example.

The game described in

Player Y, ·if rational, would be

motivated to choose strategy a while player X, if rational,
would be indifferent as between strategies a and b, even
though outcome (2,2), resulting from a joint strategy of aa,
is not partially Pareto optimal for either player.
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Table C.3
A TWO-PERSON GAME WHERE A PARTIALLY
PARETO OPTIMAL STRICTLY DOMINANT SET
DOES NOT EXIST FOR ONE PLAYER
Y

a

b

a

2,2

3,1

b

2,4

3,3

X

op
X
op
Y

P(O,R)

i

(2,4), (3,1), (3,

{(3,3), (2,4))

= i (2,4), (3,3)J

3)~

OS
OS

X
Y

=U
=[(2,2), (2,4))

If the game described in Table C.3 were transformed
into the game described in Table C.4, player X would be
motivated to choose strategy b, resulting in an outcome of
either (3,4) or (4,3) both of which are partially Pareto
optimal outcomes for that player.

Player Y will still be

motivated to choose strategy a, although either a or b would
result in a Pareto optimal outcome.

The effect of this

transformation is to create a strictly dominant set for
player X consisting of the partially Pareto optimal outcomes
( 3 , 4) and (4, 3 ) .
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Table C.4
A TWO-PERSON GAME WHERE A STRICTLY DOMINANT
PARTIALLY PARETO OPTIMAL SET
EXISTS FOR BOTH PLAYER
Y

a

b

a

2,2

3,1

b

3,4

4,3

X

1(3,4),(4,3l)

OS

l(4,3),(3,4)}

OS

X

op
op

Y
P(O,R)

=

t(3,4), (4,3)}

X

=

Y

~(3'4), (4,3)1
[(2,2),(3,4)J

Several other points should be noted about the
relation between strictly dominant sets, partially Pareto
optimal sets and Pareto optimality.

The first point is that

in Table C.l all the strictly dominant outcomes for both
players are also partially Pareto optimal outcomes for those
players.

However, this is not always the case.

In Table

C.2, the strictly dominant sets for the players in this game
contain outcomes that are not partially Pareto optimal for
those players.

Nevertheless, since these players can ensure

through collective self-control that the outcome of the game
will fall within their partially Pareto optimal sets, a
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Pareto optimal outcome is feasible.

Moreover, since the

partially Pareto optimal outcome they collectively control
is also strictly dominant for both players, they are
motivated to behave so as to realize this outcome.

The

distinction between individual and collective control is a
fine one in this instance, but it will be more sharply drawn
in later examples.
Conversely, while all the partially Pareto optimal
outcomes for each player in Tables C.l and C.2 are also
strictly dominant outcomes for that player, this is also not
necessary for Pareto optimality.

In the game described in

Table C.S, the strictly dominant set for both players
excludes outcome (2,3), which is a partially Pareto optimal
outcome for both players.

Nevertheless, since both players

can ensure that the outcome will fall within their strictly
dominant, partially Pareto optimal sets, they are willing
and able to act so as to realize a Pareto optimal outcome.
While the ability of all players to ensure that the
outcome will fall within their strict dominant, partially
Pareto optimal sets appears to be necessary for Pareto
optimality, there are exceptions to this general rule.
game described in Table C.4 is an example.

The

Player X is able

to ensure (by the choice of strategy b) that the outcome of
the game will fall within the partially Pareto optimal sets
of both players, while player Y is not able to ensure
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Table C.5
A TWO-PERSON GAME WITH PARTIALLY
PARETO OPTIMAL OUTCOMES THAT ARE
NOT STRICTLY DOMINANT
Y

x
op

a

b

a

2,3

1,4

b

4,1

3,2

X

op

Y
P(O,R)

=

1(1,4), (2,3), (3,2), (4,1)}

OS

[ ( 4 ,1 ) , ( 3 ,2 ) , ( 2 , 3 ) , (l , 4 )}

OS

l (1,4), (2,3), (3,2), (4,1)]

X

=

Y

l(

4 , 1) , ( 3 ,2 )}

L( 1 , 4 ) ,

( 3 , 2 )]

that the outcome will fall within the partially Pareto
optimal set for either player.

This suggests that as long

as one player is able to ensure that the outcome will fall
within that player's strictly dominant, partially Pareto
optimal set and as long as that player's partially Pareto
optimal set is identical with (or a subset of) the partially
Pareto optimal set of the other player or players, the
outcome of play will be Pareto optimal.

Thus self-control

on the part of all players is not necessary in this type of
game environment, because the partially Pareto optimal sets
of both players are identical.

This will be referred to as

a partially Pareto optimally unified environment.
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Finally, there are extreme situations where the
players cannot ensure that the outcome will fall within
their strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal sets, and
where the outcome of the game will nevertheless be pareto
optimal.

This is in the (mathematically degenerate) case,

such as in Table C.6, where all outcomes are in the
partially pareto optimal sets of all players and, thus, are
Pareto optimal.

This will be referred to as a Pareto

optimal environment.
Table C.6
A TWO-PERSON GAME WHERE THE PLAYERS
CANNOT ENSURE A STRICTLY DOMINANT
PARTIALLY PARETO OPTIMAL OUTCOME
Y

x
op
op

a

b

a

3,2

1,4

b

2,3

4,1

X

Y
P(O,R)

=

1(1,4), (2,3), (3,2), (4,1)}

OS

=

[(4,1), (3,2), (2,3), (1,4)J

OS

X

/(3,2), (4,11

Y

t(1,4), (2,3ij

[(1,4), (2,3), (3,2), (4,1)]

Theorem 14, it was noted above, suggests that if
players in a game can determine that the outcome of that
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game will fall within their partially Pareto optimal sets,
then, given the proper motivation, play of the game will
result in a Pareto optimal outcome.

The concept of a

partially Pareto optimal set has now been replaced by the
concept of a strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal
set, i.e., a set consisting of outcomes that are both
strictly dominant and partially Pareto optimal.

Analysis of

the examples described above in Table C.l through C.6
suggested the following conjecture:

assuming that all

players are motivated to obtain a dominant outcome (an
assumption to be formalized later), it appears sufficient
and, in general (i.e., except for Pareto optimal
environments and partially Pareto optimally unified game
environments) necessary for Pareto optimality that through
the exercise of self-control (either individual or
collective) all players are able to ensure that the outcome
of a game falls within their strictly dominant, partially
Pareto optimal sets.

possiblity
In order to formally prove this conjecture, it is
necessary first to describe these conditions in terms of the
relationship between a player's preferences and the outcome
of the game, i.e., in terms of control.

It will be

convenient for this purpose to ignore information about the
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outcome of a game that is irrelevant to the conditions
described above and to represent the outcome of the game by
means of oP, denoting the subset of outcomes (resulting from
a particular partition of the set of all outcomes) within
which the actual outcome resulting from play of the game
falls.

This subset will be called the possibility set, and

will be defined as two mutually exclusive sets consisting of
a primary subset OS and its compliment in the set of all
outcomes

OS.

For example, in the game decribed by Table C.6, the
possibility set for player X might be defined in terms of a
primary subset consisting of outcomes (3,2) and (4,1) and
its compliment, outcomes (2,3) and (1,4).

Each possibility

set will be referred to in terms of its primary subset.

In

this example the primary subset is the strictly dominant
partially Pareto optimal set for player X, so this
possibility set will be described as the strictly dominant,
partially pareto optimal possibilty set for player x.
It will be assumed here that associated with each of
the two alternative subsets is a probability equal to the
sum of the probabilities associated with each of the
outcomes in that

set and interpreted as measuring the

degree of belief of an observer that the outcome resulting
from play of a game will in fact fall within that set, e.g.,
S
S
(C.31)
p(O )=1.0 -> P(o E 0 )=1.0
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where

0

is used to denote the outcome resulting from play of

the game.

Since every outcome in that game must be

contained in one (and only one) of the two alternative
subsets, these probabilities will sum to 1.
It should be noted that the primary set might contain
all the outcomes in the game, in which case it would of
necessity be associated with a probability of 1.0 and the
observer's uncertainty would be equal to 0.0 bits.

In this

(mathematically degenerate) case there would be no
uncertainty to remove.
For example, Table C.? represents a game where selfcontrol is total and complete but where nothing is known
about the preferences of players X and Y.

The probability

associated with the primary subset of the possiblity set of
either player X or player Y would be 0.5, and the
uncertainty of the observer as to whether or not the outcome
would fall within these primary subsets is at a maximum of
1.0 bits.
The condition that the players in a game are capable
of determining that the outcome of the game falls within
their strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal sets can
now be formally represented using the terminology of
information theory.

To determine that the outcome of a game

falls within a certain primary subset aS of all the outcomes
in a game, the set of all players N must have complete
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Table C.7
A TWO-PERSON GAME IN THE ABSENCE OF
CONTROL OVER STRICTLY DOMINANT
PARTIALLY PARETO OPTIMAL
POSSIBILITY SETS
Y

a

a

b

(0.5)

(0.5)

1,1

(0.5)

(0.25 )

4,2
(0.25 )

b

2,4
(0.25 )

(0.25 )

X
(0.5)

oP

3,3

lOS ,OS}

T(CX:O)

=

i (2,4), (4,2)}

0

=

t (1 , 1 ) , ( 3 , 3 )]

P(OS)

=

oS
-S

TC (Cy:O)
X
T(P:OP)

0.25 + 0.25 = 0.5

1.0 bits
= 1.0

bits

H(OP)
1.0 bits

control over the possibility set defined by that primary
subset, i.e., in this case,
Hp(OP)

0.0 bits

(C.32)

and thus
(C.33)

while for players or groups i and j,
P

i~j,

T(Pi:O j ) = 0.0 bits
where

(C. 34)
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and

or

[O~, O~]

=

If the observer of the game described in Table C.7 now
believed that players X and Y would coordinate their
behavior so as to achieve the outcomes in the primary set,
(2,4) and (4,2) with a probability of 0.5 each, then the
probabilities associated with this set would increase from
0.5 to 1.0, as described below in Table C.B
Table C.B
A TWO-PERSON GAME WITH STRICTLY DOMINANT
PARTIALLY PARETO OPTIMAL POSSIBILITY
SETS UNDER CONTROL THROUGH INTERNAL REGULATION
Y

a
(0.5)

(0.5)

a
(0.5)

1,1
(0.0)

4,2
(0.5)

b

2,4
(0.5)

(0.0)

b

X

(0.5)
oP
oS
-S

loS

=

,cp]

1(2,4), (4,2))

3,3

T(CX:O)

1.0 bits

TC (Cy:O)

0.0 bits

X

0

=

P(OS)

=

I(1,1),(3,3)}

0.5 + 0.5 = 1.0

T(P:OP)

=

H(OP)

=

0.0 bits
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tables C.7 and C.B shows that, according to expression C.24,
knowledge of the preferences of the players in the game has
removed 1.0 bits of uncertainity (has provided 1.0 bits of
information) to the observer as to whether or not the
outcome would fall within the Pareto optimal set (the
primary subset of the possibility set).

A comparison of the

value of the conditional uncertainty term TC (Cy:O) in
X
tables C.7 and C.B reveals that this control has been
achieved through internal regulation.

The value of the

unconditional transmission term T(CX:O) in Table C.7 is 1.0
bits, indicating that some individual self-control (through
direct regulation) as well as other-control is possible at
that pOint.

The value of this term in Table C.B is still

1.0 bits, indicating that after the behavior of players X
and y has been coordinated, the determination of a
particular joint strategy can also be represented as
individual control through direct regulation.
Finally, if outcomes in the strictly dominant
partially Pareto optimal set for both players are
represented by

0

and outcomes not in that set are

represented by n, the value of the transmission term
T(OX:Oy) in Table C.9 shows that at the start of the game
the outcomes for the two players, defined in this way, are
identical.

Thus they can be represented as a joint outcome.
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A TWO-PERSON GAME WITH INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES
y

x

a
(0.5)

b
(0.5)

a
(0.5)

n,n
(0.25)

(0.25)

b
(0.5)

(0.25)

T(OX:Oy)
Tc (Cx:O x )
y
TC (Cx:O y )
y
T(P:OP)

0,0

=

=

0,0

n,n
(0.25 )

1.0 bits

oP

1.0 bits

osp

1.0 bits

osp

=

{OSp ,aSP}

I (O,O)}
=

{ (n,n))

H(OP)
=

1.0 bits

The conditional transmission terms indicate that the
potential for collective control over the outcome of the
game for player X is equal to the potential for collective
control over the outcome of the game for player y, and since
the possibility sets for players X and Yare identical, this
control can only be exercised over the joint outcomes, i.e.,
collective control over the outcome for one player cannot be
exercised separately from collective control over the
outcome for the other player.
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It is apparent that in this case no information is
lost by collapsing the representation of the four individual
outcomes in Table C.g into two joint outcomes as in Table
C.lO.
Table C.lO
A TWO-PERSON GAME WITH JOINT OUTCOMES
Y

a
(0.5)

n

a

x

oP

(0 •5 )

(0.25 )

b
(0.5)

(0.25 )

=

osp
osp

=

0

b
(0.5)

o
(0.25)

n
(0.25)

i Osp , aSP}

0.0 bits

to

1

1.0

[n

1

H(OP)

bits

1.0 bits

Therefore, the pattern of potential control in this game can
be characterized as complete and total collective selfcontrol over the strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal
possibility set for the group of players X and Y.
Expressions C.32 and C.33 thus indicate that if the
players have complete and total self-control over a certain
possibility set, uncertainty regarding that possibility set
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is completely removed when the preferences of the players
are known.
However, in the case where the observer is uncertain
about the possibility set and that uncertainty is completely
removed by knowledge of player i's preferences, expression
C.33 does not describe how this uncertainty is removed

(i.e., the role of strategies in the process), nor does it
specify how this particular possibility set is defined, or
whether the outcome of the game falls within the primary
subset or its compliment.

Therefore, to further specify

this expression, it is necessary to examine the relation
between the choice of a strategy by player i and the outcome
of the game.
In game theory, there is no direct relation between
preferences and outcomes; that is, whether a player prefers
an outcome or not has no relation to the outcome of the
game, independent of the play of the game through the choice
of strategies by all players.

Information transmitted from

a player's preferences to the possibility set must flow
through the choice of a strategy by that player.
As was demonstrated by Theorem 12 in Appendix B,
regulation sets an upper limit on control and, therefore,
complete control requires perfect regulation.

Expression

C.33 thus implies that
(C.35)
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and therefore
(C.36)

where
oi =fos,

o~,

i=1,2 ... ,n

The signficiance of this pattern of regulation can be
formally described as Lemma #1:

if the possibility set oi

is defined in terms of player i's strictly dominant,
partially pareto optimal set 0 spi and if -sp
0 i is defined as
the complement of oS1 in 0, i.e.,
V~E6s1:XEO, x ~osl

(C.37)

the probability associated with oS1' conditional upon C,
will be either 1.0 or 0.0, i.e.,
(C.38)

and, conversely,
(C.39)

This expression indicates that complete self-control over a
possibility set consisting of a player's strictly dominant,
partially pareto optimal set and its compliment in 0 implies
that the probability of the outcome falling within that
strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal set will be
either 1.0 or 0.0.
Expression C.39 follows from the definition of
HC(O

P

i)'

Le.,

Hc(Oi) = -[p(Oilc) log2 p(oil C)

(C. 40 )
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The term on the right-hand side of this expression will be
equal to zero only when p(oPlc) is equal to 0.0 or 1.0,
i. e.

I

versa.

when p(oslc) equals 1.0 and p(osl C) equals 0.0 or visa
This is because

o

(c. 41 )

and by convention
(C.42)

Lemma #1 can be illustrated by reference to the game
described above in Table C.B.

Choice of the jOint

strategies (a,b) and (b,a), each with a probability of 0.5,
means that the probability of the outcome falling within the
strictly dominant partially pareto optimal set is equal to
one, and the observer's unceftainty regarding the strictly
dominant partially Pareto optimal set for each player has
been reduced to zero.

However, this would also be the case

if the players had chosen either or both of the joint
strategies (a,a) and (b,b) with the result being that the
outcome would fall outside of both strictly dominant
partially Pareto optimal sets with a probability of one.

Rationality
It is necessary at this point to introduce the concept
of rationality, without which it is impossible to know
whether a player who has control over a strictly dominant,
partially Pareto optimal possibility set will use this

-533-

control to ensure that the outcome of the game will fall
within the strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal set
or not.

In order to characterize Pareto optimal outcomes it

was necessary to assume that each player in a game has an
intuitive sense of preference as between all pairs of
possible outcomes.

This assumption can be extended to apply

to all pairs of probability distributions defined over any
set of possible outcomes.

Now in order to predict whether

or not a player will behave so that a Pareto optimal outcome
might be realized, it is necessary to assume that if players
are rational and if they are faced with a choice between
strategies leading to two different outcomes (or probabiilty
distributions defined over

a set of outcomes) as between

which they prefer one over the other., they will behave in
such a way that the outcome that they prefer will be
realized.
If, in addition, each player's preference for one or
another outcome can be represented by a numerical utility
measure that is determined up to a linear transformation,
then this notion of rationality also implies that a player's
preference for any probabilistic mixture of outcomes can be
represented by the expected utility of that mixture and that
rational players will behave in a way that appears to
maximize that expected utility.
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However, the definition of rationality proposed here
is more general than the maximization of expected utility,
in that it allows for temporal and psychological factors to
effect a player's preferences for risky outcomes.

On the

other hand, the concept of rationality proposed here is less
powerful than the maximization of expected utility, in that
it requires that the preferences of players for risky
outcomes be described by an observer, whereas they can be
inferred from a player's preferences for actual outcomes if
these preferences are assumed to be risk neutral.
Nevertheless, it does not appear unrealistic to require this
additional information, inasmuch as people are regularly
confronted by and make choices between risky outcomes; and
when they do so, they typically consider their preferences
for expected outcomes in light of such factors as their time
horizon and their preference for risk-taking.
Some authors such as Luce and Raiffa take the
maximization of expected utility to be entirely tautological
in character, in the sense that the postulate does not
describe behavior but it does describe the word
"preference."
preference."

Behavior is thus equivalent to "revealed
However, in the approach taken here, a clear

distinction is drawn between behavior and preference.

The

additional assumption of rational behavior is necessary then
in order to preclude the possibility of irrational behavior.
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Clearly if one player were physically forced by another to
choose a strategy that did not maximize that first player's
utility, this behavior might appear to be irrational, and
the distinction between preference and behavior would be
clear.

Similarly, if a player's "personality" were not well

integrated and one part of that player's personality
"forced" the choice of a strategy which did not maximize
expected utility, as perceived by another part of that
player's personality, this behavior would appear to be
perverse, self-destructive or self-defeating.
It is quite common, for example, for people to have a
preference for an objective such as to lose weight and yet
occasionally to behave in a way that clearly is inimical to
the realization of that objective, such as to eat a large
piece of cake.

Such behavior will be characteri·zed here not

in terms of a change in preference, nor in terms of a lack
of knowledge about the effect of eating cake upon body
weight but, rather, in terms of a temporary lapse of
rationality due to the momentary overpowering force of a
physical drive (e.g., hunger), social convention (e.g., for
a dinner guest not to refuse food that is served), or
psychological obession (e.g., bulemia).
These quite real physical, social and psychological
situations have a theoretical counterpart in that the choice
of a strategy leading to an outcome in the strictly dominant
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set is not necessitated by the fact that self-control over
that player's strictly dominant possbility set may be
complete.

In this dissertation, therefore, it will be

assumed that a rational player will behave in a way that can
be described as maximizing that player's expected utility
or, more generally, as realizing that player's preferred
outcomes.
To make this rather loose conceptualization more
precise, it is useful to formally describe rationality in
Definition #1:

Let Cij denote one of m individual (or
joint) strategies (or probability distributions defined over

a set of strategies) available to player i in a game.

If

the probability that the outcome resulting from the
selection of Cij will fall within player i's dominant set is
equal to 1.0, then it is rational for player i to select
strategy Cij with a probability of 1.0, i.e.,
(C.43)
p(Odl Cij ) = 1.0 -> P(C ij ) = 1.0
Since the dominant set for a player in a game with at least
one strictly dominant outcome for that player is in fact the
strictly dominant set for that player, it is also true that

p(osi Cij ) = 1.0 -:> P(C ij ) = 1.0
(C.44)
The rationale behind this definition is that given rational
players and given conditional probabilities of 1.0 in
expression C.43 (or C.44), the probability of realizing an
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outcome in the (strictly) dominant set will also be 1.0,
i.e.,

(C.45)

and
(C.46)

In the case of players whose preferences are risk-neutral,
it is rational for players to select strategy Cij , with a
probability of one as long as the probability of realizing
an outcome in the strictly dominant set is high enough for
the expected value of the outcome to be greater than any
other alternative.

However, in general, when preferences

are not risk-neutral, then preferences must be defined over
the resulting distribution of probabilities in order to
determine which is preferred.

Otherwise the observer would

not be confident that the players were able to ensure an
outcome that was Pareto optimal.
This definition now makes it possible to formally
describe the relation between self-control and Pareto
optimality by Theorem 15:

If the pattern of control in a

game is such that, for all players or groups i,
(C.47)

where
(C.4S)
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(C.49)
then play of the game will result in an outcome such that
P(oE.P(O,R))

=

1.0

(C.SO)

This theorem can be interpreted to mean that from the
point of view of an observer of a game, complete and total
self-control by rational players or groups of rational
players over their strictly dominant, partially Pareto
optimal possibility sets will result, with absolute
certainty, in a Pareto optimal outcome.

More simply stated,

Theorem 15 means that collective optimality requires
complete and total self-control.
The proof for this theorem incorporates the proofs for
theorems 12 and 14, Lemma 1 and the definition of
rationality.

As was demonstrated by Theorem 12, the pattern

of control described by expression C.31 implies that
T(C:O P ) = H(OP)

(C. 51)

and thus that
HC(OP)

=

0.0 bits

(C.S2)

As was demonstrated in the proof for Lemma 1, this
expression implies that
P(Op

=

osplc)

=

1.0 or 0.0

(C.S3)
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strategies that are chosen.

Since, by definition in

expression C.30,
P(Osl?)
2" P(O~)
].
].
then for all players i, and the specific set of strategies C

p(oslICij)~ P(O~

Cij )

(C.54)

Therefore, if
(C. 55)
i t implies that

p (O~ C ij )

I

(C.56)

1. 0

=

where P(O~ICij) denotes the probability that the outcome of
the game will fall within the strictly dominant set for all
players i, given the choice of the specific strategies Cij
by those players.
Given expression C.56, the definition of rational
behavior as described in expression C.42 implies that, for
all i,

P(C ij )

(C.57)

1.0

=

and this together with expression C.53 implies that, for all
i,

sp
p(O i)

(C.58)

1.0

=

This and expression C.lO in Theorem 14 in turn imply that
p(P(O,R»

=

1.0

(C.59)

or, more precisely, that
p(O EO. P(O,R»

=

1.0

(C.60)
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where

0

denotes the outcome of play of the game.
Q.E.D.

Theorem 15 provides answers to the four questions with
which this section began.

First, the pattern of self-

control that is necessary, in general, for Pareto optimality
on the part of all players or groups of players is shown to
be (individual or collective) self-control on the part of
all players or groups.

Second, this self-control must be

defined over the strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal
possibility sets of all these individuals and groups.
Third, to achieve Pareto optimality under this pattern of
control, each player or group of players must be rational,
in the sense that each player or group will behave so as to
realize an outcome that is dominant..

Finally, to ensure

that the outcome of a game will be Pareto optimal, it is
necessary for self-control to be complete.

Collective Communication
Theorem 15 makes it clear that rational players in a
game will behave so as to realize a Pareto optimal outcome
if the game environment, including the pattern of control,
makes such an outcome possible.

However, when the game

environment does not facilitate such an outcome, rational
players may behave in such a way as to realize a Pareto
suboptimal outcome, i.e., an outcome that is less preferred
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find to be at least as good as the first.

In this section

of Appendix C, the paradox of rational players behaving in
an apparently irrational manner will be transcended by
raising analysis to the level of the metagame, defined here
as a game about the pattern of control in a basic game.
In theorems 16 and 17 it will be shown that given a
metagame with the necessary pattern of control, rational
players will behave so as to impose upon the basic game a
pattern of control sufficient for those players to achieve a
Pareto optimal outcome whenever such a result is not
possible prior to play of the metagame.

The significance of

these theorems for a mathematical theory of collective
communication is that rational behavior at this level of
analysis can be interpreted as the collective communication
of social choice messages.

Exposition of the mathematical

theory will conclude with the articulation of two
corollaries to Theorem 17, in which the level of analysis is
raised to yet another meta level.
The problem of achieving a Pareto optimal outcome can
be illustrated in its simplest form by a game of pure
coordination, such as the one described in Table C.11.
In this table, the outcomes are represented by the signed,
ordinal numbers 1 and -1.

If the players X and Yare unable

to coordinate their behavior, an observer might believe that
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A GAME OF PURE COORDINATION IN THE
ABSENCE OF CONTROL
y

x

a
(0.5)

b
(0.5)

a
(0.5)

1,1
(0.25)

-1,-1
(0.25 )

b
(0.5)

-1,-1
(0.25)

1,1
(0.25)
T(CX:O)
TC (Cy:O)
X
H(O

)

=

1.0 bits
1.0 bits

- 2.0 bits

the probability of achieving an optimal outcome of (1,1) is
the same as the probability of achieving a suboptimal
outcome, i.e., 0.5.

In order to coordinate their behavior,

players X and Y need to exercise the potential for
collective control (through internal regulation) that is
indicated by the value of the conditional transmission term
TC (Cy:O).

There are several ways to doing this.

In the

X

first place, if the moves in this game can be alternated,
transforming the game into a majorant game for, say, player
X, then player X, knowing that y has chosen strategy a (or
b) can choose strategy a (or b, respectively) and thus
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realize the optimal outcome.

Alternatively, one player, say

Y, could tell player X that Y was going to choose strategy a
(or b).

Knowing this, player X could choose strategy a (or

b, respectively), and the optimal outcome would obtain.
Finally, the players could agree to choose the joint
strategy aa or bb or some probability distribution defined
across these two joint strategies, once again making it
possible to realize the optimal outcome.

The Metagame
In order to analyze the ability of players such as X
and Y to coordinate their behavior in these ways, a formal
representation of the process through which they achieve
coordination is necessary.

One such representation is by

means of a second game, to be defined here as a metagame in
relation to the first, which will now be referred to as the
basic game.

The metagame has as its strategies the options

of agreeing or not agreeing with one or another of the
actions described above that could be taken to achieve
coordination in the basic game.

One example of such a

metagame is described in Table C.12, where the strategy
labeled agree could denote agreement with the proposition
that player Y should move before player X, that player Y
should describe Y's intended choice of strategies before
player X does, or that both player Y and X should choose
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strategy a or b or some probabilistic mixture of these joint
strategies.
Table C.12
A METAGAME WITH TWO RESULTING BASIC GAMES
Metagame

y

AGREE

x

DISAGREE

AGREE

Basic Game 112

Basic Game III

DISAGREE

Basic Game III

Basic Game III

Basic Game 112A
(Prior to play by X)

Basic Game 112B
(Prior to play by X orY)

Y

Y

a
(1. 0)

b
(0.0)

a
(0.5)

1,1
(0.5)

0,0
(0.0)

b
(0.5)

-1,-1
(0.5)

1,1
(0.0)

X

T(CX:O)
TC (Cy:O)
X

1.0
0.0

H(C) - 1.0 bits

a
(0.5)

b
(0.5)

a
(0.5)

1,1
(0.5)

-1,-1
(0.0)

b
(0.5)

-1,-1
(0.0)

1,1
(0.5)

T(CX:O)
TC (Cy:O)
X

=

1.0
0.0

H(O)

=

1.0 bits

The outcomes of this metagame constitute various
versions of the basic game.

If either X or Y disagree, the

-545outcome will be a game identical to that described in Table
C.ll (Basic Game #1).

However, if X and Y both agree, the

result will be either Basic Game #2A or Basic Game #2B,
depending upon the content of the agreement.

If they agree

that Y should move first or that Y's intentions should be
declared first and if Y intends to choose strategy a, the
result will be as described in Basic Game #2A, with only the
strategy of X in doubt.

Clearly, in this case, it would be

rational for X to choose strategy a, resulting in a optimal
outcome as described in Table C.13.

On the other hand, if

players X and Y agree to choose the joint strategies aa and
bb with probabilities of, say, 0.5 each, the result will be
as described in Basic Game #2B.

It is clear from this game

that both players must choose either a or b together, but
the question of which specific joint strategy will be chosen
in anyone play of the basic game has yet to be made.
Moreover, an analysis of how this question is resolved will
require a second metagame.

If the result of that metagame

was that both X and Y would choose strategy a, the outcome
would once again be as described in Table C.13.
It might also be apparent that the specific content of
the metagame described in Table C.12 could be represented by
a higher-order metagame whose strategies describe something
like proposals for the "agenda" of the lower-order metagame.
In contexts other than that of a game of pure coordination,
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Table C.l3
BASIC GAME *2A AND *2B
(AFTER PLAY BY X AND Y)
Y

a
(1.

b

0)

(0.0)

a

1,1

(1. 0)

(1. 0)

-1,-1
(0.0)

b

-1,-1
( 0 .0)

1,1
(0.0)

X

(0.0)

T(CX:O)

0.0

TC (Cy:O) = 0.0
X
H( 0

)

- 0.0 bits

i.e., where players may have something to lose just in the
way the agenda for a lower-order metagame is set, a whole
series of higher-order metagames may be required.

Nations

negotiating a treaty often have many rounds of prior
negotiations to decide upon such details as what the shape
of the table across which they confer shall be.

However,

ultimately--and in the case of a game of pure coordination,
immediately prior to the definition of the first metagame-the players will reach a level where one player will define
a metagame that the other agrees to.

This may simply be due

to one player speaking first, one player speaking louder or
one player making a better suggestion that is recognized as
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such by the other.

In any case, the determination of which

player moves first at this level of play can best be
represented as a chance move in a game of pure coordination
such as that described in Table C.ll.

The Supergame
The metagame and its basic games are thus two parts of
a compound game which are played sequentially.

when the

information provided by play of the metagame is sufficient
to determine behavior in the basic game, they may be
combined into a supergame whose strategies are those of the
metagame but whose outcomes are those of the basic game
associated with the corresponding sets of metastrategies.
For example, by assuming that the outcome of the basic game
of pure coordination in Table C.ll will always be ranked
below the outcome of the basic game in Table C.13, the
supergame created by combining the metagame in Table C.12
with these basic games can be described as in Table C.14,
where the probabilities indicate the behavior of rational
players according to Theroem 15.
Play of the metagame provides additional information
for the observer about the basic game.

In the example

described above, the additional information concerned the
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Table C.14
A TWO-PERSON SUPERGAME
Y

AGREE

DISAGREE

(1. 0 )

(0 •0 )

AGREE

1,1

-1,-1

(1. 0 )

(1. 0)

(0.0)

DISAGREE

-1,-1

-1,-1

(0 •0 )

(0.0)

(0.0)

X

osp
osp

X

Y

=

i

=

[(1,1)1

(1,1,)

P(O,R)
P(P(O,R) )

=

[(1,1)

J

1.0

strategy that was chosen by player Y, the strategy that is
to be chosen by player Y or the mixed joint strategy that is
to be chosen by players X and Y.

In general, the

information provided to an observer through play of a
metagame can be interpreted as the content of a social
choice message, and play of the metagame can be interpreted
as the collective communication of that message.

No matter

whether players X and Y communicate through a written, oral
or nonverbal medium, their agreement must be communicated
through a message, and since the substance of the message
concerns the relative behavior of both players, this message
can be characterized as a social choice message.

The
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concept of a message used here is of an intentional,
conventionally coded symbolic or representational event, but
communication of such a message might be either explicit,
e.g., by taking a vote or exchanging written notes, or
implicit, e.g., by player Y rushing to choose a strategy
first or to announce an intended choice first in
anticipation that player X would implicitedly agree to wait
until Y had chosen or to remain silent until Y had finished
speaking.
Interestingly, from this perspective there appears to
be a collective aspect to nearly all communications,

in the

sense that the distribution of any message usually requires
an agreement of some sort on the part of both sender and
receiver to participate in that communication process.

In

the example describe above, whether the communication is
explicit or implicit, the message concerns the relation
between the two players, and it cannot be communicated
except through the collective action of both players.
Play of a metagame not only involves the collective
production and distribution of a message.

At times, it may

also describe the collective enforcement of that message.
In the game of pure coordination described in Table C.ll, no
enforcement of the collectively communicated message is
necessary, for the players interests are identical.

The
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However,

consider the game of Prisoner's Dilemma described in Table
C.15.
Table C.15
PRISONERS' DILEMMA PRIOR TO PLAY
Y

x

a
(0.5)

b
(0.5)

a
(0.5)

1,1
(0.25 )

-2,2
(0.25 )

b
(0.5)

2,-2
(0.25)

-1,-1
(0.25)

T(CX:O)

1.0 bits

TC (Cy:O) = 1.0 bits
X

H(O )

=

2.0 bits

To ensure a Pareto optimal outcome, the players must avoid
the situation where both choose strategy b.

Nevertheless,

if through the play of a metagame the players agree, say, on
the selection of the joint strategy aa, they would both have
an incentive to unilaterially "defect" from that agreement
and choose strategy b, as described in Table C.16.
Something more is needed here to enforce the agreement and
thereby ensure collective optimality.
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Table C.16
PRISONERS' DILEMMA AFTER PLAY
Y
a

b

(0.0)

(1. 0)

a

1,1

(0.0)

(0.0)

(0.0)

2,-2

-1,-1

(0.0)

(1. 0)

-2,2

X

b
(1. 0)

osp
X

osp

Y

=

1(2,-2)1

P(O,R)

=

{(-2,2)j

P(P(O,R) )

=

1(2,-2), (1,1), (-2,2)1
0.0

There are a variety of enforcement mechanisms which
differ in the degree to which the sanctions to be imposed
are separated from the game itself.

The most integrated

form of sanction is achieved by making it impossible for one
player to choose strategy b without the other player being
informed of that choice and having the option of choosing
either a or b, even if that other player had already
"chosen" strategy a.

This form of sanction can be applied

to many real-world situations including, for example, that
from which the game derives its name.

This is because it is

possible at almost any point in the process of litigation
for a suspect or defendent to confess to a crime, but once a
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confession has been made it cannot be withdrawn.

In this

situation, if one player defects (by confessing), the other
would have an incentive to defect as well, resulting in a
new set of conditional probabilities such as that described
in Table C.17.
Table C.17
PRISONERS' DILEMMA UNDER CONDITIONS OF
SIMULTANEOUS DEFECTION
y

a

b

(0.5)

(0 .5 )

a

1,1

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.0)

2,-2

-1,-1

(0.0)

(0.5)

-2,2

X

b
(0.5)

Thus, both players would, in effect, be involved in a
metagame through which they could either agree or not agree
to choose joint strategy aa.

Disagreement would result in a

choice of the joint strategy bb.

The rational behavior of

players in this situation, according to Theorem 15, is
described by the supergame in Table C.la, and although a
collectively communicated agreement would not be selfenforcing, it can be seen that the threat of mutual or
simultaneous defection would be sufficient to enforce an
agreement.
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Table C .18
A SUPERGAME OF PRISONER'S DILEMMA
UNDER CONDITIONS OF SIMULTANEOUS DEFECTION

y

AGREE

AGREE

x

(1.

a)

osp

x
Y

1,1

-1,-1

=

a)

(0.

-1,-1

(0. a)

osp

(0. a )

(1.

DISAGREE

DISAGREE

(1. a)

a)

-1,-1

(0. a)

f(l,l}\

P(O,R}

[(1,1)]

p(P(O,R}}

(0.

a)

=

[(1,1}}
1.0

This situation illustrates several characteristics
required for successful enforcement of a collectively
communicated message.

First, successful enforcement

requires that information about the enforcement mechanism be
communicated by means of a message, namely a threat, in this
case of mutual or simultaneous defection.

Second,

successful enforcement requires that this threat be
credible, i.e., lead to outcomes for the enforcer such that
selection of this as a strategy would be rational.

Thirdly,

Successful enforcement requires that the enforcement
mechanism be effective, i.e., lead to outcomes for the
player whose behavior is being enforced such that selection
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of the strategy agreed upon would be rational.

Thus a

credible and effective enforcement mechanism transforms a
collectively suboptimal game into one which is collectively
optimal.

Finally, it is worth noting that when players in a

game are rational, successful enforcement means that
credible and effective sanctions may have to be communicated
but will not have to be applied.
In the case where mutual defection is not possible, it
may be that the game is played more than once.

In this

situation, either player could threaten that if the other
player defects on one play of the game, the first player
will defect on enough subsequent plays to make the combined
outcome less than what the outcome would have been if the
second player had not defected in the first place.

As long

as the strategy of subsequent defection on the part of the
first player would not make that player's combined outcome
less preferred than the combined outcome resulting from some
other strategy, the threat of subsequent defection will be
both credible and effective.
For example, suppose each player threatens that if the
other player defects, the first will also defect on all
subsequent plays until the second player has chosen strategy
a again, at which point the first player will also switch
back to strategy a.

Each player is in effect faced with a

choice between metastrategies including, on the one hand,
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the choice of some mixture of strategies.

One of the great

number of possible mixed strategies might be to pick
strategy b 50 times in a row at some point in every 100
plays of the game.

The basic games resulting from the

choice of these two metastrategies by one of the players are
described in Table C.19.

If the preferences of each player
Table C.19

BASIC GAMES RESULTING FROM TWO METASTRATEGIES
Basic Game *1:

Agree (with pure choice of strategy A)
y

a

b
(0.0)

(1. 0 )

x

a

1,1

( 1. 0 )

(1. 0 )

-2,2
(0.0)

b
(0.0)

2,-2
(0.0)

-1,-1
(0.0)

Basic Game *2:

Disagree (and choice of a mixed strategy)
y

a
(0.5)

b
(0.5)

a
(0.5)

1,1
(0.49)

-2,2
(0.01)

b
(0.5)

2,-2
(0.01)

-1,-1
(0.49)

X
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for the combination of outcomes (including the effect of
discounting outcomes to be realized in the future) is less
than the preference of that player for the consistent
realization of the outcome denoted as 1, and if the outcome
resulting from both players' choosing the second strategy is
even less preferred than the outcome resulting from one
player's choosing the second strategy, then the resulting
supergame can be described as in Table C.20.
Table C.20
A PARTIAL SUPERGAME DESCRIBING PRISONER'S DILEMMA
UNDER CONDITIONS OF SUBSEQUENT DEFECTION
y

DISAGREE

AGREE
(1. 0)

(0.0)

AGREE

1,1

-1,-1

(1. 0 )

(1. 0)

(0.0)

DISAGREE

-1,-1

-2,-2

(0.0)

(0.0)

(0.0)

X

osp
X

Osp
Y

1(1,1)1

P(O,R)

((1,1))

p(P(O,R) )

=

((l,l)J
1.0

The metastrategies have been described here in terms of
agreement with the pure choice of strategy a.
These threats will always be credible, given the
definition of outcomes in Prisoner's Dilemma, but it is
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possible that the specific threat described here will not
always be effective.

Where it is not effective, each player

need only increase the sanction, i.e., the number of times
the other player must suffer unilateral defection on the
part of the first player, to an appropriate level.
It should be noted that Basic Game *2 described in
Table C.19 could also describe a Prisoner's Dilemma under
conditions of simultaneous defection where the probability
with which the threat will be carried out is 0.98.

This

formulation would allow, thus, for realistic modeling of
uncertainties regarding the credibility of threats.
Finally, in the case where the threat of simultaneous
or subsequent defection is not possible, not effective or
not credible, it may be possible for players to enforce an
agreement through the threat of separate sanctions.

This

threat can be represented by a compound game in which the
second component is a one-person game whose outcomes
represent sanctions entirely separate from the basic game.
If the combined outcomes of the supergame are such that such
a threat is both effective and credible, the agreement will
be enforced.

If, in the example of Prisoner's Dilemma

described in Table C.15, a separate sanction were to be
associated by both players with unilateral defection on the
part of the other player, the outcomes of the resulting
supergame might be ranked as in Table C.21
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A SUPERGAME DESCRIBING PRISONER'S DILEMMA
TOGETHER WITH SEPARATE SANCTIONS
Y

AGREE

DISAGREE

(1. 0)

(0.0)

AGREE

1,1

-2,-1

(1. 0 )

(1. 0)

(0.0)

DISAGREE

-1,-2

-3,-3

(0.0)

(0.0)

(0.0)

X

osp
osp

X

Y

=

(1,1)1

P(O,R)

[(I,ll)

p(P(O,R) )

[(1,1)}
1.0

Through this supergame, each player gains complete selfcontrol over the strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal
possibility set, and according to Theorem 15, play of the
game by rational players will result in a Pareto optimal
outcome with a probability of 1.0.
Consider also the case where the threat of
simultaneous or subsequent mutual defection is simply not
credible, as in Table C.22.

In the game of "chicken" the

outcome upon which an agreement might focus is not a
dominant outcome.

Moreover, neither is the outcome which

would result from mutual defection (-2,-2).

Thus both
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Table C.22
A GAME OF CHICKEN
y

a

x

a

1,1

-1,2

b

2,-1

-2,-2

{(2,-1), (-1,2)}
=

b

P(O,R) =

[ ( 2 , -1 ) , ( 1 , 1 ) , ( -1 , 2 )J

{(-1,2), (2,-1))

players have an incentive to defect from an agreement to
choose (1,1), but once one player has defected, the other
has no incentive to defect as well, undermining the
credibility of any threat of such a move.

However, if a

separate sanction is associated with unilateral defection,
the game in Table C.22 might be transformed into the
supergame in Table C.23, in which a Pareto optimal outcome
would be achieved.
It is apparent from these examples, that a
collectively suboptimal basic game may be transformed into a
collectively optimal sugergame through the play of a
metagame which, if the basic game is one of pure
coordination, represents the collection communication of
social choice messages about behavior in that game, and, if
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Table C.23
A SUPERGAME DESCRIBING CHICKEN
TOGETHER WITH SEPARATE SANCTIONS
Y

a

b

(1. 0 )

( 0.0)

a

1,1

-1,-1

(1. 0)

(1. 0)

(0.0)

b

-1,-1

-2,-2

(0.0)

(0 •0 )

(0.0)

X

osp
X

1(1,1)1

P(O,R)

Y

1(1,1)}

p(P(O,R))

osp

{(1,1)}
= 1.0

the basic game is not one of pure coordination, represents
the collective communication of social choice messages about
behavior and about simultaneous defection, subsequent
defection or separate sanctions.
In the case where a metagame describe separate
sanctions in addition to an agreement concerning behavior in
the basic game, the outcomes of the supergame describe the
costs attributable to the administration of sanctions in
addition to the outcomes of the corresponding basic game.
This might seem to set enforcement through separate
sanctions apart from other methods of enforcement as
qualitatively different, despite the fact that all methods
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depend fundamentally upon messages.

However, it is

important to note that communication too is costly or at
least is not cost-free.

The cost of playing a basic game is

incorporated into the description of the outcomes of that
game.

Likewise, the costs of playing a metagame, when

analyzed together with the basic game, i.e., as a supergame,
must be incorporated into the outcomes of the corresponding
sugergame, whether or not the metagame involves separate
sanctions.

For purposes of exposition, this fact was

overlooked in discussing the game described in Table C.14,
when the outcomes of the supergame were said to be identical
to the outcomes of the corresponding basic games.

However,

when costs are taken into account, the outcomes of a
supergame (interval-level outcomes, not, perhaps, their
ordinal rankings) will always differ, however slightly, from
the outcomes of the corresponding basic games.

It is

important to realize, therefore, that the outcome of a basic
game will always be preferred to the corresponding outcome
of a supergame due to the added costs of playing the
metagame prior to playing that basic game.
The concept of a metagame is not a new one.

However,

the formulation of a metagame presented here differs in
several important ways from those presented by others such
as Howard, Fraser and Hipel, and Brams. 7 The metagames of
these authors are limited to majorant games, in which one

-562-

player chooses prior to the other, whereas this formulation
allows for players to choose either successively or
simultaneously.

The other metagames are limited to

conditional strategies defined over some finite (usually
small) number of iterations of a game, either successive
plays of the game, as in Howard's version, or through a
pregame, disclosure phase followed by play of the game, as
in Brams' version.

The formulation presented here, by

contrast, can be applied to joint (simultaneous) strategies,
including any probablistic mixture of them as well as to
conditional (alternating) strategies, defined over any
number of successive iterations.

Finally, the metagames of

both Howard and Brams are combined with the basic game into
what has been called here a supergame, thus making further
interpretation or analysis of the structural properties and
costs of the metagame itself impossible.

The Ultragame
There are two distinctions based upon the analysis of
the properties and costs of metagames and supergames that
are important in the mathematical theory of collective
communication proposed here.

The first distinction is

between metagames whose structure makes it possible for
rational players to impose a pattern of control upon the
basic game sufficient for them to realize a Pareto optimal
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outcome in the supergame and those whose structure does not
facilitate such an outcome.

These two types of metagames

will be designated collectively optimal and collectively
suboptimal metagames, respectively.
The second distinction is between collectively optimal
metagames whose costs, when incorporated into the outcomes
of the supergame, are not so great as to change the outcomes
of a collectively suboptimal basic game to the extent that
the collectively suboptimal outcome of that basic game is
viewed by any player or group of players as better than the
collectively optimal outcome of the supergame and those
metagames whose costs are too great in that regard.

These

metagames will be described as efficient and inefficient
respectively.
The distinction between the outcomes of the basic game
and those of the supergame and the possibility of an
inefficient metagame suggest that it may be useful to
characterize a fourth type of game, namely, a game through
which players can collectively choose whether to play a
supergame or stick to the corresponding basic game.

Because

the outcomes of this game describe both the metagame and the
basic game, it is not just another level of metagame.
Therefore, it will be designated here as an ultragame.
For example, if the game described in Table 78 is the
supergame and if the metagame incorporated within that
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supergame is efficient, then the corresponding ultragame
will appear as in Table C.24.
Table C.24
AN ULTRAGAME WITH STRATEGIES DENOTING PRISONER'S
DILEMMA AS BOTH A BASIC GAME AND A SUPERGAME
y

SUPERGAME

BASIC GAME

(1. 0 )

(0.0)

SUPERGAME

1,1

-1,-1

(1. 0)

(1. 0)

(0 •0 )

-1,-1

-1,-1

(0.0)

(0.0)

X

BASIC GAME
(0.0)

Osp

X

osp
Y

{(1,1)}

P(O,R)

((1,1)]

P(P(O,R) )

((1,1)1
1.0

It is important to note that this ultragame is
represented in the form of a supergame where the choice of
an ultrastrategy is combined with the choice of a strategy
in the corresponding super or basic game.

The ultragame is

represented in this form because, although play of the
ultragame adds costs to--and thereby alters the outcomes
of--the super and basic games, when the choice exists, it is
assumed that players have no alternative but to make the
choice.

Therefore, in this situation, the outcomes of the

basic and supergames will always include the cost of playing
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the ultragame, and it serves no useful purpose to represent
the ultragame in an extensive form.
The choice of an ultrastrategy denoting an agreement
to play a particular metagame will result in an outcome of
the corresponding supergame that incorporates the costs of
playing that particular metagame.

These costs include both

the costs associated with communication (and
metacommunication) and the costs associated with
enforcement.

However, these same outcomes also incorporate

the probability that the relevant enforcement mechanism will
be effective in inducing players to abide by an agreement,
for depending upon the severity of the sanctions, the
resources devoted to administering them, the information
communicated to the players concerning these sanctions and
resources, and the degree to which players are rational, it
is more or less likely that some players may defect and take
a chance on being able to avoid the sanctions.

Therefore,

the ultragame may be viewed as a mechanism for weighing the
relative value of the efficiency (cost) as opposed to the
effectiveness (benefit) of a range of communication and
enforcement mechanisms.
Because of the variety of alternatives and of the
complexity of the calculations involved, any analysis of
these alternatives that was in any way complete would most
likey be inefficient, in the sense that it would cost more
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However,

since it is assumed that players must play the ultragame,
i.e., must decide which, if any, met game to play, it will
also be assumed that each metagame considered during play of
an ultragame will describe not just one possible
communication (or metacommunication) and enforcement
mechanism but a set of alternative mechanisms, that various
metagames will describe overlapping sets of various sizes,
and the the ultragame will always be efficient in the sense
described above.
The concept of a metagame in supergame form can now be
used to solve the problem faced by players in a basic game
where rational behavior leads to an irrational outcome.
This solution will be formally stated as Theorem 16:

If the

pattern of control in a supergame is such that, for all
players or groups i,
(C.61)
where

Oi Ios~> OS1}
=

and if the behavior of these players is such that for all i,
s +
+
(C.62)
P(Oi Cij ) = 1.0 - > P(C ij ) = 1.0
where
denotes a particular metastrategy (or joint

c1 j

metastrategy) available to player or group i, then play of
the supergame will result in an outcome such that
P(O Eo P(O,R))

=

1. 0

(C.63)

-567Since the theorem is the same as Theorem 15 only
applied to a supergame, the proof for this theorem is the
same as that for Theorem 15.
lies in its interpretation.

The significance of Theorem 16
One implication of expression

C.61 is that the supergame must be collectively optimal, and
thus it must be possible for the players in a supergame
through choice of a joint metastrategy to ensure that the
outcome of the supergame will fall within the partially
Pareto optimal set for each of these players, i.e., for all
players or groups i,
(C. 64 )

This theorem can now be interpreted to mean that it is
rational for players or groups of players in a collectively
optimal supergame to behave so as to realize, with absolute
certainty, a Pareto optimal outcome.

The significance of

this theorem is, thus, that rational players will be able to
achieve Pareto optimal outcomes in a collectively optimal
supergame even where the basic game is collectively
suboptimal.
However, there are two obvious limitations to Theorem
16.

The first is that rational players in a collectively

optimal supergame will behave so as to achieve an outcome
that is Pareto optimal with respect to the outcomes in that
game even if the corresponding basic game is collectively
optimal.

The second is that rational players in a
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an outcome that is Pareto optimal in that game even if it is
inefficient, i.e., even if the Pareto optimal outcome of the
supergame is less preferred than the Pareto suboptimal
outcome of the basic game.

To avoid these possibilities, it

is necessary to formulate Theorem 17:

If the pattern of

control in an ultragame in such that for all players or
groups of players i,
(C.65)
where

and if

* ) = 1.0
P(Ois ICij

-> P(C*ij )

= 1.0

(C.66)

where C*ij denotes a particular ultrastrategy (or joint
ultrastrategy) available to player or group i, then play of
the ultragame will result in an outcome such that
P(O E. P(O,R))

=

1.0

(C.67)

Since this theorem is the same as Theorem 15 only
applied to an ultragame, the proof for this theorem is the
same as that for Theorem 15.
lies in its interpretation.

The significance of Theorem 17
Expression C.65 now implies

that when rational players choose to play a metagame, not
only is the metagame collectively optimal but the
corresponding basic game is collectively suboptimal.
Moreover, it also implies that themetagame is efficient.
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Taking this into account, Theorem 17 may now be interpreted
to mean that it is rational for players or groups of players
in a collectively suboptimal basic game with access to a
collectively optimal, efficient metagame to impose upon the
basic game a pattern of complete and total self-control over
their strictly dominant, partially Pareto optimal
possibility sets.
The information provided to an observer through play
of a metagame was interpreted above as the content of a
social choice message and play of that metagame was
interpreted as the collective communication of that message.
In light of this characterization, Theorem 17 can also be
interpreted to mean that it is rational for players in a
collectively suboptimal game with access to effective,
efficient collective communication and enforcement
mechanisms to produce, distribute and enforce social choice
messages sufficient to transform that game into one that is
collectively optimal.

By assuming rationality as a

descriptive characteristic of the players, the predictive
aspect of this theorem can be emphasized.

On the other

hand, by assuming rationality as a desired characteristic of
the players, the prescriptive nature of this theorem can be
emphasized.
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Metacommunication
One limitation of Theorem 17 is that it depends upon
the assumption that the metagame environment is collectively
optimal.

This assumption is restrictive, for it is quite

possible for the metagame, just like the basic game, to be
collectively suboptimal.

The metagame might be

characterized by a pattern of control that leads rational
players to behave in such a way that they impose a type of
control upon the basic game that leads, in turn, to a
collectively suboptimal result.

The Compound Metagame
Faced with such a prospect, players might find it
rational to make use of a higher-order metagame to impose
upon this first metagame a pattern of control sufficient to
transform that metagame into one which is collectively
optimal.

Were this second-order metagame to be collectively

suboptimal, the hierarchy of metagames could, of course, be
extended further.

However, while it seems useful to allow

for such an extended hierarchy, it is also necessary to give
this mathematical theory of collective communication some
closure.

Therefore, any sequence of two or more single

metagames related to one another in a hierarchical fashion
will be denoted here as a compoundmetagame and may be
analyzed in a combined form as a supergame.
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Prisoner's Dilemma into the supergame described in Table
C.18 was used to model a process of negotiation concerning
an arms race, and if the attendant enforcement mechanisms
were hampered by disagreements over interpretation of the
language of the agreement to the point where each party had
so little confidence in the usefulness of the agreement that
it appeared to be in their best interests to break the
agreement, that metagame would not be collectively optimal,
for the outcomes of the supergame would be no different from
those of the basic game described in Table C.17.

However,

if the parties involved were to agree to refer disputes over
interpretation to a third party--say to the World Court or
to a committee of the United Nations,then if that procedure
were collectively optimal, the metagame might indeed yield
outcomes in the supergame similar to those in Table C.18.
A message describing an agreement (for example, to use
a particular third party to settle any disputes) regarding
interpretation of the terms in a second message (for
example, an agreement concerning a reduction in strategic
arms) would be a social choice message, but the
communication of this first message will be defined here as
metacommunication, since the content of this message is
about the content of the second message, i.e., it is a
communication about communication.
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The significance of the metacommunication of social
choice messages can now be made clear through a
reinterpretation of Theorem 17:

It is rational for players

or groups of players in a collectively suboptimal basic game
with access to a collectively optimal, efficient, single or
compound metagame, to impose upon the basic game a pattern
of complete and total self-control over their strictly
dominant, partially Pareto optimal possibility sets.
Because the metagame referred to in this theorem is now seen
to be either a single or a compound metagame, the
interpretation of this theorem given above in terms of
collective communication appears to be

a corollary,

capturing only part of the significance of Theorem 17.

A

second corollary, capturing another aspect of Theorem 17 is
the following:

It is rational for players in a collectively

suboptimal game, with access to collectively suboptimal
collective communication and enforcement mechanisms and to
effective, efficient collective metacommunication and
enforcement mechanisms to produce, distribute and enforce
social choice messages sufficient to transform those
collectively, suboptimal collective communication and
enforcement mechanisms into mechanisms that are collectively
optimal.

These two partial interpretations of Theorem 17

will be designated as Corollary A and Corollary B of
Theorem 17, respectively, and will subsequently be referred
to as the Collective Communication Corollaries.
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Prisoner's Dilemma
A large proportion of game-theoretical work in the
social sciences has fixed upon the game of Prisoner's
Dilemma as a model of the problems that arise in
environments characterized by a mixture of common and
conflicting interests.

Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is the most

extreme and unequivocal of the "dilemma games" which
illustratem this conflict between individual and collective
levels of analysis, insofar as the players in PD are caught
in a strongly stable, inefficient equilibrium.

If the

problems represented by PD can be solved, then presumably
the less serious problems represented by other dilemma games
can also be taken care of.

For this reason, PD has been

used to model many social problems including most of these
to be analyzed in this dissertation.
The collective communication corollaries developed in
this appendix represent what might be called a "solution
concept" to game-theoretical problems of such as that
described by PD.

These corollaries have been applied to

examples of Prisoner's Dilemma in Tables C.15 through C.21
and again in TableC.24, and this game will be used in the
body of this dissertation to model many different problems
of social choice.

It is instructive therefore to compare

the information-theoretic solution presented here, with
other solutions that have been proposed in the gametheoretical literature.
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strictly speaking, there is no solution to the
Prisoner's Dilemma.

All solutions, as will be demonstrated,

involve communication, either implicity or explicity; and
communication is prohibited by the rules which define the
game.

However, this constraint is clearly unrealistic in

modeling a social situation.

Paul watzlavich, for example,

stresses the possibility of "mutual trust" as a social
solution to real-world Prisoner's Dilemmas.

Martin Shubik

adds to this the observation that
in much of everyday political, economic, and social
life, Prisoner's Dilemma situations are handled by third
parties acting as escrow agents, holding bonds that are
posted, enforcing outside agreements, or otherwise
serving to police agreements.
The list of real-world responses is further extended by
Phillip Bonachich, who cites the development of "norms,
rules, contracts, and group solidarity and loyalty" to
resolve Prisoner's Dilemma situations.

Bonacich draws the

inference that
In not allowing or severly restricting the communication
that can occur between the players, researchers have
treated the Prisoner's Dilemma as a game between two
isolated rational (self-interested) units, and
consequently have not examined the social mechanisms
that human groups develop to enable cooperation to occur
when the member's interests are somewhat opposed in thg
interesting way that the Prisoner's Dilemma describes.
From this perspective, the strict form of Prisoner's
Dilemma proves to be of limited use in social science.

As

Buckley, Burns and Meeker note, the noncooperative outcome
of Prisoner's Dilemma is only stable under very restrictive
sociological conditions; namely
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That the relationships among the actors are anomic or
antagonistic and they individually pursue their
interests ... Under other social conditions the
noncooperative outcome would not be stable, provided
of course the actors are not constrained from acting
to change the system, e.g., by their rulers; indeed,
the prisoner's dilemma game itself would not be
stable. Social and political movements would emerge
to transform the PD situation into one w~ere
cooperation outcomes were more probable.
It seems useful, therefore, to relax the restriction
of Prisoner's Dilemma to a noncooperative game and consider
transformations, such as those proposed in this
dissertation, that would explicity formalize the effects of
communication and enforcement of agreements.

It should be·

understood, however, that any "solution" that is proposed is
relevant only within a context where such a transformation
is possible.

This context effects a fundamental change in

perspective.

The dilemma, for example, is no longer to be

viewed entirely from the point of view of the individual
prisoner but now is seen from the perspective of all
prisoners.

It is thus no longer a "prisoner's" dilemma but

the "prisoners'" dilemma.
while there clearly exists a great variety of
collective communication mechanisms through which real-world
PDs such as the provision of public goods and the
determination of social welfare can be solved, formal, gametheoretic "solutions" to PD are as yet incapable of modeling
the majority of these mechanisms.

In general, these
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solution concepts involve ad hoc transformations of the
basic PD game into a new game whose structure contains the
contraints necessary to achieve an optimal joint outcome.
These concepts are incapable of providing a rigorous yet
flexible measure of constraint imposed across the strategic
space that constitutes the crux of the collective choice
problem.

For this reason, they are both difficult to

interpret and restricted in their applicability.
perhaps the best known of these solution concepts is
Nigel Howard's theory of metagames mentioned above.

This

theory is based upon von Neumann and Morgenstern's concept
of auxilIary games.
assumptions:

These games are characterized by two

(1) temporal assymetry and (2) perfect

information, and they are denoted minorant games and
majorant games depending upon whether the game is analyzed
from the perspective of the player who has to take the first
move or the player who can observe this move and then choose
his own strategy.
This majorant game was used by von Neumann and
Morgenstern to describe the condition in which one player
has "found out" the strategy to be chosen by the other,
i.e., the condition of maximum communication from one player
to the other regarding the strategic behavior of the first.
By using the concept of a "conditional strategy" to describe
the choice of a strategy when that choice is conditional
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upon knowledge of an opponent's strategic choice, Howard has
developed a theory which implicity incorporates this type
communciation as an assumption underlying the structure of
what he calls a metagame.
When 2-person PD is analyzed at the level of doubly
conditional strategies, a circular flow of information is
embedded in the strategic space.

That is, the choice of a

doubly conditional strategy by one player implies that that
player has perfect information about the other player's
choice of a conditional strategy which, in turn, implies
that that other player has perfect information about the
unconditional strategy chosen by the first player.

This

implict circularity means that strategic behavior at that
level is, in fact, collective behavior, in the sense that it
is determined by information about the preference of more
than one player.

However, because of the logical

contradiction of applying the analysis of a majorant game to
a game that is not, in fact, a majorant game, Howard's
solution concept has severe limitations.

In the first

place, the communication implied by the analysis never
actually occurs, and thus the theory applies only in cases
where the majorant game represents a purely subjective and
completely certain belief on the part of each player about
the behavior of the other.

In the second place, the theory

depends entirely upon the effectiveness and credibility of
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the threats and is, therefore, irrelevant in games of
coordination.

In the third place, it is assumed that while

the players are free to transcend these predictions if they
so desire, in fact they will not.

Finally, the theory deals

with a very limited number of hypothetical countermoves and,
that limitation notwithstanding, is so enormously complex
that even Howard is forced to assume that players are only
unconsciously motivated by this theory.IO
Recently a number of authors have improved Howard's
theory by rendering the analysis of metagames more
tractable.

They have also extended it to deal with the

entire range of potential iterations of the majorant game. II
However, despite the ingenuity of this work, none of it
addressed the first three limitations described above.
The relation between Howard's theory (including its
extensions) and the work developed here can be made precise
by considering each of Howard's conditional strategies as a
probability distribution defined across the set of joint
strategies (i.e., as mixed joint strategy) and thus as
representing a constraint imposed through play of a
metagame.
One difference between the theory presented here and
these formulations is that each of them is capable of
considering only one possible constraint, whereas the number
that could be described in information-theoretic terms is
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infinite.

A second is that in Howard's formulation, play of

the basic game is embedded into play of the metagame,
obscuring their differences and making it impossible to
analyze the cost and communication associated with play of a
metagame.

Another major difference is the fact that in

every case these formulations are individualistic in
approach and are therefore incapable of describing
agreements and compromises that are arrived at through
communication and negotiation. 12 While they may apply to
situations involving subsequent defection in the absence of
communication, they are irrelevant to the analysis of
situations involving collective communication, that is,
agreements that are self-enforcing or enforced through
simultaneous defection or separate sanctions.
Moreover, because these solutions concepts are
individualistic in nature, each player who knows of the
theory is free to act so as to disprove it.

Because the

theory presented here is collective in nature, knowledge of
the theory on the part of the players would only serve to
help reinforce the validity of its predictions.
Martin Shubik is also critical of the significance of
Howard's work, pointing out that
the metagame can be regarded as an attempt to build
complete plausibility for a restricted set of intents
within an extention of the usual Prisoner's Dilemma
game. Although it may be mathematically interesting, it
by no means offers a general resolution to the problem
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of threats. or to the many problems concerning
strategies, signaling, communication, and coding whic£3
must be considered in the study of the iterated game.
Shubik describes two other solution concepts derived from
transforming PD into an iterated game.

The first concept

was proposed by Aumann and is based upon a PD game of
infinite length, while the second, developed by Shubik
himself, changes PD into a game of economic or social
survival with either (a) a discount rate, (b) an exogeneous
probability that the game will terminate after a finite time
or (c) the possibility of termination through ruin.
The analysis of discount rates for infinitely iterated
PD has been carried still further by Michael Taylor and by
Robert Axerod, while Richard J. Harris has investigated a
related solutioh based upon the concept of maximizing the
average payoff per game.

These solution concepts all depend

upon the existence of a strategy defined across two or more
plays of the iterated game and interpreted as a threat of
punishment for defection that is greater than the gain to e
had from violating a cooperative agreement. 14
Such a threat may be communicated through previous
plays of the game or through some other channel of
communication, but it is the plausibility of the threat that
determines how much information it communicates to the
receiver about the intended behavior of the player who makes
the threat.

Shubik recognizes that "plausibility is a
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interaction," and he demonstrates that if, in a formal game
model, conditional strategies are used to model threats,
then all strategies are equally plausible and the PD is
formally solved.,,15
The relation of Shubik's formulation to the one
proposed here becomes clear if the threats together with the
behavior they are intended to punish are described as mixed
joint strategies (i.e., as a set of probability
distributions defined across the set of joint strategies).
The metagame thus would correspond to a "structure of
interpersonal interaction" and "plausibility" would derive
from the degree of uncertainty with which the observer
regarded the administration of sanctions.
Shubik realizes that by embedding the process of
communication in the structure of the game, the problem of
collective choice is obscured rather than illuminated.
Moreover, while he demonstrates that threats can be compared
in terms of plausibility, Shubik offers no measure for the
degree of plausibility of a threat.

Thus he concludes that

"for most problems of interest, the model is still not rich
enough to capture a useful abstraction of human affairs.,,16
While the symmetrical use of conditional strategies in
all of these solutions concepts can be loosely interpreted
as evidence of the need for a collective choice mechanism in
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PD situations, the work of Russel Hardin makes this
interpretation explicit.

Using a separable form of n-person

PD to model the problem of collective action and a notation
in which Pn represents the outcome of a cooperative choice
on the part of all n player and r denotes the ratio of
benefits to payments"he proves that:
For an n-person game of collective action, P is a
Condorcet choice from the set of realizable outcBmes for
the game; it is a strong Condorcet choice except in a
game in which n is even and r=2, in which case P is a
weak Cond~7cet choice from the set of realizablen
outcomes.
A strong Condorcet choice is defined as an outcome strictly
preferred by a majority to every other outcome and a weak
Condorcet choice is defined as an outcome strictly preferred
by more people than prefer any other outcome.

Thus although

Hardin's results are not generalizable to nonseparable PD
and are restricted in interpretation to that class of
mechanisms capable of determining and enforcing a Condorcet
choice, this theorem is significant in making explicit the
relation between collective choice and Prisoner's Dilemma.
Hardin's theorem is, thus, a special form of the
Collective Communication Corollary.

The majority voting

rule through which a Condorcet choice is determined can be
represented in information-theoretic terms by an environment
in which, assuming that preference relations are randomly
distributed across players and plays of the game, each
player has a probability greater than one-half (the exact
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figure depending upon the number of players in the game) of
determining the mixed joint strategy that will be imposed
upon the basic game--or, equivalently, in which the mixed
joint strategy to be imposed is determined by the relation
between players' preferences such that the strategy to be
imposed is that which is preferred by more than half of the
players in the game.
While formal, game-theoretic models such as those of
Howard, Aumann, Shubik and Hardin are restricted by their
assumptions to situations that can be represented by such
constructs as conditional strategies, games of infinite
length, probabilities of survival and Condorcet choices,
they can all be formally related to the theorems derived
here.

Informal solution concepts, however, which describe

more general aspects of coding, language and communication
are restricted by their lack of rigor and merely suggest
interesting interpretations for the Communition Corollaries.
Perhaps the most general of these are the structural and
relational resolutions of PD proposed by Buckley, Burns and
Meehan.

These authors describe a myriad of real-world

"metaprocesses" by which a PD preference structure can be
transformed into a cooperative preference structure.
However, this transformation is formally represented by a
"black box," for they are unable to provide any precise
measure of these social controls or any abstract model of
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how they might operate.

Verbal descriptions of the "social

structuring and transformation of preference structures," of
the "social structuring and transformation of action and
interaction possibilities," of i'collectivizing decision
making and action," and of control relations such as "social
solidarity and mutual trust" are illuminating and
instructive.

They may be seen as interpretations of the

meta-level processes through which a pattern of control is
imposed upon a basic game.

However, they are incapable of

either rigorous measurement or deductive manipulation.

It is clear from this brief review of the literature
on solutions to Prisoner's Dilemma that the work presented
here is consistent with these other findings and, at the
same time, is more straightforward in its interpretation,
more general in its application and more rigorous in its
description of the quantities of information processed
through a collective communication or metacommunication
system.

Conclusion
Building upon the fundamental concepts of information
and games introduced in Appendix A and the static measures
of regulation and control described in Appendix B, the
mathematical theory of collective communication described
here makes use of comparative statics to describe the
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transformation·of patterns of control through the collective
communication of social choice messages.

utilizing the

concept of collective optimality as a standard of
comparison, the pattern of control imposed upon a basic game
is transformed through the transmission of information in a
metagame, which is implemented, in turn, through play of an
ultragame.

Theorems describing this process have been

stated, illustrated and proved, and then interpreted in
terms of the collective communication and metacommunication
of social choice messages.

These theorems together with

their proofs, illustrations, and interpretations constitute
an initial exposition of a mathmatical theory of collective
communication.
This mathematical theory represents a partial
realization of Ashby's conjecture that "the theory of
regulation ... and the theory of games will have much to learn
from each other."

It make use of game theory to explore the

motivation for communication and metacommunciation while it
uses information theory to explicate the collective
communication of social choice message and to explain the
significance of self-control.

The mathematical theory of

collective choice described here culminates in a pair of
communication corollaries which provide a basis for the
social theory of collective communication presented in the
body of this dissertation.

The prescriptive or predictive
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dimensions of this theory can now be developed in hypotheses
which characterize the rationality of players either as a
desirable attribute or a descriptive assumption,
respectively.

Moreover, the empirical validity of the

predictive hypotheses can then be tested by using the
measures developed here to compare the informational content
of social choice messages actually communicated in game-like
environments to the predictions provided by the theory.
Most of the mathematical theory presented here is
original work and represents an advance over previous
research.

Where the concepts which comprise this theory are

not entirely new, they are shown to be consistent with other
work while, at the same time, more straightforward in
interpretation, more general in application and more
rigorous in formulation.

Moreover, while the theorems

presented here are limited by their foundation in
comparative statics, their focus on collective communication
and their assumption of common information and beliefs, they
are general enough to suggest the potential for a truly
dynamic theory capable of describing the full range of human
communication between individuals who differ in terms of
their information and beliefs.
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APPENDIX D
CONTENT ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES

This appendix describes some of the technical details
associated with the content analysis of mineral rights laws
in Chapter VI.
to be coded.

Prior to analysis, the content of a law has
Section I describes the techniques of

transformation, unitization and enumeration that are used in
coding the body of laws.

Section II describes the

authoritative set of categories that is used to determine
which circumstances mentioned in these laws are relevant to
this study and which are not.

Finally, Section III

describes the computational techniques that are used to
analyze the informational content of the laws that have been
coded and categorized.

SECTION I:

CODING TECHNIQUES

The text of the laws to be analyzed must first be
transformed because the sentences of which it is composed do
not correspond directly to the elementary circumstances
which are the subject of the analysis.
-589-

This process
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involves four steps.

In the first step, each sentence in

the legal text is transformed into a question.

In the

second, all independent, dependent and interdependent
syntactical units of each question are identified.

In the

third step, a matrix is constructed for each question to
enumerate the syntactical units and their relationships.
Finally, ad hoc rules are developed to increase the
reliability of this process.

Linguistic Transformation
The process of unitization used in constructing the
codebook is quite complex.

Unitization proceeds by first

transforming each sentence of the pertinent portions of the
relevant texts into a question.

(Just which laws and which

portions of these laws are pertinent was discussed above in
Chapter VI.)

This transformation will be effected by (1)

inverting the position of the subject and the first verb of
the predicate of each coordinate clause, and (2) by adding
the words "or not" and a question mark to the end of the
reconstructed sentence.

For example, the sentence,

"Evidence of record of claims shall be considered title in
preference to claims that are not recorded," will be
transformed into the sentence, "Shall evidence of record of
claims be considered title in preference to claims that are
not recorded, or not?"

In addition, (3) the word
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"which" will be changed to "this" when it follows the
articles "any" or "all", e. g., "all of which shall" will be
transformed into "shall all of this ... "

(4) All negatives

("no", "not", etc.) will be removed to prevent double
negatives, and the word "any" will be added or the word
"all" will be changed to "any" if it appears in the same
sentence.

For example:

"All quartz claims shall not exceed

500 feet in length ... " will become:

"Shall any quartz claim

exceed 500 feet in length ... , or not?", and the words "NO
person shall have the right ... " would become "Shall any
person have the right ... "

Finally, (5) the conj unction

"nor" will be transformed into "or".

Thus the phrase

beginning "nor shall anyone" will now begin "or shall any
one. "

This transformation is based upon the assumption that
the identification of elementary circumstances as either
included in or excluded from the universe of circumstances
to which a sanction applied will never require more than one
sentence.

Moreover, those circumstances that are identified

in a sentence are assumed to constitute an answer in the
minds of the mine owners to a question of some import with
regard to the security of their mining investments. Hence,
it is the answer to each of these questions that provides
information and thus effectively increases a mine owner's
monetary expectations, or, alternatively, that removes
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uncertainty and thus effectively increases a mine owner's
expected returns from his investment.

syntactic Unitization
Each of the sentences so transformed may identify one
and only one elementary circumstance, but this is not
necessarily the case.

Therefore, they will be further

analyzed into circumstances that are elementary with
reference to certain syntactic criteria.

The analysis of

elementary circumstances will begin with a distinction
between those which are independent of one another and those
which are dependent or interdependent.

Two circumstances

will be defined here as independent if the identification of
one as being included in or excluded from the universe of
sanction-related circumstances has no relation to whether
the other circumstance is also identified as being included
in or excluded from that universe.

However, one

circumstance will be said to depend upon another, if the
identification of that first circumstance as being included
in the universe of sanction-related circumstances
presupposes the inclusion of the second.

Moreover, if the

identification of one circumstance as being included in the
universe of sanction-related circumstances is explicity made
contingent upon the identification of a second circumstance
as being excluded from that universe, this will be taken to
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indicate an interdependent relation between these two
circumstances.
These distinctions have no inherent significance with
regard to the identification of elementary circumstances.
However, they are crucial to analyzing the amount of
information imparted by the identification of any particular
elementary circumstance and, therefore, drawing these
distinctions is the first step in the process of
unitization.

Independent Circumstances
Since the independence, dependence, or interdependence
of circumstances as defined above is only established
through the identification of these circumstances, it is
clear that these relations will be reflected in the syntax
of the statutes in which they are identified.

Independent

circumstances will be operationally defined here as those
circumstances identified in the following types of
syntactical components:

(1) Independent or segregatory

coordinated clauses--these are clauses each of which is
either single or separated from the next by a colon, a
semicolon, a comma preceding a coordinating conjunction, or,
if it is part of a series of three or more clauses the last
of which is preceded by a comma and a coordinating
conjunction, simply by a comma; and each of which can be
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correctly paraphrased by a separate sentence; and (2)
segregatory coordinated phrases--these are phrases each of
which is separated from the next by a comma and a
coordinating conjunction, by a coordinating conjunction or,
if it is part of a series of phrases the last of which is
preceded by a comma and a coordinating conjunction, simply
by a comma; each of which can be correctly paraphrased with
a segregatory coordinated clause, and each of which is not
used just in agreement with a preceding coordinated phrase.
For example, in the sentence, "no person shall have
the right to impede or inconvenience travel by obstructing
or rendering unsafe any public street or road; nor shall any
one change the direction of any public road without the
sanction of the proper authority," there are two segregatory
coordinated elements separated by a semicolon preceding the
coordinating conjunction "nor", and in the first of these
there are three pairs of segregatory coordinated phrases
each separated by the conjunction "or".

This sentence could

be correctly paraphrased by nine separate sentences.
The assumption here is that every sentence which
contains segregatory coordinated components can be used to
identify more than one separate circumstance.

This is so

because the syntactical relation of coordination typically
indicates that redundant material has been eliminated
through ellipsis.

If, when all such ellipted material has
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been replaced, the result is two or more grammatically
correct clauses that are independent in both the grammatical
and in the logical sense described above, then each clause
would be capable of identifying a separate circumstance as
included in or excluded from the universe of circumstances
to which a sanction applies.

Each of the circumstances

identified in these clauses could be identified separately,
or they could all obtain simultaneously.

This is because

although the coordinating conjunction used in joining these
clauses indicates a relation between clauses, it does not
establish a contingency between the identification of the
circumstances described therein.

Interdependent Circumstances
This is not always the case however.

The conjunction

"or", for example, often (though not always) establishes a
contingency between the identification of the circumstances
described in the coordinated clauses.

Circumstances therein

identified may not obtain simultaneously.

As an example,

consider the sentence, "All claims shall be worked or the
notice renewed in sixty days from the date of record."
Clearly two different circumstances are identified in this
one sentence--one involves the working of a claim and the
other involves renewing a notice.

However, the manner in

which they are identified indicates that only one or the
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other of these. circumstances need obtain to maintain the
legal right of property.

Moreover, this sentence could not

be correctly paraphrased by two separate sentences each of
which describes one of these circumstances.

Circumstances

identified in this type of sentence will be described here
as interdependent.

Dependent Circumstances
The conjunction "and" occasionally establishes a
different sort of contingency.

Circumstances described in

two or more clauses whose coordination is combinatory rather
than segregatory must obtain simultaneously, if at all.

The

"and" in the sentence, "All persons holding quartz claims
and complying with section 15 shall hold the same for the
term of eighteen months as actual property," is an example
of a coordinating conjunction whose function is combinatory.
Circumstances identified in this type of sentence will be
described here as dependent.
Dependent circumstances will also be defined here as
those identified in one other class of syntactic components,
namely nonrestrictive subordinate clauses, propositional
phrases, adjectives and adverbials.

The nonrestrictive

status of these components will be deduced from the fact
that as premodifiers they are followed by a comma and as
postmodifiers they are set off by commas.
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An example of both pre- and post-modification by a

nonrestrictive modifier is included in the following
sentence:

"In the case of locations made as extensions, the

location of two hundred feet, by virtue of discovery, is
allowed."
It is possible for a premodifer to be nonrestrictive
and yet so brief that it is not set off by a comma, for
example the adjective "beautiful" in the phrase "my
beautiful wife" would be nonrestrictive, assuming that the
writer has only one wife.

However, without any outside

standard against which to compare the circumstances
identified in the relevant body of law, it is impossible to
distinguish this type of nonrestrictive modifier when and if
it occurs.

Nevertheless since lawyers and legislators would

not wish to leave the interpretation of a law ambiguous and
subject to the assumptions or external sources of reference
which mayor may not be accessible to the reader, it is not
like that this type of nonrestrictive modifier is widely
used in legal writing.
Those nonrestrictive modifers that modify an
independent circumstance are described here as primary
modifiers.

Those that modify primary modifier are

designated secondary modifers, and so forth.

The sentence

beginning "within five days after the report of said
appraisers, notice of which shall be given to both parties,
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the person or persons owning the property ... " contains at
least two orders of modification.

The premodifier beginning

"within five days" is a primary modifier and the clause
beginning "notice of which" is a secondary modifier.
The assumption underlying the first type of dependent
circumstance is that since these circumstances are joined by
combinatory coordination, each is meaningful in and of
itself, and yet the invocation of a legal sanction by the
occurrence of one circumstance presupposes the occurrence of
the other(s).

The assumption underlying the second type is

that since these modifiers are nonrestrictive, the
circumstances that they modify have already been
independently identified.

They serve the purpose, thus, of

providing additional information, of identifying additional
circumstances that qualify or modify the first.

Elementary Circumstances
These sentences could, no doubt, be analyzed still
further.

It might be argued, for example, that all

restrictive modifers should also be counted in any measure
of precision since they are more elementary than the clauses
and phrases of which they are a part and since they too
increase the precision of the law.

However, such a

procedure would ignore the clear implication of Ehrlich and
Posner's definition of units of analysis that the language
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of property rights law refers to a universe of elements that
are in some sense identifiable as circumstances.

Without

external information as to the nature of these
circumstances, we are forced to rely upon internal
syntactical evidence as to the point where the
identification of one circumstance ends and the
identification of another begins, evidence, that is to say,
of when the identification of a circumstance can stand on
its own, independent of further modification.

The

distinction between restrictive and nonrestrictive
modification appears to be appropriate evidence of such a
point since, as Quirk, et al. point out, restrictive
modification implies that the subject of modification "can
be viewed as a member of a class

which can be

linguistically identified only through the modification that
has been supplied" (emphasis added) while nonrestrictive
modification implies that the subject of modification "can
be viewed as unique or as a member of a class

that has been

independently identified" (emphasis added).l

Since the

units of analysis in this study, the "elementary situations
or circumstances identified in the law," are clearly the
subjects of modification, it seems reasonable to consider
all the restrictive modifiers in anyone clause as referring
to essential components of a single elementary circumstance,
because without their modificaiton that circumstance would
not yet be linguistically identified.
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If it should happen that a circumstance identified in
one law is identified again in another and this time with
additional restrictive material, this material will be
viewed as a separate elementary circumstance, dependent upon
the first.

Since it was clearly not originally necessary

for identification, it does not by its appearance violate
the elementary status of the original circumstance.
Nevertheless, since it is so closely tied to the first, it
must be seem as a subsequent modification of, and therefore
as dependent upon, the first circumstance.
The focus of analysis is, thus, upon circumstances
that are elementary in the sense that, on the one hand, each
has been linguistically identified as a member of a class of
circumstances and, on the other, none can be further
analzyed into grammatical components adequate to
independently identify a member of a class of circumstances.
The assumption here is that the elementary circumstances
identified in the law on property rights are those that lead
to Pareto Optimal outcomes and that precision in the
definition of property rights is increased through the
identification of additional elementary circumstances.

As

far as dependent circumstances go, these may be additional
in either a syntactical or a temporal sense, i.e., they may
be nonrestrictive modifiers appearing in the same sentence
or either restrictive or non-restrictive modifiers appearing
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in a later version of the same sentence.

Independent (or

interdependent) circumstances may be added in the same
sentence through segregatory coordination or in subsequent
sentences.
Precision in the identification of a sanction-related
circumstance, however, is viewed here as relative to the
party doing - or concerned with - the identifying.

No

matter how much or how little restrictive material is used
in the identification of a circumstance, it is assumed that
less of such modification would be inadequate while more
would be impossible, irrelevant or redundant for the
purposes of those concerned.

Thus all sentences or clauses

(original or paraphrased) devoid of coordinated components
and nonrestrictive modifers will be considered equal in
precision in that each is, by implication, just precise
enough to identify a particular circumstance as a member of
a class of circumstances of concern to

mine owners or their

representatives.
Consequently, no attempt is made here to ascertain the
level of particularity (or, conversely, of generality) of
any of these circumstances as defined.

Lacking any

meaningful external standard or measure, it is clearly both
impossible and irrelevant to determine whether or not a
circumstance is elementary in any such absolute sense.

-602Circumstantial Enumerization
Now that all independent, interdependent and dependent
circumstances have been defined, the process by which each
question is unitized can be described precisely.

For the

purpose of this content analysis, it is convenient to retain
the clustering of elementary circumstances into questions
and to associate with each question a matrix of figures,
each of which indicates the number of elementary
circumstances dependent upon one of the other independent
circumstances as described in Table 0.1.
Table D.l
MODIFICATION AND COORDINATION MATRIX
1 x PO

Al x PI -- Bl x ql

B2 x q2
Bl x ql
B21 x q21

N21 x z21

etc.

etc.

etc.

etc.

In Table D.l, A, B, and N denote primary, secondary and nary modifiers, Ai' being the ith primary modifier, Bij being
the jth secondary modifier of the ith primary modifer, etc.,

•
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and p, q, and z represent the number of circumstances
related to primary, secondary and n-ary modifiers through
coordination, Pij being the jth set of circumstances so
related to the ith primary modifier and qijk being the kth
set of circumstances so related to the jth secondary
modifier, etc.
A separate matrix is constructed for each independent
clause in each sentence and for each segregatory
coordinating conjunction that joins two independent
circumstances that have a different number of subsequent
modifiers.

Figures enumerating the number of circumstances

and sets of circumstances joined by contingent coordination
or by combinatory coordination are distinguished from those
joinged by segretatory coordination by being enclosed in
parentheses and in brackets, respectively.
Consider the following example:

"Shall it be the duty

of said A. Sutro, his associates, their successors or
assigns, to commence the work of said tunnel in advancing
the objects affordsaid, within one year from the passage of
this act, and to complete the same within eight years, or
not?" Associated with this sentence are two matrices,
constructed as follows:
1)

1

x 4

1

2)

1 x 4

-604The first consists of a "1" on the first line,
denoting the first clause, followed by a multiplication sign
and a "4", denoting the number of segregatory coordinated
circumstances in that clause, followed by a "1" in the
second line, denoting the primary modifier, "within one year
from the passage of this act."
The second consists of a "1" denoting the second
phrase beginning with "and to complete the same ... " followed
by a multiplication sign and a "4", indicating the number of
segregatory coordinated elements in the first clause that
also pertain to this phrase.
An example that demonstrates secondary modification is
the following:

"Shall all claims be worked or the notice

renewed in sixty days from the date of record, and shall any
claim exceed 500 feet square, hill claims excepted, which
may be reduced to 50 feet front, or not?"

Once again, two

matrices are constructed to represent this question:
1)

1(x2)

2)

1
1 -- 1

The first of these reflects the fact that the two-fold
coordination in the first clause is an interdependent one,
while the second reflects the fact that this independent
clause contains a nonrestrictive modifier which itself is
modified nonrestrictively.
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Once each pertinent portion (taken in numerical order)
of each relevant rule, law or statute (take in chronological
order) is unitized into questions and the appropriate matrix
is associated with each of them, the informational content,
expressed in bits, of each question is computed.

This

computational process will be described in the section on
analysis.

These questions will then be compared, one by

one, with the list of questions generated from analyzing
previous sections of earlier laws.

Those questions which

are not already included--word for word--will be retained
and added, along with the measure of their information
content, to the master list.

If it should happen that one

question is contained--word for word--within another
question already on that list, that question will be
dropped.

On the other hand, if a question is found to

contain another question already on the list in addition to
other material, the additional material will be reformulated
as a separate question, and this reformulation will be added
to the master list, along with a new figure enumerating the
informational content of the reformulate dquestion.

This

new question will immediately follow the first, and will be
indented, so as to indicate a dependent relationship.
Finally, if any question refers to the deletion, suspension,
substitution or replacement of a question or questions
answered in earlier laws, the total informational content of
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the question(s) so referred to will be subtracted from the
informational content of the new question, and the remainder
will be used to indicate the net informational content of
that new question.
Once all relevant laws and sections have been
processed in this manner, the master list of questions is
complete.

Each question inquires as to the identification

of a set of clusters of elementary sanction-related
circumstances and the informational content of an answer to
that question (i.e., the uncertainty contained in that
question) is described by a figure associated with each
question.

Ad Hoc Unitization
It is apparent that based upon the rules of syntax
described above, the reliability of the unitization process,
as measured and described in Chapter VI, is not as high as
might be desired.

In order to increase the reliability of

this process, certain ad hoc rules were developed in
discussion with the coders to supplement the syntactical
rules when the latter failed to remove all ambiguity
regarding the unitization of legal text.

These ad hoc rules

are listed below, and the effect of these rules upon the
reliability of the coding process is described in Chapter
VI.
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1.

If ambiguity exists

a~

to which of two or more

referents one of a series of nonrestrictive modifiers refers
to, it will be assumed that it modifies the closest of the
possible referents.

For example, the adjective "located" in

the clause, "by the extent of the claim, on the supposed
line of the ledge, as located," could refer either to
"claim" or to "ledge" but will be taken to refer to the
latter.

2.

The word "and" will not be taken to indicate

coordination if it follows the preposition "between," as in
the phrase "between Corral Canon and Webber Canon."

3.

One word appositives such as "however" are not

considered to constitute elementary circumstances even if
set off by commas.

4.

A comma after the last word in a series of lengthy

phrases is not taken by itself as an indication that the
next phrase is nonrestrictive.

The determination will be

based upon the logical context of that phrase. An example is
provided by the sentence beginning "A. Sutro, and his
associates, successors and assigns, shall ... "
preceding the verb "shall" will be ignored.

The comma
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5.

If the status of a long series of phrases with regard

to restriction is inconclusive, assume that they alternate
between orders of modification.

This rule does not apply

when the status of phrases in a series is indicated by their
context, by subordinate conjunctions, or by a parallel
series of phrases whose status is clear.

For example, the

clause "All dips, spurs, angles, variations, veins,
crossledges, strips and feeders, within such area of two
hundred feet, by the extent of the claim, on the supposed
line of the ledge, as located, shall be considered ... ," will
be represented by the following matrix:
1

x 8

1 - 1
1 - 1

Each succeeding phrase, beginning with "within such
area of two hundred feet," is thus interpreted as
alternating between primary and secondary modification.

6.

Coordinations which have been precisely articulated in

a section and are inserted again merely for purposes of
agreement are only counted once, e.g., in the sentence
"whenever ... persons ... refuse to sell ... to any person, mining
company or corporation, .•• said person, mining company or
corporation shall ... ," the trio of person, mining company
and corporation will only be counted once.
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SECTION II:

SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

Not all elementary circumstances are relevant to this
study.

A set of topical categories derived from the

contents of the Americal Law of Mining is used to
distinguish relevant from irrelevant circumstances.

2

These

categories are noted below:

Topical Categorization of Mineral Rights
I.

prospecting and Discovery
A.

prediscovery Rights of the Prospector

B.

Necessity and Effect of Discovery

C.

Time and place of Discovery
1.
2.

D.

Time of Discovery
Place of Discovery

Rules of Discovery
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Relationship Between Discovery and Other
Concepts
Rival Locators--Generally
Rival Locators: The Prudent Man Rule
Mining Claimant v. United States: The
Prudent Man Rule
Mining Claimant v. United states: The
Marketability Rule

E.

Special Rules Applicable to Placer Claims

F.

Proof of Discovery
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II.

Mining L.ocati.ons
A.

L.ocaters

B.

Lecatiens
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

C.

Lecati.on Precedures
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

III.

General C.onfigurati.ons
p.osting N.otice
Discevery W.ork
Marking.of L.ocatien
Recerding in L.ocal Office
Surveys and Maps
Lecatien by Adverse Pessessi.on
Lecatien.of Mill Sites and Tunnel Sites

D.

Rel.ocatien Pr.ocedures

E.

G.o.od Faith

F.

Title.of Lecater Prier t.o C.ompleti.on .of L.ocati.on

Rights C.onferred By Lecatien
A.

Intralimital Rights

B.

Extralateral Rights
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

IV.

Classificati.on.of L.ocatable Dep.osits
L.ode L.ocati.ons
placer L.ocati.ons
L.odes in Placers
Mill Sites
Tunnel Sites

Nature.of Extralateral Rights
C.onditi.ons Necessary t.o Exercise Extralateral
Rights
Factual Situatiens Affecting Extralateral
Rights
Extralateral Rights in Secendary Veins
Subsurface C.onflicts

Maintenance .of Claim After L.ocatien
A.

Character and Am.ount .of W.ork Required
1.
2.

Character.of Werk
Ameunt.of Werk Required
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Performance of Work Outside Claim Boundaries
1.

V.

C.

Proof of Performance

D.

Time for Performance and Effect of Non-Performance

E.

Resumption of Work

F.

Suspension and Deferment Statutes

G.

Requirements in Addition to Assessment Work

Abandonment, Forfeiture and Relocation
A.

Abandonment

B.

Forfeiture
1.
2.
3.

C.

Forfeiture to Subsequent Locator
Forfeiture to Co-Owner
Forfeiture to the United States

Relocations
1.
2.
3.

VI.

Work within Boundaries of Contiguous Claims

Relocation by Owner
Relocation by Co-Owner or Other Fiduciary
Relocation by Third Person

Liabilities Incident to Mining and Milling Operations
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Tailings and Debris
Trespass
Subjacent and Lateral Support
Underground water
Unfenced Tunnels, Shafts and Pits
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SECTION III:

ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES

In order to avoid the problems of inconsistency and
misinterpretation inherent in Liebcap's indices of
precision, the replication described in Chapter VI makes use
of another measure, Claude Shannon's "entropy":
H

= -

L Pi

Log 2 Pi

This measure has been interpreted and

described as a measure of "uncertainty" by Garner and
McGill, Ashby and others, and will be used as such in this
dissertation.

It is applicable to any arbitrarily defined

set of states such as, in this case, those social states
defined by all possible combinations of relevant
circumstances either included in or excluded from the
universe of circumstances to which a sanction applies.
Because it is a logrithmic function, it allows for the
computation of amounts of uncertainty that remain
proportional to the number of elementary independent
circumstances about whose status one is uncertain.

Finally,

since it makes use of a logarithm to the base 2, the
interpretation of this measure when applied to independent
variables that can take exactly two values, such as
independent circumstances that can either be included in or
excluded from the universe of sanction-related
circumstances, is straightforward.
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Derivation of the Uncertainty Measure
Suppose the probability Pi is estimated by the
relative frequency with which event i has been observed,
(1 )

where N is the total number of observations and n i is the
number of times event i has been observed to occur.
Substitution then Y'ields

H

= -

I: ni/N

Log 2 ni/N

Now if all events are equally likely, i.e., n l
nm, then

(2 )
• ••

=

(3)

Log 2 .n i /N

(4)

This is a special case of Shannon's "entropy" and has been
called "combinatorial uncertainty" by Krippendorff.

By

manipulation,
H

-(Log 2 n i - Log 2 N)
Log 2 N - Log 2 n i

(5 )

(6 )

Finally, since all events are equally likely, where N --X)q
ni/N = 11m

(7)

where m denotes the total number of events, i.e., i
1,2, ... ,m.

substitution gives
H

-Log 2 11m

(8 )
(9 )
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By convention in uncertainty analysis,
Log 2 1 = 0

(10)

leaving
(11 )

In the case of the informational content of statutes,
the number of events refers to the number of possible
combinations of circumstances that are either included in or
excluded from the universe of sanction-related
circumstances, i.e., circumstances that are either sanctionrelated or nonsanction-related.

For example, suppose that

there are 3 independent circumstances.

Prior to the passing

of any statute, a mine owner would be uncertain as to which,
if any, of these circumstances was sanction-related, that is
to say, as to whether anyone of these circumstances was
related to the definition or protection of his property
rights through the legal system. Using r to denote sanctionrelated circumstances and. n to denote circumstances that are
not sanction-related, the set of possible events can be
described as follows:
circumstance II

1

2

3

n
n
n
r
n
r
r
r

n
n
r
n
r
n
r
r

n
r
n
n
r
r
n
r

event II
1
2

3
4

5
6
7
8
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There are, thus, eight possible events, each of which
is equally likely.

Applying Shannon's formula, as it has

been redefined in expression (4), the amount of uncertainty
in the mind of a mine owner can now be calculated:
H = Log 2 8
= 3 bits
This example also demonstrates that the total amount
of uncertainty is equal to the number of circumstances
provided that each circumstance can take only two different
states and that each circumstance is independent of the
others. Since most of the questions to be analyzed in this
study include some elementary circumstances that are not
independent of each other, this method of calculation will
not be appropriate.

However, this example also demonstrates

a more general principle, namely that the uncertainity due
to a set of events each of which is independent of the
others is the sum of the uncertanities due to each event.
Since each circumstance can take either to two states each
contributes 1 bit of uncertainty to the total:

circumstance i (i=1,2,3) event #
r

1

n

2

H = Log 2 2 = 1 bit.
Therefore once the amount of uncertainty due to each
independent component of each question has been calcualted,
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the amount due to each question will be equal to the sum of
these amounts.

Similarly, the total amount of uncertainty

due to all the questions which remain unanswered at any
point in time can be found by adding the uncertainty due to
each of them separately.

Application of the Uncertainty Measure
In most cases the circumstances identified in anyone
question are not all independent of one another.

Therefore

it is necessary to determine the exact number of
alternatives involved before the uncertainty they remove can
be calculated.

There are two types of dependence involved,

that resulting from nonsegregatory coordination and that
resulting from nonrestrictive modification.

The first

results from two types of coordination designated here as
combinatory and contingent coordination.

Combinatory

coordination essentially joins two circumstances into one,
and although they are independent insofar as they each can
be identified separately, the fact is that the relation of
one to legal sanction has been identified in such a way that
it is completely dependent upon the relation of the other.
It is assumed here, therefore, that in the mind of mine
owners and potential investors who lobbied for this
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legislation, they constituted one compound circumstance and
did not contribute separately to their uncertainty over
property rights.
In a somewhat similar manner, contingent coordination
also joins two circumstances into one.

Both are related to

legal sanction, but in this case either one is sufficient to
invoke the sanction and yet neither one nor the other is
strictly necessary nor need the two occur together as was
the case with combinatory coordination.

It is once again

assumed that circumstances joined in this way do not
contribute separately to uncertainty over property rights,
and for this reason both types of dependence are taken into
account simply by ignoring such types of coordination in
computing uncertainty.
If one circumstance modifies another, it is assumed
that the identification of that circumstance depends upon
the identification of the other.

Thus a pair of

circumstances so related generate only three possible
alternatives, for the identification of the modifier in the
absence of identification of the circumstance modified would
be illogical.

Information, as was mentioned above, is

conceived of as an inverse function of uncertainty.

More

precisely, the amount of information communicated to the
mine owners by the law at any point in time can be found
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either by subtracting the amount of uncertainty contained in
the questions that remain unanswered at that point in time
from the total amount of uncertainty contained in the master
list of questions before the passing of any law or statute
or, more simply, by calculating the uncertainty contained in
the questions that have already been answered.
measure--the amount of information

This

collectively

communicated through the law (when the law is defined as the
body of rules, laws or statues in effect at a particular
point in time)--will be used here in place of Leibcap's
indices of "precision."
The method of analysis can now be described in detail.
The data to be analyzed consist of the informational content
of the questions in the codebook that are answered at some
point in time.

To determine this informational content, the

matrix associated with each question must be analyzed.

The

method of analysis consists of a computational procedure
which determines the number of alternatives generated by the
figures in a matrix.

This procedure is described in the

following algorithm:
A)

For each figure in each row--moving from top to

bottom, left to right, compute the following:
1.

The number of alternatives generated solely by

the circumstances described:

use the formula 21 +

(m-1),
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where m denotes all the free-standing multipliers p, q, ... ,
z.

Free-standing multipliers are those that are not

enclosed by either parentheses or brackets.

Those that are

so enclosed are to be ignored.

2.

The number of alternatives generated in total,

taking into account prior alternatives of which this
modifier or these modifiers are independent: multiply the
result of step 1 by 1 or by the sum of the number of
nonterminal alternatives (if any) as calculated in step 3
for the immediately preceding modifier (if one exists) and
the number of terminal alternatives (if any) as calculated
in step 4 for the most immediately preceeding modifier of
the same order (if one exists).

3.

The number of nonterminal alternatives generated

(i.e., those which are independent of immediately succeeding
circumstances:

(i) if no subsequent circumstances exist,

all alternatives generated in step 2 are terminal (see step
4); (ii) if the subsequent circumstance or set of
circumstances is a modifier of a higher level, then the
number of alternatives computed in step 2 must be divided in
half to allow for the fact that all negative alternatives
are terminal, i.e., they lead only to other negative
alternatives and therefore generate only one final outcome;
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(iii) if the subsequent circumstance is a modifier of a
similar or lower order, all alternatives computed in step 2
are nonterminal.

4.

The number of terminal alternatives:

the total

number of alternatives computed in step 2 for the last
circumstance or that number minus the number of nonterminal
alternatives generated in step 3.

B.

Find the sum of all "truly" terminal alternatives,

i.e., those generated by the last of the primary modifiers,
the last of the secondary modifiers for that modifier, etc.,
down to the last of the n'ary modifiers of the last n-l'ary
modifier of the last, etc., of the last primary modifier,
i.e., the terminal alternatives generated by the last
circumstance considered.

c.

Calculate the amount of uncertainty removed by the

answer to that question by finding the log of the sum of all
truly terminal alternatives to the base 2.
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For example, The application of this algorithm to the matrix
1

1-1
-lx2
-IX(2)

would generate the figures described in Table D.4 below.
Table D.2
APPLICATION OF THE COMPUTATIONAL ALGORITHM
FIGURE

ALTERNATIVES

TOTAL

NONTERMINAL

TERMINAL

1
1
-1
-lx2
-IX(2)

2
2

2
2
2
8
16

1
1
2
8

1
1

2

4
2

TOTAL
BITS

16
18
Log

2

18 = 4.12

The resulting bits of uncertainty may now all be added
to find the uncertainty due to each question and to find the
total amount of uncertainty.
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lR. Quirk, et.al., A Grammar of contemporary English
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